# Al-Qa'ida's (mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa

## Part II: Al-Qa'ida "In Their Own Words" The Harmony Documents

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has the responsibility to plan and synchronize efforts across the Department of Defense for the war on terrorism. In conducting their operations over the past several years—particularly Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—representatives of USSOCOM have uncovered scores of documents authored by members of al-Qa'ida. These documents, which currently reside in a classified database called "Harmony," shed important new light onto the inner workings of the organization as well as the personalities and preferences of their authors. The database houses thousands of items with a wide range of content, including loose papers, multimedia, and personal letters.

In the latter half of 2005, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point was given access to a small subset of recently declassified Harmony documents and asked to provide an analysis of potential network vulnerabilities and conflicts of interests within the organization. The CTC was chosen to conduct this study based partly upon its expertise in analyzing al-Qa'ida's strategic texts, jihadi images, video clips, and other materials distributed on the Internet. The documents used in this study were initially identified, processed and translated based upon criteria established to support military planning efforts, including:

- al-Qa'ida documents (media, letters, loose papers) discussing ideology, tactics, techniques, procedures, strategy, and operations;
- Taliban documents discussing prior or future terrorist actions in Afghanistan or the region and the interaction/coordination with al-Qa'ida;
- any material related to al-Qa'ida extremist ideology, training, recruiting, and logistics flow;
- documents discussing any al-Qa'ida operation; and
- any dialogue from al-Qa'ida that threatens another country/group or its leadership.

The initial 28 documents extracted from the Harmony database that met combinations of the search criteria described above range from single page letters to 70+ page excerpts from larger jihadi texts, and were authored both before and after September 11, 2001. Every document released to the CTC from the Harmony database is included on the

enclosed CD-ROM in both original Arabic text and English translation and is posted on the CTC website at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq.asp.

Harmony: Al-Qa'ida's (mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa

In late 2006 and early 2007, USSOCOM released another 24 documents to the CTC. This iteration of Harmony focuses on al-Qa'ida's continuing organizational, operational, personnel and pecuniary challenges in the Horn of Africa (HOA). Although most terrorist groups seek out and thrive in ungovernable spaces, the HOA countries pose greater challenges to al-Qa'ida than one might expect. The HOA is a surprisingly difficult area in which to operate, especially for an organization that relies on secrecy, deception, and the loyalty of its operators and affiliates. The area is ripe with political turmoil, corruption, and poverty and these local concerns sometimes trump or hamper al-Qa'ida's efforts to wage their global jihad.

As in the first Harmony study, these newly released documents reveal a different side of al Qa`ida that is often not shown in traditional media reporting and literature. Harmony HOA continues to show that oftentimes so-called al-Qa'ida allies and sympathizers do not necessarily want automatic subjugation to the group, do not share the same religious fervor, and often desire some kind of compensation before providing operational security or support. These documents demonstrate that although al-Qa'ida did have some success in terms of planning and executing attacks, raising funds for operations, and establishing contacts throughout the region, they also expose their failures and frustrations.

Though Harmony illustrates that al-Qa'ida faced significant challenges in the HOA, it is not the intent to discount its ability to adapt to its operational environment. On the contrary, these documents reflect how the organization overcame obstacles and remained steadfast in its efforts. Moreover, they are testimony that some senior operational leaders of al-Qa'ida in the HOA (most notably Abu Hafs al-Masri, Saif al-Adl, and Abdullah Muhammad Fazul) were extremely talented and resourceful. Unlike some 'adventurers' from the Middle East and elsewhere who went to Pakistan and Afghanistan for vacation during the Soviet occupation to claim jihadi credentials, there is no question the senior members of al-Qa'ida were deadly serious about their mission in the HOA, and that their jihadi status was unfortunately well-earned.

Thankfully, al-Qa'ida has not been successful in generating wide-ranging support of local populations or securing wide swaths of territory even though they have maintained a continuous presence in the HOA for almost 15 years. Recent alleged al-Qa'ida activity in Somalia and US counterterrorism actions throughout the HOA further reinforce this point. Indeed, the HOA will indeed be a place of interest for both al-Qa'ida and the United States for many years to come.

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Doc ID: AFGP-2002-003297
Author: Unknown
Title: Letters from the Taliban
Date: Unknown
Length: 3 pages

## Synopsis

The document contains only one-line summaries of papers related to the Taliban.

## Key Themes

The document itself consists of one-line summaries of papers from another (not included) document. In the referenced document, there is a detailed map and description of the Battle of Khaled in Hira. There is also a possibly forged Taliban government stamp from its Khartoum embassy, and an official letter from the Taliban government official al-Haj Mullah ‘Abd al-Jalil to 'Abdallah.

**AFGP-2002-003297**

Page 1
[Verbatim]
[TC: A sign.]
“Allah is great”

Page 2
[TC: Blank page.]

Page 3
[Verbatim]
[TC: A sign.]
“Don’t forget to hand over your special papers to the brother in charge of securities.”

Page 4
[TC: Blank page.]

Page 5
[Synopsis]
This page contains an historical account of a battle fought by *Khaled* [NFI] in *Hira* [variant: *Herat*].

Page 6
[Synopsis]
This page contains a map of battle detailed on page five (5).

Page 7
[Synopsis]
This is a possible forged stamp from the Khartoum Embassy of the Islamic States of Afghanistan.

Page 8
[TC: Blank page.]

Page 9
[Synopsis]
This is an official letter from the Islamic States of Afghanistan (Taliban) to *'Abdallah* from *al-Haj Mullah 'Abd al-Jalil*. It is in Pashtu.

Page 10

[TC: Blank page.]

****end-of-document****

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-003677
Date: 1996-1998
Author: Multiple and unknown
Length: 11 pages
Title: Ciphers and Status of bin Laden's Security

## Synopsis

A series of incomplete documents that consist of (1) codewords and ciphers used by al-Qaeda; (2) an assessment of Osama bin Laden's personal security situation; (3) letters primarily concerning the disposition of three prisoners held by Iran that are important to al-Qaeda; (4) a letter discussing the frustrating situation on the front lines in Afghanistan, and the foreign fighters there.

## Key Themes

The first part of the handwritten document is a table of contents, apparently for another missing document, discussing training camps and operations conducted by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, including Hezbollah.

Next, the document contains a cipher, with letters that corresponds to numbers.

It then lists code words to be used for countries and cities within al-Qaeda's anticipated sphere of operations, certain key people, and a variety of other key words, including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons vocabulary.

Ciphers and codewords for the times of meetings and operations are also covered, with examples.

The writer negatively assesses the security of the location and food for Osama bin Laden's weekly lunch meetings, in light of possible American attempts to assassinate him.
1. The source of the food is not secure.
2. The food is not distributed securely.
3. It is obvious which plate Osama bin Laden will receive.
4. Osama bin Laden drinks water from a general guard.

There follow several letters, one a thank-you letter, and another enquiring about the possibility of obtaining the release of several prisoners.

Letter to Abu Ibrahim, from Muhammad Atif: This letter provides updates on several financial transactions, and a number of associates.

A lengthy letter discusses the status of three al-Qaeda prisoners of the Iranians. The letter reports that the prisoners, along with other Arabs, Afghans, and Pakistanis, have been moved to Iran through Tajikistan after several failed attempts, including the use of Masoud's airplane, and a truck that rolled over. The writer suspects that 'they' might actually be trying to eliminate them.

The writer then lays out three options for obtaining the release of the prisoners from Iran.
A. Direct and indirect mediation with the Iranians, using a combination of diplomacy and threats. This is the recommended solution.

B. Taking several Iranians hostage to exchange for the prisoners. This will have complex consequences, and will serve to divide up the Muslim world, but is worth discussing with the Taliban.
C. Bomb Iranian interests abroad until they release the prisoners.

The writer also requests the return of 'the Pakistani' so that training and operations can begin.

Letter to Sheik Abu Hafs: This letter continues discussing the prisoner situation. The writer has discussed the situation with a Taliban commander, who requests a car, and warns of not being bothersome to the Taliban.

The letter then provides news on the prisoners. Three of the prisoners are alive. A fourth was killed. Several Pakistanis have been released after their relatives intervened, or after they bought their way out.

Letter to Abdul Aziz: The writer provides updates and instructions on various operations, and expresses concern about the security situation.

The final letter describes the situation on the front lines in the fighting between the Taliban and Mas'oud (presumably the Northern Allliance). The writer is frustrated at the back-and-forth nature of the fighting, and believes that the Taliban have lost their will to fight. Many foreign fighters have abandoned the front lines in despair, and the writer then provides status updates on those that remain. Some refuse to fight, some want to leave for personal reasons, or to engage in projects elsewhere, including in Saudi Arabia. A small number are staying on the front, including a group at Bagram, some Jordanians, and an Iraqi.

There are also two brothers from Ogadin (Ethiopia), one of whom wants to get married, and the other to be part of the Eritrea security group.

Document number AFGP-2002-003677

This is 20 pages of handwritten text, including some key aliases and codewords along with personal letters. Lines prefixed with {TN} are my notes

Page (1)

Contents:

1- The Muslim Islamic Movement (AIM)… 1
2- Terrorism Training Camps in Iran… 1
3- Terrorism Training Camps in Sudan… 4
4- Operation to Destroy the Marines' Building and the French Center in Beirut… 7
5- Operation to Blow Up the American Embassy in Beirut… 10
6- The Hizbullah Operation in Paris, Responsible for the Paris Explosions… 11
7- Assassination of Shahbour Bakhtiar in Paris… 16
8- The Airport Operations in Rome and Vienna… 18
9- Hizbullah in Lebanon… 19

Page (2)

{TN} Back of page (1)

Page (3)

Partial cipher:

==

| L | A | K | B | S | I | N | M | D |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 9 | 3 | 7 | 5 | 1 |

LA KBSIR MD

24 68937 51



Special cipher for Abi al Faraj
Page (4)
Codewords: SATTS (meaning) – when necessary, follows:

{TN} **RIGHT COLUMN**
Azerbaijan – “LI (Ali)
Daghistan – ASAMA (Osama)
Chechnya – SIF (Saif)
Iran - :?HB (Shihab)
Sudan – M”AZ (Mi’adh)
Somalia – “BID? (Abida)
Djibouti – JLAL (Jilal)
Yemen – IASR (Yassir)
Bahrain – BLAL (Bilal)
America – AADM (Adam)
England – HMD (Hamad)
France – FARS (Faris)
Ethiopia – RFA”I (Rifa’i)
Kenya – TRAB (Turab)
Khartoum – TAJ (Taj)
Cairo – R;Q (Razq)
San’a – OALD (Khalid)
Alexandria – DLIN(Dalin)
Nairobi – ALUWIL (Taweel)
Addis Ababa – U? (Tah)
Mombassa – SLAM (Salaam)
Dar el-Salaam – ABW “BID? (Abu Abida)
Cambala – “ISI (‘Aissa)

{TN} **CENTER COLUMN**
Abu Abdullah – HM;? (Hamza)
Abu Hafs – ABD ALRHIM (Abdul Rahim)

Abu Talha – ALFATH (Al-Fatih)
Osama - :AML (Shamil)
Abu Islam – S?L (Sahal)
The Doctor – NWR (Noor)
Abul Hiz – ABRA?IM (Ibrahim)
Abul Faraj – XLAH (Silah)
Ashraf – RBI” (Rabi’a)

{TN} **LEFT COLUMN**
V.X – FITAMIN (Fitamin) [vitamin]
Saman – SHN? (Sahna) [expression]
Sarin – FITAMI 2 (Fitami 2) [vitamin 2]
Red Mercury – AL;AIED? (Al-Za`ida) [the additive]
Anthrax – ALJDDI (Al-Judadi)[the new ones]
Uranium – BWR (Bour) [port]
Plutonium – BRWFIN (Provine)(the F is written with three dots, pronounced as V)
The Specialist – ALDKTWR (the Doctor)
Information – MLA;IA (Malaysia)
Intelligence – ALVRAIEB (al-dara`ib) [the taxes]
Prison – ALSAQI? (As-Saqi)[ditch]
Fax – ALRSAL? (ar-risala) [the letter]
The Brothers – ALAQARB (al-aqarib) [the relatives]
Press Agencies – X.B. (P.O. Box)
Operation – XDIQ (Sadiq) [friend]

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{TN} Below the columns:

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5,4 Fax messages to al-Fatih {TN: Above this is Abu Talha}
-- --
Weapons from Muhammad ‘Atif’s group
(10,000) Dollars

NWR (Nour) contacts YASR (Yassir)

Date

Notes:
(1) Word of Safety – How are you – Praise God – Praise God, Good (means there is danger)
(2) Appointments are two hours before, ex: Monday means 10 o’clock, Saturday means 8 o’clock, using GMT {TN: Examples have been scratched out, but are still readable}
(3) Regarding the friend (the operation), the timing will be based on GMT

(4) Regarding telephone numbers, switch number 3 with number 5

{TN: Parts of this page are wrinkled and covered over (top right, bottom left) another copy, a look at the original will yield a little more information}

{TN: Page (5)}

Report on Security Observations

America has failed to get any evidence on you. We expect them to try to assassinate you again in another way, using the following weapons:

1) Osama and his high-ranking assistants eat together once a week (lunch on Friday)
   a. Source of the food: the special kitchen in the receiving building. That kitchen is thought to be in a bad place, since so many Arabs and Afghans know where it is, and there is so little security. This is good for America, it is an open door for them. first negative point
   b. How the food is distributed: it is distributed between the new and old people gathered second negative point
   c. While the plates are being handed out it is clearly obvious which plate is for the Sheikh third negative point
   d. The way you drink your water: I've observed that when you sit in the hangar, a glass of water is brought to you by one of the accompanying guards who is there for a general visit fourth negative point

{TN} end of page 5, remainder of this letter is not present

{TN} Page 6, letter on Human Concern International letterhead (Peshawar, Pakistan)

To Abu Abdullah (Osama bin Laden)

This is a thank you letter for all of his actions that support Muslims worldwide. The author says we are sending two men, 'Ilam Farouq and Muhammad Tibb.

From Wazir Al-Hasan

{TN} Page 9

letter to Qari Saahib
asking for help getting the following brothers out of prison:

1) Abul Jirah (Yemeni)
2) Abu Yousef (Sudanese)
3) Abu Abdullah Al-Laili Al-Milki
4) Abu Umran al Ghamdi

From Saif al'adl
Nov 19 1997

{TN} page 11

Letter to Abu Ibrahim

1) Ghazwan's trip was five days, it went very well.
2) If anyone wants to come, living there is not bad
3) Abdul Jabar sold about 45 fudan which he was planting.
   {TN: chances are this is a codeword}
4) Abu Tariq and al-Nawawi's donkey (nuclear) is valued at $350,000 even if it was sold for $100,000
   a. {TN: chances are these are codewords}
5) We hope Abu Awaiss is well and can visit us to put his things in order
6) The three member committee met after Abu Awaiss left and they decided not to divide.
7) As for the papers of Khalifa, we will send them when they are ready
8) For Omar Abdul Hasan the Mauritian, we met him through the Mauritian Sheikh Abdullah… he wants to join the company and be one of us, he was sent to Egypt
9) Jan (John) Agha is very worrisome, please don't send any letters to him until the last sign and pass this on to the whole company.

From Muhammad Atif, 14 Aug 1996

{TN: Page 13&14, full translation}

Addendum to the first letter
Read after 5

1 – After the meeting with the prisoners who were released a few days before this addendum, we are sure that our three brothers who are with 85 Pakistanis really were moved more than two months ago to Tajikistan, and from there to Mashhad, Iran. Those prisoners remembered the names of all of our brothers and they described them. They remembered

that they complained very strenuously to the administrator of the prisoners, whose name was Mujahid, and he was a corporal in charge of the prisoners within the prison. They mentioned to him that they were not able to stay with the Pakistanis in the same place, he moved them in with the Afghanis, they also mentioned to him that they might act as if they had recovered completely from their injuries, and that their morale was very high. The prisoners said that after they had moved the Arab and Pakistani brothers, under an attempt to move the Afghani prisoners, these attempts were a failure. The first attempt failed in Masoud's airplane which was coming to transport them. Another time, the truck rolled over with the prisoners and guards, killing eight guards, two Pakistanis and four Taliban and injured others, and these events halted completely with the arrival of the last airplane. Because of this, there were ideas being tossed around that they were trying to get rid of the most important of our brothers.

A – Operations to mediate, directly or indirectly, in a limited way with the Iranians to talk about releasing the prisoners. It will be somewhere between diplomacy and threats with an operation which is something against their interests.

B – The operation to take Iranian hostages to trade for our prisoners will embarrass Iran quite a bit nationally, as a truly moderate party in Afghanistan, then for a country whose feelings clearly run that way. The operation will become a statement to Muslims in general to confirm and delimit their position. There will be responses, both positive and negative, but it is not bad to have discussions about it. Maybe the Taliban will benefit from some of this.

C – Operation to bomb something Iran has an interest in, and the threat to repeat that if they do not release the prisoners. This could be in Pakistan or in an Arab country, Iran's interests are spread all over the world.

The first solution is best for us, and it could open the door through which the Taliban may return as well.

2 – The time of Hamza's (the Pakistani) punishment has ended or passed. Please send him back to us, we need him urgently. We have started to shrink unnoticeably, but the training program is almost over and we will start the operations training in the next few days. During this time, I will go through the training for personality and courage, and the necessary preparations to conduct an operation that

is successful, and has an impact on the general situation, if God wills.

Signed Adbul Hadi Al-Ansari
11-2-1998
Monday, 14 Rajb 1419h

{TN: Page 15-16}
A letter to Sheikh Abu Hafs

1 – With praise to God, we have destroyed one of the enemy's cars on the way to Maradbik using an 82 mm mortar, and we destroyed another car on the way to Bakram using a tank. Also, in Bakram we scored a direct hit of two enemy tanks, and now we are trying to hit the third tank which is in front of our position after they withdrew the fourth tank. If you were here with us while we were shooting at them using Abu Turrab's tank, you would have laughed at the way they were running away!
2 – After three days of unrelenting attempts, we were finally able to meet with Sheikh Muhammad Rabbani. We talked to him about:

a – things dealing with the prisoners. After bringing up the issue of pursuing their release, he asked me not to get inextricably involved with any faction as an attempt for us (Arabs) to release our brothers or to get support to them because we heard that they are not in a good situation and they need money (this is from the three who brought news that they are in Bengshir). He said that we are sending them aid, which will go to all of them without exception.

He specified one of the intelligence officials for us to work with on this issue. He asked us not to attempt trading with them for money, as this would open a door that would not close.

b – I asked him for the paper for the car or for a car. Then he told me that he heard that you had sent us two cars. I denied this, and refuted the story of the cars since the beginning of our participation. I told him how the Sheikh (Abu Abdullah) sent us his personal car which is now on the front lines. He said to me – and it appeared to me that he did not believe what I said – that he would talk to you about this car situation.

c – Afterwards, I asked him for a house for us to use as a headquarters because we have tired from the rent and the properties. He told me that they had moved away from Wazir Akbar Khan and the center of Kabul. They had moved

to the outskirts of Kabul far from observation, because Sulaiman Al-‘Amri(The Saudi Consul) has asked about us and is concerned about our news. He has eyes to follow us, and we must show deference to their (the Taliban) position and not show defiance or embarrass them!!!!!!!!!??? So he sent Mullah Hamad Allah Zahid to find us an appropriate house. May God bless him and keep him standing in the truth.

Finally, he sent his greetings to all of you.

- Please talk to him about the cars, he promised that he would.

3 – We have sent brother Mirouis (Shahib) on his way, after supplying him with the necessary reasons and securing his needs. Just about no one knows about this except me, may God keep him.

4 – We have learned that one of the Pakistani prisoners has been released from prison after his brother and father went to Bengshir via the Pakistani and Afghani learned men. He told them that in the Dashtarak prison in Bengshir there were **three** Arab brothers, their names according to what he remembered are (Ali, Mahmoud, Abeed), two of whom have leg injuries, (Abeed and Ali). They were shot after they were captured, and they sustained serious injuries. They have gone without treatment until the Red Cross intervened and began treatment, along with the rest of the injured. Now their injuries are doing well. We also learned that their fourth colleague with them was also injured. However, the enemy shot and killed him when they were captured. He doesn’t know him or his name, or where he comes from, or anything about him or where he was. According to their descriptions in their memory, (Abeed is Abu Abeeda – and his name was Omran earlier) (And Mahmoud is Abu Yusef Al Sudani) and (Ali is Abu Abdullah Al-Layli) and the other two are from the group of the Sheikh’s son who joined us at the end of the matter. The three were in the back of the house belonging to the brothers there. The fourth one in the house was Ibn al-Jarah who is possibly the one that was killed (This is only a possibility). The brother who visited us in the house also mentioned that that he heard that there is an Arab with 12 Pakistanis who are now prisoners, who are now in Jabal al-Siraj, and this brother is possibly (Nabisha). This also is only a possibility, since the last of the folks have come down from the mountain. He could have been the last of the Afghanis and Pakistanis, at that time he was on the mountain in

observation {TN: watch post} with Qutaiba al-Ghamadi who came down a little before him.

If God permits, we will keep trying to find out about the fate of the others and to get to know the brother in Jabal al-Siraj with the Pakistanis.

We are waiting for your instructions.

We know that at last they asked Qari Saif Allah Akhtar for one million Pakistani Kildar in exchange for releasing each of them, after they had initially asked him for a one for one exchange.

{TN: Last page of letter missing}

{TN: Page 17, 18 is back side}
To Abdul Aziz

(1) Concerning the program, we are waiting for two. As I told you in the last letter, this is based on what Abu Ihlam said, they are concentrating. I think, and God knows, waiting is good for you until we receive it, and if God wills it won't be long.
(2) Concerning the issue of the drama you talked about in your letter to the Sheikh, the Sheikh saw no problems with it initially, but you should send us pictures of the matter, how much it will cost and your opinion on it from the perspective of security. It is appropriate to study it from the security standpoint.
As for my opinion, I am afraid for your security. There is no need for recklessness, God knows.
(3) Concerning the steel {TN: could be code word, ALHDID} please turn it over to Abdul Hadi so he can take care of it in a safe place until another place is designated. This is because moving it now would raise a lot of questions.

My greetings to all who are with you,
Your brother, Ahmed Abdul Aziz
11 Ramadan, 1419 {TN: 1999}

{TN: next letter starts page 20, second half on 19}
{TN: does not mention name of addressee}

Concerning the situation on the front…
The situation on the front is very strange… I don't know who should pray for mercy for those brave Mujahideen who

died… how sad the things are that a person must see here… but you are not saddened by this beginning which is not given up… The position of the Taliban is strong and good all along the front. Mas'ud's position is shaky… the Taliban have now begun shelling and striking and Mas'oud's groups have started to move to the rear. There are only two or three posts left to take the advance… The Taliban are advancing {TN: under crease in page} and they have started to retreat, but there is no reason for them to retreat… Mas'oud's groups are again giving up their positions… this is the way things have been repeated three times here until the present… I am sure that if Mas'oud advanced forcefully and didn't have the mountains in front of him, you would be seeing the Taliban's vehicles with you.

Up to this point, I don't have any ideas other than that the Taliban have lost their will to sacrifice. The price and unfortunately the severity of this situation has created a bad response by a lot of our brothers who have lost their will to stay for the Taliban… Consequently they have lost the feeling that holds them together, as the bombing against them is intense and there are injuries or martyrs every day. The Taliban are not advancing… Disregarding the position of the Taliban, if only they had some semblance of the way the prophet behaved, or something… This is with no indication of inoculating the guys with a new motivation to work… and if they were to open their mouths for something other than confirmation and rumors… this is the short version of the situation I found when I returned, and we ask God to guide you to a way to fix this…

- Regarding the following line:
There is no official in Kabul that I can talk to on this matter in any real way… The Secretary of Defense is in Pakistan… Akbar Agha is in Kandahar… and the rest of them are not qualified… I could probably go myself in the midst or just two… and I don't know where to get people to bring here… The situation of the brothers has become as follows:
1 – The Yemeni brothers have all gone and none of them remain except for Abdul Aziz, but you already know this.
2 – The rest of the remaining brothers are as follows:
a – Abu Khalid Yemeni and Ayoub wouldn't stay on the front line after Muhannad was killed without being forced. I told them to write to you so you can know them yourself.

b – Anas and Abu Mahjan have family situations, one has a sister getting married and the other is leaving in order to see his relatives. He wants to meet you and get to know you… He is a brave brother but he is in a hurry and was impatient waiting with us on the day of the blessed tanks.

c – Al-Zabir al-Maliki and Zaid al-Khair say that they have a special program to work on the peninsula {TN: Saudi Arabia} and they want to consult you about it.

d – Samu'al arrived by way of the son of the Sheikh; he has a letter of introduction for you to become acquainted with him.

e – The guy from Ogadin {TN: Ethiopia} and his brother, the first says that you put him in the new security group – Eritria – and the second is to get married.

3 – The brothers who are staying on the front include:

a – the group at Baghram. Abu Ziyad is responsible for observation… Abu Tamim Group BMI {TN: BMI is written in English letters}… The Jordanian Abdul Hadi group, gharnai {TN: place name or Russian word??}… The Triberlamini group, tanks and the Iraqi brother is with them who recently arrived from Jalalabad and you sent him to report… That's it, no more.

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-003705
Length: 4 pages
Title: An explanatory statement concerning circumstances surrounding the assassination of brother “Abi Tarek”
Author: The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement Secretariat
Date: Sha'aban 22, 1417H (January 2, 1997)

## Synopsis

The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement denounces the assassinations of Abi Tareq and Sister Zubaidah, and connects them with a series of attacks and plots by the Popular Front in Eritrea to divide the Eritrean opposition, sever their connections with their supporters, and obstruct da'wa and jihad.

## Key Themes

On December 21, 1996, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement had issued a statement condemning the assassination of Abi Tareq and Sister Zubaidah.

According to the document, the Popular Front has seized on divisions within Eritrea's revolutionary organizations and begun assassinating, or attempting to assassinate key figures within the movements, including the Liberation Front and jihad movements. It has also accused Arab countries of supporting the jihad groups, and has tried to turn international opinion against the jihadists. At first the groups blamed one another, which increased their internal dissension.
The Popular Front assassinated the following people:

1. Mohamoud Hasab in Kasala
2. Idris Hanqala in Kasala
3. The assassination of Sa’eed Saleh in Kasala
4. The assassination of ‘Uthman ‘Ajeeb in Khartoum.

It also attempted to assassinate the following people:

1. ‘Abdulla Idris, president of the Eritrean Liberation front in Khartoum.
2. ‘Abd Al-Qader Jailani, president of the Eritrean Liberation Front - the National Council in Kasala.

After the attack on Jailani, the Sudanese government discovered that the 'popular front' was behind the attacks. The Aforqi regime [perhaps another name for the Popular Front] has also conducted attacks on civilians and blamed them on the Mujahideen.

The Popular Front designed the assassination of Abi Tareq and Sister Zubaidah to accomplish several objectives.

1. To create conflict between the Eritrean opposition and Sudan, which is hosting them.
2. To exacerbate pre-existing problems within the Jihad movement.
3. To hurt the international reputation of the Jihad movement. The timing of the assassinations was designed to the Jihad movement just as it was canvassing for support abroad at the beginning of Ramadan.
4. To obstruct da'wa and jihad that had been increasing among the Eritrean opposition after the Sudanese government relaxed restrictions.

The Eritrean Islamic Jihad movement prefers clear ideology, dialogue, moderation, and reform to physical violence.

Document #: AFGP-2002-003705
Partial Translation (pages 1 & 2)
Date: June 28, 2002

**Document Summary**: This document consists of (8) pages of which pages (4, 6 & 7) are blank. The following is a translation of pages (1 & 2) which contain a statement explaining the circumstances surrounding the assassination of Brother Abi Tareq issued by the Islamic Jihad movement; and denouncing this horrible incident and at the same time clearing itself from any wrong doing.

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In the name of Allah the Merciful the Compassionate

Praise to God; Peace and blessing of God upon his Prophet.

**An explanatory statement concerning circumstances surrounding the assassination of brother "Abi Tarek"**

In a brief statement dated 12/21/1996; the Jihad movement previously denounced the assassination of Brother Abi Tareq and Sister Zubaidah, may God have mercy on them. This explanatory statement is motivated by the movements desire to clarify the greedy ambition of the wicked circles which committed these actions.

Without a doubt, the popular front has continued to commit crimes, create problems and incite sedition, to cause division among the Eritrean organizations. This is done through assassination incidents executed on leaders of the Eritrean revolution groups. They seized the opportunity and the right timing to carry out their operations. Especially, when differences crop out among the lines of the Eritrean organizations and the struggle reached its peak. We mention the following as an example and not by count:

- The assassination attempt on 'Abdulla Idris, president of the Eritrean liberation front in Khartoum.
- The assassination attempt on 'Abd Al-Qader Jailani, president of the Eritrean Liberation Front - the National Council in Kasala.
- The assassination of Mohamoud Hasab in Kasala
- The assassination of Idris Hanqala in Kasala

- The assassination of Sa'eed Saleh in Kasala
- The assassination of 'Uthman 'Ajeeb in Khartoum.

Accusations were exchange among the conflicting Eritrean groups in most of these incidents, and the real perpetrator was not known until after the assassination attempt on Jailani when the perpetrator revealed to the Sudanese authorities then most of the previous assassination crimes and the commissioned networks by the Popular Front.

After the Popular Front seized power in Eritrea; it began to liquidate its rivals from the inside under the cover of suicide, traffic accidents, disappearance and kidnapping. The Popular Front also mobilized all of its capabilities seeking the help of its Taqrai ally army to militarily quell the Jihad movement as it previously did with the Liberation Front. But it failed in front of the steadfastness and continuous strikes of the Mujahideen. In order to cover its failure; it began leveling accusations to Sudan and other Arab countries, attempting to win the sympathy of the world arrogant countries, to obtain their support on one side and hostility against the movement and the neighboring countries on the other.

An attempt by the Aforqi regime to shake the confidence and to create a conflict between the Eritrean people and the movement; he committed several kidnapping and assassination operations in some areas of Eritrea and attributed them to the Mujahdeen. The latest was the Hibro incident when some of the regime's agents throw grenades at one of the popular celebrations at night. This resulted in a number of casualties among the innocent, which Aforqi tried as usual to attribute it to the Mujahdeen. They were exposed after the people followed the tracks of the criminals which lead them to the camp of the popular front adjacent to the site.

Hence, the crusade regime in Eritrea failed in the attempts of rumors war, distortion and division. The movement came out with God's help strong and firm, after winning the confidence of the people inside and outside, and the confidence of its supporters everywhere.



It has surmounted many difficulties, obstacles, and hardships until it attracted the attention and interest of countries and people in the region because of its steadfastness in confronting the Jewish crusade regime which pause a threat to the security of the region and its people.

In view of all the victories achieved by the movement in all fields, and in view of the political relaxation experienced by the Eritrean opposition in Sudan; the Popular Front surprises us with the assassination of Brother "Abi Tareq 'Omar Mohammed Taidarous" and sister "Zubaidah" may God have mercy on them. This incident is considered one of the conspiracy series targeting the Eritrean Jihad in particular and Eritrean opposition in general from several aspects such as:

1- To strain the relation between Sudan and the Eritrean opposition since the incident was committed on Sudanese soil and in an atmosphere of security tension prevailing in the region.
2- To offend the Jihad movement since the incident was committed while some problems existed prior to the incident. It is meant to give the impression that it is a result of these problems and to be exploited by anyone intending to harm the movement by circulating accusations.
3- To damage the movement reputation abroad and create confusion about it during specific occasions, especially with the presence of trouble makers at the beginning of such occasions. The timing coincided with the beginning of the month of Ramadan being an occasion of increased movement activity abroad in order to obtain support and aid.
4- Obstructing the movement's Da'wa (call to Islam) and political mobilization activities which swept the Eritrean population in Eastern Sudan following the political relaxation experienced by the Eritrean opposition during the past weeks.

These were some of the objectives behind the assassinations. The Eritrean Islamic Jihad movement denounces this horrible incident and reiterates that the movement ideology does not approve of physical liquidation if a conflict occurs. Our ideology in this concern is to initiate dialogue, reconciliation, and reform. The best indicator of this stand are the reconciliation initiatives the movement launched in the past year to contain some problems. In addition, the movement welcomed and responded to all reform initiatives presented by the movement supporters locally and abroad. We also affirm that these methods will not undermine the trust of the Jihad movement supporters that is characterized with moderation and clear ideology.
The march of Da'awa and Jihad which disrupted the enemy's sleep will not stop God willing, despite their will.
We would like to warn all Eritrean opposition organizations to be cautious of what is being planned against it, although the methods of conspiracies do not deceive anyone.

Finally, we would like to express our condolences to both families of the deceased and pray that Allah will forgive and have mercy on them, and provides their families with patience and consolation. “We all belong to Allah and to Him we shall return”.

The Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement
General Secretariat
Date: Sha’aban 22, 1417H (January 2, 1997)
Movement Stamp

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Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter One)
Date: Mid 1990s
Author: "Your Uncle"
Length: 32 pages
Title: The Five Letters to the African Corps I

Synopsis: This letter is addressed to "Dear Brother Saif" and signed by "Your Uncle." The author has prepared a lengthy response to issues raised in two previous letters (not included in this collection) sent by Saif from Somalia where he is in charge of Al-Qa'ida activity. Uncle gives frank observations about the prospects for jihad in Somalia.

Key Themes: Uncle believes that Somalia is not ready for classic jihad and that Al-Qa'ida will not be able to find an ally with an identical intellectual force. The goal is to expel crusader forces from Somalia even if a semi-Islamic, semi-democratic government were to gain power.

Saif is warned that the Somali movement he is working with is in danger of isolating itself from the masses, and if the masses become suspicious of a movement it has no prospect for success.

The U.S. invasion of Somalia presents Saif with a golden opportunity to strike at the "bald eagle" now that it has landed unexpectedly in his sights.

Flexibility is required. If Al-Qa'ida could work with Sayyaf, Hikmatyar, and Burhan to achieve it purposes in Afghanistan, then Saif can work with Aideed, Mahdi, and Kharteet in Somalia. The Somali leadership, however, must be bolstered since they have even less manhood than Saddam Hussein and Arafat.

Uncle proposes a 5 point strategy to unite Somali forces and create an Islamic national front:

1. Expulsion of the foreign international presence.
2. Rebuilding of state institutions.
3. Establishment of domestic security.
4. Comprehensive national reconciliation.
5. Economic reform and combating famine.

The message ends with encouragement to persevere through financial difficulties and act according to the traditions "of our noble Messenger." Uncle cites God feeding Quraysh and the great Badr raid as examples of victories that come through the "confident belief that God will grant victory."

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter Two)
Date: September 30, 1993
Author: Hassan al-Tajiki
Length: 11 pages
Title: The Five Letters to the African Corps II

Synopsis: The letter provides an update and analysis concerning jihad activity in Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Russia, and China.

Key Themes: Tajikistan is judged to be a challenging but not hopeless area for jihad activity.

Russia is in chaos and the former republics of the Soviet Union are weak. America is preparing to fill the power vacuum in the region.

In Afghanistan America is supporting warlords and exploiting Civil War to neutralize opposition to its control of the region.

China is a rising power where future relations with the Islamic world will be of great importance.

The letter concludes with an upbeat assessment for future jihad operations in Tajikistan.

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter Three)
Date: May 24, 1994
Author: Hassan
Length: 36 pages
Title: The Five Letters to the African Corps III

Synopsis: Congratulations for the victory in Somalia and a strategic review of worldwide jihad operations. Success of the Africa Corps is contrasted with the difficult position of the Asian Corps.

Key Themes: Hassan begins by expressing his congratulations to the Africa Corps for their great victory in Somalia. He would like to join them is having difficulties traveling because he is now wanted for security reasons in Pakistan.

He asks the questions: "So how were our amazing Corps and its starving African Muslim allies able to be victorious over the greatest power in the world today?" The answer lies in the power of God, because "When we are truly fighting in the name and on behalf of God, we have nothing to fear…"

In Somalia, Islamic forces were able to exploit America's Vietnam Complex, because the American's fear getting bogged down in a real war. Al-Qa'ida needs to develop a tactical doctrine to exploit the weakness of its great enemy, and a Counter-Intelligence strategy to confront the power of the American security agencies.

Victory in Somalia must be followed up to avoid giving the defeated foe time to regroup. The strategy of the "Jewish West" is to strike at the periphery of the Muslim lands. The original crusaders tried to strike at the center of the Islamic lands, but were defeated. The Crusaders adapted, conquered the periphery, and were then able to control the Arabian Peninsula and Palestine.

Somalia represents a victory for Al-Qa'ida on the periphery. The hour for regaining the heartland has arrived, but much training is required before this phase can begin.

While the Africa Corps has been successful, the Asian Corps is very weak with only 5 members. Yemen is described as a crucial battlefield, an auspicious location for declaring jihad in the Arabian Peninsula.

More effective radio broadcasts are needed to launch a propaganda campaign in Yemen and Somalia. Demands should include:

> Evacuation of the Crusaders, Jews, and infidel forces from the Peninsula.
>
> Destruction of churches and Jewish and Buddhist temples.

Hassan observes that radio stations are more powerful than atomic bombs and that several dozen committed young believers can bring correct teaching to the whole area. Martyrdom attacks in Yemen create an auspicious opportunity to declare jihad in the Arabian Peninsula.

Next comes a review of lessons learned in Tajikistan. Serious errors have been committed by the Nahdha who have relinquished their Islamic identity. Nahdha like Saddam Hussein exploits Islam to gain popular support, but by no means expresses true adherence to Islam.

In Kabul, warlords who pursue their own agendas are weakening the work of jihad.

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter Four)
Date: May 24, 1994
Author: Hassan
Length: 14 pages
Title: The Fourth Letter about Jihad in the Caucasus

Synopsis: Hassan is writing from an Al-Qa'ida training camp and relates his disappointments concerning reverses Al-Qa'ida has experienced in Central Asia. He also seeks to apply lessons learned from the arrest of international terrorist Carlos.

Key Themes: In Tajikistan Al-Qa'ida has been outmaneuvered by the Nahdha movement and Ahmad Shah Mas'oud who have been able to extract arms and ammunition from Al-Qa'ida without providing training. Demoralized Mujahideen have been leaving the movement.

Arab fighters in northern Afghanistan are loathed by Mas'oud and his commanders and in Pakistan Arab fighters are restricted and harassed by Pakistani authorities. Combating Islam is now both a state motto and policy in that country. In Pakistan Islam is a "folkloric" religion.

Hassan states that Al-Qa'ida in Pakistan is besieged and that "All we have is the beleaguered space between our camp and Kabul in which to move with relative freedom."

Jews are gaining strength in Russia. Hassan engages in the eschatological speculation that the Jewish nuclear project will prepare the way for Armageddon and the rule of King Anti-Christ. He proposes bringing the jihad to Moscow with the ultimate objective of bringing jihad to Jerusalem.

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are essential fronts for fighting to overcome the developing American blockade in Central Asia.

The extradition of Carlos emphasizes the need for preserving strong, secure rear areas in Sudan and Afghanistan.

Hassan says that he is bored in Afghanistan and want to relocate his family to Sudan.

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter Five)
Date: 1994?
Author: Hassan al-Tajiki
Length: 14 pages
Title: The Fifth Letter to the Africa Corps

Synopsis: An analysis evaluating the impact of jihad in the Caucasus. Written while fighting is raging in Grozny, Hassan sees this struggle holding great promise for the future of jihad.

Key Themes: The Soviet Union collapsed as a direct result of the war in Afghanistan. This left the U.S. to run the world in an autocratic manner. The U.S. alliance of Western states is fragile, however, due to the warfare inherent in the capitalist system.

The new world order is America against everyone, and everyone against the Muslim. The Jews have succeeded in creating a Crusader alliance among Orthodox, Protestant, and Catholic churches. Then they added Hindu and Confucian Buddhist power in India, China, and Japan.

This alliance is fragile and just as the 11th and 12th century Crusaders succumbed to infighting, so too will this alliance. Jihadists can look forward to Russian gangs selling nuclear weapons and ultimately providing nuclear arms for the jihad.

The Caucasus is a strategically important zone because it provides access to the West. The U.S. is attempting to use Turkey and Pakistan to isolate the region, but the Chechens are rugged warriors.

Furthermore, harsh Russia violence in the region means only opportunities for martyrdom and paradise for Muslims. The Crusader strategy will backfire because the "bloody governing" of the Russians will result in a disaster inflicted by Islamic forces.

Al-Qa'ida can best support Chechen rebels by striking in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Arab fighters are at a disadvantage in the area since they do not know the language and culture.

In an aside, Hassan comments that the jihadi missionary must be patient. Most Muslims will not pick up a weapon and declare jihad "unless he has tasted killing and felt the knife as it passed across his throat."

Therefore the Crusader wars are welcomed, but the" armed missionary must realize that his moving amongst Muslims whose Islam exists in Name only." Apostasy reigns, not only in Turkey and Pakistan, but also in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The challenge for Al-Qa'ida is to unite the rising jihadi spirit in Arab lands with that in the Caucasus. The regions of Ingushetia, Dagestan, Abkhazia, and Azerbaijan are fruitful areas for expansion because of the hostility toward Russia in those areas.

Document #: AFGP-2002-600053
Full Translation
June 5, 2002



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**To: The African Corps**

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In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

**The African Corps – The First Letter**

Praise to God, and prayers and peace upon the messenger of God.

Dear Brother Saif,

Greetings to you and to your dear family

Before I attempt to respond, I have just reread the latest letters I received from you. Despite your prodding, I postponed trying to answer for several weeks. There are many reasons for the delay. I was supposed to address the situation here, as well as comment on the contents of your two letters regarding what is happening where you are. Hence, it was more than just writing an ordinary letter. It required writing long books, which is just about what happened, once I finished a relatively lengthy letter about the situation here entitled "Basic Elements of the Jihad War in Tajikistan." The first letter is essentially directed at the Tajik leadership, in addition to referring to the main issues of action here. Hence, it is somewhat involves writing a separate letter to you in this regard. I attached that memorandum with my letter so the brothers could look at it.

I also hope that we can meet somewhere, somehow, sometime to discuss the African and Asian facets of the situation, in order to advance our work within a common intercontinental perspective. This will open the way for the other continents to join the international jihad club.

Commenting on the contents of your two letters, we say, and God grants success, that if we can compare the work of jihad to a locomotive, its motive force is faith, and it moves on two steel rails, one being political, the other economic. The leadership oversees the entire course. Unfortunately, the track is not yet complete for fully-integrated jihad action. With respect to Al-Qa'eda, the main outlines of its activity indicate a chronic error regarding political guidance. This was the case with Al-Qa'eda in Afghanistan, and I believe that it continues in its new battleground in Somalia.

It appears to me that Al-Qa'eda's Salafia tendencies have led it to search for a political ally in Somalia with an identical intellectual focus.

This is the greatest calamity. I think you know my view in detail regarding the [U/I] tendencies and jihad, and my belief that it is impossible for successful jihad action to be led under [U/I] leadership [TC: These [U/I] s refer to a series of symbols in the text inserted automatically when the electronic text was converted after acquisition. They appear to refer to the same adjective, person, or organization.] This is not the place to go into detail on this topic, but I use that result to evaluate the capability of the Somali group with which you are working, the isolationism it is manifesting in the movement, and the lethargy of its reactions to events. I'll mention to you a discovery which is merely thousands of years old. This discovery states that a movement that is isolated from its masses, that is suspicious of its people, and whose people are suspicious of it, can achieve nothing but destroy itself.

Based on the scarce amount of information we have regarding the situation in Somalia, including the simple yet magnificent report issued by the director of the branch of the Islamic World League last June, it appears to me that



Somalia needs a comprehensive national front that agrees on general, not detailed, Islamic slogans. That front must lead to an expanded national

government approved by the major forces in the country: tribes and political groupings. The slogan acceptable to all is "Somali Freedom and Islamism." It is no secret to you that the United Nations is the legal cover and the international league of western Crusader forces led by the Jews. Thus, United Nations forces are a purely Crusader army. I do not believe I was very far off when I called them the Knights of the Cross. They lead the most arrogant Crusader campaign against Islam. Therefore, the most important need is to expel them from Somalia, even were a semi-Islamic, semi-democratic, semi-etc. government subsequently to assume power. Unfortunately, we are going to have to accept the least consequential individuals to avoid the most extreme. That is the situation. For your information, the Knights of the Cross are preparing to go into Afghanistan in cooperation with Rabbani, Hikmatyar, Mas'oud, and others with the objective of ending the jihad in Tajikistan and central Asia and ending the presence of Arabs involved in jihad in Afghanistan and the region.

Dear Sayf,

Maneuvering in the political arena is more dangerous, more urgent, and more essential than maneuvering in military operations. Can you conceive of military action without maneuvering or proceeding according to a phased plan? Jihad action in the manner of a rhinoceros is stupid and futile. By this I mean jihad action that only considers military action, nothing else.

When you entered Somalia, the Somali arena was barren and futile. The situation changed, however, after the intervention by America and the Knights of the Cross. You most resembled a hunter aiming his rifle at the dead branch of a tree, with no leaves or birds on it. Suddenly, a bald eagle lands on the branch of the tree, directly in line with the rifle. Shouldn't the hunter pull the trigger to kill the eagle or at least bloody it?

The American bald eagle has landed within range of our rifles. You can kill it or leave it permanently disfigured. If you do that, you will have saved Sudan, Yemen, Bab al-Mandab, the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf, and the waters of the Nile. Could you want more magnificent objectives of war than those?

I don't think you are allowed to pull back now; to do so would be a crime.

Fire at the bald eagle. Kill the Knights of the Cross. God is with you. After faith, God's greatest blessing is the brain. Use it wisely; do not fight like a rhinoceros.

God strengthens his religion through the iniquitous man and people who have no morals. There is a saying of the Prophet on this issue. We have all seen this confirmed in actuality in Afghanistan in its war against the Soviets. Is there any objection to this being repeated in Somalia, too? Are Aideed, Mahdi, and Kharteet any worse than Sayyaf, Hikmatyar, and Burhan?

Nearly everywhere your situation and ours has no place for the ideal; just for that which is the least bad. Hence, the issue is not the tendency of a Salafi, a Sufi, or a Muslim Brother. The issue is whether we are to be or not to be. Will we survive, or become extinct? Will an Islam survive that includes smoke and deception, or will unambiguous Christianity come in its stead?

In terms of the military aspect, your suggestions are excellent and totally appropriate. Place your bases in the mountains and move everywhere. Kill them where you catch them; expand urban terror; plant mines on the roads; use all the covert weapons of war from rumor, to strangulation, poisons, explosions, lightning attacks on small targets, and sniping. Be like mercury; do not allow them to pick you up, determine your location, or draw you into a military confrontation. Fill their space like air, present yet unseen. Believe me, they are the timbers of complex military machinery led by semi-humans and bastards. Their hearts are stone or even harsher. Their hearts are air. Even when able to, they have no mercy. Even when they promise, they betray. Their life is luxury. They have nothing beyond this world, so they are afraid of death. They fear believers the way believers fear God or even greater.



The hour of their punishment is much nearer. The Byzantines will always be Byzantines; their punishment is near. This punishment will be by our hands where you are, where we are, and everywhere, God willing.

The principles of military action are well-known. Their application is a matter of skill, while their continuity is a matter of morale. With respect to morale, faith is foremost, but it is something that rises and falls. Our

successful military blows increase the faith of the Muslim public, but the reverse is true when the blows are unsuccessful. In sum, military action has to be used to raise morale, the incentive to fight, and to become embroiled in combat when necessary. In any event, the field command is best suited to determining the proper methods of action.

I learned from your letter that there are very few weapons or ammunition in the area. I recall that when the events began many weapons were readily available and cheap. Where did they go? They are in the process of incredible intentional disappearance and ruin, whether because of internal clashes or because they are being taken outside the country. The same thing is happening in Afghanistan to facilitate the mission of the Knights of the Cross. In Afghanistan, the Knights of the Cross will be from the Islamic countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Algeria, Morocco, Bangladesh, Syria, et cetera.

Financing is a problem that grows more serious every day with respect to the Muslims generally and Islamic action in particular. This should come as no surprise, since today the world's riches are totally in the hands of the Jews. They are determined to dry up our financial resources. I therefore ask that you discuss the letter entitled "The Problem of Financing Islamic Action" and let us know what your theoretical and practical views are. I believe the letter reached you earlier, but just in case we shall send you another. For your information, Abu Qatada al-Shar`i has authorized it.

The announcement by Boutros Boutros Boutros [sic] Ghali that the Cross Organization intends to stay two more years in Somalia reflects both weakness and malice. The group anticipated swift success and was surprised as the African swamp gradually swallowed it up. However, it will make every effort to conquer Somalia and destroy Islam there within the time frame it has established.

Despite the small amount of information available, the following solutions can be envisioned:

1. Political and military cooperation among all Somali groups opposed to the international occupation of their country and the formation of a national Islamic front to that end.
2. Formation of a temporary government for the country with an agenda containing:

A. Expulsion of the foreign international presence.
B. Rebuilding of state institutions.
C. Establishment of domestic security.
D. Comprehensive national reconciliation.
E. Economic reform and combating famine.

3. An urgent military program. It would be best that it come from the National Grouping and be based on a division of responsibilities for military action throughout the entire country. A security-defensive strategy needs to be outlined that includes:

   A. Resistance to foreign presence and action to force it to withdraw.
   B. Supervision of liberated areas and securing the lives, funds, and property of all members of the populace.

Each group would carry out its assignment under this program within its geographical area. This would be temporary until a unified defense force could be established.

It is only natural that the Muslims will be unable to come to terms over a unified program. How much more difficult it will be if the program is a comprehensive one. It will be useful, therefore, to set forth a program of action for the forces available to you and a political, military, and economic program. Based on what we hear about operations in Mogadishu, it is clear that those carrying them out are fully knowledgeable about the technical aspects of the action. The political effort is clearly there and effective. Likewise, the military effort is simple, effective, and inexpensive.

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The Somali leadership with whom you are dealing has recommended waiting for the arrival of the occupation forces and a misunderstanding to arise between them and the residents before intervening. Frankly, don't be angry, but only a coward or a scoundrel would say such a thing. I have no doubt that even Saddam Hussein, Aideed, Arafat, Sayyaf, Hikmatyar, and Burhan have more manhood than they have. Like the latter, they are useless. Beware of them. You must find men you can deal with, even if they are not from our venerable forefathers—men having instinctive enthusiasm for Islam like al-Afghani [TC: 19th Century Islamic thinker and modernizer], but

if you can't do that, you must not get bogged down with scoundrels. In the aphorisms of olden days they said: "Do not befriend a scoundrel, and do not let one befriend you." Or as they said: "Beware wasting time, effort, money, and perhaps even blood with such people." Look for a group that is effective with respect to goals that are achievable on behalf of Muslims in this country. I do not mind cooperating with Aideed if you have made sure that what he is doing with the Americans is not staged and agreed beforehand as was the case with Ataturk, Abd al-Nasir, Hikmatyar, etc.

By the way, what they said reminds me of the plan of the commander of the popular resistance in al-Sharqia after the disaster of [blank] who offered his plan to the military command saying:

"When the Jews attack Tell Basta, let's allow them occupy the town. They will put up barbed wire; then we'll infiltrate by night and cut the wire. After that, we'll sneak into the storehouses and steal their tinned beef." I think your group is dreaming of the tinned beef that will accompany the occupation forces, the most important thing being that it be ritually butchered.

Dear Sayf,

I think a practical political program, an inexpensive military program, and an adequate economic program can be drafted. But we must not be satisfied with what is possible now; we must work to do better and seek greater perfection as activities develop. Assembly and massing of Somali forces were available to us. The crime now, however, would be to leave that arena because it has become a line of confrontation with the international forces of the cross.

If they take that position, a large and critical link in our Islamic positions in the area will collapse.

Dear Sayf,

God fed Quraysh to ward off hunger and provided faith against fear. Hunger and fear destroy the underpinnings of the human self and undermine pride. God lifted the spirits of those who had lost the sense of their humanity. This point has to be addressed before we ask people to do things they are

incapable of. If you wish to be obeyed, order that which can be done. Isn't that so?

The memorandum about the financing problem contains some detail regarding this point. But I remind you, and I remind myself, of the great Badr raid [TC: A successful early Islamic battle against the Quraysh tribe of Mecca], and how as the greatest raid in the history of Islam it proceeded on a base of faith and economy. The raid was aimed at the adversary's economy and financial arteries; at capturing them on behalf of the Muslims and denying them to the infidels. So, contemplate, consider, and then act. Act according to the traditions of our noble Messenger.

I'll draw your attention again to a noble tradition related to assassinating the leaders of infidelity and inciters of sedition. The killing of a single man could possibly save much blood threatened in a major battle. So, contemplate, consider, and then act. Act according to the traditions of God's Messenger. We know everything, yet we are a people who do not consider this to be an armed economic war, low in cost, great in return, and having a tremendous impact on the souls of believers and infidels alike.

Contemplate, young man, and according to the traditions of our noble Messenger, put into action the practical points contained in your second letter for dealing with the situation you have. They are simple, practical, and useful. There is no doubt but that you have such successful solutions as rightly-guided battlefield leadership. You must depend on God and initiate action in the confident belief that God will grant victory.

You will be victorious in your battlefield there; we will be victorious in our battlefield here. It will be a day wherein the believers will be joyous at God's granting victory.
Peace, mercy and blessings of Allah upon you

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Your uncle,

Abu al-Waleed
Jihad Wal
Thursday, 30 September 93

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

**The Second Letter to the Africa Corps**

Praise to God, and prayers and peace on the messenger of God.

Dear brothers and members in the Somali Africa Corps,

Peace, mercy and blessings of Allah upon you.

Following is a summary of the situation on the eastern edge of the land of Khorasan, called Tajikistan, where are found the signs of the Mahdi, black banners, and the signs of the anti-Christ and the evil army that follows him.

We will now discuss:

1. The internal situation
2. The regional situation
3. The international situation

Later we will discuss the activities of the Khorasan Corps and developments regarding its actions and projects.

I. The Internal Situation

A. With respect to the Nahdha movement:

This is a recently-formed missionary movement that became involved in a complicated jihad situation. The movement lacks leadership expertise having abilities adequate to dealing with this prodigious event. It also lacks the appropriate organizational structure for conditions of jihad.

Add to this the fact that the intellectual superstructure of the movement is the legacy left by the Muslim Brotherhood, even though elements of traditional Sufi thought were to be found in the folds of that Islamic alliance, and that politically it appears the movement allied itself with democratic tendencies of marginal value.

Tremendous challenges are facing the movement, as follows:

- Clearly defining and developing its intellectual line.
- Building its leadership structure.
- Building its organizational structure
- Confronting the challenges of jihad action militarily, politically, and economically.

B. The internal situation in Tajikistan

Tajikistan's policy is weak and stupid, centered socially on an extremely narrow tribal layer and a collapsed political layer, the survival of which is totally dependent on outside support coming from Russia, the United States, and Israel.

The Tajik province of Badakhshan revolted against the central government and cooperated with the mujahedeen. It represents [U/I] of the area of the country. Militarily, it is the strategic key to Tajikistan, indeed to the entire area.

Consequently, it can be said that the mujahedeen have won the battle strategically. They just have to first establish themselves in Badakhshan and then expand from there throughout the rest of the country.



## II. The Regional Situation

**The most important components are:**

A. The situation in Russia
B. The situation in the Commonwealth countries
C. The situation in Afghanistan
D. The situation in China

A. The Situation in Russia

This can be summarized in one word: chaos. There is chaos in the political situation and division between parliament and Yeltsin, which in reality is a division between the old communists and the supporters of joining with the

capitalist West. A division also exists between Russia's developed industrial north and its backward agricultural south.

The economic situation is in chaos. An economy that had been socialist was unable to convert to capitalism. It currently is in the stage of having no identity. Inflation is grinding the people and carrying them to the brink of overwhelming poverty.

Social chaos is the certain result of political and economic chaos, plus the chaos and collapse of values, the mixing of concepts, and the absence of confidence in any practice or anything else.

Military chaos is expressed in a general's letter to the parliament, in which he says that the Russian army now lacks leadership. This was a comment on what happened to the Russian border guard in Tajikistan during the famous Sari Ghar [phonetic] operation. The republics divided up the Army's weapons and forces and sold off whatever weapons, factories, experts, and secrets could be sold in an effort to obtain the almighty dollar.

This has been reflected in the current situation of the Russian army in Tajikistan where the Army is shrinking in a strangely negative manner, as follows:

- Along the border strip with China and Afghanistan
- In the capital Dushanbe
- In the protection of gold mines
- In the protection of uranium mines

It is bizarre that along the borders the Russian Army does not intervene in crossing operations by armed mujahedeen. It moves only when it is attacked. The Army is no longer active in the area of Tawil Durra near the gold mines. They have left the mission to the militias and the Uzbeks. The Commonwealth has a weak combined force.

B. The Situation in the Commonwealth Countries

The Commonwealth countries are suffering from the same problems as the Russians, but worse so. Russia is the political and economic backbone of those countries, but since Russia has been so far incapable of treating their intractable and increasingly exacerbated problems, America is planning,

indeed has actually begun, to fill the political vacuum occurring in the area. It is doing so in cooperation with NATO and using the United Nations umbrella when conditions allow. The Russians have strongly rejected such intervention, but they can do nothing to stop it. The crisis, however, is still at the stage of theoretical discussion. Based on the little information we have, it has not developed any further than Security Council intervention and European cooperation in resolving the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan regarding the province of Nagorno Karabach. I think that is just the beginning.

American-European intervention in the region is expected to increase once the proper conditions exist, including:

1. Increased strength of the jihad movement in the Islamic areas of central Asia.
2. As Russia continues to be in crisis and weakens.



Several months ago America offered military cooperation with NATO to the Russians to combat Islamic extremism in central Asia and so on. It is extremely important to take this into consideration when conducting long-range planning for jihad action in the region.

The Commonwealth countries are obviously negative regarding military intervention in Tajikistan. When it comes to implementation, their repeated statements result in nothing worthy of mention. Military reinforcements having any weight have so far failed to arrive in Tajikistan.

The Situation in Afghanistan

The true danger to Islam in central Asia comes from Kabul, not from Moscow. This may come as a shock to current Islamic sensitivities, but an analysis of events unfolding in Kabul, in particular, and in Afghanistan in general, indicates that this conclusion is correct. For example:

In the practical arena, all ideological assertions of the party leaderships have ended for good. As earlier, they have begun to practice the worst forms of narrow-minded political self-interest that serve only individual or tribal interests.

Party leaders are striving to exert hegemony over the Tajik movement, then haggle over and sell it politically in exchange for financial returns and local political gains in Kabul.

The most prominent contestants for swallowing the Tajikistanis are:

Mas'oud – He controls the highest proportion of immigrants and has provided arms and training.

Rabbani – Along with Mas'oud, he controls the highest proportion of immigrants and has provided funds.

Dostum – He controls [U/I] of the immigrants. He is being covered by international and regional support. He is prepared to sell the immigrant Tajikistanis and attack the mujahedeen the moment he is issued the orders.

Sayyaf has provided arms and perhaps funds.

Inasmuch as the aforenamed are the distinguished pupils of Pakistani intelligence and the obedient boys of American intelligence, they are pursuing with respect to the Tajikistanis the same methods pursued by Pakistan and America during the Afghan war. The most prominent of these is containment through assistance, followed by isolating political decision-making.

As President of the Republic, Burhan has nearly finished establishing the framework for a political resolution of the Tajik issue in cooperation with his well-known masters and the American United Nations. Moreover, he has empowered Russian forces to pursue the Tajikistanis within Afghan territories whenever necessary!

What is preventing implementation of the program to eliminate the Tajikistanis from Afghan territory and sell them internationally, along with those fundamentalist Arabs remaining in the region, is that Afghan society still has many obstacles needing to be addressed.

Afghan decision-making is still divided within itself politically.

Afghanistan still has armed jihad forces rejecting the project.

The punishment for being divided is that America has gathered in its hands most or all of the political strings affecting the Afghan arena, with the exception of Khalis, [TC: Mawlavi Khalis Muhammadi] as a person, not as a party, and with the exception of the Shi`ite groupings that Iran is manipulating to obtain American concessions, not just in Afghanistan, but in the Gulf and in Lebanon as well. The more dangerous obstacle is the presence of armed jihad forces with the addition of undisciplined tribal forces prepared only to take money from any source, the foremost being Satan himself, yet unprepared to obey any order except within the weakest confines and for a limited period of time. This danger is compounded by the tremendous amount of weaponry and combat expertise of those groupings, which terrifies any external force contemplating entering Afghanistan.

In summary, I envision the American program as follows:

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1. The civil war is an important element for overcoming Afghan obstacles. The Somali and Lebanese examples illustrate this because civil war destroys activist social elements and forces resisting foreign intervention. It also prepares the people to accept any foreign occupation that might rescue them from the ordeal of civil war. The warlords in Kabul are playing the same game the warlords in Lebanon played in exchange for foreign funding and assistance with arms and supplies. This game has to be expanded to the maximum extent possible if its goals are to be achieved.

2. So far, the civil war being managed by America in Kabul has not been able to expand to cover the entire country. So the candidate now is the game of general elections in Afghanistan, which will not only convey the civil war into all the provinces, but into every village and home. All of the contesting parties have agreed to the concept of general elections—Mas'oud, Hekmat, Rabbani, Sayyaf, and the royalists.

We do not know the position of the Shi`ites and Dostum. We do not think that they are not opposed as a tactical position [sic].

3. In the event the chaos and bloodbaths expand, wicked Boutros and his Knights of the Cross will intervene based on a request by the legitimate government in Kabul, supported by all the country's parties, so that forces

from the Islamic World Organization can enter to establish security and order, so that a constitution for the country can be drafted for choosing a permanent government to create an intelligence agency to create a police organization to return the Tajik immigrants to their country, to eliminate the center of terrorism in the country—the Tajikistanis and the Arabs—and to close the country's entry points to prevent suspicious individuals and fundamentalists from coming in illegally.

Accordingly, Afghanistan's borders with Pakistan and Tajikistan will be monitored to eliminate the dens of terrorism and extremism and the camps of the Arabs, Tajikistanis, and Kashmiris and to eliminate the local war criminals—the jihad forces opposing Boutros and Rabbani—disarm them, and put them on trial in New York, Switzerland, or elsewhere. Arrest the members of terrorism and international fundamentalism and put them on trial. [sic]

Fortunately, plans in Afghanistan usually fail or are carried out so poorly that they may lose their meaning. We have seen what happened to Soviet plans, then those of the Americans. Only certain parts of them succeeded, while other parts failed.

Tajik leadership has a unique opportunity to leap once again into Tajikistan and reduce its reliance on Afghanistan to the minimum, but it must be done covertly. Tajik Badakhshan offers an excellent alternative and strategic focus for successful jihad warfare.

C. The Situation in China

China enjoys political and economic stability, and according to western assessments it will become the number one power in the world in less than half a century. China is concentrating on building its own strength and is determined not to get involved in international or regional struggles, at least not until it has finished building itself up to the point that it has an irresistible impact on international affairs. Academic research conducted by esteemed American centers has been published that points to the importance of preventing any type of cooperation between China and the Islamic world.

Russia provides China with modern weapons in exchange for money and to have China look the other way with respect to central Asia.

America has also ignited an arms race in East Asia that China is gradually turning to, and it has developed India technologically, military, and in nuclear terms as an alternative to the West to destroy China or to confront and exhaust it when necessary.

Israel has established growing relations with China and facilitates its acquisition of funds and technology from the West in exchange for not seeking any form of cooperation with the Muslims, indeed in exchange for actually oppressing the Muslims of China in Singkiang province where petroleum has been found in greater amounts than in Saudi Arabia.



After half a century China may become the number one power in the world, or at least one of the greatest giants.

This in itself constitutes one of the primary features of the future.

Likewise, Chinese relations with the Islamic world in general, and with the Islamic movement in central Asia, are a matter of the greatest importance to both parties and to the entire world.

Thus far, China's position with respect to events taking place on its frontier with Tajikistan, and in central Asia in general, has been completely negative, but this does not mean that China will also have that position in the future.

D. Activities of the Khorasan Corps

This Corps consists of 20 persons, or less!

They are deployed across a geographic area absolutely appropriate to their size. They are deployed between the two states of al-Farouq and Jihad Wal, then the Republic of Takhteh Bek, then Kunduz and Takhar, then Tajikistani Badakhshan. Of course, we cannot forget the land of hypocrisy in Peshawar. The activity of the corps is confined to two elements:

a. Transporting weapons
b. Training

Regarding the first element, which is the more advanced, the following has been accomplished:

- The Khost airfield has been repaired, with rooms for the administration.
- Two AN-32 [sic] aircraft with arms and ammunition have been shipped to Kunduz, approximately [TC: Number missing from text] tons.
- A large vehicle of arms and ammunition was shipped to Kunduz. The operation then stopped because Rabbani stopped paying. He is the financier of the shipping operation.
- We have about [TC: Number missing from text] of arms and ammunition in our stores here. None of the amounts in Jalalabad have left there yet.

With respect to the second element which is training:

- We have explained why training is impossible in the north in previous letters.
- Training in the south is taking place slowly and is highly costly. [TC: Number missing from text] trainees have gone through the initial course, of which [TC: Number missing from text] have left for the front. We now have [TC: Number missing from text] approximately persons and [TC: Number missing from text] more will soon arrive for the mountain and urban warfare course. [TC: Small section of text appears to be missing here] are not choosing the elements required following our terms, but the Nahdha group are expressing interest in providing reliable cadres for training with us.

The training project is designed to create a mountain brigade. The weapons and ammunition are nearly all on hand, except for certain non-essential items, however the training budget only provides a decent number of nice prayers! We are supposed to send that brigade, or at least two companies, onto the battlefield sometime around next May.

Then there is the problem of the budget to operate this brigade. As calculated by our brother Abu Kan`an, it is an amount we had best not mention in order to protect everyone's nerves.

Were general conditions around the world to remain as they are at the present time in Russia and Tajikistan, and were we able to place this brigade onto the battleground, there is a possibility that we could reach the gates of a

decisive victory within the same year, provided we temporarily ignore Russia's military presence, i.e. let it sleep on the frontiers and within the mines until we are done with the capital. However, we expect Uzbekistan to lop off the province of Khuqand and annex it with support from Moscow because the area is the most industrially developed and has uranium mines!

Stability is impossible, however, and the Russian situation may become even more critical. Should we succeed in introducing that brigade onto the battlefield and using it well, I would expect wicked Boutros to intervene in the area of operations in Afghanistan and Tajikistan in wintertime—with Islamic and western forces.

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To depict just how fragile the regime in Tajikistan actually is, we'll relate the following incident:

About ten days ago a number of Tajikistani groups that managed to infiltrate into the little town of Shahr Toz located on the Uzbekistani frontier and take it under control, even though most of the groups were unarmed and their original mission was sabotage only. However, the groups found there was no government in the town, took it over, and destroyed vital installations. Upon receiving no response from the government, they remain there as of this writing. Radio information has now come in to the effect that our reconnaissance mission that was supposed to go to Tajikistani Badakhshan went to take part in conquering this town!

Accordingly, our military program from now until the end of [TC: Text missing] can be summarized as follows:

1. Training, arming, and operating one mountain brigade.
2. Training and outfitting a number of urban deterrence groups [TC. The writer uses this term for urban guerrillas] to operate in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan during the year of [TC. Text missing].

The obstacles are as follows:

1. Scarcity of a training team
2. Lack of a budget for training or for operating the brigade

3. The turmoil in the Afghan swamp
4. The lack of an Arab military team to operate the brigade in the field.

Success is God's.

Your brother,

Hassan al-Tajiki
Jihad Wal
Saturday

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

**The Third Letter to the Africa Corps**

Praise be to God, and prayers and peace on the messenger of God.

Dear brothers, leaders and cadres of the Africa Corps

Peace, mercy and blessings of Allah upon you

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We congratulate you, ourselves, and all Muslims for that great victory in the land of Islamic Somalia. God has accepted your efforts from you and all those who toil and has placed them in your scale for the day of judgment. May he looks upon them generously.

Since the tenth month of last year I have been trying continuously to come to you, particularly after receiving the historic letter from brothers Abu `Ubayda and Abu Hafs. But God ordained otherwise, and what He wished was done. The harder I tried to travel, the more complicated matters became until I was surprised to find during my last attempt that I was wanted for security reasons. My name was listed at airports and passport departments in the venerable country of hypocrisy, Pakistan. I still have no idea of the reason for this close concern or what its source is. However, this is the reality of the situation. God suffices us and is wonderful to trust.

The most difficult aspect of the matter is that I am compelled to write what I had wanted to say directly to you in gatherings I believe would have

pleasurable, lengthy, and filled with the give and take of ideas, as was always our habit during the enchanting evenings in Afghanistan now passed. How I wish they could return!

Putting or cramming all of those topics into a letter is a very difficult matter, but the attempt must be made. This is our situation as we grapple with impossible difficulties. Our good opinion of God compels us to accept the challenge magnanimously, with a sporting spirit, and optimistically since God's support is one of our rewards.

We begin this letter after praying that God grant us success in arranging the topics and filling you with patience and comfort upon reading it.

**First: Somalia**

I would have liked to write on this subject unemotionally and somewhat objectively, were in not for my overwhelming desire to kiss the heads and hands of all those who took part in this action. Dear ones, this is a splendid victory and a unique experience that deserves recording, evaluation, derivation of lessons, and determination of courses of future action in light of its results. But was that what we did in Afghanistan, which was more profound, more comprehensive, and more critical? This was one of our major shortcomings, and how many they were!

I was not there for the experience, and I'm sorry to say I did not take part, but monitored it from a distance. Nonetheless, I will imagine it, draw conclusions, and indeed, offer advice, to myself first of all, and to you. This may not be rational, but unfortunately, that is what I will do in the following lines.

**General observations on the operation:**

1. The Africa Corps did not enter the Somali arena with a clear vision, specifically a strategic vision, either militarily or politically.

2. Likewise, Americans did not enter the Somali arena with a clear vision of the objectives of its presence. Moreover, its vision of East Africa and the Horn of Africa failed to crystallize. I believe that the buffoon Clinton was motivated by election considerations and a personal inclination toward

flamboyance, as if for a fleeting moment he believed the falsehood that he was the leader of the most powerful country in the world.

These are not just my words. Rather, this is the considered opinion of many inside America and abroad. What was the result? The result was that our amazing Corps was equal to America for the first time, but in a limited area—the area of darkness regarding a strategic vision. So how were our amazing Corps and its starving African Muslim allies able to be victorious over the greatest power in the world today?

This question is at the core of this topic. Indeed, it is the essence of our clash with the pagan west, whether under America's leadership today, or Europe tomorrow, or the Jews for ever and ever.

I believe the answer is found abundantly in our Islamic literature—from texts in the Koran, to the noble traditions of the Sunna, to the statements of the jurists. Therefore we necessarily know it because of religion. not be repeated. It is the same



It need eternal story of the struggle between truth and falsehood repeating every time, although the form changes to conform to the circumstances of the age.

When we are truly fighting in the name and on behalf of God, we have nothing to fear, even were we to be fighting thousands of battles against the most arrogant power on earth, because the result is known in advance. In every case it will be in our favor.

This is the essence of our clash against falsehood—past, present, and future until God comes to inherit the earth and all those on it.

Were we to forget this shining truth for a single second, we will most certainly be destroyed.

3. Let us return again to our beloved Corps. What was it doing in Somalia before America and the West arrived? It is true that it took part in achieving a brilliant victory over the Americans, but that was not part of its original objectives. It was an anomaly made imperative by subsequent events. Has

the Corps forgotten the objectives it started with, or will it resume them once the American tempest is over?

4. The Muslim victory in Somalia over the America has profound implications ideologically, politically, and psychologically that will require lengthy studies. You have the duty to record notes about these implications and keep them until it is time to study them in depth. Just the same, there is an important observation that we must not ignore, which is that the Americans were not defeated militarily in Somalia. Effective human and economic losses were not inflicted on them. All that happened was that the Somali battle revealed many of their psychological, political, and perhaps military weaknesses.

5. The Somali experience confirmed the spurious nature of American power and that it has not recovered from the Vietnam complex. It fears getting bogged down in a real war that would reveal its psychological collapse at the level of personnel and leadership. Since Vietnam America has been seeking easy battles that are completely guaranteed. It entered into a shameful series of adventures on the island of Grenada, then Panama, then bombing Libya, and then the Gulf War farce, which was the greatest military, political, and ideological swindle in history. The outcomes were 100 percent guaranteed. Even so, the Americans brought with them forces from 30 countries to take the blows on their behalf, should events not turn out the way they were supposed to. In the end, the Arabs, the Europeans, and Japan paid the costs of the war, plus fees!

America wanted to continue this series of farces. It assumed that Somalia was an appropriate space for another ridiculous act. But the Muslims were there—so the great disaster occurred. They fled in panic before their true capabilities could be exposed.

6. In Mogadishu and Beirut, urban deterrence operations caused the American forces to flee in a shameful and humiliating manner. Doesn't this demonstrate the importance of this type of warfare and the need to develop our warfare capabilities in terms of personnel, training syllabi, equipment being used, its level of technological advancement, development of security syllabi, development of security procedures, and training of competent elements for the security field.

On the subject of security, it should be noted that the enemy's greatest effort to pursue and eliminate Islamic action has become so dependent on his security agencies that the military apparatus is gradually being transformed into something resembling advanced Central Security. Doesn't this make it essential that we upgrade our security studies, institutions, and practices? Or should we leave the enemy with a free hand regarding espionage and sabotage activity against Islamic action, without any real deterrent on our part, whether awareness precautions or counter-penetration and deterrence operations. Likewise, here we also need a study of the experience of urban deterrence groups, the Somali experience, another study of the guerrilla warfare brigades prepared in advance, and an evaluation of that experience and its results with commentary. We intend to enter this experience in the future, God willing, but our circumstances here demand certain changes. It is important that we review the results of the experience before we undertake it.

7. There is an important military rule that states that victory must be exploited. When the enemy abandons the battleground, he must not be allowed to flee. He must be pursued from one position to the next until rooted out. This is what the Muslims did at the dawn of Islam when they began the jihad against the Persians and the Byzantines.

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The war against the Persians began in southern Iraq and progressed from one victory to the next until any Persian capability was completely eliminated. The end came at battles beyond the Jayhun River [TC. The Arabic name of the Amu Darya]. With respect to the Byzantines, and our perpetual battles with them, the early Muslims made progress in successive victories over them until they were expelled from Syria and North Africa. The struggle continued for several centuries until Constantinople, the capital of the Eastern Romanic people, was conquered, and so on.

Now, what have you done to exploit the victory in Somalia and develop the battle against the Byzantines? I fear that you will repeat the crime that was committed in Afghanistan when we allowed the Russians to withdraw in safety, while the Afghans were preoccupied with civil strife in Kabul. We were preoccupied with civil strife in Peshawar, followed by a disorganized flight to we knew not where. The rule says that if you have failed to pursue the enemy once he flees, he will catch his breath, reorganize his ranks,

launch a counter-attack, and regain what he lost and maybe even more. The Byzantines are the quickest people to reassemble themselves following defeat, as `Amr ibn al-`Ass attested, God rest his soul.

8. Your early arrival on Somali soil ahead of the enemy America gave you an excellent opportunity to gain advance knowledge of the battleground and prepare in advance the implements of combat in terms of personnel and weaponry, and understand the conditions of the social and political situation. Early arrival at the battleground and readying it for combat offers an important advantage to ensure superiority over the enemy. This is also one of the advantages of the ambush. Can we say that this is one of the practical applications of the following noble saying of the Prophet: "My nation is blessed for its earliness?" The question is directed at religious scholars.

7. [sic] One victory may generate additional victories because it raises morale and offers an incentive to action, but it may lead to defeat if a sense of delusion and indifference sets in. A defeat can lead to additional defeats because it destroys morale and creates despair. Yet it can lead to great victories if the causes are analyzed and the lessons learned are used in a future successful action. What are the advantages and faults revealed by the Somali campaign in the ranks of the Africa Corps? The success or failure of future campaigns will depend on the precise answer to this question and how it is exploited in practice.

8. The essential advantage of the Africa Corps is that it is a storehouse of intensive military expertise in guerrilla warfare. This is the most critical aspect of the matter. It is the thickest truncheon in our arsenal and must be developed skillfully and wisely.

Muslims now and in the future have an acute need for that tool. Hence the Corps, with its expertise, trainers, and cadres, will constitute a successful Islamic arsenal in the severe confrontation with the pagan tyranny of the Jewish West. Be fully aware of this.

9. Your Afghani heritage and African victory have increased your value tremendously. Have you thought about this and prepared yourselves for the coming stage at your current value, which is radically different from your value before the Somali campaign? Without engaging in delusion, the Corps today has international value, credibility, and effectiveness that must be noted and evaluated with objectivity and neutrality so that it can be used for

the general Islamic good. The Corps must avoid sectarian and individual convulsions. Any error in evaluation, taking advantage, or development of the Corps will be a crime against our suffering nation and a betrayal of the trust that rests in our hands and will pass on to others in the future. Be careful. Be careful.

The Somali operation confirmed an important and correct military principle at the tactical and strategic levels, which is the sensitivity and critical nature of action on the flanks. Most battles, if not all, are won or lost in operations on the adversary's flanks. If we go back to the beginning of the Crusader wars, the reasons for their failure are that they tried to strike at the centers of Islam in Syria, Egypt, and the Arabian Peninsula. However when they began via what were called "geographical discoveries" to encircle the Islamic world with military centers on its periphery, then brought under control the international waterways, then began lopping off the remote parts piece by piece, they succeeded in finally reaching the heartland. They now fully control it, including the religious sanctuaries in the Peninsula and Palestine.

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Here once again I remind you of one of your fatal mistakes, which is the quick changing of strategic targets, whereby now every action is tactical and improvised. Despite whatever success some of these operations may have had, the general line of the march is lost, loses its direction, and possibly loses all of its accomplishments. This is an oppressive burden on our unfortunate nation.

I remind you that before you abandoned the Asian position under the slogan that you were going to work in the heartland region—the Arab region—you had totally rejected the concept of movement on the flanks claiming that the battle would be decided in the heartland. Indeed, you went so far as to lose hope in these foreigners, but now you say you have accomplished a strategic gain. Where? In Somalia? Where is Somalia? Is it not on the southern flank of the Arab world?

Consider this well, my dear friends. You went to work in the heartland, yet got involved in the southern flank where you achieved a brilliant victory that could only have been achieved on the flank. Meanwhile, the sick heartland remains ailing and suffering. You went to Somalia to assist the Somali

Salafia in its fight against Somali communism. The nature of the battle changed suddenly to an all-out Islamic battle against international infidelity. What happened? The West was defeated and fled Somalia, leaving pockets of the armies of infidelity and apostasy under the banner of the American United Nations.

The original problem that you went to address still exists. What happened to the Somali Salafia and where is it now? What is its stance? What is the role of Somali Marxism? What is your strategic objective in this complicated arena? How much of your original objective have you accomplished? Did you suddenly go to Somalia and then suddenly withdraw, as happened in Afghanistan, without accomplishing any clear objective or follow up the victory and benefit from it to accomplish additional victories?

In summary:

1. Set out a well-studied, clear, fixed strategic program and follow-up with determined action.

2. Do not leave Somalia the way you left Afghanistan. Plant firm pillars there and go on working in an adjacent or nearby geographical field in preparation for a battle in which you will wrest away from the adversary additional retreats on the flanks.

3. Continue active work in guerrilla warfare on the adversary's flanks—training, organizing, and planning—followed by very tenacious close battlefield supervision.

4. Your role in the heartland must have a clear and firm framework for a sufficient period of time that an obvious change in the balance of power occurs in the heartland area and the hour of preparation for the decisive battles arrives. This stage does not appear to be close at hand. Right now I suggest that you be satisfied with providing the following services to the mujahedeen in the heartland:

Training, both practical and theoretical; technical guidance and consultation; efforts to establish some type of joint coordination among the Arab jihad sectors and get beyond the phase of national jihad and ignore the Sykes-Picot boundaries, in the sense that all of North Africa is good as a single theater of operations. Likewise, Egypt, Libya, and Sudan are good as a

single theater of operations. The entire Arabian Peninsula can serve as a single theater of operations or as two, one being Yemen and Oman, the second being the rest of the Peninsula, and so on.

This, of course, is over the long term, but we can gradually work towards that goal. We can begin by providing some type of service exchange in technical matters at first, then financial matters, then tactical operations, and finally general strategic planning. We must keep completely away from any attempt at organizational merger for the reason that the practical experience of Muslims tells us that every attempt at merger causes numerous divisions and splits. So the attempts to merge must end. We have to be satisfied with coordination in practical fields. In and of itself, this will lay the proper groundwork for organizational unity in the distant future, or until God wills that the Mahdi appear.



I am unable to provide a detailed program for development, but I would suggest two axes for developing action in the coming phase. They are:

1. The African axis, centered in Sudan – the Africa Corps
2. The Asian axis, centered in Afghanistan – the Asian Corps

I believe that the most suitable strategy governing joint action on these two axes is the concept of: "Operating on the enemy's flanks with the objective of making progress in his areas of weakness, while providing whatever services are possible to mujahedeen in the heartland."

Successes in Afghanistan and Somalia confirm the correctness of this approach. These are successes that can be developed to incredible proportions if we behave properly and if we make the best use of the scant resources we have available to us. Both corps must be strengthened and reorganized in order to perform more effectively. In my view, following the Somali operation the African Corps needs to reorganize these important elements: put its financial situation in order, reconsider its organizational situation, gently begin to build an underground political structure, and begin to establish a simple informational presence and an underground center.

The Asian Corps needs to make a greater effort. Its present situation is not much beyond the zero point. All we need to know is that it only has five

full-time personnel. The number of cadres cooperating with it from abroad is also five. Its financial situation is even worse than its organizational situation, and despite that it is working full bore to send the Corps onto the battleground within a month from now!

The Asian Corps suffers from the negative effects of sedition in Kabul that followed the conquest, the negative effects of disorganized evacuation and removal of the Arabs from the area, the negative effects of international pursuit of the Arabs in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, the negative effects of the Islamic shock at what happened in Afghanistan after the conquest, and the severe collapse, psychologically and in terms of morale, and Islamic withdrawal from the region and everything in it that it left behind. The young men here have picked up a pretty good amount of the effects of that psychological frustration.

Hence, the problems impeding the development of the Asian Corps can be summarized as follows:

- A problem of psychological morale resulting from the effects of the Afghan disaster.
- An organization problem because of the lack of an organizational framework and the scarcity of cadres.
- A financial problem of pittance contributions.
- The Afghan sedition.
- Pakistani pursuit.

Nonetheless, overcoming those obstacles and creating a real Corps qualified to perform its role is not an impossible operation.

In general, the potential for success in the region are beyond splendid. I hope that an independent discussion covering this aspect will take place.

In order to stabilize the conditions of the Asian Corps and upgrade its capabilities, we make the following overall recommendations:

1. Attach the Corps organizationally and financially to the Africa Corps and provide it with a fully integrated group for military training and another group to support military action in Tajikistan in the area of planning and battlefield direction.

2. The aforementioned support is the minimum, but it is sufficient under the current circumstances and perhaps for years ahead. This has several advantages:

- It keeps expenditures at the minimum.
- It reduces friction with the Pakistani and Afghan community to the minimum.

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- It is simple to administer and control.

3. Both Corps must enjoy great ability to act individually in a flexible decentralized fashion committed to the application of general strategic objectives.

4. The leadership of each Corps must set out its own tactical plan and plans for developing action in its area.

Other advantages of the foregoing recommendations are as follows:

They bring about jihad action having a unified strategic vision on two geopolitically critical flanks: a) the eastern flank of the Islamic world in central Asia, and b) the southern flank of the Arab world.

Both flanks are distinctive for being relatively relaxed, capable of deep penetration, and providing scope for jihad and armed opposition unanticipated by the adversary yet able to greatly affect his balance and cohesiveness. Moreover, such action constitutes application of the indirect approach strategy that is more appropriate for us in our current situation. The ultimate goal is to bring about conditions that will lead to reconquest of the Arab region through simultaneous external and internal jihad action.

Second: The Southern Arabian Peninsula

In the last few days fighting has broken out in Yemen—north and south. [TC: May 1994] I can imagine the state of tension and awareness you are in. How I wish I could be with you taking part in those stimulating discussions as the winds of paradise blow and the swords of jihad clash. Wouldn't it be

great if that sacred melody were coming from the southern part of our Arabian peninsula?

Once again the Yemen file is being opened for jihad after a wait of several years following the passing of one opportunity that had seemed suitable. Now a new opportunity has appeared on the horizon. How suitable will it be for a new Islamic thrust, albeit limited in scope and results? It may not be possible for us to make Yemen leap from its present situation into a fully-integrated Islamic status through military jihad action. I believe this is not possible, not in Yemen nor anywhere else. However, the alternative is not to stop the jihad but to carry out a phased advance through continuous jihad battles. As we push the enemy backward, we will gradually advance toward a position that presents us with a decisive and final battle at some time in the future.

There is nothing like the flanks, extremities, and fragile areas for accomplishing those jihad policies. Yemen is without doubt a fragile area, as is Afghanistan, central Asia, and other areas at the margins of the continents suffering from political, economic, and ideological disintegration.

I am imagining myself among you, inciting you towards Yemen. Why?

Let us at least scare the Jews and America and inflict real fright on them such as they have not seen this century. Is this exaggerated? I do not think so for the following reasons:

From the American perspective the Arabian Peninsula is a region of vital interests, namely petroleum. There can be no doubt that America and the West are prepared to enter into a war on behalf of oil.

From the Jewish-Crusader perspective the Arabian Peninsula is the center of Islamic threat. They are prepared to enter into a war should an Islamic threat appear in the Peninsula.

What would happen if we posed both an Islamic threat and a petroleum threat? Can this be done on the basis of the Yemeni fighting currently taking place?

I believe that with God's help and with a bit of effort it can. We have nothing to lose because the Peninsula is in their hands, petroleum is in their hands, Palestine is in their hands, and the entire world is in their hands.

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Any attack we make against them can only carry gains for Islam, God willing. We cannot lose anymore than we have already actually lost.

Islam is surrounded and pursued in the Arabian Peninsula itself. Its riches have been plundered and no one can demand them back.

If we take advantage of them, the events in Yemen:

- Can restore a feeling of pride in Islam to the population of the Peninsula.
- Can crystallize new objectives for Islamic action for the population of the Peninsula.
- Can be the beginning of an Islamic jihad program with excellent opportunities for progress on the shaky soil of Yemen. Any Islamic progress in Yemen is certain to be a serious threat to the Jews and the Crusaders in the entire Peninsula and in Greater Syria, i.e. in the Islamic heartland.

The events in Yemen provide an auspicious opportunity for declaring jihad in the Arabian Peninsula. The time may be right to announce an "Islamic Jihad Grouping" with these objectives:

- To rid the Peninsula of Jewish and Crusader influence.
- To rid the Peninsula of communism, secularism, and atheism.
- To restore God's rule to the Peninsula and make it a purely Islamic place once again: "Let no two religions come together in the Arabian Peninsula." [TC: Statement attributed to the Prophet Muhammad]

This "Islamic Grouping" would announce itself and begin its operations on Yemeni soil by declaring a jihad against communism and atheism in Yemen to purify it and restore it to God's path.

This Grouping would begin a concentrated propaganda attack over its radio stations in Yemen and Somalia against the Jewish-Crusader presence on the

soil of the Arabian Peninsula, whether military, economic, or political. The population of the Peninsula would demand to carry out their legal duty to combat this presence, cleanse the soil of the Peninsula, and restore God's path throughout all parts of it.

Over the radio the Grouping would demand:

- The evacuation of all Crusader and Jewish infidel forces from Peninsula soil.

- Restoration of the Peninsula to a life of simplicity and a boycott of the life of opulence and the Western lifestyle as an essential step towards breaking off economic dependency on the infidel states in the West.

- Destruction of the churches and Jewish and Buddhist temples throughout the Peninsula.

- Warn all those who defend the infidel presence in the Peninsula that they will be treated as apostates.

- Restoration of the wealth and property of Muslims, petroleum first and foremost, and its disposition in accordance with the provisions of Islamic law.

- Halt all transactions involving interest and recovery of balances from Western banks for investment in Muslim countries.

The events in Yemen could be the true beginning of infusing a spirit of jihad in the Arabian Peninsula and confrontation of the Jewish project in the region with an Islamic project flowing from the cradle of Islam. We do not expect sudden decisive changes; such knowledge is God's alone. We are seeking to revive that spirit of the call and combat together in the Yemeni arena, which has human, geographic, and political advantages unhidden to anyone.

Were we able, using Muslim youth in the Peninsula, to direct deterrent blows through martyrdom operations against Jews and Christians in the Peninsula, that would certainly be an important introduction to the

transformation of the course of Islamic jihad and Islamic trends for the Arabs in the Peninsula.

Jihad radio stations operating in Yemen and Somalia will have a more powerful effect on them than nuclear bombs. Jihad operations in Yemen against communism will give jihad action in the Peninsula credibility and effectiveness.



Martyrdom operations on the soil of the Peninsula against Christians and Jews will arouse the Arab Islamic spirit the world knows and history keeps in its records of the past.

In my estimation, just several dozen young men like Shafiq and Sakhri would be more than enough to make matters right and discipline or expunge most of the Jewish, Christian, and apostate braggadocio from the soil of the Peninsula.

During the jihad in Yemen, such people can be prepared through training camps and expertise gained in battles.

Combat in Yemen must not be left to become simply tribal fighting or the settling of political scores between those competing to rule. The Islamic Grouping we seek must raise the banner of jihad. It must work using military and religious means to drive out the cultural and political presence of communism in Yemen. That effort on Yemeni soil will prepare the Peninsula and awake it militarily and religiously to throw the Crusader-Jewish incubus and their beliefs out of that land.

The situation in the rest of the Peninsula will heat up over the fires of jihad in Yemen. The longer there is a confrontation in Yemen and the more successful it is for the Muslims, the higher the Islamic temperature in the rest of the Peninsula will be and the more jihad battles will break out.

As the fragile southern end of the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen provides an excellent location for establishing Islamic jihad positions in the mountains to threaten the heartland and arouse terror in the hearts of the Jews and Christians in the fear that Islam is coming from the soil of the Peninsula, the

cradle of Islam, and out of concern for petroleum, the lifeline, wealth, and strength of the Christian West.

[TC: The text of the above letter is broken at this point, but resumes after the closing of the letter below.]

Letter Regarding the Tajikistani Negotiations

A letter of inquiry sent to the ambassador of the Furqan Project in Kunduz, Abu al-Hussein al-Misri, following the negotiations that recently took place between the Nahdha Party and the Dushanbe government.

Dear brother Abu al-Hussein,

Peace upon you and the mercy and blessings of God. After praising God and seeking prayer and peace for the Messenger of God, we pray God that you and all the brothers with you are well and healthy. To save time, we wish to say that we have a complete picture of the position of the Nahdha Party regarding the negotiations between Teheran and Moscow over a political settlement. Generally speaking, the firm position of the party was as follows:

They are demanding that Russian forces be kept in Tajikistan in cooperation with United Nations forces to oversee the procedures for a political settlement within the country. These procedures include:

1. Disarming both disputing parties—Nahdha and the Dushanbe government.
2. A general referendum to establish the country's system of government.
3. Prior to that, of course, supervision of the return of the émigrés.
4. Election of a parliament; establishing a constitution; selection of a head of state.

We have also learned that the negotiations failed because of procedural conflicts related to the level of official representation in the negotiations, especially from the side of the Dushanbe government, which sent two negotiators below the level appropriate to the delegation sent by Nahdha.

The stance of the Dushanbe government was as follows:

1. Not to touch the system of government.
2. Work to have the émigrés return to their homes.
3. General amnesty for those involved in bearing arms against the state.

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Despite the fact that the negotiations failed, or more correctly never began since each party only presented its point of view, we have heard that a committee was formed consisting of the Nahdha Party, the Dushanbe government, and the United Nations with the goal of conducting a census of the Tajikistani émigrés. This is the only practical measure that we have heard about in preparation for the proposals for a settlement which are unknown.

This is a summary of what we have learned about the political progress toward a settlement. We have a few comments in this regard:

First: The Nahdha Party has relinquished the Islamic identity of the Tajikistani cause and has converted it to merely a dispute over power between the opposition and the government.

The Nahdha Party has thereby relinquished its most powerful weapon and receiving nothing in exchange. It can now be said that the Nahdha Party lost the war in Tajikistan, even if some of their leaders were to receive some seats in any future parliament or government. Moreover, at the end of the day any military confrontation by Nahdha will be doomed to failure.

Second: Nahdha has recognized the legitimacy of the Russian presence on Tajikistani territory. This is a position that is not acceptable in either Islamic or nationalist terms.

Third: Nahdha has recognized the Russian right to military oversight of the organization of the future political situation in Tajikistan. As a consequence, this situation will be unable to escape the framework of serving Russian interests and total affiliation with Russia.

Fourth: It has requested United Nations intervention and to have the Russian forces operate under its banner. This is another gift from Nahdha to the Russians. Thus Russia's army of occupation represents "international legitimacy," thereby weakening the position of the mujahedeen politically.

Fifth: Nahdha placed its Islamic association in doubt when it demanded a referendum on the type of system of government. At the same time the Dushanbe government proudly established its communist identity for once and for all when it refused even to discuss a change in the type of regime.

Thus, while Nahdha relinquished its ideological identity, the Communists held on to theirs.

Sixth: The agreement to surrender weapons to the Russian Army is a positive admission of the relinquishment of Islamic identity, affirms the legitimacy of the Russian occupation of the country, and affirms the legitimacy of Russian guardianship and hegemony over the land and people of Tajikistan, to say nothing of its betrayal of jihad and the mujahedeen.

Seventh: Surrender of weapons by both parties, Nahdha and the Dushanbe government, leaves just one party in Tajikistan armed, organized, and capable of imposing its will fully and unopposed, namely the Russians.

Eighth: The Nahdha vision of the future political situation in the country can be summarized as merely offering an Islamic face to rule the country in Russia's interest, instead of its old and no longer desirable communist face.

Ninth: Formation of a committee to conduct a census of the émigrés means that the government's vision of a settlement is on its way to implementation. The practical steps with respect to the émigrés conform to the government's view that the essential nature of the regime is not open to discussion.

However, Nahdha should have insisted on changing the regime before making the effort to resolve the problem of the émigrés or even to discuss it.

Tenth: Nahdha has ignored the fact that the United Nations is an organization that expresses the interests of the colonial West, headed by the United States, that it is an original party in the West's battles against Islam, that the Jews control most of its operating agencies, and that the basic mission of that organization in the current international situation is to lay traps for Islam and the Muslims.

Eleventh: As with all failed negotiations, the enemy has benefited and had its legitimacy confirmed, whereas Nahdha has given up its legitimacy and

lost its credibility. It is going to suffer from internal division and perhaps an organizational split. This is how the enemy achieved through politics what it would have found impossible to achieve through war. This is what they call "victory without war."

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Nahdha abandoned in advance its primary and singular weapon, which is its ideological weapon. What was the result? Naturally, the communists did not pay the price of the goods they were given by the foe. They made no concession to the Nahdha Party which conceded everything when it relinquished its Islamic identity. Now that Nahdha realizes the predicament into which it has fallen having relinquished everything for nothing, it has again come back demanding jihad and raising weapons. What does this mean?

What it means is that Nahdha, like any opportunistic political grouping, is attempting to exploit the Islamic card to make minor gains by threatening its foe with the sword of Islamic jihad, as Saddam did when he became enmeshed in the Kuwait war. Such Islamic tendencies are not so much an expression of true adherence to Islam as they are taking political advantage of Islam and exploiting the enthusiasm and sacrifice of Muslims to obtain a few seats in a government or parliament.

Nahdha's latest political experiment has caused it to lose its credibility in terms of Islam and jihad, and its ideological concessions do not allow Muslim to fight on its side.

If Nahdha continues in this manner, it can only be defeated. Without Islam, weapons are of no use. On the heels of such damage, the march is difficult to fix but not impossible. The process of repair will require strength and determination in an amount equal to the gravity of the deviance that occurred. I believe that the following measures will accomplish what is required:

1. An official declaration of a halt to all political contacts.
2. Retraction of all proposals Nahdha submitted during previous contacts.
3. An announcement of the Islamic identity of the movement and the Islamic future of the country.
4. A demand for the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces.

5. An announcement that any foreign forces on Tajikistani soil shall be considered hostile forces, regardless of their source.
6. Isolation of the members of the previous negotiating delegation or assigning them to marginal tasks.
7. Appointment of a foreign relations official—Minister of Foreign Affairs—and an official spokesman for the movement who is a well-known warrior.
8. Rejection of the return of the émigrés until the current regime has been overthrown and replaced by a regime with an Islamic tendency.
9. Entry of first line leadership onto the battleground and initiation of their tasks from there.
10. Declaration of the material and moral protection and defense of Tajik émigrés in every possible way against any attempt to force them to return to their country against their will in light of the current communist regime.
11. Cutting off any cooperation with the United Nations or allowing them to participate in determining the political future of the country.
12. Considering the issue of émigrés to be a secondary issue that can only be resolved at its roots by overthrowing the communist regime, the original cause of the tragedy inflicted upon the émigrés and the entire Tajikistani people.

The brothers here are of the opinion that cooperation can not be continued with the Nahdha movement in view of its current deviance which is a violation of Islam. However, once this defect in the march has been corrected and the march has returned to the truth, we will not delay in carrying out our Islamic duty of jihad on God's behalf.

Therefore we ask you to look deeply into the matter with Mr. Abdullah Nuri and inform him of that letter or discuss it with him. We appeal to God to give you, us, and all Muslims success in that which is loved and satisfying to Him, so that we become aware that He hears and answers prayers. Peace be upon you and God's mercy and blessings.

Your brother Abu al-Walid

Date: [Text garbled]

[TC: The text that follows is a continuation of the letter interrupted at page 34.]

Third: Tajikistan

Perhaps you have read the accompanying letter full of questions which explains the current predicament between us and the Nahdha Party, indeed the internal predicament within Nahdha as an organization. [TC: Presumably he is referring to the immediately preceding letter.] Perhaps also, from our earlier letters several months ago, you are aware of our view of the Nahdha Party and that it is unsuited for the mission facing it, or in which it is bogged down, in terms of leadership, organization, and thought. So there is no need to repeat it.

In earlier letters we also explained to you that the basic danger to Islam in central Asia comes from Kabul, not from Moscow or Washington because Afghan political forces—the parties—are the spearhead striking at Islam in the region and reinforcing central Asia against Islamic jihad action at the direction of Washington and with support from Moscow.

Accordingly, we understand that fighting in Kabul is one in a series of steps following that course. The effects of that war led to [TC. Text garbled] and harm to the Tajikistani émigrés—aircraft and artillery shelling—in addition to the pressures of Rabbani and others on the Tajikistani leadership to stop the fighting and seek a political solution conforming to the international outlook of America.

Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, etc. also applied pressure. Nor do we forget, of course, the Islamic group, Pakistan, and the international Muslim Brotherhood, for they had a distinguished role in that effort. The results of the negotiations were as is clear from the letter full of questions: a disaster, as we understand it. The Nahdha negotiators maneuvered inside the forbidden zone, the area of beliefs and religious association, thereby framing the issue within a narrow and despicable circle as a political dispute between the government and the opposition.

- They exchanged recognition of legitimacy with the communist government in Dushanbe!

- They recognized the legitimacy of the Russian occupation of the country, indeed, they made it one of their demands; which is also a demand of the communist government, and they approved of a mutual surrender of weapons to the Russians!
- They demanded military intervention by the United Nations, and that Russian forces be one of its components.

By the way, this means that the international organization would have to be responsible for the costs of the Russian occupation of the country, which currently costs [text missing] million dollars per year. The evil Boutros has so far rejected this, claiming a lack of resources. But when necessary, King Fahd may volunteer to cover Boutros's shortfall and Moscow's problem and finance the international Russian forces to strike at Islam in central Asia. His Majesty might just do that.

In short, rather than negotiate, the Nahdha delegation prostrated itself, with the result that the Dushanbe regime is now taking a hard line and refusing to respond or even to send a reasonable delegation to complete the farce. This is the logical result, of course, because now that the foe—Nahdha—has surrendered and given up its weapons in advance, why should it receive compensation? This is exactly what Kissinger told Sadat after the latter expelled the Soviet advisers from Egypt and then went to ask for compensation from America. The Americans said to him: "We received the goods in advance; why should we have to pay for them?" The logic of the Jews!

Nahdha now says "come to jihad" after the enemy has kicked it.

But the honor of political parties is not like a matchstick. Instead, it is like a lighter that can be lit thousands of times.

The problem of confidence has now begun between us and Nahdha, within the ranks of Nahdha itself, between the religious scholars—figuratively speaking—and the politicians, and among the hawks, the doves, the Islamists, the democrats, etc. The foe has succeeded in transferring the battle to within the ranks of Nahdha with just a simple political maneuver.

He may have won the entire battle and is now preparing militarily to affirm his political victory.

What do we do now?

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The battles are supposed to begin and gradually intensify starting this month. We were supposed to participate in this effort through however much of the al-Furqan project we were able to accomplish—approximately [text missing] of the original plan.

It should be noted that the Nahdha party is compelled to fight to pressure the regime to accept negotiations on the former basis. There may be the possibility of further concessions from Nahdha's side because we only mentioned their initial proposals, i.e., from Nahdha's perspective the war aims at obtaining a limited number of seats in the municipal councils, or perhaps in the coffeehouses. For Nahdha to get signs of approval from Dushanbe, especially if the mujahedeen on the fronts get lucky, it is most likely to leave the battle and sit in those seats from where it will attack fundamentalism, the extremists, and the Afghan Arabs.

Nevertheless, the Asian Corps staff so far continue to support the notion of completing the steps of the project to the greatest degree possible, i.e., completing the paragraph regarding military participation. This is for the following reasons:

1. Despite the Corps' weak resources, it is one of the distinctive elements in the Tajikistani question. The leadership views the Corps as the best source of serious training and equipping of cadres. They cannot be compared to its original cadres. Radio Moscow speaks of Arab exercises in intense guerrilla warfare for the Tajikistani mujahedeen.
The amount of weapons and ammunition that were transported through the Corps' efforts were considerable and cannot be ignored relative to what they received from other richer and more powerful parties: Mas'oud, certain Afghan parties, Iran.

2. The religious, behavioral, and intellectual impact relayed to young Tajikistani men through the training camp is tremendous by the admission of Tajikistani leaders and the Arabs themselves.
The Corps hawks believe the contact should continue, whether regarding training or operations, regardless of the political results due to leadership weakness. This will lead to the rise and strengthening of a jihad trend

among young men that could change the course of events in Tajikistan and the region.

3. The Corps' training activity has become almost legendary thanks to the traditional exaggeration of the peoples of the region. The movements arising in the area around Tajikistan have begun to try to take advantage of that training effort, whether directly through bringing in trainers, or indirectly by sending elements of the graduates from their places. Training activity is likely to embark on unexpected horizons this year. Accordingly, the Asian Corps' hawks are demanding we continue our role here, and indeed escalate it to take advantage of the element of time to create a new fait accompli to control the course of events militarily and politically, not just in Tajikistan, but in the entire area, especially in Uzbekistan. However, as yet we have taken no final decisions while we await the arrival of our resident emissary with Nahdha so that we can crystallize a final visualization of the future for action and how it can be carried out.

**The Action Program**

If the situation between us and Nahdha does not explode, and if the decision is to escalate our military participation in all the resources available to us, the general features of the action program may be as follows:

1. Resume and upgrade military training in terms of the training programs and the nationalities benefiting from the training within the borders of central Asia and the Caucasus.

2. Ready the Tajikistani portion of the Pamir plateau as a solid base for unending guerrilla warfare in the area as the resources gradually becomes available.

3. Seek an appropriate strategy in the field for military action and carry it out.



4. Arrange suitable land passages with Uzbekistan, activate the jihad situation there, and provide it with appropriate forms of assistance.

At the same time one must note that the paucity of human and financial resources leaves the rate of accomplishment extremely modest. In addition to this there is a lack of full agreement between us and Nahdha, and there are other problems, both Afghani and central Asian. Yet even slow achievement has benefits, as we have seen recently. Not least is the local Islamic element's need for a slow pace of change that allows it to absorb deeply and become knowledgeable about doctrinal issues, especially behavioral and intellectual issues which generally take a long time. This can not be accomplished rapidly no matter how many material resources are available.

As the Prophet, God's prayers and peace be upon him, said: "It is not poverty that I fear for you."

**Fourth: The Situation of Nahdha**

Season's greetings on the occasion of the blessed feast of sacrifice. Saturday, [text missing]. Approximately two days earlier we received an answer from the Nahdha Party to our aforementioned letter. Brother Abu HUssein arrived with verbal details he relayed from the leadership to explain its position regarding the negotiations and answers to the contents of our letter to them. Here is a summary.

- Nahdha leadership is of the view that it has benefited greatly from the experience of entering into negotiations and that the result has been to isolate the Dushanbe regime and enable Nahdha to appear as a primary party on the political stage with others confident of its political and military capabilities.
- Nahdha's military preparations are proceeding apace and have not been affected by the negotiation process.
- Nahdha says that our letter to them failed to contain an important condition of Nahdha. That condition demands the resignation of the Dushanbe government, with governance of the country to be turned over to a neutral government for a two-year period. Nahdha also says that condition contains its strategy regarding the entire negotiation process. It thinks as follows:

"We must offer harsh terms. If the enemy accepts them, this will lead to his political downfall. If he rejects them, this will give us adequate justification to continue to fight."

Nahdha leadership was certain it would be impossible for the Dushanbe government to accept this condition, which is what actually happened. In practical terms this led to the failure of the negotiation process after Nahdha had already accomplished important objectives, including:

According to the testimony of the parties overseeing the negotiations, the Dushanbe government bears responsibility for the failure of the negotiations.

With the exception of Pravda, even the Russian newspapers have put the blame on the Dushanbe government and praised Nahdha's flexibility.

The malleable conditions that Nahdha offered once it was certain that it would be impossible for the Dushanbe government to accept the principle of resignation put the lie to the accusation of extremism and violence. Indeed, it was the Dushanbe government that came to be accused of extremism and rejecting reconciliation and peace.

In response, Nahdha leadership says that it has certain specific procedures it does not wish to reveal that in practical terms would make the surrender of weapons meaningless.

The response states that Nahdha has not so far included its representatives at any level in the negotiation process because the Dushanbe government has not sent any representatives at an appropriate level. Thus the two Nahdha representatives, Hammat Zadeh and Turjan Zadeh, merely conducted a dialogue in Moscow with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Teheran-Moscow negotiations, meanwhile, were carried out by certain opposition factions allied with Nahdha.



"We say this gave Nahdha an excellent opportunity to abandon any future negotiation process on any terms that do not suit it."

Based on this, the Nahdha leadership says it offered no political concession impinging on the Islamic identity of Nahdha or the Tajikistani people. Nahdha believes that out of the negotiation process it has won recognition of its existence and legitimacy from all parties that participated in or oversaw the negotiation process.

Nahdha also believes that politically it has driven a wedge into the Moscow-Dushanbe relationship. Differences in the positions of the two parties regarding events in Tajikistan have arisen and are still there.

There are also disagreements within the communist wing in the country. There are now four or five differing movements, all of which, with the exception of the movement in power, are secretly negotiating with Nahdha over the political future of the country, from Nahdha's perspective. This alone is large disintegrating factor in the structure of the current regime.

As for creating a committee to do a census of the émigrés, its objective is to strike at the legitimacy of the current regime and point out that any elections conducted under its authority would not be serious for the reason that about one million Tajikistani émigrés are outside the country in the commonwealth states and Afghanistan. This represents about [text missing] of those entitled to vote in the country. Thus there can be no true elections until they return to take part in the balloting. We also say that this Nahdha position has validity because the emigration process (escape) from the country is linked to the current political situation in which the communists took over the government as a result of mass slaughters carried out by armed communist militias supervised and armed by the American ambassador in Dushanbe in the fall of [text missing] AD. Consequently, a census of the émigrés and arranging for their return would automatically require a change in the current regime in Dushanbe. Tajikistani émigrés stressed this to United Nations representatives in Afghanistan when the latter, through a combination of deceit and pressure, attempted to return them to their country by offering cosmetic guarantees for their safety. However, the Dushanbe government killed young émigrés and detained old men and women. As a result, the project to have them emigrate back failed, and the émigrés stuck with Nahdha leadership and a change of regime in Dushanbe.

Finally, Nahdha leadership says that Russian statistics show that their forces in Tajikistan were subjected to about [text missing] attacks in the years [text missing]. During the first two months of the year [text missing] they were subjected to about [text missing] attacks.

This is why Nahdha leadership believes the Russians are under military pressure, agreed to sit down to negotiate with it, and that without jihad there will not be any response to any Nahdha demand.

This is a summary of the Nahdha movement's position regarding the recent negotiation processes. Our position in regard thereto is as follows:

Nahdha is moving politically within a framework that on the whole is integrated, correct, and well-suited to its extremely difficult circumstances.

Nahdha has made relative progress in the political area proportional to and reinforcing of the relative progress of the military action it carried out last year.

We have determined that there has been no splintering or division within Nahdha as a result of the recent negotiation processes, which we had feared.

Based on the information available to us the internal situation in Tajikistan is about to collapse and conditions are gradually slipping away from the Dushanbe government.

Meanwhile, the situation in Moscow is gloomy and depressing. Any wide-scale military adventure in Tajikistan could lead to a disaster on a scale known only to God.

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We therefore made the unanimous decision to complete the steps of the program, move to the front, take whatever steps are possible there, and engage in greater coordination with Nahdha leadership regarding this year's program and future action in general in Tajikistan and the remainder of the area.

In fact, this was the view of all the brothers even before the Nahdha response arrived and making the worst-case assumptions we explained in our letter. This group decision was motivated by the positive results achieved at al-Faruq camp despite all the obstacles.

The change in the trainees was noticeable and so effective that it convinced the brothers of the importance of the mission the Arabs are undertaking in this region. It is much deeper than simply using weapons or training on them.

The presence of Arab mujahedeen here assists with the reformation and recasting of the Islamic personality in the region. This is occurring in the best missionary environment, which is the jihad environment.

In short, this is our mission here, one that we hope to be able to perform in the best possible manner despite the shortage in funds, personnel, and accomplishments.

Peace, mercy and blessings of Allah upon you

Your brother,

Hassan

24 May 1994 A.D.

**P.S.:**
One excellent development recently is the noticeable and unexpected improvement in Nahdha's situation with respect to domestic Afghanistan policy in spite of the severe turmoil within Afghanistan which seemed to us to be a sure danger to the jihad movement in Tajikistan.

The story began on the eighth of last Ramadan when we sent a delegation from our side to Haqqani in Kabul, in his capacity as the head of the intermediary delegation. During the mediation we asked to include the topic of transfer of weapons and ammunition to the Tajikistani mujahedeen from the south of the country to the north under a guarantee by the contending parties. Haqqani's direct comment was: "This is the most impossible thing to do in Afghanistan at the present time." Hikmatyar happened to enter at the very same moment and surprisingly, he immediately agreed to the detailed proposals in the letter and the offer of land, air, and barter facilities!

Nahdha leadership was terrified over how Mas'oud would react, but once the transport operations started, which were by land only, Mas'oud did not object to the presence of his adversary at the other end of the operation.

Summarizing what has happened since then up to the writing of this letter, Nahdha has gained a political position putting it at the forefront of the contending parties and perhaps the object of internal auctioneering amongst them that included Abu Jahl al-Afghani! [TC: This appears to be a derisive

term for someone, probably one of the warlords, rather than a nom de guerre].
(EC: I believe he is referring to the Afghani president. Addressing him as Abu Jahl, Prophet Mohammed uncle, who died not believing in his nephew's message).

Nahdha movements have become possible by land and air for arms, supplies, Tajik personnel, and Arab collaborators and are guaranteed by all!

Nahdha leadership may be able to play the role of accepted mediator among the warring parties in Afghanistan. This may be of limited benefit to the Afghan situation, but it is of immense benefit to the Tajikistani jihad situation within Afghanistan itself.

Is this not a marvel, indeed a miracle?

Politics is fickle, yet serious. Afghan politicians are even greater heathens and hypocrites. We ask God for the help, success, and accuracy of his mujahedeen worshipers, even in the area of politics. We pray to God saying: "Even when you throw, you have not thrown: God has thrown."

Peace, mercy and blessings of Allah upon you

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Your brother,

Hassan

24 May 1994 A.D.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

The Fourth Letter about Jihad in the Caucasus

Brother Abu `Abdullah and brothers Abu Hafs and Abu `Ubayda

Peace, mercy and blessings of Allah upon you

We have the honor of bothering you once again with one of our lengthy letters that does more to raise more concern and apprehension than it does to inspire delight and joy. But, that is the state we are in, and in God is our help.

After our letter number [text missing] to the African Corps we went to North Afghanistan to meet with the leadership of the Nahdha Party and then continue our movement northward over the Jayhun River accompanied by that portion of the al-Furqan force that we were able to train. According to the original plan the Nahdha movement reviewed and approved as a whole and in detail, it was supposed to consist of a fully-armed brigade. However, the number trained did not exceed one third of the number scheduled, the reason being the failure of Nahdha to respond adequately by sending trainees to the camp. In terms of weapons, last Ramadan we began moving respectable amounts of ammunition and weapons to Nahdha headquarters in Taloqan. This was done with the knowledge and approval of all of the contending factions in Kabul. This was truly amazing, to us at least. It was a success granted by God, most High, that is inexplicable in the world of causes. The entire amount of arms and ammunition, and all the trainees, arrived with almost no problems.

We then met with the leader of Nahdha, Mr. `Abdullah Nuri. He asked us about our program. We were a bit surprised at his question because for the past two years we had discussed nothing but the al-Furqan Program project. Nonetheless, I gave him another brief review of the broad outlines of the project and its importance for them and the region.

We again received a full and comprehensive approval of the project. The only thing remaining is to move northward and cross the Jayhun River to begin operations in the Tajikistani region of Badakhshan as agreed. But as it turned out a short time later, all of those earlier and subsequent approvals were just a skillful maneuver on the part of Nahdha, directed by Mas'oud. Mas'oud's plan was to draw us in and show approval to us so that he could extract all the arms and ammunition we had. Until that was accomplished, his firm decision was that we could not participate in operations inside Tajikistan, neither the Arab personnel in our group, nor the force that had trained with us at al-Faruq camp. Abdullah Nuri was insistent that I stay at his side as a military advisor!

The purpose of requesting us was to freeze us and keep us away from the front while ensuring the continued drawdown of our weapons and ammunition remaining at the rear lines in the south.

As for the al-Furqan force, Radwan used force and threat to call it back into submission, which was a camp at Taloqan run by Radwan, Nahdha's Minister of Defense, with the assistance of a comical gang of scoundrels wearing American military dress and dark sunglasses.

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This gang of scoundrels terrorized the ranks of the poor Tajikistani mujahideen and raided their homes on the pretext of sending them into training camps and jihad. All of this was done with the support of Mas'oud's forces in the region.

Once Radwan had directed enough curses, rebuke, and charges against force personnel, most of which were directed at the Arabs and at us indirectly, every person or two went off in different directions. The result was that the majority of the young men snuck away and went back looking for work with their old area commanders.

`Abdullah Nuri offered an excuse uglier than sin to justify what happened. He said that Marshal Radwan had acted in accordance with decrees of the Shura Council to avoid a split within the Nahdha movement, because this force had trained, been armed, and would operate in the field under the supervision of the Arabs. Soon afterwards we received threats through a prominent member of the Shura Council that we would be killed by Radwan.

At this point we decided to return so the situation would not deteriorate any further. We did not want to suddenly cut off all lines as of the first visit or attempt to work through Nahdha in a region beyond the river.

From this brief violent experience, and on the basis of previous and later information, we developed a picture of the situation within the Nahdha movement, which is as follows:

1. Mas'oud so controls the Nahdha Party that it can be considered a natural extension of Shourai Nazar. [TC: Mas'oud's political party]

2. Nahdha's Minister of Defense Radwan is Mas'oud's number one man in Nahdha. He is the only decision-maker in Nahdha.

3. The role of `Abdullah Nuri within the Nahdha movement is only that of official spokesman in Radwan's name and the legal show window behind which he operates.

4. There are powerful signs of a coming split in Nahdha's ranks within the fronts and the politicians in exile opposed to the deteriorating situation of Nahdha as reported above.

Accordingly, we have decided to freeze our activities with Nahdha until developments within Nahdha and the fronts become clearer. We expect Hikmatyar's Hezb-e Islami to have a role in supporting the anticipated split inside Nahdha. It could develop into a situation where there is more than one split. There may also be a role for both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Our relations with Nahdha deteriorated further following our return. We received news from the Hikmatyar group that the ammunition we sent had reached Mas'oud, while the [Nahdha] party group was spreading the news in a distorted fashion saying that Al-Qa'eda is sending weapons and ammunition to Mas'oud. They spread this among the Arab fighters with the [Nahdha] party. Our relations here with the party's thieves in the area were tense from the outset, making relations even worse. We received confirmation from Muhammad Rasul, Nahdha's former Minister of Defense currently opposing the Nahdha farces, that our ammunition was making its way to Mas'oud.

We are now trying to contain the crisis with the party, but our relations with Nahdha are about to reach the point of no return. We are working very hard to prevent this from happening by simply taking a stance of wait and see in order to determine other means for acting beyond the river. Before we go on to the point related to how we envision action in the region in the future, we would like to add some finishing touches to the picture we have painted for you so that certain important aspects are clear.

What Nahdha did to us was not a mistake in behavior; it was a masterful scheme. As we review their positions toward us over the last year, we are certain of that.

Their overall position toward us can be summarized by their reckless attempts to receive the largest amount of weapons and ammunition, while sending the smallest possible number of trainees and filling us with large amounts of praise. They were bent on putting an end to the drawdown of weapons before we should arrive with the force to operate, whereupon everything would be exposed.

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They were actually able to draw respectable amounts, and they are currently trying to restore relations with the goal of continuing the attrition, particularly now that there is no room for operating on the front this year. They have more than enough time to steal the remaining weapons and ammunition we have, while they hint to us that our project could be restored next year. In other words, they are readying another poisonous opportunity for us from the same pit and with the same viper.

In July [text missing] `Abdullah Nuri visited Kabul for the first time, where he heard Mas'oud's decision and plan regarding working with us. From that time on the weapons requests grew, and they nearly stopped sending trainees. As you learned, at the same time we received threats from Sayyaf about closing the camp, relayed to me in particular. We also received news of the movement of our brothers against us and against the project from the state in Kabul, including Sayyaf, Mas'oud, and finally, Mr. `Abdullah Nuri. Some time earlier we had received the Mas'oud decision banning the Arabs from entering the Tajikistani arena militarily without his approval and planning. At the time we did not believe that; we believed the leaders of Nahdha who said they made their decisions independently.

A few days after we arrived in Taloqan we heard a news report on the radio about a security treaty for extradition of criminals between Tajikistan and Egypt having been signed. During the same period, Israel's Foreign Minister visited Uzbekistan where he signed security treaties to combat Islamic fundamentalism, in addition to economic and other agreements.

America has signed agreements to establish American military bases with a number of Islamic republics, including Kyrgyzstan, which neighbors Tajikistan.

Mas'oud is able to exploit the Tajikistani resistance card to reinforce his position when haggling with the Russians and the Dushanbe government. To a large degree he is dependent on petroleum supplies, especially for aircraft and many foodstuffs come to him over the Tajikistani borders. While we were there, Dostum's air force shelled one of these convoys while it was still inside Tajikistan and hit Russian border guard positions.

In view of the current situation in the north, it is almost impossible for the Arabs to operate without cover from Mas'oud through Nahdha. Even when such cover exists, the loathing of Mas'oud's commandants is obvious, but their enmity is concealed. The Tajikistani leadership has been affected, as have most of the mujahedeen, by Mas'oud's attitude toward the Arabs.

It is no secret to you that the position of the Arabs in Pakistan is going from bad to worse. Hostile language and provocations increase as the Arab presence weakens and the number of mujahedeen falls. Now there is nothing worthy of mention in Peshawar with respect to the jihad capabilities that at one time had built up there. Even the attitude of the Pathan Afghans, in particular, is bad in Peshawar. The Arabs have become subject to crude police harassment. The former communists, however, have occupied most of Hayatabad, where their conditions are good, as is their economic situation and financial resources. House rents have doubled because these lords from Kabul are able to pay any amount of money to rent any house. They usually assist the police by spying on Arabs and reporting them.

You can conclude that our situation here is one of being besieged. The Pakistani borders and even the Indian Ocean are officially off limits to us. Another blockade begins in Kabul where the duo of Rabbani and Mas'oud extends to the frontiers of central Asia.

All we have is the beleaguered space between our camp and Kabul in which to move with relative freedom. The process of pursuing the Arabs left over from the remains of the jihad phase continues. Based on news we have received, Egypt's Minister of Defense Tantawi came to Islamabad on a police mission. He rebuked the government for its dereliction in not eliminating the Arabs. He brought with him a list of those wanted and their addresses in Peshawar, and demanded that a Pakistani force be placed at his disposal to attack and arrest them!

The American chief of staff had visited the country just a few days before Tantawi, and there are joint military projects and exercises for cooperation between the armies of the three countries. This means the possibility of their conducting a military action against the Arab camps in Afghanistan cannot be dismissed.

The Pakistani government is using relatively new methods to destroy the Arabs here, such as fabricating charges of narcotics possession. In his most recent speech before the Parliament, the Minister of Interior went further than any Arab Minister of Interior. He accused the Arab mujahedeen of sexual perversion and wife-swapping. This, together with the required elements of slander, was published in all Pakistani newspapers in all languages amidst a disgusting campaign against the Arab mujahedeen, which is not strange coming from a government headed by a prostitute.

There are no political forces to oppose this American policy invading the Pakistani state. The anti-Arab campaign is just a deceitful manifestation of the collapse of the historical truce between the state apparatus in Pakistan and Islam as a folkloric practice. Combating Islam is now both state motto and policy.

However, the anti-Islamic measures in Pakistan are proceeding in accordance with a patient, well-studied, and phased American plan. The first phase or trial balloon was the elimination or distortion of the Arab, and then Afghani, jihad presence. Elimination of the Pakistanis and the Kashmiris will be next, followed by naturalization of relations with India and Israel, and then the employment of Pakistan human and military forces in combat on behalf of America throughout the world in general, and in Islamic areas in particular. The Pakistani people will then be impoverished, starved, and embroiled in a struggle for a bite to eat instead of a struggle on behalf of religion, even if only a folkloric religion, as is the situation in Pakistan.

With respect to Russia, the state there has not yet recovered its balance. Chaos rages in all aspects of life. The Jews have used that situation to their advantage at all levels. They have succeeded in exploiting the Soviet collapse and total Russian chaos on behalf of the historic Jewish project. They bought Russia for a most trivial price in about one year. The most

significant sites and buildings in Moscow are now in their hands: industries, projects, even the politicians and the parties. The economic plunder of Russia is occurring under the supervision and with the cooperation of the Russian regime, as it does in our Arabistan with the participation of the West. [TC: Writer is referring derisively to the Arab world in general, not Iran's Arabistan.] There is a systematic plundering of everything, from gold to weapons to radioactive material. I believe the Jews are planning for nuclear weapons to become weapons of the people, just like Molotov cocktails, by smuggling nuclear bomb components to all parts of the world at the cheapest prices. So, I do not dismiss the possibility that if we stay in our position here for another ten years, that during this time we will introduce courses in the manufacture and tactical use of nuclear bombs into our training programs in the camps.

We have to realize that the Jews' need of the West to implement their historical program ended once they controlled what they needed for their episode with respect to Greater Israel. In the new phase that is about to begin, or has actually already begun, Israel needs Armageddon, that nuclear holocaust that will wipe out Western civilization in its entirety and prepare the way for King Anti-Christ to descend to rule the world from Jerusalem. For this reason the Jews have built several roads leading to nuclear warfare, including the smuggling of radioactive materials.

That's enough for the finishing touches. I think the picture is now sufficiently clear that we can discuss our future program in central Asia. We can not discuss a detailed program, of course. That is impossible at this stage, characterized as it is by flux and the failure to have reached a stable structure to serve as the basis for planning. This is true with respect to our special position as a group cut off in the hills in a state of semi-siege, and it is also true regarding the general situation of Afghanistan with respect to central Asia. Indeed, one could say that the general international situation is still in the labor pain phase and has not reached its ultimate picture.

Hence we will discuss a general framework for an action program based on the current facts of the general situation around us, which are subject to change without prior notice. The starting point remains firm and unchanging, namely the need to continue jihad action beyond the river and advance it in the direction of Moscow as an intermediate objective.

The ultimate objective is Jerusalem with the army of the Mahdi, which the armies of Khorasan will pledge allegiance to and choose. The prevailing thought is that both the intermediate and the ultimate objective may come after Armageddon which will be touched off by the Jews. This allows us to understand realistically the features of the battles of the end of time as contained in prophetic tradition, in which the implements of war will be swords and horses.

With respect to the framework for our current action:

1. Work with the Nahdha organization is extremely difficult in its present state. Failing a radical change at the senior leadership level, it will be impossible to work with them.

2. If political or front splits occur, we may be able to work with the loyal movements inside the fronts, including a number we know about, within the limits of our resources.

3. In its basic form, the Furqan Project can not be implemented for an indefinite period of time.

4. Direct Arab participation in combat inside Tajikistan will remain very restricted and limited. Mas'oud may be able to end it or completely marginalize it. As far as we are concerned, it will be even more difficult now that we are infamous within Nahdha and with its master Mas'oud.

5. Uzbekistan continues to be the decisive word in central Asia; Tajikistan continues to be the bridgehead for Uzbekistan and the region in terms of jihad action. Afghanistan continues to be the essential rear base for all of that action.

As is clear, this is a very complicated equation in our current circumstances, but the preceding phrase makes it imperative that we have a framework for action that we cannot abandon. This framework is:
A-We must plan carefully from now to begin jihad action in Uzbekistan.
B-We must not abandon the Tajikistani arena, regardless of the cost, because it is the transit point for all vital areas of Uzbekistan.
C-We must continue the war for survival in Afghanistan, while improving the terms of such survival, i.e., gradually emerging from the state of siege

imposed upon us whenever the chance arises, whether in the northern direction toward the Jayhun River or to the south toward the Indian Ocean.

6. The previous paragraph leads us to the fact that the Turkish and Uzbek elements are the key to the entire area from Eastern Turkistan in China to the Anatolian plateau, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Black Sea. As a consequence, placing the weapons of jihad in the hands of Uzbekistan's Muslims is an Islamic act of extreme sensitivity for initiating a new, long, and historic struggle against Western civilization and atheism, and in preparation for the emergence of the inevitable caliphal state in this region.

7. We now have in our hands powerful strings for manipulating the jihad in Uzbekistan through Uzbek elements that are politically and militarily active and effective in the Tajikistani and Uzbek arenas. Of course their military activity is only in Tajikistan as of now.

8. One of the most important contributions that can be made to jihad in Uzbekistan is to prepare military cadres. This is one of our most important successes in our experience with Nahdha. We have discovered the importance of these cadres by working with them in the past period. We believe that focusing on the religious and military preparation of the cadres through our camps is work that has no equal. No other Islamic body talks about it with the exception of some superficial jesting that the brothers are always engaging in, as usual.

Agreement has been reached with the Uzbek jihad leadership to adopt the al-Faruq Camp as the basic and sole agency for preparing those cadres, both those being prepared for Uzbekistan itself and those currently engaged in combat action in Tajikistan who lack comprehensive training.

9. Regarding the arms resources that we still possess, the best use of them under our current circumstances is to send them to the two Uzbek groups just mentioned, but this must be kept well out of Nahdha channels.



10. There is no other Islamic alternative here in the region that can undertake the critical and ambitious mission we have assumed because of the difficult and immense nature of the mission and the complicated nature of our circumstances as terrorists confronted with international pursuit. We

here need to reorganize our entire situation so that we will be able to continue to perform our tasks efficiently and successfully. We have appealed constantly to you for very humble human and financial support, but it fell on deaf ears. Worse than that, you are about to withdraw the few cadres you have here. There is no doubt that this will be a fatal blow to the entire program. What the region needs is that we commit to:

A. A permanent human presence in terms of training cadres
B. A known and specific annual budget. We are now proceeding along an amazingly contrived route with no assistance but that of God and the prayers of our parents.

As the untouchables being pursued, we have no state or universal movement in the world of causes to care for our projects. The region is too critical to be left so simply after the oppressive price we have paid, while we remain the price of that presence.

As long as we remain in our mountainous exile, threatened by dangers, we will be unable to find an appropriate solution to this problem. What we expect from you, in your relatively better situation with respect to movement, resources, and communications, is to assist with resolving the two parts of this problem—human and financial—on a permanent and systematic basis. The cost of work here is insignificant and has a tremendous impact. These advantages rarely exist. We ask that you freeze your decision to withdraw the cadres temporarily until you have the chance to discuss the entire matter one more time with a representative who will come to you specifically for this purpose.

We would like to direct your attention to two points:

First: America's intention to blockade Islam in central Asia.
Second: Al-Qa'eda's trend toward shrinking regionally, then nationally.

On the first issue, it is well-known that America wants to encircle central Asia with an iron fence of secular governments hostile to Islam in Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. It has been completely successful in the first and the third, but in the second—Iran—more time is needed in order to exchange the regime there for a purely western government or to split Iran into a series of small states.

America's objective in the project to blockade central Asia is to weaken the Islamic spirit and isolate it from the impact of Afghanistan, which goes well beyond juridical purity. The type of Islam America is pushing in central Asia is the Islam of al-Azhar [TC: University in Cairo and center of Islamic orthodoxy for 1000 years] and Saudi Islam. Iranian Islam, on the other hand, is deemed undesirable by America except for the extent to which it causes confusion, turmoil, and perhaps even fighting within developing and weak Islamic ranks.

The significance of Afghanistan as a jumping off point and strategic rear base for the forward progress of jihad beyond the river is the basic issue behind America's directing the civil war in Kabul and kindling hatred among the tribes and ethnic groups. While the Afghan jihad parties have the primary role, it is well-known that America leaves its agents in the region to play various roles in kindling that war.

The second point regarding Al-Qa'eda's losing ground was demonstrated when it completely washed its hands of the central Asian region, indeed condemned or despised work there. This is a total contradiction of the charter that established Al-Qa'eda and its adoption of the motto of universal jihad. Despite my opposition to this motto because it goes beyond Al-Qa'eda's actual capabilities, Al-Qa'eda stuck with it, indeed took steps to implement it. It is dangerous for any group or organization to abandon the objectives for which it was established or to bypass those objectives and mottoes. This means the beginning of the end for action.

Al-Qa'eda has shrunk from engaging in universal action to regional action in the Arab region. I believe it is in the process of shrinking even further in the direction of national action in the Arabian Peninsula. I fear that if it continues on this path that it will be converted like some of our venerable Egyptian organizations to greater specialization in action in certain parts of the nation.

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What happened to us in Egypt is that organizations for Upper Egypt and others for Lower Egypt came into existence. I even heard about specific organizations for neighborhoods. These organizations would start out around a "fatwa section," i.e. some person of genius suffering from juridical

diarrhea who deems himself capable of resolving any issue in heaven or earth.

This is from the perspective of principle, but in practical terms it is useful, or perhaps essential given the prevailing adverse circumstances, for Al-Qa'eda to have a rear line for emergencies. Rapid and sudden international changes may turn front lines into rear lines and vice versa. Rear lines may be transformed into front lines. The Carlos incident and his extradition to France has led me to think further about the situation of Sudan with respect to its position in the overall Islamic situation, in particular those miserable wretches, the people of the Sunnah and the Jamaa`a. I used to think of Sudan as a small old boat bobbing on the surface of a raging sea, after the waves had swallowed up a huge ship—the Islamic world. Hundreds were struggling to get to the poor little boat, where they jammed into it and far exceeded its carrying capacity in a dark and gloomy sea of swells as high as mountains. The boat just might sink with all on board, so a diligent captain will have the passengers draw lots to see who he must throw overboard into the water. He must choose the least important passengers, those who weigh the most, or those who are the largest to lighten the boat and save the lives of whatever passengers he can.

In short, my dear friends, the story of Carlos's extradition brought this image into my mind. As I see it, Carlos was the first victim. The nature of the sea of international politics is far more brutal than that of the natural seas, which are among God's worshippers who never disobey Him, because the political sea is based on unbelief, warring against God, competing with God here on earth, and engaging God in a discussion of His divinity. For this reason, the political sea will not be satisfied with having just one or two victims thrown overboard. Rather its appetite and greed boil with rage and demand more. They will not stop until the sea has chewed up and swallowed the timbers of the boat, if it can.

Dear brothers, the island of mountainous horrors here in Afghanistan is much easier than the murky and malodorous interior of the sea of international politics, which never hides its insatiable desire to swallow us all, if it can.

Thus, I believe it is a matter of reason and wisdom that we hold on to the island we relatively own in Afghanistan and that we keep a hut there, a rifle for use against the beast of politics, and men to protect it and be based there

for their jihad and missionary campaigns in central Asia, as well perhaps as other parts of the world. One day you may feel the boat is beginning to list and groan from your weight, and you will still have the ability to swim or fly back to your beloved mountainous island to fight from its fortresses until God judges righteously between us, the infidels, and the apostates, for He is the wisest of judges. So ends the practical aspect of this unentertaining letter. The personal aspect remains, which is that I hope to transfer with my family to Sudan and retire there for the few days or hours remaining of this long life. Half a century of my life on this earth is over. It will be just a few days until I am beside the beloved Nile catching fish in its blessed waters, reading many books, and doing a little writing. I'll be able to engage in endless Byzantine discussions with you, since we rarely agree on anything, regarding minutiae of no value. How beautiful were those Afghan days—a dream I cannot believe passed that way and produced such fruit, most of which had the bitter taste of colocynth, but some of which was blessed and is the fruit of paradise.

What I hope is that my entire family with gather in an Arab country. The only place we have is Sudan, even though that weak boat is endangered by the international waves of unbelief. I feel bored in this life away from home under the harsh circumstances in which we find ourselves. This does not mean I am making a blanket call to abandon the entire region, for the fateful appointment with the armies of Khorasan is not very far away. We are waiting.

Peace, mercy and blessings of Allah upon you

Your brother Hassan

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In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

**The Fifth Letter to the Africa Corps**

Concerning Jihad in the Caucasus

As this report is being written, the battles for Grozny, the Chechen capital, are taking place, recording a new fight on behalf of the Islamic awakening at

the end of this century and offering the promise that the coming century is certain to be the century of Islam.

Ever since Afghanistan, and perhaps under the impact of that fight, Islamic battles and signs of a jihad renaissance have appeared successively in prominent locations, the most important being Algeria in the Arab world, Palestine, Somalia, and Yemen. Each brings with it undeniably new characteristics and progress in the level of jihad action.

Here I will now take a quick look at what is happening in Chechnya in order to point out the areas of assistance available to us to reinforce the jihad of that Muslim people. It is essential that we spotlight the international and regional situation surrounding that struggle before discussing our role there.

**First: The International Situation**

The Soviet empire collapsed as a direct result of the war in Afghanistan, leaving the United States in control as the number one power overseeing world affairs. The U.S. tries to run the world in an autocratic manner by assigning absolute priority to its interests, followed by the interests of its allies in the West and then its Asian satellites, Japan in particular.

The cracks in the ranks of this fragile alliance are increasing with time. Warfare is an absolute certainty in the nature of the makeup of the capitalistic system. It cannot be avoided. Within one or two decades the nuclear weapon that in the past prevented a clash between the superpowers, while proxy wars became a way acceptable to them, will be a people's weapon. History will take new course when that happens. One researcher summarized the situation within the American-led alliance of the major powers as follows: "America against everyone; and everyone against the Muslims." This statement is absolutely true. We have to absorb it and use it to explain the massacres to which we are being subjected.

The Jews have succeeded in creating an international alliance against Islam under their leadership, essentially covering the Crusader powers. These are America and Russia, with their three churches: Orthodox, Protestant, and Catholic. They added the Hindu and Confucian Buddhist powers in India, China, and Japan to these. This is how everyone came to be against the Muslims.

Of course, there is no need for us to point out that the financial power of international Jewry is what made it possible for them to gain intellectual and political control of the world today. Nor should we forget that this compact front is full of cracks that we can use, indeed which we must use. "Strong is their fighting (spirit) amongst themselves." [TC. Koran, 59:14] Of course, we must never forget what happened during the Crusader wars of the 11th and 12th centuries when all the armies of Europe marched on Syria. The moment they stepped foot there, the internal struggle amongst them began for booty and spheres of influence. In the end this is what led to their destruction, as the spirit of Islam rose in the area and loyal leaders appeared.

This picture is unchanged except in form. This is exactly what is happening now in Islamic territory. Under current international conditions, the Russians appear to have been delegated internationally by Christians and Jews to wage war against Islam and defeat the Muslims in areas under the influence of the Orthodox Church in Europe, central Asia, and the Caucasus. Catholic France has similarly been delegated with respect to Algeria, Tunisia, and Lebanon. The biggest of all, the United States and its satellite Britain, constituting the Protestant axis, together with Israel as the political representative of international Judaism, have assumed responsibility for Syria, Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Libya, and the Sudan. It is important to observe that Islam is the ideological foe of this unholy alliance containing the idols of the whole world, but the weight of Muslim armies poses no physical danger to those of the West.

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However, the jihad forces in the Islamic world are sounding the alarm against the West, which has announced the formation of a material force that can compete in the area of beliefs. Hence, defeat of the jihad forces in the Islamic world is at the top of the list of priorities of the satanic international alliance.

Here, too, we must take a look at the philosophy of the Crusader West concerning preventive "spoiling" operations to strike at the Islamic danger, even in its fetal state, as yet unborn, undeveloped, and unequal to the battle. A look at what is happening from Tajikistan to the Caucasus to Bosnia and throughout the Arab world makes it clear that this is the prevailing course in the confrontation.

The massacres are being directed by the West against the Muslims, whose relationship with their religion is simply one of historical ties and sentimental yearning. They have so far failed to reach the stage of full interaction with and practice of their religion and its rites.

**Two: The Regional Situation**

The Muslims of the Caucasus are affected by four important spheres, which are:

1. The Russian sphere
2. The Islamic depth in central Asia
3. The Turkish-Iranian sphere
4. The Arab depth

**First: The Russian Sphere**

Russia is suffering from a state of imbalance and loss of identity and direction. It has not yet recovered from the terrible shock of the loss of the Soviet empire.

The political leadership there does not know in which direction to proceed:

Should it reverse course and recover the lost empire, using the old communist umbrella?

Should it recover the colonies using a sacred nationalist orthodox banner as was the case in the Tsarist era?

Should it move forward by hanging onto the coattails of the West and becoming an inseparable part of it philosophically, economically, and politically?

How can this be done given the tremendous gap between the West's level of superiority and Russia's level of collapse?

Russia has not found itself. It has not stopped seeking a course; however it is doing so while rapidly falling into a bottomless abyss in all aspects of life.

The West could have stood by delighted at the downfall of a member of the Western Crusader gang because it would lead to the distribution of its estate

to the rest of the thieves. However, the problem is that the Russian thief is armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons. What would happen were it to export the problems of its collapse to the European world via a war outside its borders? That is the traditional solution to which nations resort to get themselves out of historical predicaments of that type. Hitler and Mussolini did nothing more than that during World War II.

The war in the Caucasus initiated by the Russians on January 1 of this year is a war in the permitted zone, indeed in the internationally desired zone, because it is against the Muslims. This is an area of unanimous agreement among the parties in the international alliance. It is also a type of painkiller for the regime during its attempt to recover dignity and relieve the pressures of containment and domestic subjugation. But what would happen were this dose of painkiller insufficient, or were it to lead to even greater pain rather than relief?

The voracious Slavic dog might leap in any direction to tear peoples apart. In its desperation, it may be unconcerned for the consequences because it possesses nuclear weapons. What would happen were it to leap in the direction of the Gulf, where oil is located, or once again in the direction of the Indian Ocean, or towards central Europe to recover its lost possessions? Everything is possible and reasonable. The West has to be on its guard. The Muslims, on the other hand, have other calculations. It suffices that they have nothing to lose but disgrace and servitude to something other than God.

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The worst possibilities in the eyes of the West mean only martyrdom and eternal paradise to the Muslims. "(So) which of the two parties has more right to be in security?" [TC: Koran, 6:81]

The pillars of the Russian nation are in a state of dissolution and collapse.

The army, the backbone of the nation, is suffering from a loss of discipline, the spread of corruption, theft, a shortage of financial resources, and the collapse of morale. Following the collapse of its former intelligence agency, the KGB, Russia has failed to create a similar agency. All the same, such an agency is a good candidate to grow once again given the police state that Russia is expected to become.

- The internal security forces suffer just like their predecessors, but more so. They have become fertile ground for organized crime.

- The church has made relative progress, but it is far from becoming the leader of its flocks or a spiritual force directed at the people.

- The Russian economy needs no introduction. The nation is in a state of genuine bankruptcy, except for the injections made by the rich West from time to time to help it revive.

- The parties have no real power in the street. They get no consideration from the decision makers. Political authority is concentrated in the hands of the President and senior army, intelligence, and security officers. The parliament is window dressing of no consequence, as has been clear since Yeltsin shelled it in the year [text missing].

Apart from political authority, the real power in the country is in the hands of the economic "whales." These are the bankers, the oil industry, and the arms industry. Their interests do not pass through the parties, as is the case in the democratic system of the West. Instead, they contact the President, his retinue, and senior state officials directly and use the techniques of bribery and behind the scenes struggles between the conflicting interests of those monopolies.

Some think that the arms and weapons monopolies are exerting pressure for continuation of the Chechen war.

In light of the above, we do not believe that the Western political model will be achieved in Russia. Instead, it will continue its historical march of bloody governing regimes that cannot live without bathing in the warm blood of its people and that of Muslims in particular. The more Russia's internal crises grow, the more furious are its blazes and bloody turmoil. Historically, Russian destroyed the weakest points around it, they being the Muslims. The Russians are once again repeating their bloody history and their unforgettable historic method. However, the situation on the Islamic front has changed. This time the Russian method, which the Crusader West and the Jews will encourage and back, may result in a disaster for the Russians and their allies. The Muslims may show them something they will hate and should be guarding against. "And that is not hard for Allah." [Koran, 35:17] This is our duty, but God knows best.

With respect to the Russian sphere, we would point to the tight economic ties the Russians used to hobble their former colonies in central Asia and the Caucasus. Not a single one of those components can live independently of the Russian economy. Moreover, the ethnic and border problems the Russians carefully planted prevent those components from engaging in joint cooperation outside a Russian framework. In fact, just the opposite is true, because it is political, and perhaps military, struggle that constitutes the prevailing relationship. Everyone needs the Russians, their big sister, not just for food, but also to settle their internal disputes. Consequently, the road to independence for these satellite components will be extremely difficult. The road cannot be crossed without Islam, for it is the sole passageway through ethnic problems among the various nationalities and the gateway to a sound economic solution.

**Second: Islamic Depth in Central Asia**

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The Muslims of central Asia represent the primary weight of Muslims in the region demographically and economically. Those Muslims take various forms in five of the republics that received formal independence from the collapsed Soviet framework. However, they are politically, economically, and militarily dependent on the big sister in the north, as they used to call the Russian Federal Republic.

Those republics, or at least some of them, try to achieve some degree of independence in the fields of economics and politics. The most serious of those aspirations were those of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in the decade of massive petroleum agreements with America and the West. These agreements led to severe tension with the Russians and the Azerbaijani war—a petroleum war. In one of its aspects the current Chechen war is just one more step in the petroleum war in the central Asian region, where Chechnya is the primary crossing point into Russian territory and a strategic line of communications into its fields in Azerbaijan.

In view of the weight of the countries of central Asia and their great impact on the Russians, the latter gave top priority to addressing their problems and quieting matters there before turning to the Chechens. Although the specter of Dudayev had loomed into view one full year before the problem in

Tajikistan, the Russians did not turn to Chechnya until they were satisfied that matters in the south were in good shape, thanks to the treachery of the Nahdha Party, brother Ahmad Shah Mas'oud, and leader Rabbani.

Hence, we stress that the most important Islamic support for the Chechen people and easing the brutal Russian attacks on them must come about by directing strikes against the Russians in Tajikistan, and if possible, in Uzbekistan as well. This must not be carried out under the concept of an emergency military assistance mission, but in implementation of a firm Islamic strategy based on the principle of attacking on two axes. One would be from the south—essentially Tajikistan and Uzbekistan—with the other from the Caucasus, led for the most part by Chechens. Both axes are directed toward Moscow as the ultimate meeting point, despite the distance of the march.

Here we would like to make an important observation related to the behavior of the contemporary Muslim with respect to the obligation of jihad. This obligation is usually not carried out on the basis of ideological conviction, but as a security necessity. We have witnessed this in Afghanistan, and even in Tajikistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya. In other words, the Muslim does not pick up his weapon and pronounce the word jihad unless he has tasted killing or felt the knife as it passed across his throat. This is why one of the advantages of the international Crusader war against Islam and the Muslims is the return of Muslims to their religion in an overall sense and to that absent obligation in particular. Hence, the supporters of the Arab mujahedeen must realize this point. They are an extension of that missionary in the first age of Islam who called for monotheistic practice as he brandished his sword against injustice. Polytheism is the greatest injustice of all, without a doubt.

That armed missionary must realize that he is moving amongst Muslims whose Islam exists in name only. He has to start his mission with them from zero and draw them to paradise gently. He must not be hasty in consigning them to hellfire with an uncivil message out of his own ignorance. We have a lesson in Afghanistan.

**Third: The Turkish-Iranian Sphere**

The tsars were able to take over the Caucasus when they isolated the area from its Islamic depth in Turkey and Iran. Turkey was licking the wounds

of losing wars with the Russians and others. Iran received a financial bribe when the tsars forgave the debts it owed to Russia. History is now practically repeating itself as the Caucasus area remains blockaded from an Islamic perspective. Non-religious Turkey is powerfully chained to wheel of international Crusaderism. It is trying to spread its hapless model to the peoples of the region under the rotten banner of the Turkish race. Iran has taken a new bribe from the new tsars in the form of a deal. Iran is besieged, even threatened, on its Arab flank by America and its allies. The only Islamic depth it has is to the east, which is a Russian area of influence. To enter there, Iran must first remove its ideological shoes and deal economically with the region.



In exchange, Russia will get Iran as a strong ally on the Gulf so that it does not merely become an American lake and Israeli territory. Look at the nuclear reactor that Russia is building on the shore of the Gulf!

Iran is of course the entry point and one link in a chain of Russian arrangements to return to the Arab region—the Middle East. So far, this chain appears to include Iraq, Syria, and possibly Yemen. The completion of this wall is continuing, but it may not succeed in its entirety depending on resistance or approval from the remaining members of the crusader alliance, America and Israel in particular, the uncontested masters of the area.

A strategic problem is that Muslims of the Caucasus find themselves in a blockade that intertwines geography and politics. There is a geographic blockade north and south [sic] between two seas—the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea—and a political blockade between Turkey and Iran that block to the west. Only the eastern door stays open to the lava flow of the Slavic armies of the Russian Orthodox.

**Fourth: The Arab Depth**

The Islamic armies carried the religion of Islam to the people of the Caucasus, who embraced it and defended it fiercely.

Jewish-Crusader planning is designed to isolate the Caucasus from the Arab Islamic depth and to cut off common interaction between those two regions. The Jews realize that the Caucasus is the crossing point for the Islamic army

coming from Khorasan and central Asia. Historically, Turkish armies coming from the innermost parts of Asia were the Islamic jihad implement that totally destroyed the crusader armies in Syria. Evidence in the Prophetic tradition indicates that the Islamic armies pouring out of those regions will also be decisive in the final battles for Syria between the Muslims, on the one hand, and the Jews and Byzantines, on the other. This is why they are trying to surround the Caucasus and Asia with impenetrable walls to prevent Islamic interaction between those major Islamic blocs and the Arabs. They are completely frightened by that jihad spirit that has started to boom in the Arab countries. They are trying to contain and then extinguish it before it spreads to other areas, especially the Caucasus and central Asia with their vast technological and human resources, plus nuclear resources, for fear they might fall into the hands of the Muslim mujahedeen and find their way into the jihad against the Jews in Palestine.

The Jews hope that Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan will continue to be an iron fence separating the Arabs from the Islamic people in the heart of Asia. Indeed, their ambition is to have "new" Afghanistan join that satanic alliance. As part of this plan, the Crusaders and the Jews are promoting distorted and mistaken Islamic models within the ranks of the region's population. This is precisely the role of Saudi Arabia and Egypt in those places. Meanwhile, the flare-up of jihad in the Caucasus and areas of central Asia foils this scheme at its roots. It must become an opportunity for an Islamic jihad encounter between Arab youth and the people of those regions.

**Second: The Internal Situation**

The internal situation in the Caucasus poses advantages and disadvantages to the jihad movement there. The advantages include:

1. The appearance of strong leadership embodying the spirit of Islam, challenge, and relentless confrontation to the Russians, as represented by Chechen President Jawhar Musa Daud, a.k.a. Dudayev.
   The Grozny battles revealed him to be the undisputed leader of all the people of the Caucasus, not just the Chechens. There is a similarity between his personality and that of Imam Shamil, the famous Islamic leader of the war in the Caucasus in the 18th Century.

2. The Caucasian people have sufficient reason to fight against the Russians. The Grozny experience ended Russian prestige and revived hope in the possibility of resistance and victory.

3. The nature of this mountainous region and its tough people are totally suited to guerrilla warfare, the inevitable picture of future warfare. In the view of most observers the battle of Grozny was the initiation of this lengthy war.

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4. The region is rich in resources, especially petroleum.

5. The people of the region are deeply woven into the Russian social, economic, and administrative fabric. They are therefore able to direct deep and painful blows at Russia inside its own house via the Caucasians in the Army and security forces, even within the Mafia living in Russian territory. Chechens in particular constitute a high proportion of those gangs. It is specifically those gangs that could let the Muslims of the Caucasus defy "strategic impossibility" and set an historical precedent by becoming the first movement to engage in guerrilla warfare armed with nuclear weapons. The activities of the Russian mafia in smuggling nuclear weapons components to Europe and the world are well-known. In theory there is nothing in such a case to prevent the Chechen mafia from arming its people with nuclear weapons.

6. The amounts of weapons and ammunition in the region are sufficient for a long period of guerrilla combat, not urban combat as is the case in Grozny at present. It would be easy to get control of the adjacent areas needed, such as the Ukraine and even Russia itself. Russian officers are known to welcome the sale of their equipment, and sometimes consumables, in exchange for hard currency, or assuming the worst, for drugs. With respect to weapons, all we need to know is that Dudayev distributed about half a million automatic Kalashnikov weapons to his people.

   There are 300,000 fighters under his command, including 200,000 in the militias and 100,000 regulars. It is said that they only amount to 16,000, which is closer to reasonable.

7. Several of the Caucasian peoples are prepared to get involved in guerrilla combat against the Russians when the spring sun rises. These include the peoples of Ingushetia, Dagestan, Abkhazia, and Azerbaijan.

**The negative factors are as follows:**

1. Some regional affairs specialists doubt Dudayev's ability to lead a guerrilla war in the Caucasus for various reasons. One is that he was a regular officer who served over 20 years, which means he is intellectually and technically unable to comprehend and practice guerrilla warfare. Partial support for this view may be found in Dudayev's decision to confront the Russians directly in Grozny. He prevailed there. Indeed, we could say that he was victorious despite the final results of the battle. It is enough that he was able to withstand the Russians for that entire period while they attacked him with four military divisions plus the Air Force.

   In any event, holding out in Grozny had major morale value regardless of the losses on the Chechen side. It was a battle of dignity and challenge in which the Chechens succeeded notably.

   However, will Dudayev be able to demonstrate that skill in guerrilla warfare? Many observers doubt that he can, but they cannot be absolutely certain. Those same observers have doubts about Dudayev because he is a former Marxist who assumed the presidency of Chechnya at Moscow's request, although he was selected in a general election supervised by a committee representing an external country. This confirms the unanimity of the people in selecting him. Dudayev's essential demand is for independence within the framework of a confederation with Russia. This is not a radical demand.

2. Dudayev's remaining personally alive will decide much of the course of Islamic resistance in the Caucasus. Even should he disappear from the scene of events, the Caucasus will never again be as quiet as it was. However, the Caucasus will lose one of its most important elements of success in any battle, which is competent leadership. This will continue until a new Shamil or another Dudayev emerges. Look at the difference between the situation where competent field leadership is present on the battleground and the absence of such leadership as was the case in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Egypt, Syria, and so on.

3. The people of the Caucasus are racially divided and have political, border, and economic disputes. The Russians can exploit this to split up the Muslims and defeat them.

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4. The Islamic feeling is still very weak. In the popular mind, Islam is understood to be a nationality more than a religion. Consequently, jihad is even stranger. Russian brutality may have led the Muslims, and even the national groups, to overcome this obstacle. This will depend on the method of war command and the success of Muslim military operations.

5. The difficulty of gaining economic independence from Russia. Not doing so means starvation and economic collapse, particularly in case of a blockade imposed on the Caucasus and the lack of a short-term alternative.

6. The small size of the population, only six million. In other words, the population of Tajikistan is about equal to that of the Caucasus. Uzbekistan is four times as large in population. This brings us to a reminder of the importance of the jihad movement among the Muslims of central Asia.

7. The existence of strong Christian mini-states such as Armenia and Georgia, the largest assemblies of orthodox in the Caucasus. This presents an obstacle and a challenge to the Muslims of the region.

Following this brief review tour of the situation in the Caucasus we return to the original question: What can we do? We are not saying "what must we do?" because what must be done is to declare a general jihad throughout the entire Islamic nation. Yet this is impossible given the state of apostasy that rules in the land of the Muslims and the satanic situation governing the world.

The Chechens can currently be assisted in two ways:
1- Through direct support
2- Through indirect support

**First: Direct Support**: In-kind assistance in the form of blankets, clothing, medicine, money, etc.

This is the preferred method of jihad among the Arab people and many of its peaceful missionary groups. The mainstay of this activity could be in Jordan because of political and social circumstances. The political circumstances are His Excellency the King's need for an Islamic fig leaf to cover the evils of his treaty with the Jews. His good fortune endowed him with an Islamic cause he can trade on, as many did earlier in Afghanistan. The social circumstance is the presence of a large, powerful, and influential Chechen community as a pillar of the Jordanian state. This community has a lot to offer to the Chechen people if it wished to do so, and depending how much red or green light is being emitted by His Majesty's lamps.

Missionary and in-kind assistance should be coordinated with the Chechens of Jordan. They do not lack sincere Muslims and it is not out of the question that some of them might go there to take part in combat.

Turkey, the bearer of the standard of nationalism and secularism in central Asia, will attempt to discomfit the Russians politically and expand its area of influence in the region by exploiting the Russian mess and the wave of anti-Russian hostility. Of course, Turkey will not encourage jihad or any jihad movement by its citizens against the Chechens. I believe it fears a recurrence of the Afghanistan experience near its borders because it would be the next target. For that reason it will seek to envelop the Islamic impact of the crisis by banning the mujahedeen movement, but allowing the movement of assistance and media across its borders. So, Turkey may become an "aid and media support station" for the Caucasus.

In terms of the Arabs, the Jordan station will be easier to deal with and coordinate. God knows best. The dispatch of Arab volunteers to Chechnya is not advised. Although this would be very useful for morale, it is very dangerous and militarily ineffective. The region is isolated and surrounded and Russian military and security activity is expected to increase. This constitutes a danger to Arabs who do not know the area and its languages.

This will not prevent Arab attempts to arrive or try to go there, but we do not recommend it as a way of providing assistance except in the case of extreme necessity for a very limited number of highly competent personnel. This appears to be remote.

On the matter of training, Caucasian cadres can be trained in areas appropriate to the purpose and to very advanced levels. Such cadres will later on assume responsibilities for action and training in their countries. A small experiment of this type was conducted several months before fighting broke out and could be repeated with reasonable difficulties. Chechen jihad groups from Jordan and other regions, or jihad groups from Turkey, would be extremely beneficial if they were able to reach the fighting there, both militarily and for morale. They would also be an excellent tool for the Islamic mission for that country, which lacks an all-around Islamic cadre that simultaneously has combat and missionary capabilities.

It is advisable to look for and send such groups out there. If general conditions subsequently improve, Arab groups can be sent. No one denies the extreme value of such groups. This has been proven in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Somalia, Bosnia, et cetera.

**Second: Indirect Assistance:**
This is more valuable and important. It is also more readily available, although it is not easy. Indirect assistance consists of activating the southern front in Tajikistan. The situation there was explained in an earlier report. An attempt can be made to revive the jihad movement there based on sincere elements still there and by adopting an appropriate policy with respect to the Nahdha Party, which is a real disaster for Islamic action in Afghanistan.

With some good planning, a small and very effective guerrilla war can be created there to wear down the Russians physically and psychologically. Based on what we currently see in Chechnya, and based on the collapse the Russians exhibited in Tajikistan, they are incapable of acting effectively on two fronts. They will be subject to a total collapse not too long from now.

The jihad movement still faltering in Uzbekistan can be activated. It has not begun acting for many reasons, including lack of funds and the absence of expertise needed for action.

These are obstacles we can help them to overcome without influencing the effectiveness of the jihad movement in other locations. Apart from reliance on God the Almighty; success in that action only requires the mobilization

of the right segment of our human and financial resources, putting them in the proper place, and setting them in motion in the correct way.

Hassan al-Tajiki

Success is from God; Peace, mercy and blessings of Allah upon you.

Jihadwal, dated Shaaban [text missing] equivalent to Saturday, [text missing]

End of Document / Translation

Edited

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600104
Length: 20 pages
Author: Sayf al-Islam
Date: August 1994 (regarding events occurring from January 20, 1993 to December 31, 1993)
Title: The Ogaden File: Operation Holding (Al-Msk)

## Synopsis

What is apparently a personal narrative by Sayf al-Islam that describes how Abu Hafs of al-Qa'ida sent him and a team of al-Qa'ida operatives to Somalia and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia to construct training camps, train members of the General Islamic Union in military tactics and ideology, and to assist them in fighting the enemy.

## Key Themes

*Going to Ogaden*

Abu Hafs sent a team of al-Qa'ida operatives in January 1993 from Peshawar, Afghanistan to Nairobia, Kenya to train the General Islamic Union in Somalia and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, which had been promised by Abu Ubaydah, who was based in Kenya.

Prior to departure, the al-Qa'ida operatives received training in ideology and travel procedures. They wore European clothes, and traveled in groups of two or three, always with one person in the group who spoke English. The operatives had a three-fold mission:

1. To find and establish a new base for military operations.
2. To find a base area that was as close to the 'Arab region' as possible.
3. To train Somalian and Ogaden jihad forces.

Upon arrival in Nairobi, Sayf al-Islam and the other operatives met with Abu Ubaydah, and the Green Team agreed to go to Ogaden, partly in order to honor the agreement between Abu Ubaydah and the General Islamic Union. Sayf al-Islam had doubts about the feasibility of Ogaden due to its isolation and rough terrain. In Nairobi, the Green Team wrote a plan to train supported guerrilla platoons.

The Green Team traveled to Ogaden by hiring a small private plane from Kenya that landed at the village of Luuq in Somalia, where they were met by representatives of the General Islamic Union, and transported by armed convoy to the camp in Ogaden.

Sayf al-Islam provides a detailed topographical and ethnographic description of the region, probably in part to fulfill the first mandate for the al-Qa'ida mission.

*In Ogaden*

In Ogaden, the Green Team found that the camp of the local General Islamic Union branch, headed by Abd al-Salam Uthman, was primitive, unprotected, and strategically poorly placed. After meeting with a second group, headed by Abdullah Mohammed Ira, they eventually built a new camp, protected by two perimeters, on a nearby mountain. In describing the site selection and camp construction process, the author is keenly aware of the strategic importance of topography and natural resources, and describes the layout of the camp and its location in some detail.

Apparently another file describes the training program in detail, but in this document, Sayf al-Islam summarizes a three-step training program. While Sayf al-Islam was in Ogaden, the camp graduated two full classes, totaling approximating 460 recruits.

1. Use of different types of weapons, discipline, adapting to military life (5 weeks).
2. Specialist training in various units (recon, command, administration, combat) (2-3 weeks)
3. Recruits grouped into supported guerrilla platoons (2-3 weeks)

Between the second and third phases, Abu Hafs came to the region from Pakistan to discuss al-Qa'ida help with the revolutionary council (of the General Islamic Union). Although they were not able to agree on aid to the Somalis, Sayf al-Islam was appointed al-Qa'ida's representative to the General Islamic Union.

Sayf al-Islam was soon forced to deal with a planned separation of the Ogaden branch of the General Islamic Union from the main Somali organization, on the grounds that the main organization had abandoned jihad, and refused monetary and military support to the Ogaden branch. Sayf al-Islam managed to convince the Ogaden branch to stay, in part due to dangling the presence of al-Qa'ida in Somalia. However, Abd al-Salam Uthman went abroad, despite Sayf al-Islam's advice against it (as the timing was not right), to rally support unsuccessfully for the Ogaden branch's jihad.

Sayf al-Islam continued the training program despite an attack from the enemy in August, which was successfully repulsed. The author also describes dealing with an incident where members of the General Islamic Union requisitioned a car from a group of Sufis, and as a result caused a rift between Sufis, and Salafists in the region. Sayf al-Islam was worried that this split would open up a second front, and mediated a face-saving end to the conflict.

Sayf al-Islam also describes the battle of Da'rduur in September 1993, where the mujahideen use their new training to stop the enemy's advance, and push them back. After the recruits' graduation, as military advisor, Sayf al-Islam organized a series of meetings among the Ogaden commanders where they created an operational plan to take advantage of their new training, and advance against the enemy. As a result, the Ogaden jihadists successfully began advancing in October 1993, and Sayf al-Islam returned to Beled Huwa' to meet with Abu Fatima. He suggests learning from the experiences of the battles, forming leadership, and investigating how to shape and liberate the region.

On several occasions, Sayf al-Islam mentions hearing news of events outside of the region, including the killing of 18 US soldiers in Somalia and the attack on the Russian Parliament, the Oslo Accords, and a referendum in Egypt.

Document #: AFGP-2002-600104
Page 1:

The Ogaden file
The meritorious journey
In the name of Allah the great and merciful
Operation Holding (al-Msk; represent by the Arabic letters MSK, which is an acronym that means "holding" or "grabbing")
Introduction:
On Wednesday evening of January 20, 1993 (26th of Rajab, 1413), Brother Abu Hafs summoned us to his house in Peshawar after the evening prayer. He told us to cancel all of our personal plans, such as marriage, travel, and other things, and to prepare for a mission to travel to Kenya and Somalia. The mission (Mahema) to travel to Kenya represents the first letter of MSK.

All of the Brothers attended this meeting:
Sayf al-Adel
Abu Qutaybah al-Maghrebi
Abu Jihad al-Noubi
Abu Yusef al-Maghrebi
Abu Thammam
Abu Islam al-Saghir
Abu Khaled al-Masri
Sayf al-Islam
Abu Hafs

The mission was given to me, Sayf al-Islam, to travel with these Brothers because Brother Sayf al-Adel was going to stay in Pakistan. A number of orders were given, among them:
1: Keep the group in an isolated house where we can undertake the requested measures to prevent unwanted meddling, even from people with good intentions. This is so we could shave our beards, buy European-style clothing, and travel a number of times to Islamabad to reserve tickets to travel by ourselves.
2: A quick training session was given by Brother Haydarah al-Argentini on Transportation Routine and Travel Procedures, and a second training session on Reconnaissance Strategy was given by Brother Abu Walid, in English.
3: This enabled the individual to perform every travel procedure on his own.

Abu Hafs noted his appreciation and agreement with these training sessions, and the next day, he began classes on Relying on Allah and Personal Effort for every brother. After about a week, both Zakariyya al-Tunisi and Abu Fadhel al-Qamari joined the team after being released from detention, which brought the final traveling team to nine members. Praises to God, we were able to get visas for most of them, and as for the last one, we deliberately left him at the embassy so as not to attract attention. Then we divided the team into twos and threes, so that in each group, there was one person who knew English

and could help the others. Then reservations were made for a week later on different flights on the PIA GULF airline.

The first trip was on Thursday, February 4, 1993 (Shaban, 1493). I was on this flight so that I could receive the brothers and take care of affairs for them in Nairobi. On Tuesday, February 9th, after two groups of the Brothers arrived, there was a meeting with Brother Abu Ubaydah in Nairobi at Salim and Tawfiq's beautiful country home outside the city. While we were there, the brothers talked about the region and the importance of our being there. He also talked about his first meeting with Uthman al-Sini and Hamad, and outlined our three goals for the region:

1 – Find a location for military operations that would replace Afghanistan
2 – The location must be near the Arab region
3 – Attempt to help the brothers in Somalia and Ogaden

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He told us that the agreement was made with the General Islamic Union to establish two locations for training. The first would be in Bussaso (Northeast of Somalia) while the second would be in the village of Luuq (Southwest of Somalia). Also, a separate agreement was reached with the Ogaden branch of the Islamic Union to establish a military camp in the interior in a location of their choosing.

Basically, they requested a training crew for Somalia, and another one for Ogaden. There was a long meeting between me and Abu Ubaydah during the evening about the benefit of conducting operations in Ogaden, which is a closed-off region, dangerous, and difficult to get to. It was my opinion that the matter required a general plan and an inclusive program for the Horn of Africa region. But Abu Ubaydah had promised the people, and it was necessary to execute what had been agreed upon. It was stipulated that we, the Green Team, would go to Ogaden. And thus began the most glorious experience of our lives.

In the remaining days that we spent in Nairobi, we developed a training program to form supported guerilla platoons. (The program is found in a special file.) During this time, the brothers arrived from Pakistan, and two others came from Sudan, named Sulayman and Abd al-Sabur, to join our Green Team. The group prepared to leave on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of February.

The meritorious journey
At 5:10 in the evening, on Thursday, February 18, 1993, on a hardball runway, a small dual-prop plane landed (model Y5-15) with no prior notice or indication. There was room for seven passengers, but nine men got off the plane. This was at the small village named Luuq, located on the banks of the Juba River which flows around the village in a semi-circle. This was a new adventure for the nine men, none of whom had ever

imagined or seen anything like this before. The small plane took off from the Wilson Airport in Kenya at 1425, and the flight lasted 2 hours and 45 minutes. We crossed Kenyan airspace into the ravaged country of Somalia, where there was no air traffic control or even communications. The pilot turned off the communications device when he crossed the border, and he had to look for the location of the village with his own eyes. There was a clearing near the Juba River, and he asked us to help him look for it. Then the plane landed at a low altitude. A man appeared at the airport, and Sayf al-Islam and Abd al-Islam went to go ask him about anyone from the Islamic Union. But suddenly, an Italian Bekaso military vehicle armed with medium-sized machine guns (called SK 43 Greenhoff) appeared. It was carrying a group of guys wearing military uniforms, and it kept going until it got to the place where the plane landed. Men of varying ages got out of their vehicle to greet our nine men, and began to get acquainted with them. They were represented by two men. One of them was named Abd al-Rahman al-Zayla'i, and he spoke Modern Standard Arabic as well as a dialect that was similar to that of the Arabian Peninsula. He was in his early forties and of medium height. His position was Head of Purchasing for the Islamic Union in Ogaden.

The second man was Sheikh Abdullah Ahmed, who was in his fifties and who spoke Modern Standard Arabic, but not as well as al-Zayla'i. He was skinny, but physically fit. He was responsible for transportation for the Islamic Union in Ogaden. We quickly thanked the pilot who was busy filling the plane's tanks with fuel, and we gave him 5000 Kenyan shillings. We got into the vehicle and headed toward the village of Luuq, which we passed through quickly and in secrecy.

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We then crossed a bridge to the western frontier. We were completely happy, and we crossed a distance of almost 10 km to get to the brothers' camp at Ogaden. This was located on the bank of the Juba River, which flows from Ethiopia, or to be more precise, from the country of al-Aromo, which the Muslims call al-Hebisha.

The strange people who received us brothers were lukewarm and wary towards us. I think this is because we were wearing European-style clothing and were clean-shaven. They directed us toward the leadership, and there on the west bank of the Juba River we met the rest of the leadership, like the good Sheikh Naseeb. He was second in command of the Ogaden branch of the Islamic Union. The leader was Abdul Salam Uthman, who had preceded us to the camp in the interior of Ogaden. We were also received by Abdullah Rabi, who was a graduate of the Islamic University in the al-Hadeeth department, yet still down-to-earth and kind. Also, Mohammed Hamed Omar was there, who is Foreign Relations Coordinator, as well as his brother Abd al-Weli.

A number of other guys were there, as well as other leaders of the effort. There were also a number of men injured from some of the battles with the enemies who govern Ethiopia. We stayed on the bank of the river for four days, and while we were there, Brother

Hamed al-Kuwaiti visited us. He was in charge of the other training crew, and he arrived there two days before us, by way of the Kenyan city of Mendira on the border. He traveled in a private plane. He crossed the border, and then arrived in Luuq to begin work at the Somali's camp there. He took Mohammed al-Saudi with us to complete his team, leaving us eight men. We departed after four days on foot, according to the restrictions of the blessed month of Ramadan. The journey lasted 23 days, during which we crossed a distance of 415 km. We arrived at the Reeramdan region north of the Shibli River. The location is called Quray Shighut, or Green Forest, near a well called Aghnaji, which is the name of one of the leaders of the nomadic tribes in the region.

To give a general picture, the caravan was composed of 80 men to protect us eight men, and seven camels to carry our food and supplies. All of us were armed with automatic rifles, sub-machine guns, and RPG-7s. We were transported by vehicle about 40-45 km north of Luuq to where the camels were, exactly 20 km from the border. The leader of the convoy was Captain Abd al-Wahed Mohammed Hareed, and he was supported by First Lieutenant Abd al-Razaq. After crossing the borders on the morning of the second day of Ramadan, Abd al-Razaq returned with some heavy loads on the camels. The convoy continued along its way, and there were so many wonders on it that there is not space in this report to describe them all. Eventually, we had to get our drinking water from jerry cans because the water in the river had become salty.

Then we arrived at Quruy Shigut on a mountain overlook that faced to the north, directly from Luuq. The name of this place means Green Mountain, because it has trees that are green about half the year when the rain falls in the fall from September to December and from March to November. The hottest times of the year are from March to April, and the coldest times of the year are the two months of June and July, when the sun is in the first part of the (meaning unclear) and then when it is in the Tropic of Cancer. A general description of the region from north to south: thorny forests completely cover the ground from the 2nd parallel to the 8th parallel. Even though there are two rainy seasons, it doesn't rain much there, and in some years past, it didn't rain at all. Sometimes during seasons like these, there are clouds that cover the sky completely. Most of the people in the region depend upon wells scattered around the Juba River, and sometimes it isn't enough.

The area is poor in agriculture, and they depend about 90% upon rainfall. Even though the thorny trees I described have sap and gum, no one uses them for anything. All the people there prefer to subsist off wheat and camel milk, and because of this, they are stingy and greedy.

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(However, Allah was generous and good to the Brothers.) There are some stories so you can know about these people, such as the one about the man who left his wife to die of hunger because he wouldn't slaughter a camel from his herd of more than 100.

If they see a caravan of fair-skinned people approaching them, they will welcome them if the caravan looks rich. You would think that this is so they can offer the caravan some hospitality, but it is exactly the opposite. This is just because the people looked Muslim to them. Usually, in their eyes every fair-skinned person is an infidel.

Generally speaking, it is a poor country with a little development and little wealth, and one who passes through it sees many valleys leading up to the small mountains in the northwest. In summary, this land is covered with trees, but none of them bears any fruit. If there is fruit, then it is bitter. There are valleys everywhere, but none of them has any water. If there is water, then it is bitter and salty.

The people there are %100 Muslim, and they are descended from the original Arabs. Most of them are tribal people, and one of the names of the tribes is Ogaden. Their most important ancestor is called Jaberati, from Yemen. Their culture and identity is Somali, but they live in remote areas in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Northeast Kenya. The most well-known of the tribal sects is Abdullah, which lives in Jeddi, the local capital of the province, and Denan, and the tribe Abd al-Illileh, or as they say in broken speech, Abd al-Allel Ha. Also, there is the Reer Amadan tribe that lives in the region where we were. One of them, named Abdullah Saad, was the head of the local government in the region until mid 1993, then he was replaced by Abdullah Rabi, who we spoke about previously. And there is the leader Mustafa Arab who is second in command of the Jihad office. Also, there are some small tribes in remote regions to the north, Dejhebour Jekjiki, and a desert tribe called al-Zenouj in and around Yemi. And there is Auleihen in the south.

When were arrived there, we were greeted by Brother Abd al-Salam Uthman, who is the leader of the Islamic Union branch. We arrived in the middle of the forest at the Brothers' camp, which was about 300 meters from the river. The camp was in a primitive area, open on all sides, and surrounded by the administrative building, the mosque, and the mujahedeen barracks. There were no trenches or fortifications because the mujahedeen considered such things for cowards.

Immediately upon our arrival on the morning of the 23rd of Ramadan, we felt the lack of comfort in the place. We told them that we saw mountains where we could dig tunnels for protection, to live in, and to store weapons and ammunition. These were not far from the water, just 1 km away. They agreed to this, so on the same day that evening, we went up to the nearest mountain with Mustafa Arab, Abd al-Salam, and Yusef Shilabu to choose a place. However, we decided to try again the next day, and after that we found a better place. This place seemed suitable to almost everyone, but the most important issue was still water. After three days, the Brothers found a location in a crescent [TC: most likely a saddle in the mountain shaped like a crecent] 1300 meters from the well. Nearby was an old road that could be opened up, which would make the distance just one km. We set up a security location at the highest point of the crescent, and we began making plans to dig a tunnel there inside the mountain.

We wrote down what we needed, like digging tools, and what we could do to help with training. I sent the first report to Brother Uthman after we had been there for about two

or three days, and then came Yom al-Aid on the 24th of March. The Brothers asked us to deliver a sermon for Aid al-Fitr. We agreed, and the subject was The Duty of Humility and the Duty of Honor. On Monday the 29th of March, we did some reconnaissance of the area, specifically the road, and choose a place to start our work on it. We arrived at the village of Jerisla, 34 km east of the camp, where the rest of the Brothers were. (There were two companies there, each composed of 130 brothers. The first was named Hamza, and the second was named Omar Bin al-Hetab, God bless them. They were with me on Ahmed al-Maghrebi's trip to draw the road because there was no map available. We finished drawing it, praise be to God.

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This was my first encounter with 36 year old Brother Abdullah Mohammed Irad from the Jihad Office center. He held a rank position comparable to a LTC, and he was a Recon officer with Ziyad Barri Army. He was very physically fit and he loved his work.

He had a strong personality, and for that reason, everyone was in awe of him at the time. He was very religious, a strict Salafist. He always performed his prayers, you always saw him in his military uniform. He wore a green pistol belt around his waist and had fastened a Russian pistol to it. This pistol was his war booty--he had taken it from a Tigaray leader that he killed. He also wore a red beret made of cloth from Saudi Arabia. The Muslims were eager to follow his orders, and no one ever fired a shot without his personal permission. He argued with me over the significant number of rounds (about 10,000) I requested for the first training course, but after I convinced him, he agreed. He was even more convinced when he saw the good effect it had on the mujahedeen, especially after the first encounter with the enemy at the battle of Buali near Denan. The preparations for the training course lasted 16 days, during which the Brothers took the opportunity to prepare a training manual.

Not impossible, God willing.

When we entered the month of April, we found that a week had passed and the Brothers had not come as we had asked them to, and we discovered that they had not made the new camp ready. We hadn't decided to do it ourselves because the possibilities were limited. But it was announced that the first training course would begin on Saturday, April 3, 1992 (10 Shuwal 1414), so we went to build the camp quickly, using wood and trees that were available in the forest. We asked for a meeting with Brother Abd al-Salam Uthman and his two aides about the following issues:

- Determining specific responsibilities
- Showing the training program to them
- Determining the timing of the course and the number of trainees, and dividing them into soldiers and trainers

About determining responsibilities, we told them the following: Brother Abd al-Salam Uthman should advance his forces and take control of the forward region, so that we can establish our primary armed advanced perimeter. I also made it clear that we'll be uniquely responsible for the trainees for the time being, until the brigade is formed, and only then the true work would begin.

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The results of the training will be mentioned here in summary. The specific details are in a special file.

The complete training course lasts 10 weeks, about two and a half months, and with all the phases and holidays included, it's probably about 12 weeks. It's divided into three phases. The first phase lasts five weeks, and the soldiers are trained to use a number of different weapons very quickly. There is also a focus on discipline and adapting the trainees to military life. The second phase lasts 2-3 weeks, and during this phase the brothers are divided into different groups according to their capabilities, where they specialize in the following: rifles, anti-tank, light and medium machine guns, explosives, sniper rifles, mortars, radios, first aid, administrative affairs, recon, and leadership. The third phase lasts 2-3 weeks, and during this phase the soldiers are grouped into supported guerilla platoons, organized as follows: There are two infantry squads in each platoon, each composed of 10 personnel. 2 of them are anti-tank qualified, 1 shooter, and the other to help carry the rifle. Everyone else carries an AK-47, including the platoon leader and his aide. The third squad is called the support squad, and it is composed of 23 personnel: 4 in explosives, 4 in recon, 4 in mortars, 4 in administrative affairs, 2 radio operators, 2 medics, 2 snipers, 1 machine gun operator, and the Platoon Leader and his Platoon Sergeant.

The brothers are trained under our supervision in formations, movement, patrols, offensive movements, defensive movements, expulsion, retreat, living in the forest, choosing a target, and planning an ambush. Then our work with them is finished and they are ready to be self-sufficient units. Then we determine when the course will begin, and we separate them into soldiers and instructors. On April 2 (9 Shuwal) we separated the brothers into two groups: 126 soldier trainees and 40 instructor trainees (Saif al-Islam and Ahmed al-Maghrebi participated in this training as well.) We decided to transfer to the new camp to facilitate its building, since the planning was completed. The plan was to build the camp beneath one of the sides of the crescent. This gave us the opportunity to monitor the training from the mountain. We made two tents up there, one for the administrative center to protect papers from the rain, and the other to store food. We built a mosque in front of the administrative center. Then we built barracks for the trainees in the shape of an open semi-circle. These barracks consisted of huts made of wood—they kept out the rain, but they were also hot. The quarters for the trainers were on the right side of the mountain. The Islamic Union leaders and the radios were on the left side of the mountain.

There were huts for the soldiers…

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…a kitchen, and storage for food. There was room in each hut for 10 or 12 men, and each hut was completely hidden by the big trees, so they couldn't be seen from the air. We needed to build at least 16 huts. We got all the guys together in a group, and we told them that we only had one day, Friday, to build everything that we needed, because training was going to start the next day. Also, we didn't have any tools for digging or for cutting down trees. But God willing, it would not be impossible. We would cooperate with them, and God willing, the order would be easy to follow. We asked, don't you want us to come here and do this training in your poor country? You have no [other] opportunities here. They said yes. We asked them, is this order easy or not? They said that it would not be impossible, God willing. You should have seen it—they worked with all their might. We divided them into squads, and each squad built their own hut. Even I began to have doubts, and I thought that it might take at least a week, even though I wanted to push them to work faster. But to my surprise, most of the squads finished their huts in one day. They were able cut down the trees without any machinery. On the following day, they built the mosque, and the training camp was completely finished by Saturday. The Islamic Union leaders were astonished because they didn't believe that it would be possible when we were discussing the matter in the old camp. Then they hurried to build their own houses themselves, even the top leader. As for us, we refused any help to put up the tent and to prepare the ground. On Sunday morning, April 4th (11 Shuwal) we began the first phase of the training. Basic training began at the Khaled Bin al-Walid Camp near the mosque under the trees. There were 166 brothers in the first class, and we began that day with studying the Holy Koran, and with discipline, which was the most important part of the entire training course. Not impossible, God willing.

The studying continued, and Brother Ahmed al-Maghrebi and I took turns teaching Topography and Tactics. During the days that we spent teaching, I would go out and recon the surrounding area, and draw maps. The most important recon mission was when I went out to the mountainous regions to the north with Brother Arad Abdullah to find an alternate location for the camp that we could move to in times of danger. We also drew a defensive line to follow by studying all possible routes to our location. At this time, we visited an old camp that had been used at the beginning of the century by the Somalian jihadist Mohammed Abdullah al-Hasan. It was located on an aquifer, and there were a number of deep wells there. However, it was difficult to approach the camp, so we decided to use it as an alternate camp to move to in times of emergency.

During the first phase of the training, we established an outside perimeter 35 km from the center where we placed reserve forces at the roads that presented the biggest threat. We established the inner perimeter 7 km from the center, with hidden ambush locations. The

third perimeter was established just outside the camp, where guards were placed on the surrounding hills, at the wells, and at the roads and entrances to the camp. We trained them in case of any emergency. The first phase of training ended on the Thursday, May 6th (13th of Thay al-Qaeda). The second phase of specialized training began on Monday, May 10th (9th of Thay al-Hajja) and lasted until June 2nd

The third phase of training began on the 12th of Thay al-Hajja, and then the third phase was over and so was the entire training course. The name of this graduating class was the Badr Company, comprised of three platoons, and they graduated on Friday, June 18th (28th of Thay al-Hajja). There was the Salman al-Fasi Platoon, the al-Bara' min Malek Platoon, and the Sharhebil bin Hasna Platoon.

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We had a small celebration for the graduation, and all the Brothers attended, including Brother Abdullah Mohammed Irad. On that day, control of the troops was transferred to the leadership of the Khaled Bin al-Walid Battalion, which completed their graduation.

We rested for about a week, and then personnel for the next training course came. Brother Umar Taj al-Din (Abu Khadija al-Saudi) came to us on Thursday from the eastern front, and he also gave us news about Abu Fatima (Abu Hafs) from the southern front. He got there Saturday, 15th of July (21 Muharrem). And with him were the brothers Abu Ziad al-Iraqi, Abd al-Salam al-Yemeni, Abd al-Rahman al-Masri Abu Hani, Zakkariyya al-Tunisi, Abd al-Rahman al-Zila'i. They came by car, but they could only travel that way for 60 km. They had to go the rest of the way on foot, but it only took them nine days, coming from Luuq on the same road. They asked to participate in political affairs and on the Revolutionary Council to facilitate affairs in the correct direction.

It was decided upon to convene a session of the Revolutionary Council to decide upon new strategies for the area. This lasted for 15 days, and Abu Fatima (aka Abu Hafs) attended it. It appeared that the leaders of the Islamic Union wanted to have a discussion with Abu Fatima about building upon their strengths with the help of al-Qaeda. Abd al-Salam tried to get Abu Fatima to tell him specifically what we could give them, but he was not able to. Finally I told Abu Fatima that I wanted a firm answer in my hands that I could offer the Revolutionary Council.

One of the matters we agreed upon with Abd al-Salam was that I would have the right to represent al-Qaeda in political discussions with the Islamic Union, to coordinate military affairs, and to send the results to the brothers in al-Qaeda. But Abu Fatima had to travel to Abaqru in the south, about 100 km away, and I had to go with him. This lasted for three days. The session of the Revolutionary Council ended without them asking anything of the Brothers, and I told them that Brother Umar Taj al-Din was in charge. (Abd al-Salam al-Rahel was there also.)

Finally, on Sunday, July 25th, 1993 Abd al-Salam Uthman issued the three decrees from the session of the Revolutionary Council:

- We have decided to continue jihad until the violators get out of our country, and to form an Islamic government in Ogaden.
- We have decided to join the Islamic Solidarity Party with three stipulations:
    - Follow the path of jihad
    - Incorporate the name Solidarity and Union to make a new name
    - Follow the Salafist ideology in the movement
- We decided to separate from the General Islamic Union in Somalia and we will write to them about that if they send a committee to assess the situation in the province, to determine whether training and fighting should continue or not. The reason for that are as follows:
    - The decision of the General Islamic Union to abandon jihad for the pursuit of peaceful solutions
    - They don't give us the money we deserve from the donations they receive
    - They try to isolate us politically, and control us with orders from foreign countries. They were angry with us when we contacted you in Sudan and other things like that.
    - They wanted us to shut down our military camps. Our problem with that is that our country is occupied with foreign infidel enemies, and we need to kick them out.

Praise be to God, we began to address the issues they brought up in the following manner:
- As for continuing jihad, we agree to that completely, and we will not retreat from this path.

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-As for the second point, we agree that the Sharia should be implemented, and that we should go back to the fundamentals of Islam. This is good, and God agrees.
-As for the third decision, I have an important comment to make. Maybe you are right about that, but I have one important request of you before you make the announcement [to separate from the General Islamic Union].

In your jihad, you need a base of operations, a remote location, supply lines, and water for your people. All of this is available in Somalia. Al-Qaeda members are in Somalia. Because of this decision, you have the opportunity for a significant benefit.

The General Islamic Union's decision to stop practicing jihad is not in their best interest, and their constituents will not be satisfied with this. The GIU will regret this decision, and maybe they will change their minds. Some of their guys are in your military camps, and that means that the leadership would change.

> So we're not cutting off communications with GIU leadership, because that might isolate Somalia.
>
> Your hopes for independence will be explained to the GIU. We want them to reach an agreement with you because this is in everyone's best interest.
>
> As for financial support, jihad brings a lot of money from charities, and for this reason, the GIU will need you one day [since you practice jihad].
>
> At the very least, don't be the ones to initiate the separation, because in reality, there are political problems in the provinces right now, and a separation could occur anyway. They might allow you to maintain your differences with them, but without actually separating from them.
>
> As for the conference that they will be inviting you to, go ahead and accept the invitation, because God willing, we might be able to make them change their minds about their country.

Then their leader said "I can't tell the Revolutionary Council all that, even though I agree with what you say, because there are people who are going to insist that we still separate." I told him to keep an open mind so that we could come to a solution, and I gave him my advice. I was able to convince most of them, but there were still two men who didn't agree. One of them, Abdullah al-Rabi, was very angry. I think that the other one was Ali Jaz or Mohammed Ahmed. There was much discussion among them, and finally, we decided to call it off for a time. After that, when they went to Jerisli and met a second time, they decided to cancel their decision. This is because they found a lot of guys from the Islamic Union in Somalia who came to them, saying that they wanted to participate in jihad, praise be to God.

Then Abd al-Salam Uthman met with me to inform me that he wanted to get away from the shitty political situation in Somalia so that he could explain the situation abroad and collect donations. He asked me my opinion about that matter, and I gave him my advice. I told him, If you do that right now, then you're like a head without a body. No one will pay attention to this issue in your country because it is an Islamic issue. Usually, people are distracted by the heated debate about these issues that is perpetuated by the media, and Muslims and Arabs don't even take notice when blood is being spilled. They only notice after it has happened. In my opinion, you should get your house in order from the inside, especially from the administrative and political standpoint. Wait until the battalion is complete, and then make your official announcement of jihad. Then the media and the rest of the people will pay attention to you because you will have many other people standing with you. They will pay attention to the issue of jihad in Ogaden, and battles and martyrs. They will wonder who the Islamic Union is, and who represents them. Then when you travel, you will get real support from everywhere, and people will have trust in the work that you are doing. This is the perseverance of jihad and the shadow of the spear.

But Egypt was on his mind, so he arranged a trip and he left with Abdullah al-Rabi. He left Sheikh Tayib in charge as his representative. The results of the trip were what I told him they would be. They were not satisfying.

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Also, he did not leave his affairs in good order when he left, and we discovered a big administrative inadequacy while he was gone. It was so bad that there were some people who were asking to appoint another leader.

Al-Fateh Class

On Monday, July 26th (8th Safar) the al-Fateh class began their Basic Training phase at the Khaled Bin al-Walid camp. There were 300 trainees and they were divided into 10 platoons. Each instructor was in charge of one platoon because the three who had come with Abu Hafs (aka Abu Fatima) had joined us: Abd al-Salam, Abd al-Hadi al-Musuli, Zakaria al-Tunisi. Umar Taj al-Din was there also.

I now had a break from the administration and the politics in the Islamic Union, and in the middle of August, we received the news that the enemy would be moving with troops through the Union's area, and supply routes had been cut. A platoon was in the Sejej area 150 km north of the camp. There was also a platoon in Abaqro 100 km south of the camp. We heard there were troop movements from the west of the Bali province, in Lamoro. There were discussions about what the next phase should be. Should we stop training and hold our ground against the enemy's blows, so that he goes to a new place and we have to expel him from there also? But praise be to God, my mind was set that we should continue training on the basics: small tactics, especially patrols, recon, raids, ambush, and movements. And in the same way, each platoon had 30 brothers in the basic course. This training lasted a week, and patrols were sent in each direction. We divided our perimeter into five axes, with each axis having two platoons responsible for it, and guarding all the paths and roads that led to the camp. The sectors around the camp were named for the hours on the military clock (1300, 1500, 1700, 2100, 2300, etc). Recon of each area was performed in the shape of a fan, and the necessary lines of defense were placed along the roads. Hidden ambush locations were maintained at the ready, and the personnel in each one continued to train to make the defense of their sector more complete.

The reconnaissance reports were compiled and the lines of defense in each sector were ready. The general plans were put in place, such as getting [the cooperation] of the tribes in the surrounding area, which was a semi-circle about 40 km across. As a result of this action, the enemy's activity was completely stopped, and basic training was able to continue. The lines of defense became further entrenched and even more prepared. Also, alternate locations for the camp were chosen. Weapons and munitions were transported to a hidden cache underground and maps of the locations were prepared. This was so we could evacuate the camp quickly without suffering any losses. After ensuring that the sectors around the camp were secure, I decided to move to Camp Hanji 30 km east of Camp Aghnaji. I left Brother Umar Taj al-Din in charge of the training camp.

On the August 30th at camp Hanji, I met with Sheikh Abdullah Umar, who was representing the Islamic Union. I asked him for some written materials or documents about his organization, and I was surprised to see that he didn't have anything like that with him. The Revolutionary Council met, ended, and everyone went to their homes without making any political plans. And we had Abd al-Salam [in the Revolutionary Council], who had taken $20,000 from Abu Fatima (aka Abu Hafs) on behalf of the council! As for military affairs, they didn't even have any maps with enemy locations and movements.

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Page 21: Because of this, there were no good choices for locations or defense planning, and even worse, they had put all their ammunition in a tent in middle of the camp.

The Sufi vs. Salafist Problem

On the day that I arrived at Camp Hanji, I found Abdullah Umar busy listening to the news on the radio from the village of Jarbo. He was waiting for Abdullah Irad and Ali Jaz to arrive. They had gone to attempt to reconcile a problem that had arisen in Jarbo, and they were able to form good relations with the local people, as well as the Sheikh of the tribe, Owjas Nur. [They were able to come to an agreement] over food supplies and movement on the highway for communication with the outside world. The Sheikh seemed confused, and he didn't know what to do about the problem [of Sufi vs. Salafist]. In the past, it wasn't necessary for him to think about who was trying to control the province and implement an Islamic government there.

This problem [of Sufi vs. Salafist] was beginning to chafe me—I had heard about it before--and the day began in a very unsatisfactory way for me. That same day, two men from the Revolutionary Council had gone to Jarbo to contain the problem. Their names were Sheikh Hussayn Khalif and Sheikh Hussayn Takhri, and they were responsible for the Shar'ia Da'wa. When they got there, they saw a 1988 double-cab Toyota belonging to the Timawin Sufis. These Sufis had long hair, and they were joking around and smoking cigarettes, and dealing with the enemy like they do in our country, where we call them "Big Hairs". They have a lot of hostility for the members of the Islamic Union, who they say are Wahabbis and agents for foreign countries. The Sheikhs decided to take the Toyota from the Timawin. The two sheikhs fired up some of the young men and they put pressure on the military leader Major Mustafa Arab. He agreed, and the fired-up young men went to the Union to get the Toyota from the Sufis in the Union. The young men rode roughshod over the Sufis. No one thought to go against the young men's wishes, even though the Sufis had many reasons why they needed the Toyota. But they took it lying down and didn't say a word in their own defense.

The ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front) party helped the young men get this car, and they decided to try to abscond with another car belong to an aid organization. It is said that the general chaos throughout the country came about after the WSLF (Western Somalia Liberation Front) overthrew the whites and the EBRDF was driven out. The

local leadership for the ONLF was Abdullah Sa'ad from Reer Amadan, and the local WSLF leader was Abd al-Rahman Jali from Reer 'Aulayhen in the south. (This was in June 1993).

But stranger than that was the behavior of the Sunnis. They showed a level of cunning and hatred that surprised us, and I think it was the businessmen who gave them the idea. They said that our car that was taken in Jarbo actually belonged to a holy man from the Ojus Koshen tribe, and that we were from the Haroon tribe in Dajhaboor in the south. They said that we would cut off trade and take their cars until they were giving our cars to us as presents and we expelled the Islamic Union from their country.

A man came from Jarbo with money to distribute to the people, especially the tribal Sheikhs. He said that "we don't want political parties in our countries, and weapons either. Our best interests are not being followed because the Islamic Union is here." The mudslinging just got worse, and he made a speech with these kinds of words from the pulpit during the Friday prayer. He demanded that the people kick the Islamic Union and its army out of Jarbo. He said that Jarbo is the only village who is offering support to the Islamic Union and that it is a wasteful expense. The people were on the verge of rioting, and this is the exact reason why the enemy and its forces interfere and occupy their country under the slogan of reconciling the warring tribes.

On the evening of the same day, Abdullah Irad and Ali Jaz arrived in Jarbo and a meeting was convened where we discussed this issue in detail. I asked Abdullah Irad: "By your own admission, you are the chief of the Office of Jihad. Did you order this action, or even know about it before it happened?" He said no, and that he was becoming increasingly displeased with this kind of behavior. He asked me my opinion, so I told them that this [car stealing] had resulted in the following:

1. New battle fronts have opened up adjacent to us, in addition to the main enemy.

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2. The people are considered hostile now, and we should attempt to win them over step by step, especially the Sufis.
3. We've given the enemy a golden opportunity to exploit, to show up here, right next to us, because of the need for reconciliation and keeping the peace.
4. This operation exposed a lack of organization in our military operations. How is it that military force is employed by order of civilians and the military commander doesn't even know about it?

I also told them the following:
- Give back the car to its rightful owners so this issue can be settled, and we can sabotage the enemy's plans. But to save face, we will do the following: we exploit the previous request of the Sheikh of the Ogas Koshen tribe in Jarboo to return the car, and we tell him we will do it for him, but with the following stipulations:

- The Timawin rebuild the school that they tore down for the Islamic Solidarity Party.
- They promise not to infringe upon Muslim interests after that.
- Dealing with the enemy (the businessmen) is objectionable. Write this down and disseminate it. Discuss it with the people. We'll use this to get the support of the Solidarity people. It will convince people and we'll get the tribe and the sheikh of the tribe on our side. We must act quickly. Start with this tomorrow.

In the morning, Abdullah Irad and Ali Jaz went to Jarboo and returned the car to the tribe's sheikh, as had been agreed upon previously. Thus ended the problem, praise be to God.

Then I spoke with Abdullah Irad about the proposed new Office of Jihad. I also spoke with Sheikh Abdullah Umar about implementing political and military strategy, and about the administrative system to facilitate affairs in the next phase.

The new politics

While Abdullah Irad and Ali Jaz went to deal with the problem according to what we had agreed, I met with Sheikh Abdullah Umar, and we agreed to put a new plan in place for political and military work in the next phase. This was regarding the fast-approaching graduation of the basic training class, and the troubling news about enemy movements nearby. I met with what remained of the revolutionary committee. (I mention a few of them here: Abd al-Qadr Haj Teqni from Reer 'Aulayhen south of the River Shibli, Mohammed Hassen Terar.) We discussed the following issues:

- The enemy: its troops, its weapons, its distribution, its military history, its decisions, and possible developments.
- Our troops: weapons and supplies, our decisions, possibilities, developing our levels, and the balance between our troops and the enemy's.
- The land: climate, topography, its resources, its suitability for guerilla warfare.
- The people: their history, their position on the issue, their position with the Islamic Union, and the possibility of getting them on our side.

We even discussed the possibility of retreating from the jihadist line, perhaps returning to missionary work [or propaganda]. We concluded that we could not retreat from the jihadist line because no one would show us any mercy if we did. The results of our discussion were positive and it was necessary that we rely upon God and implement the new politics: political, military, administrative, and missionary work [or propaganda].

Then we discussed the priorities of the jihadist effort:

- Specify the primary enemy (the businessmen), and postpone [efforts against] other groups.
- Determine responsibilities and separate politics from military in the effort.
- Write a statement announcing jihad, with the cooperation of Sheikh Abdullah Umar.

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Then on Tuesday morning August 31st, I convened a meeting with the new leader of Camp Hanji, Mohammed Sheikh Hassan Terar, to organize the camp:
Organize the brothers in the camp and divided them into platoons according to the sectors of the perimeter.
Organize efforts on the gun trucks, and their respective weapons, and train from fixed positions and on the move.
One the following day, September 1st, we implemented this program.
On the second day, Thursday, we visited Jerisli to find a place to hide the ammunition. We arrived at the basic training camp, which was 2.5 km from the village in the Tesmani Valley. When we arrived, we found trenches with 26 brothers in them, most of them young. They only had 8 AK-47s, and basically, this location was a weak point. If the enemy were to strike, there would be grave losses, especially if it became possible for the enemy to advance along the road. I was very troubled by this situation. This trip was in the evening, and the next morning, when I was writing the statement announcing jihad, I discovered that the sheikh was not moving forward with this issue.
The statement included the following thoughts:
Jihadists verses [from the Koran]-quotes from the Hadith-words from the theologians
The history of the country's colonization beginning with the English and the Italians
The colonizers' deeds-and the native people's jihad
Characterizing the Islamic Union and its goals
The announcement of jihad
Our roots in jihad
A message for Muslims of the world to unite
On Friday morning I returned with two guards (from the mujahedeen), and we walked to Aghnaji. On Saturday September 4th, the platoons that graduated read the reports, and drew the maps and divided the perimeter into five sectors. Then there was a meeting before noon with the brothers in training to discuss the latest developments and to prepare the basic training class for the al-Fateh class. The meeting finally took place on Wednesday the 8th [of September] and lasted from 6:00 am to 11:00 am. Then there was a meeting with the Revolutionary Council Office of Jihad. Then the news came on Thursday morning September 9th that the enemy had advanced to the village of Da'rduur 30 km west of the camp. This news came from our troops that had gone out in the same direction where Sa'id Bin Zayd's platoon had been out on a recon patrol out toward my location under the leadership of Abd al-Nur.

Sa'd Bin Abu Weqas went to Da'rduur to meet with Sheikh Hussayn Rabi and they declared a state of emergency. He also convinced Doctor Hamdi from the university to lead the Sa'd platoon, and also prepared the al-Zebir platoon with the leadership of Ahmed al-Maghrebi to strengthen the defense in this direction. This was in support of the Camp Deputy Commander Umar Taj al-Din, with recon on all fronts, especially the roads leading up to the camp.

I relocated with the al-Zebir platoon and a radio to create a Tactical Operations Center and an Administrative Affairs point in the mountains of Da'duur, and we kept a squad

there. Then the al-Telha platoon pushed out to the southwest in the direction of 2100 under the leadership of Abd al-Sabur. When we got there, we found that 14 enemy personnel had attacked and crossed one of the recon perimeters. Sa'id Bin Zaid's platoon pushed them back to the river, but did not overtake them. The enemy was waiting for Sa'id's platoon to return. There was magnificent coordination between communications and supply in this operation. On Monday September 13th we returned to the camp and recorded in my notebook with a red pen about the following news: "A new peace treaty for self-government has been signed by the Jews and Yassir Arafat. Shimon Perez and Mahmoud Abbass signed it in Washington." On Tuesday morning September 14th a new basic training course began, which was what the enemy was trying to keep us from doing with their recon patrols. But we had completed our preparations before they got there, and this operation was met with a great show of force from our troops, and imparted fear of us to the enemy.

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Page 27:
They weren't going to ever cross the river, unless we went to them to finish the job. On the following day, the news discussed the role King Hussein played in aiding the Jews with the return of Yitzhak Rabin to Morocco, and his attendance at the Jewish New Year celebration. [They also discussed] Hussein's secret friendly visits to Israel.

On the same day, I returned to Hanji to complete the administrative and political reforms, and to continue teaching Islamic politics and law to the platoons. Every platoon that graduated would have an Islamic politics representative and an Islamic law representative. The first would allow the people to govern by their religion, and the second would allow them a political position in the Islamic Union. Every platoon was also taught some literature so that they would be literate, and none of their rights would be taken from them. They were also given papers that had the names of the heads of the tribes written on them, and documents saying that they were members of the Islamic Union. The results were magnificent. When a tribal delegation from the Islamic Union came the following week, they joined the mujahedeen.

The position on arresting spies
On October 2nd, the third phase of training began.
The brothers in training were divided into two companies as follows:
The al-Fateh Company, under the leadership of Ahmed Nur, and composed of the following:
A – Abu Bakr al-Sadiq Platoon, God keep him
B – Hamza Platoon, God keep him
C – Abu Abida Platoon, God keep him
The al-Yarmuk Company, led by Sheikh Hussein Rabi and composed of the following:
A – Umar Ben al-Khatab Platoon, God keep him
B – Sa'd Bin Abu Weqas Platoon, God keep him
C – al-Zebir Bin al-'Awam Platoon, God keep him

“Sunday was bloody and Monday was sad. A devil was slain in Moscow and Parliament was destroyed, making the final conclusion to the communist regime, and this was done by hand of the Russian, Boris Yeltsin. And evil was slain in Mogadishu, [in an attack] against the Americans. Two planes crashed, killing 18 and wounding 84. In addition, seven soldiers were missing, including the pilot. This destroyed a special unit that had come to oppress Somalia, and was executed at the hands of young Muslims. In one day, the bear and the elephant was destroyed, praise be to God.

“Also, the results of the Egyptian referendum are in, and of course, it was a crushing victory for the third time for the Mubarek administration, despite the refusal of the opposition, and 94% negative ratings.”

On Tuesday morning and Wednesday night, there was a turbulent meeting with the members of the Office of Jihad, where we prepared them for our implementation of the battle plan in the next phase, after the platoons graduate in the coming days. The following people attended the meeting:
Abd al-Irad, Commander of the Office of Jihad, and Mustafa Arab, Deputy Commander
Abdul Rahman Hussein, [meaning unclear] Khaled, Ahmed Nur, Qas al-Fateh.
Mohammed Sheikh Hassan Terar, [meaning unclear] the northern sector, Umar Taj al-Din
The distribution of the platoons was explained in this meeting, in the region of Ogaden and the military sectors for each company.
The plan for operations was for us to strike first in the north at the Sejej location, and at the southern location at the Abaqro location. In order to provide camouflage for these operations, the other platoons will move in an open manner to the east first. The leadership of the platoons was there to watch the planning so they could execute operations for each platoon.

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Page 29:
Here a storm was released, and they [the members of the Office of Jihad] refused, especially Abdullah Irad, and there was fear that the supply lines would be cut, and that there would be a negative effect on the morale of the brothers. But after much trying and convincing, the trip was satisfactory. We achieved a consensus and drafted a plan. The three brothers Umar Taj al-Din, Zakariyya, and Abd al-Sabur all agreed. Their authority was clearly outlined, and copies were distributed to them. I took a copy with me also.

On Thursday October 7th, after arranging all the affairs and distributing food and ammunition, as well as the missions to the platoons, al-Yarmuk Company pushed out to the east and the north. This began the execution of the plan, the first step on the operational timetable. (Operation al-Fateh)

Wednesday October 13th was the first operation in Sejej, performed by al-Zebir Platoon under the leadership of Unar Taj al-Din. They killed 23 enemy soldiers and injured the rest of the platoon. They confiscated 6 weapons, a radio and a sum of money. Six

brothers were killed and two were injured. The enemy withdrew completely. On Thursday October 14th the al-Fateh Company began movements toward the south. On Friday afternoon they crossed the river safely with ropes and a rubber raft, at the village of Quuni. On Saturday afternoon, they advanced toward the enemy and surrounded them in the night at Abaqro. We spent Sunday night in negotiations with the people of the village and the enemy, and we hid in their homes. The leader of the campaign, Abd al-Rahman Sheikh Hussein, decided to pull away from the enemy for the sake of our safety, and to return later with snipers and a road blockage. We had pulled out before dawn, and after that long, sad story of the night we spent there, I left feeling sick.

We withdrew to the south with two platoons, and the Abu Abida Platoon remained there a distance of 15 km away, under the leadership of dear brother Abd al-Rahman Bedi, who was martyred in an ambush a few days later that he executed against the enemy with his platoon. We knew by looking at his face that he harbored a complete love for the Koran.

Then we moved to the south with the Abd al-Weli Platoon and Abd al-Rahman al-Hussein, and the trip lasted 12 days. We reached Abu Fatima in Beled Huwa' at dawn on Friday (5:15 am October 29th). A carload of brothers and Abd al-Razaq received us on Ethiopian soil at Ogaden on the borders. They took us to Luuq at night, and then we went to Huwa' in the same night. On Saturday October 30th there was a meeting with Abu Fatima and the Green Team. Another travel mission began in Somalia that lasted until the last day in 1993.

On this occasion, I began to keep a diary of this phase. I was actually there the whole time, since Brother Saif al-Adel began [the mission], and the details of it are kept in a special notebook with the Brothers.

Notices and Investigations

1. Completing translations for some of the people, such as Abd al-Salam Uthman, al-Sheikh al-Tayib, Abd al-Rahman Hussein, al-Sheikh Abdullah Umar, Abd al-Rabi, al-Sheikh Yusef Hussein, Mustafa Arab, Ahmed Nur, Mohammed Hassen Terar, Abd al-Razaq, Abd al-Wahed.
2. Concentrating on some of the battles so we can learn from them.
3. Forming the leadership and their operational schedule.
4. Shaping the region and the possibility of its liberation.
5. The core group of people who went to Muslim Africa in the appendix of the report.

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Page 31:

The trip to Muslim Africa [a poem]

The brown forest is oppressed by the colors of pain and suffering.
Darkness spreads its wings over the hills and mountains.

From the darkness of the laws of wolves… (etc.)

Page 32: Blank
Page 33:  Poem continues.

(signed)

Saif al-Islam
Khartoum, August 1994

Pages 34-36: Blank

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600108
Title: Saif Al Islam's Report on the Jihad-Wal Camp
Author: Saif Al Islam Almasri
Date: Unknown
Length: 3 pages

## Synopsis

Saif Al Islam Almasri writes an exit report from his time as 'ameer' of Jihad-Wal camp in Afghanistan, providing reasons for his failures, and suggesting what can be done so that those mistakes are not repeated again.

## Key Themes

Saif Al Islam Almasri looks back on the two years and ten months he spent as leader ('ameer') of Jihad-Wal camp in Khost, Afghanistan. In his report, he attempts to write down lessons learned, but hopes that the recipient has been reading and storing all the previous letters he sent. He claims that he will discuss a number of topics, but there is only one topic discussed in the document:

*Receiving and delegating responsibilities*

There were two main problems with the way in which Saif received the ameership, First, the responsibilities (over more than four camps) were greater than originally envisioned. Second, and more importantly, the previous ameer and other brothers had left their posts without providing guidance to Saif. As a result, he had no idea how to deal with 'outside entities' and many predicaments arose. Saif did in fact seek help from previous ameer, but many problems cropped up after the previous ameer was no longer available. So that this unfortunate situation will not happen again, Saif suggests three policies be implemented: (1) The old ameer must be present when the new ameer takes over; (2) The old ameer must explain the working of the camp, and the nature of all the relevant relationships; (3) The new ameer must receive an archive of all documents used since the beginning of the camp.

Date: 03/15/2007

[AN] Analyst's Notes
[] Missing text
[Sic] Thusly written

The following is a verbatim translation of document # [AFGP-2002-600108-ORIG.PDF] which is thought to having been written by Saif Al Islam Almasri [AN: literally means, "The Egyptian"].

B. E. Last report.

SH, Y [An: initials in Arabic]

In the name of Allah the merciful forgiver.

Thanks be to Allah the lord of both worlds. [AN: World of the Jinn and world of mankind] and prayers and peace be upon the most righteous of Allah's believers and messengers, our lord Mohammad and upon his kin and all of his companions.
I am about to leave my responsibilities in Jihad-Wal [AN: a training camp near Khost Afghanistan]. And only a few days remain for my principle mission, to include, arranging the place/post prior to leaving.
Two years and ten months have passed since my taking over the Ameership [AN: prince hood] and it is considered a typical period, that was recorded since the founding of the [Military training] camp or sector.
This period, has passed and it was full of events, trials and lessons and shed tears. It passed, though it did not occur. And yesterday is close and how far is tomorrow [AN: can not forget the past].
At the end of my Ameership term, I write this report. I wish that is the last report that I write while I am at a position such as this one. It is a great responsibility. I ask Allah that it not be repeated with me again. [AN: a contorted way to say, "I do not care to go

through this again”]. And I will seek all the reasons that will distance me from it [responsibilities]. And Allah is the grantor of success and the one to seek for help.
This report will contain unorganized thoughts and I shall try to the extent of my capabilities to classify and organize them within my abilities [Sic]. Perhaps, the time period that remains for me in this place will affect the betterment of the prose of this report, or, the opposite. [Sic] Weariness, passes by quickly, and benediction has decreased during this time and we [I] ask Allah for the amelioration of this conclusion. [Sic]
I hope that you will benefit from this report and that it will help you to make the best and wisest of decisions. And I wish that you will keep it for your future use. Thus, [even though] I do not posses the recorded experience of the past. And that is a shame, a deficiency and a failure. I wrote you many reports. I do not know if you are retaining them or not. I hope the answer is yes.
This report will be in the form of paragraphs and chapters. And every paragraph or chapter will deal with a specific topic. As such, there are many thoughts and the time is short and it is not possible to present them [thoughts] in a continuous tense prose [Sic]. So, I implore you to forgive me for this and perhaps, I took too long [in telling you this] and forgive me. And [now], to the report.

Receiving and delegating responsibilities:

This subject still pains me immensely. The reason is not within it, but, the manner in which I received the Ameership in the absence of the previous Ameer [Prince]. And the sector was not a “room”, instead, at the time, it was four camps plus.
The problem does not reside in its vastness but, it resides in my ignorance of it and what occurs within it and in particular my ignorance of the external relationships [Sic] [AN: the author uses the “present tense” to refer to past events].
I received my new responsibilities and I did not know how the brothers used to deal with the outside entities (in detail) and my ignorance about these matters landed me in many complications. These complications did not appear clearly until after the departure of many of the brothers even the leadership that had knowledge of what was taking place. There is no doubt that the brothers who will remain with this responsibility all had dealings with many entities. And there is no doubt that to them, a clear picture had crystallized to the extent of how to deal with these entities. I did not know all of this. I did not know all of these entities and the nature of the relationships with them.
This tragic situation (at least for me) made me start from approximately zero and it had landed me in many predicaments at times. Some might say that the previous director was present in the area for a long period and you could have asked him about any situation or complications that faced you. So, why did you not do so?
I say, “I did”! The problem was that things appeared after his departure and the departure of others and these things did not appear previously. That is, at the time that he was present. What happened, happened and Allah is the one to seek for help.
I am content with what Allah has destined for me; however, should I receive an Ameership or responsibility such as this once again, in this manner, I will begin and you will discover my insistence on this issue in time [Sic].

And in order that this is not repeated with me or with another person, I suggest the following solutions:

1. The old Ameer must be present during the hand over of the Ameership responsibilities.
2. The old Ameer must explain to the new Ameer all the issues that are connected with the work and in great detail and that includes:
    I. The programs that are carried out at the [camp] location and how to operate them.
    II. Internal ties and internal order and the many different criterions that are connected to either individuals or other things.
    III. Relationships and external ties, either with the currently associated or with those whose previous ties had ended.
3. An archive must exist that is presented to the new Ameer that contains all that had occurred in the past since the location [camp] had begun functioning till then, in the form of periodical reports or written and signed documents. (Documents of acceptance, and delivery, voucher of sale or purchase, loan documents, assistance documents……

[AN: end of document]

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600110
Length: 5 pages
Date: 1993, 1996, 1997
Title: Situation Report from Somalia
Author: Various

## Synopsis

A number of disparate reports that detail the financial and living situation prevalent in the organization's projects in Somalia, and describe the situation in Somalia in the face of Ethiopian attacks, attempts by the Somali tribes to unify, and cooperation with the Ittihad.

## Key Themes

The first news report (dated 7 September 1996, written by correspondent Harun Khan Amin) describes a military attack by Ethiopian forces and their secular Somali allies against the forces of the Islamic Union (al-Ittihad al-Islami) and the Ogaden fundamentalists (presumably they are a branch of the Islamic Union – see AFGP-2002-600104), who had taken shelter and were using training camps in the Gedo region of Somalia. After a series of bomb attacks in Addis Ababa against a bus, a hotel, and a bridge, as well as an assassination attempt against the Ethiopian Minister of Transportation, Ethiopia convinced the leader of the Marehan tribes, as well as the leader of Somali secular forces, General Masali, to attack the Ogaden fundamentalists in the wake of Farrah Aidid's death. The combined Ethiopian-Somali National Front swept the fundamentalists from three cities, Balad Huwa, Luuq, and Dalo. The fundamentalists condemned the attack, and vowed to continue to fight within Ethiopia, but were thrown into confusion for a time. Kenya also condemned the attack, saying that one of its soldiers was killed in cross-border violence.

The second news report (dated 7 September 1996, written by correspondent Shu'ayb al-Salihi) describes events in the Lower Juba region during the Gedo offensive. Marghan, a Somali leader based in Kismayo, moved with his tribesmen toward Kenya in an attempt to unite the Darud tribe (it has three constituent groups, the Mujirtin, the Ogaden, and the Marihan). He also attempted to retrieve weapons that he had left in Kenya in the face of attacks from Aideed three or four years ago, but was blocked by the 'Abdallah tribe. A number of Somali leaders and tribes are mentioned in the report, especially Ogaden leaders.

A financial report, wrriten by Mukhtar Husayn Kaim on 16 January 1997, describes the costs associated with a pond project, which has a budget of $10,000

The third news report (dated 1 February 1997, written by Shu'ayb al-Salihi) describes the current situation in the Lower Jubbah region of Somalia. Engineers from the Gulf have arrived to gather information. Al-Akhwan are present in Kambooni. A technical director for the 'farm' has been appointed, money has been set aside for buying 'agricultural necessities', and the workers have not yet been trained [The translation seems to be using code words for weapons, fighters, and training camps]. The Ethiopians continue their attacks, but have been double-crossed by 'Ali Mahdi, who sold 70 tons of weapons he received from them in Mogadishu.

The next report (by Nur al-Din al-Bahar) describes the financial situation of the Fishing Project. The engineers have purchased boats and refrigerators, but do not have enough money for necessities in the face of the failure of the 'plan'. They will try to sell some boats and refrigerators to raise capital.

The following report (by all the engineers, Khalid Mukhtar, Tawfiq al-Mumbasi, Nur al-Din al-Malindi, and

Shu’ayb al-Malindi) describes the dire living situation in what they find themselves.

Finally, there is a report from Salih ‘Abd-al-Wahid to Sheikh Abu-Hafs on 1 December 1993. Three days earlier, Salih met with Sheikh 'Abdallah Sahl, Hasan Tahir, and 'Uthman, and discussed several points amid a concern for secrecy.

1. They needed to strike UN forces, and more specifically American forces in Somalia.
2. If the Ittihad carries out a military operation, Salih's group will rally the Mujahidin to work for the Ittihad, otherwise Salih's group will continue to help the secularist groups.
3. Salih's groups is willing to pay all expenses.

Sheikh Hasan advocated continuing to use political means until they had built up a sufficiently large and trained military force, to which Salih responded that the Sheikh had not sent any forces for training to the camps already open. Sheikh Hasan replied that the camps were vulnerable to air attack, and the Shura council preferred in-house training in Mogadishu. Abu Hafs agreed to close the camps. Sheikh Hasan has not been in Ittihad for two years, but maintains strong ties.

[TC: The sequential order of this document is not the way they appear in the PDF. The proper order, according to their page numbers in the PDF is 1-7-3-4-5-6-2-8-9-10]

P. 1 & 7:
Pages 1 and 7 contain a news report dated 19960907 about an incident in which Ethiopian forces entered Somalia and conducted an offensive operation against Islamic Fundamentalists in the Gedo Region of the country. A news correspondent assigned to East Africa, Harun Khan Amin, provided the report.

The main reason for Ethiopia entering Somalia is the presence of al-Ittihad al-Islami [The Islamic Union], the Somali Fundamentalist Movement, which controlled the Gedo region. The correspondent says that the true on is that there are Ethiopian Fundamentalists from the Ogaden region present in this area of Somalia. These Ethiopian Fundamentalists went there Sanctuary and for Training Camps and as a place to launch their military operations inside Ethiopia. These fundamentalists are present in large force in the area [Gedo] and have training camps there. At the same time, large numbers of terrorists from all over the world are gathering in this region. The Ethiopian forces entered the region to "break the back" of these fundamentalists from Ogaden who are threatening to end the Ethiopians' rule.

Two months before this incident a Saudi man was arrested in the southern Ogaden region, at the same time military operations near Addis Ababa [The capital of Ethiopia] increased. Two or three weeks before the attack there was an assassination attempt on the Ethiopian Minister of Transportation, 'Abd-al-Majid, in which three guards wee killed and the terrorists escaped, also a bus carrying 40 Tigray [TC: the ruling tribe in Ethiopia] exploded, killing all aboard. Two days before the attacks, a bomb exploded at a hotel where several Tigray lived, the main bridge between Ogaden and Addis Ababa exploded, and there was an explosion on train tracks that provide the main source of goods to the capital from the sea.

The Beginning of the Problem:
The Ethiopians had a large opportunity when the Somali leader, Farrah Aideed, passed away and the Fundamentalists weren't conducting any military movements, so the Ethiopians contacted Somali General Masali, who is the leader of the Secularist Front (SNF) in Gedo, and the leaders of the Marehan tribe. They met in Addis Ababa and convinced them that the problem was the presence of the Ogaden Fundamentalists. The attacks were conducted against three cities in the area Balad Huwa, Luuq, and Dulo. It was reported in the news that the attacks were carried out with heavy weapons, Cobra Helicopters, and tanks; members of the SNF were at the front of the attacks.

Results of the Attacks:
This paragraph mentions that all three cities fell and the numbers killed and injured it states that 12 foreigners were killed, among them Arabs, French, Turks, and Americans. The Ethiopians burned a large mosque in Balad Huwa, which was a gathering center for the fundamentalists, and handed over the city to the SNF.

The Fundamentalists position on the attacks:
The leader of the local [Somali] Fundamentalists is Muhammad Hajj Yusuf.
The attacks were a shock to most of the commanders of the local fundamentalists. The deputy officer Mu'alim Mahmud went to Mombassa, Kenya two days before, and after the attacks he moved to Nairobi where he met with the officers there. They wrote a letter to Humanitarian Organizations denouncing the attacks by the Ethiopians.
The Ogaden Fundamentalists vowed to continue their military operations inside Ethiopia and one Ogaden Fundamentalist sent a fax to the Ethiopian Embassy threatening to kill them.
The Somali Factions; the new leader of Somalia, Hussein Aideed; and the other leader of Somalia, 'Ali Mahdi, denounced the attacks.

The position of nearby countries:
Kenya denounced the attacks and claimed that some of the explosions affected lands within the Kenyan borders, killing one Kenyan soldier. Kenya began conducting surveillance on all Somalis living in Kenya. The Ethiopian embassy in Kenya issued a memo containing the names of 100 members of the Ittihad al-Islam and the telephones of all Islamic organizations in Kenya are under surveillance.
Djibouti did not issue any denouncement of the attacks and did not want to comment about them.

Conclusion:
The region remains in turmoil because the Ethiopians are still conducting attacks against the Ogaden Fundamentalists inside Somalia and the fundamentalists are still conducting operations within Ethiopian cities. Another major offensive is expected and the Ethiopians will probably use Somali tribes to help. They already distributed some 600 weapons to the Marihan tribe, but after distributing them, some of the people ran off with the weapons.

P. 3 & 4:
Pages 3 and 4 contain a news report about the incidences in the Lower Jubba region during the Ethiopian attacks on Gedo. Shu'ayb al-Salihi, the Monte Carlo Correspondent wrote this report on 19960907.

In Southern Somalia, in the Lower Jubba region, Marghin, the Somali Leader who lives in Kismayyo, moved with more than 50 men from his tribe. He took with him Ahmad Hashi, who is the second successor after Hussein Aideed, and who has influence in Dobla, and is from the al-Muqabil tribe, which is a sept of the Ogaden tribe and whose members live in Batatu [possibly Badhaadhe]. Marghin had announced his plans to move well in advance of the attacks. The first goal of this movement was to unify the largest tribe in Somalia, the Darud, who had controlled the previous government in Somalia. The Darud tribe is divided into three main sects; the Ogaden, the Marihan, and the Mujirtin. The tribe composes the majority of Somali Citizens and the most land. The second goal was to go to Kenya to retrieve some weapons that he had left there 3 or 4 years earlier when Aideed attacked Kismayyo.
One of the tribes along Marghin's way to Kenya was the 'Abdallah tribe who refused to

let him pass.
Names of persons and tribes mentioned in this section:
The Muqabil tribe in the city of Batatu [Possibly Badhaadhe], Somalia
The ‘Abdallah tribe in thee city of Kolbiyo, Kenya
The al-Akhwan tribe [al-Akhwan means the brothers and is possibly referring to the Ittihad al-Islam] in the city of Kaambooni, Somalia
General Mahmud, the former Kenyan Defense Minister and a member of the ‘Abdallah tribe
Sheikh al-Tayyib, general officer of the Ogaden movement and from the ‘Abdallah tribe
Sheikh ‘Abd al-Salam, head of the Ogaden movement
Sheikh Hasan Turki, deputy general officer of the Ogaden movement
‘Abd-al-Rahman Husayn [AKA Daybish], the military officer of the Ogaden movement and from the ‘Abdallah tribe
Sheikh ‘Abd-al-Salam ‘Uthman, a former officer of the al-Akhwan in Ogaden and from the Muqabil tribe
Sheikh Hasan Ashqar, the officer for the Akhwan [Brothers] in the lower Jubba area of Somalia

Marghan mentioned that he received half a million dollars from the wife of David Morse [TC: possibly David Morris], the Jew who had been killed by the Akhwan.

P. 4 & 5:
The end of page 4 and page 5 contain a financial report, written by accountant Mukhtar Husayn Kazim on 19970116. The report is about the costs associated with a pond project. The project includes training agricultural workers and has a budget of $10,000. The report identifies three training sessions of 60 workers each to take place between August 23 and November 15. It also lists costs for food, medicine, travel by the engineers, repairing a vehicle, seeds for the farm for two seasons, a boat, 50 sheep, and a house for the engineers on the farm.

P. 6 & 2:
Pages 6 and 2 contain reports written on 19970201.
The first is a news report about the situation in southern Somalia in the Lower Jubbah region; it is written by Shu’ayb al-Salihi. The report says that some of the engineers arrived from the Gulf with some donations and gathered information about the area including taking pictures. It talks about the food that is being delivered by humanitarian organizations and about the presence of al-Akhwan, who have gathered with their families in Kambooni. The fifth section of the report sates that the technical director of the farm was appointed and they received approximately 1500 dirham, of which a large portion was designated for buying agricultural necessities (weapons) and some for repairing a vehicle; however, the workers are new and have not been trained. The end of the report states that the Ethiopians are still striking and that they gave approximately 70 tons of weapons to ‘Ali Mahdi, but he turned around and sold them in the markets in the Somali capital city. The time from October 1996 to January 1997 was the worst time for fighting in Mogadishu between the factions of ‘Ali Mahdi, Hussein Aideed and Muhammad ‘Ali ‘Atu.

The second report from this section is a report about the economic situation of the Fishing Project, written by Nur al-Din al-Bahar, the economic engineer. The report discusses the purchase of boats and refrigerators costing an amount of 82,000 Kenyan Shillings [Approx $10,000] and not having enough money for a small transport vehicle or to buy material necessities for the engineers. The amount used for buying the necessities for the "plan" was approx $61,000 and they spent $2,000 for the capital, but the plan failed, so now they are trying to sell some of the boats and refrigerators to come up with new capital, for a second attempt at the plan.

The third report is written by all of the engineers about their material situation; It states that there are 4 engineers who were chosen to undertake the Fish Project, Khalid Mukhtar, Tawfiq al-Mumbasi, Nur al-Din al-Malindi, and Shu'ayb al-Malindi. The report states that the project cannot cover their financial needs; it can't even pay for a house rental. The report describes the current living situation of each engineer, including two other engineers, 'Abd-al-Sabur and Salih Harun, who work for the "organization".

P. 8-10:
Pages 8 through 10 are a report from Salih 'Abd-al-Wahid to Sheikh Abu-Hafs on 19931201. The report states that on 19931128, Salih met with Sheik 'Abdallah Sahl who arranged for him to meet with Sheikh Hasan Tahir. In this meeting they spoke of cooperation between their two groups. Hasan Tahir, Salih 'Abd-al-Wahid, 'Uthman, and Sheikh 'Abdallah Sahl attended the meeting in which they discussed the following points:

1- The need specifically to strike the American Forces in Somalia and in general strike the UN Forces in Somalia
2- Research a plan for a military operation with the military leaders of the Ittihad. If the Ittihad conducts an operation, "we" [the group that Salih belongs to] will try to gather the Mujahidin sects to work for the Ittihad
3- If the Ittihad does not conduct an operation "we" will continue to aid the secularist groups
4- "We" are prepared to finance all operations
5- The necessity of secrecy because of the poor security situation

Sheikh Hasan states that the time is not right to start conducting Jihad and that they must work against the Americans through political means until it is the right time. He says that right now they have to work on preparing a large force of Islamic fighters and train them to conduct guerilla warfare. Then they will go to the Shura Council to decide the appropriate time to begin.
Salih asks why the Sheikh hasn't begun to have the men trained in the camps that have been open for almost 8 months. Sheikh Hasan replies that the camps are in open areas that are vulnerable to strikes from planes so it was agreed on by Abu-Hafs to close the camps. He says that the Shura council wants the training to be conducted inside houses in Mogadishu, instead of in the camps. The letter closes by discussing the fact that even though Sheikh Hasan has been separated from the Ittihad for two years, he still speaks on their behalf and the young men that Salih's group will be training belong to the Ittihad al-

Islam.

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600113
Date: Unknown
Author: Omar al-Sumale
Length: 6 pages
Title: A Short Report on the Trip from Nairobi to Cape Kambooni and the Situation in the Southern Region

Synopsis: Omar describes the tribal population, the region's cities, and the topography. He also writes about the schedule of future work, provides some examples of terrorist operations that his group carried out, and gives his opinion on the location and the future of the operation.

Key Themes: The notes made in the first section represent a terrorist scouting report for the Kenyan coast popular with tourists. Special attention is given to the areas where tourists congregate, and the patrols conducted by the police. Tactics for avoiding police detection are described as well as navigational details for moving by ship along the coast.

The second part of the document begins with ethnographic information about Bajuni, Ogaden, and Jal Jaal people of coastal northern Kenya and Somalia. Political programs were established with all three to promote their cooperation with Al-Qa'ida.

Operational requirements for the region are established, and the results of two operations analyzed.

Ambush of Belgian Patrol. Al-Qa'ida supported forces in Somalia are credited with killing a Belgian soldier in an ambush and driving the Belgians out of the region.

Attacks against Indian forces. Al-Qa'ida supported forces are credited with a successful attack against the Indian Army encampment at Bols Quqani, and in another operation driving the Indian out of Kambooni.

Omar has a high opinion of the local fighters who have proven to be successful and have inspired many Muslim youth to sign up and be fighters.

**Document AFGP-2002-600113**

FULL TRANSLATION
Translated on 3/20/02
Original document pages: 7
Document date: Not dated

Omar al-Sumali (aka Saif al-Adl) writes his report about traveling from Nairobi to establish a camp in Kambooni, Somalia.
Omar describes the tribal population, the region's cities, and the topography. He also writes about the schedule of future work, provides some examples of terrorist operations that his group carried out, and gives his opinion on the location and the future of the operation.

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*In the name of God the merciful the compassionate*

**A SHORT REPORT ON:**
**1- The trip from Nairobi to Cape Kambooni.**
**2- The situation in the southern region.**

Thanks to the one God, Who makes you successful if you worship him, and peace and prayers be on Mohammad and his followers.

**1) The trip from Nairobi to Cape (Ras) Kambooni:**

The bus left Nairobi at 11:00 PM (date), and we arrived in Mombassa at 5:00 AM in the morning the next day. The road was safe and in a good condition. The police security points do not normally check busses, but they thoroughly check small cars. There are four mobile checkpoints.

We left Mombassa for a city called Malindi which is ___ km away, and then to (cape) Ngomeni which is ___ km away from Malindi. The boat that goes to Mombassa is located in Ngomeni.

The sea trip is of two stages, first from Ngomeni ____ km by land, and ____ km (___ hrs) by sea to the vacation island of Lamu. This is the dangerous stage because of the sea conditions (roughness) of the Indian Ocean, and due to the presence of the Kenyan Coastguard, which, thanks be to God, we did not encounter. The sea was rough and the waves were high, as if we were riding a camel or a fast horse, and we were all wet.

The second stage of our trip was from Lamu to Kambooni. There are two sea lanes for this trip; the first is right through the Indian Ocean, which can be rough, and the second is among the Indian Ocean islands, where the conditions are normally calm. The overland distance between Lamu and Kambooni is ___ km, and the distance by sea is ___ km.

During the last 1 ½ hours of the trip from Kionga to Kambooni, I piloted the boat, which is an easy operation if you know the sea lane.

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We embarked on Monday (the first day) the (date) at 5:30 AM, and we anchored at 5:30 PM. On Tuesday (the second day) the boat departed at 4:00 AM and began heading for Kionga, which we reached at 10:30. The boat owner had some private business which he attended to. At 3:30 PM we resumed our trip to Kambooni, which we reached at 5:00 PM. The total hours needed for that trip were ____ .

Opinion: Need to buy that boat even if the price is $ ____. This is very important.

COMMENTS ABOUT THE TRIP:

Mombassa: An island that teems with foreigners who stroll all over the place. It is said that the American army soldiers take their R&R there. Mombassa's security situation is terrible.

Kilifi: A small city favored by tourists who often share the local bus with the natives to reach it.

Malindi: Another small city ___ km from Mombassa, favored by tourists because of its lovely beach.

Ngomeni: An Italian satellite communications project named 'San Marco' is in that small city near the pier, where our boat is ___ meters away.

It is an odd thing that tourists come to this place, where they rent the sailboats to go to a nearby deserted island ___ km away, where they isolate themselves for a day or two.

Lamu: A small, beautiful island, a tourist haven, exquisite. ___ . km away from Mombassa.

**2) The situation in the southern region.**

1- The population

Three main tribes:

- Bajuni
- Ogaden
- Other tribes.

Tribal and political situation

First: The Bajuni

They populate the eastern coast from Kismaayo throughout Kenya, and up to Dar As-Salam in Tanzania. They are peaceful. They do not know how to fight nor enjoy fighting. Hunting and fishing are their life; they do not have any political ambitions. They are not religious nor have any religious attachments, nor are they ready to war. In case of attack or war, they just move out of the area.

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When our brothers were in the Kambooni, they were visited by the Bajuni who asked them to stay and govern, and secure the city. They have noticed that the presence of the brothers prevented the highwaymen from entering the city, and the fishermen

began coming to the shore to spend the night in the city. They told our people that they do not want them to leave. They await the arrival of our wives and children.

They freely gave fish to our people, and our people guarded the well while reading the Koran, and helped the fishermen get water.

We already formulated a political program for the Bajuni and for the region. Next week we will ask Sheikh Hassan to adopt the plan, and arrange for a transitional agreement with the chief of the local Bajuni. We will succeed, God willing.

Second: The Ogaden

These are an extension of the same tribe present in southeastern Ethiopia and southern Somalia, and it is a branch of the Darod tribes who entered into an alliance with the Hawiya tribes that support Aideed and Omar Habees.

These are nomads and fighters who are always warring with the Majertain tribes that are represented by Morgan. Their fighting location is the Kismaayo rich region. They are few in number, and their struggle with the Majertain will continue until a replacement force such as a UN exists, and forces them to behave.

At first they liked our brethren, and thought that they were a force that can be added to their side. But when they found out that we were friendly with the Majertain they kept quiet and shunned us. The Majertain youth that joined our people are keeping away from the tribal ideology and are fighting in the name of God.

Sheikh Hassan started to teach these young men (our dogma). From the political side, contacts were made with "Jihad" (Iskandari Union) supporters to join with us.

Procedures were established to deal with the Ogaden tribe, particularly with those who are secular and highwaymen. As a result of this, our brethren earned the respect of the tribes, some of whose members want to join ranks with us.

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Third: Other Tribes

Jal Jaal

A branch of the Hawiya tribes that entered into an alliance with the Ogaden tribe, and joined in their fight.

This is a coastal tribe located in the area between Kismaayo and Kambooni. They are nomads and herders. They are not willing to join in any fighting because they are very poor, and the few weapons they have are used for defense. The chief of this tribe is ready to cooperate with us. We met him during our stay in Kambooni, through which his caravans pass on their way to Kenya. We will visit with this tribe soon, and Sheikh Hassan will introduce our movement. We will leave one of our (Muslim) scholars with them.

We established a good political program, and all the tribes welcomed us and are requesting to live with us in peace.

2- Topography

Kambooni is a small port for small boats and no pier. The village has a good number of houses.

As to the area's topography, it is the same as per the previous report written by brother Kareem. Large vessels can anchor in the sea at a distance from the village. It is possible to get goods in and out of these ships.

3- Schedule of Work for the Next Phase

a) A political campaign directed at the region's population

b) Military movements, security sorties and sentry location.

c) A military operation against the worshipers of cows *(might be a code word?)* or any other UN force.

d) A proper administrative set-up is badly needed. Small cars are needed.

e) Establish and equip Ras Kambooni to become the first headquarters for the Jihad movement here.

4- Some Examples of Already Executed Operations:

a) Quick ambush – Belgium patrol.

On the way to our camp, our brothers heard the engine noise of a Belgium patrol car, stopped the car and shot one of them in the head. The car was surrounded, another was shot in the leg, and a third was also shot.

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When brother Noor examined the site, he said that a lot of bullets were used and there was a lot of blood shed.

b) A double operation

Two groups were sent, one with Nooruddin al-Bahhar, to Dubli to meet brother Jaafar and proceed against the Belgium soldiers.

The second was sent with brother Usama, accompanied with Mohammad, also to attack the Belgium soldiers.

However, in view of the above operation, the Belgium contingency decided to withdraw, and we heard the sound of their plane as they departed.

Thank God, we drove the Belgium contingency out of Somalia.

c) Bols Quqani Operation.

After The Belgium soldiers withdrew from Dubli, Noor and Jaafar, accompanied by a Somali and Sheikh Abdulaziz (aide to Sheikh Hassan) left towards Bols Quqani where the Indian contingency is stationed. Noor, Sheikh Abdulaziz, along with the driver Ibrahim and Jaafar, decided to stay behind.

The leader of the team, claiming that he was suffering from an earache, entered and observed the interior of the Indian camp, and came back.

Our people were divided into two groups. At 9:00 PM, at the agreed upon signal, one of the brothers approached four of the guards and tossed a hand grenade "cook-off" style. They were killed, and our group opened up fire from all sides and launched RPGs. One vehicle and many tents were set on fire. There was a lot of shouting and

sobbing in the Indian camp. The Indians returned fire and we withdrew. A helicopter was called to locate us, but to no avail.

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d) The Rabbaniya operation
Two children found a grenade, played with it, and were killed when it exploded. The Indians heard the explosion, thought that they were under attack, and began firing and hitting each other. Next, the Indian soldiers attempted to lift the heavy machinegun (Zikoyak) to the roof of their one-room command. The gun was too heavy and the roof collapsed. It is said that four officers died.

e) Our brothers went to retrieve some booby traps that they previously planted. The Indians knew about this, and declared a state of alert. The local citizens ran away, and no attack took place.

f) Kambooni Operation

During our first days in Kambooni, the Indians landed their helicopter on the beach. One of the brothers lifted his RPG and launched a grenade, which exploded in front of the helicopter. This caused the Indians to hurry back, and another RPG missed. The helicopter took off, and the Indians never came back again. Thank God.

Please note that we are left with only 3 RPGs.

Our Opinion on the locality

The above record of simple operations proves without any doubt that the men in charge here, unlike the people of Gedo, are serious believers in what they do and are a thousand times better than those of Mogadishu who operated, and ceased to operate, by orders of Aideed.

We should remain here with them. They sought and killed the Belgium and Indian soldiers, and now many Muslim youth from the surrounding cities want to join up with them.

This locality can be a good secure area to replace that of Abu-Atta's, but it needs support. The local men in charge are ready, and the individual brothers began to accept new ideas and ways of thinking. According to my colleagues, these "engineers" are a thousand times better than those of Gedo. Since establishing the camp, Sheikh Hassan stayed very close to brother Mukhtar, never leaving his side.

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Comments:

1) The situation of the relief agency in Lipouy is not yet corrupted, unlike that of Mandeera which is a hopeless case.

2) Give this locality a chance by supporting it financially and supplying good personnel. The potential is very good. We should move very quickly, and seize this opportunity for Jihad. It is a good locality, from which we can establish the expected (base for) work in Somalia.

3) Please do not delay, as you usually do, in taking the appropriate decisions.

4) The enemies' accusation about the person that he is a sectarian is not true. He says "you plan and I will execute", and he does execute.

5) Please visit us as soon as possible to see for yourself that what we tell you is true. This is my request and opinion. It is also Khaled's and that of the group.

Peace and the blessings of God be upon you.

Your brother

Omar al-Sumali, previously known as Saif al-Adl.

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600114
Length: 7 pages
Author: Saif Al-'Adl
Title: A Report from Saif Al-'Adl
Date: January 17, 1994

## Synposis

Saif al-'Adl suggests, after a thorough investigation, that al-Qa'ida buy a launch in Somalia. He also evaluates the Al-Hadidiyah forest as a base for the organization, and gives a positive report on the local leadership, in the form of Sheikh Hasan and his Deputy ‘Abd Al-‘Aziz, and their recent tour to gather support from local tribes.

## Key Themes

*About buying a launch*

Saif Al-'Adl begins by discussing in detail the possibility of buying a launch, and recommends buying it. The first issue is whether the venture will actually succeed. Major concerns include:

1. The height of the waves as the launch approaches shore, which should be overcome by buying a fiberglass boat.
2. Coast guard patrols, which should not be a problem once the launch passes Lamu island, and heads toward Kionja.
3. Finding expert sailors who are not also morally reprehensible. Al-'Adl suggests Yemeni Muhammed 'Aboh as trustworthy.
4. Finding an expert captain to bring the ship back [it is unclear whether this is the launch or the ship that meets the launch]. Again, Al-'Adl's contact is an expert, but not trustworthy.

The second issue is the ability of the launch to transport equipment from the ship to shore. Al-'Adl describes the technical specifications of the launch, and pronounces it large enough to be useful. He is in the process of attempting to bargain the owner down to 800,000 shillings, but leaves the decision to the recipient of the letter depending on the price.

The third issue is the possibility of using the launch as a profitable venture. Al-'Adl calculates in detail the potential costs and benefits of transporting and selling fish, and concludes they can make a profit on their investment. Strategically, a successful fishing company can also establish a controlling presence on the coast.

*About Al-Hadidiyah forest*

Saif Al-'Adl reports on the advantages of using Al-Hadidiyah forest as a location for refuge and training. The extreme density of the trees, an insect that drives animals insane, and the impassibility of routes into the forest during the rainy season all mean that it is difficult for people to live there. A ravine with water and fish, protection from air attack, and varied terrain useful for most kinds of training are positive reasons to use the area. Al-'Adl describes the area's location relative to other important points, as well as a visit to a training camp on a beach of Wadi al-Jihad.

*About the existing local leadership*

Saif Al-'Adl positively rates the leadership capability of the local jihad leaders, Sheikh Hasan, who excels in da'wa and political matters, and his deputy ‘Abd Al-‘Aziz, who excels in military matters. Al-'Adl compliments the leaders' loyalty and dedication, and notes that they desperately need help with military

organization and administration. The local leaders understand the al-Qa'ida is currently short of funds, and has not asked for any.

*About a leadership tour*
Sheikh Hasan met in Kelpeo with the sheikhs of Kelpeo and Patato, in order to announce the new movement and introduce the Brother. Most of the sheikhs agreed to cooperate in jihad.

AFGP-2002-600114
By: HB



A report from Saif Al-'Adl
Al-Hadidiyah on 01/17/1994

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate
A summary report on the following:

1- The purchase of a launch.
2- A description of the "Al-Hadidiyah" forest.
3- A picture of the existing leadership.
4- The results of Sheikh Hasan's first tour to the area.

Thanks be to God who says about the faithful, "Oh you the faithful, fear God and always ally with the truthful"; and may the blessings of God be on His prophet Mohammed.

**(1) Concerning the launch:**

There is no argument about its importance due to the following points:

A- It is a safe and secure venture, with God's assistance.
B- It is a means for transporting equipment from the ship which is expected to arrive.
C- It is a source of income estimated at 600,000 Kenyan shillings/month.

**Note**: The last point will be explained in more detail later.

**A**) Its entry point was good, with God's mercy. The largest fear with the launch will always be the height of the waves. In view of what the sailors informed me, the type of launch we intend to purchase will be difficult to sink because it is made of fiberglass. In the worst conditions, it will tip over and float on the surface of the water.

The other probable fear connected with this launch concerns the coast guard -which rarely ambushes anyone- and the secret word/password which is DOLLAR. After crossing/passing the island of Lamu, the coast guard will not appear again until we reach the city of Kionja. In Kionja they have security police and the navy, but they don't have boats or launches and very rarely receive anyone from Lamu.

The third point in this matter is the sailor (captain) of this launch. Sailing the launch is very simple, but the actual expertise lies in knowing your way in the sea. The most important aspect is familiarity to the approach routes to the shores, even during the times of ebb tide.

Not all available sailors abide by the laws. They are known for low morals and big egos. Cigarette smoking, chewing gat, chasing women and lying, etc. are common among them.

*Page 2 of 6

It is possible to find only these kind of men, money and threats influence them. Therefore, we must find a sailor from within. Yemeni Brother Mohammed 'Aboh, please postpone # (20), will solve the problem if we dispatch him in periodic hunting/fishing trips to the area. We decided to begin training a group of Somalis on swimming and sea activities during the coming period, God willing, in order to have a good reliable crew.

The fourth point is finding a sailor who is willing to go and bring the ship back. We have a captain who knows the way from Dar Al-Salam, Tanzania to 'Aden, Yemen. The problem, though, is that we don't trust him, because he fits into the above mentioned moral description of the sailors. As far as his skills are concerned, he is excellent. I traveled with him previously, he knows the best ways to approach shores.

**B**) According to what is written in the papers, the launch capacity is 7.3 tons, but the sailors say it is 6.0 tons. The launch is capable of carrying a large number and variety of items in its three storage areas:

1- The first is located in the bow and is relatively small in size.
2- The second is located in the middle and is not among the largest.
3- The third is located in the aft, housing the engine, and is not adequate to store anything.

The launch surface can carry many things, and also contains a small room large enough for two persons. This type of launch was originally made in Somalia for a Swedish Company. The company manufactured 500 launches in Somalia before shutting down its business long before the war. These launches are called "Volvo", driven by a two cylinder Sap Manourah engine, and yield a maximum speed of 15 km/hr. The launch carried a crew of four sailors (the captain, his assistant, cook and a student), and with myself, the

brother who accompanied me, and the fish merchant, the buyer there were three additional passengers. The offering price of the launch was (1,200,000), and we are trying to bring this price down to (800,000). The owner of the launch is driving a hard bargain.

My personal opinion is that we should purchase this launch even if it cost $15,000, if the price exceeds that, then the decision becomes yours, particularly when I explain point (C) to you. This is information I have about the launch. Its main fault is that it has no plumbing.



**C**) The owners of these launches do not fish, but buy fish from small boats which go on periodic fishing trips lasting about 10 days. Afterwards, the fish are sold to a company which provides ice, free of charge, to the owners of the launch.

The cost per trip in Kenyan shillings:

1- Round trip fuel, two barrels of diesel – 12,000
2- Employees' wages (driver, six assistants, five cooks, four students) – 15,000 /month.
3- Food for the trip – 2,000

Total = 29,000 Kenyan shillings.

**Note: Employees' wages are calculated monthly and not per trip.**
The price of fish per kilo from the sea (17 – 30), according to the type
The price of shrimp per kilo from the sea (200 – 250)
The fish selling price to the company (40 – 70), according to the type
The shrimp selling price to the company (350 – 400)

Calculation based on an average purchase price of 20, and selling price of 50, of a quantity estimated at 5 tons:
Total purchase price = 20 X 5,000 = 100,000 shillings
Total selling price = 50 X 5,000 = 250,000 shillings
Total cost = 100,000 + 29,000 = 129,000 shillings
Add the sum of 11,000 shilling for maintenance
The final cost becomes 140,000 shillings

Total profit = 250,000 – 140,000 = 110,000 shilling
Monthly profit will be = 110,000 X 3 = 330,000

By adding the deducted wages for two trips
388,000 = 580,000 + 330,000 shilling (TC: numbers do not add up unless you take one of the zeros from 580,000 and add 58,000 to 330,00 to equal 388,000).

These numbers represent the low season of fishing. I would like to tell you that Somali shores are rich with fish, especially with shrimp which is called here (Argosto). According to the merchant who accompanied us, the average profit in one trip is (250,000 – 300,000) shillings.

According to this simple calculation, we could, God willing, make what we pay for the launch, and make an investment towards establishing a fishing company capable of controlling the shores of Somalia and the fishing industry.

*Page 4 of 6

Therefore, I hope we will be able to purchase this boat and send Brother Mohammed 'Abdoh.
The amount available to us now is $8,000 that was sent by Abu Fatimah as part of the $14,000, and the $3,000 I requested from Ghazi when I was in Mumbasa.
The $3,000 was transferred to the camp's budget because they urgently needed it. We will dispatch the Brother with the $8,000, and you can supply the rest of the amount, may God bless and assist you.
**Note:** There is a previous report on the same trip and the Kaambooni cape.

**(2) Description of the Al-Hadidyah Forest:**

The native Somalis call it the "Calm Sea", and they also call it "The Land of the Elephant" for several reasons:

A- The height of the trees, some reaching 15 meters in certain locations, and the density of the trees, where it is impossible to see the sun in some areas, and it is difficult to walk in other areas, even for humans.
B- The secular extremists fled into this forest in the past, and no one has been able to eliminate them until now. They still exist inside this forest, inside Kenyan land.
C- A small insect exists in this forest. It is larger in size than the fly, and smaller than the bee, black in color, and like mosquitoes it mainly lives on water, but only during the daytime. It does not exist in the whole

forest, but in some areas, and in different densities. It is impossible for it to exist in some areas, and its numbers are lighter in some areas than in other areas.
This insect makes animals go crazy. A donkey ran for a distance of 20 km after it was attacked by this insect. Our men call the insect "piercing incendiary", but they have become accustomed to it. While sitting in class, you hear the slaps from everywhere, announcing the human victory over this insect.

Because of this insect, it is impossible for the bedouins to enter the area to safeguard their animals. The insect's long and sharp stingers pierce the clothes and easily get under the skin. No known negative effects are caused by the insect, however, and the moment you hit it the sting pain is gone.
It is said that the insect was brought to the area a long time ago by the Europeans, as it did not exist here before that time.

D- All the animals are present in the area where you see the flocks of large and small monkeys – our neighbors – deer of different sizes, the wild cow, the lions (our best friends and we have a pact against the deer).



This area has a lots of elephants. I did not see them, but I saw the destruction to trees that was caused by them. For all these reasons, it was difficult for the people to live in this area; but pray to God our men are able to do so.

There is a ravine filled with water, and fish at least ten months out of the year in the area where we will establish the camp. It is difficult to strike the camp from the air. Even if they wanted to burn the entire area it would be difficult, because there are open areas and the ravine is large.

Let me add that during the rainy season, it would be impossible for any equipment or vehicle to reach the area. It becomes muddy and swampy, and it becomes impossible to move over it except on foot or by animal, and from the Kaambooni Cape road only.
We were very successful in selecting it, and we can do many things with this area. But it requires certain amenities, such as storage areas or camps.

The forest is about 45 km away from the Kaambooni Cape, 200 km from Dopli, 30 km from Kelpeo and 45 km from Patato. It is possible to use it for any kind of training you can think of, except urban warfare and snow warfare.

I just returned from a tour to the camp, as we begin the new training course and the obedience class given by Brother Nouruddin in the land of gathering, at the beach of Wadi Al-Jihad (Al-Jihad ravine) under the shade of the trees. The cool breeze blew over our faces and there were cries of the trainees saying Jihad, Jihad. This was my first experience as I sat watching and listening, the biting insects came down on me from every side.

**(3) An Idea about the Existing Leadership:**

Brother Mukhtar says that the existing leadership here is represented in Sheikh Hasan and his Deputy ‘Abd Al-‘Aziz, and the two Brothers Mohammed ‘Abdullah and Ahmad Madoubi, the carrier of this letter. I can say in accordance to what I have seen with my own eyes that it is a leadership as simple as it is very loyal. Our scientific evidence is that they accompanied us at all times, beginning with preparation for the camp, training and then fighting. They insisted on participation in the training and in the fighting, too.
We must note that they are desperately in need of someone to support them and stand beside them after God, especially in matters concerning organization and administration, and military operations.

*Page 6 of 6

The existing leadership, Al-Sheikh Hasan and Al-Sheikh ‘Abd Al-‘Aziz, make a stable administration, meaning that work of one without the other will not be as complete and coordinated as when they are both working together during all phases of the operation. The capability of persuasion and the influence of Sheik Hasan was clear during the last phase in the Da’awa and in the political fields. As for Sheikh ‘Abd Al-‘Aziz, he represents the side of utmost importance; pushing forward military combat activity.
The leadership, as we previously mentioned, is in urgent need for someone to organize this activity from all aspects. They want only to fight and nothing else, and they are ready and willing to accept any work program or ideas submitted from our side.

I would like to direct your attention to an important financial matter. The leadership during the past period has not asked us for any financial support as a condition of cooperating with us, due to the unavailability of the funds during this phase. Everyone agreed that God will not abandon us as long as we work on the path of Jihad (these are the words of Sheikh Hasan).
This concludes what Brother Mukhtar has said and written about the subject of the leadership. I support him in his opinion and pray to God that we succeed.

**(4) The result of the first Political Tour by Sheikh Hasan in the area:**

Sheikh Hasan made a quick tour of the area that was, in my opinion, a media initiative to present the Brothers and the new movement. The Sheikh moved to Kelpeo where he met with the Sheikhs of Kelpeo and Patato. According to the details of the meetings, the talks were fruitful and all parties agreed on one objective, that being fighting the infidels and governing by the Holy Koran. As far as who among the tribes in the region will assume the leadership position – time for such talks is not due yet – they all agreed to hold talks at a later date.

Some Sheikhs said they will join you now to fight the infidels. Others said they were amazed by your stand during the last period. We knew that you were facing problems and that this is your actual role. According to sources, there were no objections except for one of the Sufi's Sheikhs.

In general, the session was very beneficial.

For your information and may God bless you,

Saif Al-'Adl

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800080
Author: None
Title: Photographs of Fazul Abdellah Mohamed
Date: None
Length: 2 pages

## Synopsis

This document contains various photographs of Fazul Abdellah Mohamed. The names Ghazi and Abdellah are also written in Arabic.

AFGP-2002-800080

*Page 1 of 2 MG
Different Photos of Fazul Abdellah Mohamed. The name Ghazi and Abdellah are written in Arabic.

AFGP-2002-800080

*page 2 of 2 MG

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800081
Author: None
Title: Kenya Airways Ticket 1
Date: 4 November 1997
Length: 2 pages

## Synopsis

This is a photograph of a passenger ticket and baggage for passage on Kenya Airways for Fazul Abdalla, from Nairobi to Khartoum to Dubai to Karachi, and back to Nairobi.

AFGP-2002-800081

*page 1 of 2 MG

Passenger Ticket and Baggage Check issued by Kenya Airways Limited
P.O.Box 19002
Nairobi, Kenya
Member of International Air Transport Association
706 4401 750 336 4

AFGP-2002-800081

*Page 2 of 2 MG

Kenya Airways ticket dated on Nov 4, 1997
Name Mr. **Fazul Abdalla**
Round trip ticket 706 4401750336 4

From Nairobi
To Khartoum
To Dubai
To Karachi
To Nairobi



Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800083
Author: None
Title: Kenya Airways Ticket 2
Date: 3 May 1998
Length: 2 pages

## Synopsis

This is a photograph of a passenger ticket and baggage for passage on Kenya Airways for Fazul Abdalla, from Khartoum to Nairobi to Moroni, Comoros on flight #321.

AFGP-2002-800083

*page 1 of 2 MG

Passenger Ticket and Baggage Check issued by Kenya Airways Limited
P.O.Box 19002
Nairobi, Kenya
Member of International Air Transport Association
706 4401 845126 0

*Page 2 of 2 MG

Kenya Airways ticket dated on May 3, 1998
Name Mr. **Fazul Abdalla**
Ticket # 2 706 4401845126 1

From Khartoum Flight # 321
To Nairobi
To Moroni

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800084
Author: Various
Title: Fazul's Travel and Educational Documents
Date: Various
Length: 17 pages

## Synopsis

These are travel and educational documents for Fazul Abdallah.

## Key Themes

There are a number of duplicate documents, but these are the most important.

1. Certificate from Lycee D'Etat in Moroni, Comoros, where Fazul Abdallah from 1987 to 1988.
2. A document certifying that Fazul Abdella Mohammed studied Apple Macintosh computers in 1995, and did well in the course.
3. A foreign transaction certificate issued by the Sudanese Foreign Ministry in 1995, and authenticated by the Sudanese Attorney General's office. A similar certificate appears later in the document as well.
4. A document certifying that Fazul Abdallah Mohamed Ali completed a course in English typewriting at the same time as the Apple Macintosh course.
5. An entry certificate for Fazul Abdallah Mohamed Ali from 'the second degree' cycle in the Comoros, from 1991.
6. A 'baccalaureate' graduation certificate for Fazul Abdallah Mohamed Ali from 1994.
7. A document certifying that Fazul Abdallah Mohamed Ali successfully passed an Arabic typewriting course at the same time as the Macintosh and English typewriting courses.
8. Prior to these courses, there is another document indicating that Fazul Abdul Mohamed Ali completed a course in DOS and Windows programming, and did well.

AFGP-2002-800084

*Page 1 of 17 MG

Certificate from Lycee D'Etat in Moroni-Comoros.
Name: Fazul Abdallah
Attended in 1987-1988

LYCEE D'ETAT
SAID MOHAMED CHEIKH
B. P. 49
MORONI-COMORES

CERTIFICAT DE SCOLARITE

Je soussigné, Proviseur du Lycée d'Etat Saïd Mohamed Cheikh,
certifie que M. Fazul Abdallah
né le 25 Août 19 72 à Moroni
Grande Comore
demeurant à Moroni
a poursuivi ses études dans mon établissement en qualité d'élève régulier
Année scolaire 1987-1988 dans la classe de 3e/10

Moroni, le 11 Avril 1988
Le Proviseur

Le Proviseur

AFGP-2002-800084

*Page 2 of 17 MG

Ray Documentation House certifies that student Fazul Abdella Mohamed had training on the Apple Macintosh computer from 23/5/1995 to 23/6/1995 and graduated with very good grades.



RAY DOCUMENTATION HOUSE

دار راي للتوثيق

شهاده

تشهد دار راي للتوثيق بان الطاليه / الطالب / ..... فاضل عبد الله محمد

قد تلقت تلقي كورساً تدريبياً علي جهاز أبل ماكنتوش في الفترة من ٢٣ / ٥ /

١٩٩٥م الي ٢٣ / ٦ / ١٩٩٥م

وتخرج بالتقدير .....جيد جداً..... علي برنامج الناشر المكتبي والماك بينت

الإدارة .....

اي كشط او تغيير يلغي هذه الشهادة

*Page 3 of 17 MG

Commercial Transaction
A Sudanese Foreign Ministry certification on 19/5/1995
Ministry of Justice in Sudan rubber stamp
Authentication Office of the attorney general in Sudan No. 31441 on 26/4/1994 with a receipt No. 26099 on 9/8/1995. Signed by Ahmad.



AFGP-2002-800084

*Page 4 of 17 MG

Diploma from Gilani Institute
Name Fazul Abdallah Mohamed Ali has completed a training course in English typewriting from the period 25/5/1995 to 25/6/1995.



MG

Gilani Institute

Diploma

This is to certify that

FAZUL ABDALLAH MOHAMED ALI

has completed the training course in English Typewriting for the period from 25/5/1995 to 25/6/1995 he / she successfully passed the examination achieving ( 28 ) words per minute and has been awarded this Diploma

Date

Manager

INSTITUTE FOR TYP

Supervisor

AFGP-2002-800084

*Page 5 of 17 MG

Authentication seal from Sudan Republic (Foreign Ministry) commercial records dated 19/8/1995.
Seal from the Ministry of Justice attorney general in Sudan.
Certification dated on 19/8/1995

AFGP-2002-800084

*Page 6 of 17 MG

Certificate in French No. 004950 from Comoros
Name Fazul Abdallah Mohamed Ali
Date 25/8/1972



REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE ISLAMIQUE DES COMORES
MINISTERE DE L'EDUCATION NATIONALE, DE LA CULTURE, DE LA JEUNESSE ET DES SPORTS

N° 004950

BREVET D'ETUDES DU PREMIER CYCLE DU SECOND DEGRE

Le Ministre de l'Education Nationale, de la Culture, de la Jeunesse et des Sports
Vu les textes en vigueur et notamment le décret N° 81-005 du 13 janvier 1981

Vu le Procès-Verbal d'examen en date du 23 Août 1991

Centre de Moroni N° 1193

Délivre le présent diplôme à M Fazul Abdallah Mohamed Ali

Né (e) le 25-08-1972 à Moroni

Fait à Moroni, le

Signature du Candidat

Le Ministre de l'Education Nationale, de la Culture, de la Jeunesse et des Sports

AHMED MOHAMED

IMPORTANT : Toute reproduction de ce diplôme, (photocopie ou copie), n'est valable que si elle est certifiée conforme par le Ministère de l'Education Nationale

*Page 7 of 17 MG
Diploma in French from the Ministry of Education in Comoros No. 000404
A
Bachelor degree
Center Moroni
No. 247
Name Fazul Abdallah Mohamed Ali 1972, Moroni
Dated on 20 March 1994
Signed by Ibrahim Wissani Mfoihaya

REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE ISLAMIQUE DES COMORES

№ 000404 - A

MINISTERE DE L'EDUCATION NATIONALE

BACCALAUREAT DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT DU SECOND DEGRE

Le Ministre de l'Education Nationale,

Vu les textes en vigueur
Vu le Procès-Verbal d'examen en date du 25 Février 1994

Centre de Moroni N° 247

Confère le grade de Bachelier de l'Enseignement du Second Dégré

Série A Mention Bien Session de 1993

et délivre le présent diplôme

à M. Fazul Abdallah Mohamed Ali

Né(e) 1972 à Moroni

Fait à Moroni, le 20 MARS 1994

Signature du Candidat

Le Ministre de l'Education Nationale

IBRAHIM WISSANI MFOIHAYA

IMPORTANT : Toute reproduction de ce diplôme, ( photocopie ou copie ), n'est valable qu'en tant qu'elle est certifiée conforme par le Ministre de l'Education Nationale.

AFGP-2002-800084

*Page 8 of 17 MG

Diploma written in French dated 1991
Center Moroni
No. 1193
Name Fazul Abdallah Mohamd Ali
25/8/1972 Moroni
Signed by Ahamd Mohamed

REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE ISLAMIQUE DES COMORES
MINISTERE DE L'EDUCATION NATIONALE, DE LA CULTURE, DE LA JEUNESSE ET DES SPORTS

N°

# BREVET D'ETUDES DU PREMIER CYCLE DU SECOND DEGRE

Le Ministre de l'Education Nationale, de la Culture, de la Jeunesse et des Sports
Vu les textes en vigueur et notamment le décret N° 81-005 du 13 janvier 1981

Vu le Procès-Verbal d'examen en date du 23 Août 1991

Centre de Moroni N° 1193

Délivre le présent diplôme à M Fazul Abdallah Mohamed Ali

Né(e) le 25-08-1972 à Moroni

Fait à Moroni, le

Signature du Candidat

Photocopie certifiée conforme à l'original
MORONI, le 25-04-1993
fait par le Bureau
Hassani Ibouroi

Le Ministre de l'Education Nationale, de la Culture, de la Jeunesse et des Sports

AHMED MOHAMED

IMPORTANT : Toute reproduction de ce diplôme, (photocopie ou copie), n'est valable que si elle est certifiée conforme par le Ministère de l'Education Nationale

*Page 9 of 17 MG

Gilani Training Institute Diploma
Name Fazul Abdelah Mohamed Ali completed typewriting course in Arabic between 25/5/1995 and 25/6/1995 and passes the exam successfully.
Diploma date 28/6/1995

MG

معهد جيلاني التأهيلي

دبلوم المعهد

نشهد بأن ..... فاضل عبدالله مجيد علي .....

أكمل / أكملت كورس التدريب على الآلة الكاتبة عربي

في الفترة من ..... ٢٥/٥/٩٥ الى ..... ٢٥/٦/١٩٩٥ (واجتاز / اجتازت الامتحان

بنجاح وقد تحصل / تحصلت على ..... (ثمانية وعشرون) كلمة في الدقيقة

وعليه منح / منحت هذا الدبلوم ..

التاريخ ..... ٢٨/٦/١٩٩٥م

المدير ..... المشرف .....

* Page 10 of 17 MG

Authentication from the Republic of Sudan (Foreign Ministry) commercial records dated on 9/8/1995

Office of the Attorney General stamped on 9/8/1995
Record No. 17563

AFGP-2002-800084

Date of the Diploma 23/10/1986
Receipt No. 26099
Commercial Records
Signed by Amina Ahmad

*Page 11 of 17 MG

This page is the same as page 7
Diploma in French from the Ministry of Education in Comoros No. 000404 A
Bachelor degree
Center Moroni

No. 247
Name Fazul Abdallah Mohamed Ali 1972, Moroni
Dated on 20 March 1994
Signed by Ibrahim Wissani Mfoihaya

REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE ISLAMIQUE DES COMORES

№ 000404 - A

MINISTERE DE L'EDUCATION NATIONALE

**BACCALAUREAT DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT DU SECOND DEGRE**

Le Ministre de l'Education Nationale,

Vu les textes en vigueur
Vu le Procès-Verbal d'examen en date du 25 Février 1994
Centre de Moroni N° 247
Confère le grade de Bachelier de l'Enseignement du Second Dégré
Série A Mention Bien Session de 1993
et délivre le présent diplôme
à M. Fazul Abdallah Mohamed Ali
Né(e) 1972 à Moroni

Photocopie certifiée conforme à l'original
MORONI, le 04-05-1995

Signature du Candidat

Fait à Moroni, le 20 MARS 1994
Le Ministre de l'Education Nationale
IBRAHIM WISSANI MFOIHAYA

IMPORTANT : Toute reproduction de ce diplôme, ( photocopie ou copie ), n'est valable que lorsque elle est conforme par le Ministre de l'Education Nationale.

*Page 12 of 17 MG

This page is the same as page 2
Ray Documentation House certifies that student Fazul Abdella Mohamed had training on the Apple computer from 23/5/1995 to 23/6/1995 and graduated with very good grades.

RAY DOCUMENTATION HOUSE

دار راي للتوثيق

شهاده

تشهد دار راي للتوثيق بان الطاليه / الطالب / .....فاضل عبد الله محمد.....

قد تلقت تلقي كورساً تدريبياً علي جهاز آبل ماكنتوش في الفترة من ٢٣ / ٥ /

١٩٩٥م الي ٢٣ / ٦ / ١٩٩٥م

وتخرج بالتقدير .....جيد جداً..... علي برنامج الناشر المكتبي والماك بينت

الإدارة .....

اي كشط او تغيير يلغي هذه الشهادة

Ray Documentation House
7 JUN 1995
Khartoum

*Page 13 of 17 MG

This page is the same as page 3 of 17.
Sudan Foreign Ministry certification on 19/5/1995
Ministry of Justice in Sudan rubber stamp

Authentication office of the Attorney General in Sudan No. 31441 on 26/4/1994 with a receipt No. 26099 on 9/8/1995. Signed by Ahmad.

*Page 14 of 17 MG

Diploma from Global Computer Institute to Fazul A Mohamed Ali, who has successfully completed the following courses:
Introduction and DOS

AFGP-2002-800084

Introduction to Programming
Windows
Period from 1/2/1995 to 1/5/1995

Institute Manger signed on 8/5/1995

المؤسسة العالمية للإنتاج والتنمية الإعلامية

GLOBAL COMPUTER INSTITUTE — المعهد العالمي للحاسوب

يشهد المعهد بأن الدارس : فاضل عبدالله محمد علي

This is to certify that : FAZUL A. MOHAMED ALI

Has successfully completed prescribed courses — قد اكمل الدورات الاتية في علوم الحاسوب :

| COURSE | GRADE | التقدير | الدورة |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 INTRO & DOS | EXELLENT | ممتاز | ١ مقدمة في التشغيل |
| 2 INTRO - PROGRAMMING | EXELLENT | ممتاز | ٢ مقدمة البرمجة |
| 3 WINDOWS | EXELLENT | ممتاز | ٣ نوافذ |
| 4 | | | ٤ |
| 5 | | | ٥ |
| 6 | | | ٦ |

TOTAL HOURS : 144 H — عدد الساعات ١٤٤ ساعة في الفترة من ١٩٩٥/٢/١ م الي ١٩٩٥/٥/١م

OVER ALL ASSESSMENT : EXELLENT — التقدير العام ممتاز

INSTITUTE MANAGER — GENERAL MANAGER — المدير العام — مدير المعهد

Date : 8/5/1995 — التاريخ : ١٩٩٥/٥/٨

*page 15 of 17 MG

Authentication form the Foreign Ministry of Sudan (commercial sector)
Date 1/10/1995
No. 28584

Signed by Amina Ahmad
Sealed from the Attorney General office in Sudan.

*Page 16 of 17 MG

This page is the same as page 4 of 17.

Diploma from Gilani Institute

Fazul Abdallah Mohamed Ali has completed a training course in English typewriting from the period 25/5/1995 to 25/6/1995.



MG

Gilani Institute

Diploma

This is to certify that

FAZUL ABDALLAH MOHAMED ALI

has completed the training course in English Typewriting for the period from 25/5/1995 to 25/6/1995 he / she successfully passed the examination achieving ( 28 ) words per minute and has been awarded this Deploma

Date

Manager

G. INSTITUTE FOR TYP

Supervisor

*Page 17 of 17 MG

This page is the same as 5 of 17.
Authentication seal from Sudan Republic (Foreign Ministry) commercial records dated 19/8/1995.

AFGP-2002-800084

Seal from the Ministry of Justice Attorney General in Sudan.
Certification dated 19/8/1995



Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800086
Author: None
Title: Student ID Card for Said Bakar
Date: 1991
Length: 2 pages

## Synopsis

This document is a student ID card for Said Bakar, who is listed as being a 15 year-old student at Jamia Farooquia, Shah Faisal Colony in Karachi, Pakistan.

AFGP-2002-800086

*Page 1 of 2 MG

Student ID card signed by the name Abdullal Fazul with a photo and stamped seal.



AFGP-2002-800086

*Page 2 of 2 MG

Student's Identity Card
Name: Said Bakar
Father's Name: Bakar Mohammad Ali
Date of Birth: 25/12/1975
Age: 15-year-old
Address: Jamia Farooquia Shah Fasal
Colony 4, Karachi 25 Pakistan
Class Markazi Loughs
Roll Number 0022689/90
Issued on 1991
Valid Up to 2000
School/college Jamia Farooquia
Shah Faisal Colony, Karachi



STUDENT'S IDENTITY CARD

Name SAID BAKAR.
Father's Name BAKAR MOHAMMAD ALI.
Date of Birth 25.12.1975 Age 15 years.
Address Jamia Farooquia Shah Faisal Colony, 4, Karachi -25, Pakistan
Class Markazi Lougha Roll No. 0022689/90
Issued on 1991 Valid Upto 2000
School/College Jamia Farooquia. Shah Faisal Colony, Karachi.

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800087
Author: None
Title: Passports of Fazul and Maimouna Mohamed Ali
Date: Various
Length: 5 pages

## Synopsis

This document contains images of the passports of two citizens of the Comoros, Abdullah Mohammed Fazul, and Maimouna Mohammed Ali.

## Key Themes

The first passport, for Abdullah Mohammed Fazul, shows that he was born in 1974 in Moroni, Comoros, and works as a computer engineer. He has two children, Assiya Said, and Loutfi Said, born in 1995 and 1996, respectively.

The second passport, for Maimouna Mohammed Ali, lists the holder as a student born in 1976 in Moroni, Comoros. According to the passport's stamp pages, the holder left the Comoros, and spent ten days in Tanzania before returning in August and September 1998. The numbers for both passports are the same, suggesting they are either one passport, or they are a family.

AFGP-2002-800087

*Page 1 of 3 MG

Passport # 076059 / 3879
Nationality: Comorienne (Comoros)
Name: Abdullah Mohamed Fazul
Date of Birth: 25 Dec 1974
Place of Birth: Moroni, Comoros
Profession: Computer Engineer
Place of Residence: Moroni, Comoros

RECOMMANDATIONS IMPORTANTES

1° - Le passeport demeure la propriété de l'État Comorien. Il est remis à titre rigoureusement personnel au porteur pour lui permettre de voyager librement à l'étranger. Il doit être signé et ne peut être prêté.

2° - Il est interdit d'y effectuer des grattages, corrections, ratures, surcharges et adjonctions de mentions ou de feuilles supplémentaires. Toute rectification non opérée par l'autorité compétente, entraîne la nullité du titre, sans préjudice de poursuites judiciaires.

3° - En cas de perte ou de destruction, le titulaire doit en informer immédiatement l'autorité administrative ou consulaire compétente la plus proche.

4° - Avant son départ pour l'étranger, le titulaire doit s'assurer que son passeport possède une durée de validité suffisante et s'enquérir des conditions d'entrée et de séjour dans le pays de destination auprès du consulat compétent. Il doit aussi s'assurer qu'il disposera de moyens de paiement suffisants en monnaie étrangère pour couvrir les frais de son retour, nos consulats ne pouvant prendre en charge son rapatriement.

5° - Le renouvellement ou la prorogation d'un passeport expiré au cours d'un séjour à l'étranger doit être demandé au consulat de l'État Comorien le plus proche ; cette formalité nécessite un certain délai.

6° - Les enfants ayant atteint l'âge de 15 ans doivent être munis d'un passeport individuel.

7° - Il est recommandé au Comorien qui établit sa résidence à l'étranger, de se faire immatriculer au Consulat dès son arrivée dans la circonscription consulaire. Cette formalité est gratuite.

NOM : ABDALLAH
Prénoms : Mohamed Fazul
Né(e) le : 25 Décembre 1974
Lieu de naissance : Moroni. COMORES
الجنسية قمرية
Nationalité Comorienne
Profession : Ing. Informateur
Domicile : Moroni. COMORES
جواز رقم
Passeport N° : 076059/3879

AFGP-2002-800087

Children Names:

Assiyah Said, DoB 22/7/95, PoB Moroni-Comoros

Loutfi Said, DoB 8/8/96, PoB Moroni-Comoros



2 ٢

الأوصاف
SIGNALEMENT

Taille : 1,67 القامة

Couleur des yeux : marron لون العينين

Couleur des cheveux : noir لون الشعر

Signes particuliers :

الأوصاف المميزة

Signature du Titulaire
إمضاء صاحب الجواز

Ce passeport contient 32 pages

3 ٣

ENFANTS
الأولاد

| lieu de naissance محل الميلاد | date de naissance تاريخ الميلاد | nom الأسم |
|---|---|---|
| Moroni-Comoros | 22-7-95 | Assiyah-Said |
| Moroni-Comoros | 8-8-96 | Loutfi-Said |

Name: Maimouna Mohamed Ali
DoB: 25 Dec 1976
PoB: Moroni-Comoros
Profession: Student
Passport # 076059 / 3879

RECOMMANDATIONS IMPORTANTES

1° - Le passeport demeure la propriété de l'État Comorien. Il est remis à titre rigoureusement personnel au porteur pour lui permettre de voyager librement à l'étranger. Il doit être signé et ne peut être prêté.

2° - Il est interdit d'y effectuer des grattages, corrections, ratures, surcharges et adjonctions de mentions ou de feuilles supplémentaires. Toute rectification non opérée par l'autorité compétente, entraîne la nullité du titre, sans préjudice de poursuites judiciaires.

3° - En cas de perte ou de destruction, le titulaire doit en informer immédiatement l'autorité administrative ou consulaire compétente la plus proche.

4° - Avant son départ pour l'étranger, le titulaire doit s'assurer que son passeport possède une durée de validité suffisante et s'enquérir des conditions d'entrée et de séjour dans le pays de destination auprès du consulat compétent. Il doit aussi s'assurer qu'il disposera de moyens de paiement suffisants en monnaie étrangère pour couvrir les frais de son retour, nos consulats ne pouvant prendre en charge son rapatriement.

5° - Le renouvellement ou la prorogation d'un passeport expiré au cours d'un séjour à l'étranger doit être demandé au consulat de l'État Comorien le plus proche ; cette formalité nécessite un certain délai.

6° - Les enfants ayant atteint l'âge de 15 ans doivent être munis d'un passeport individuel.

7° - Il est recommandé au Comorien qui établit sa résidence à l'étranger, de se faire immatriculer au Consulat dès son arrivée dans la circonscription consulaire. Cette formalité est gratuite.

NOM : MAIMOUNA
اللقب
Prénoms : Mohamed Ali
الأسماء
Né(e) le : 25 Décembre 1976
تاريخ الميلاد
Lieu de naissance : Moroni - COMORES
محل الميلاد
الجنسية قمرية
Nationalité Comorienne
Profession : ÉTUDIANTE
المهنة
Domicile : Moroni - COMORES
محل الإقامة
97 جواز رقم
Passeport N° : 076059/3879

*Page 2 of 3 MG

An exact copy to the previous page.

*Page 3 of 3 MG

Passport # 076059

There is an Comoros exit visa dated 21/8/1998 Stamped service Eml---- (?) Oulouhou(?)

*Page 3 of 3 MG

Passport expire 21 Sep 2002

Departure date from Moroni, 22/8/98

Arrival date to Tanzania, 22/8/98

Departure date from Tanzania, 2/9/98



Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800088
Author: None
Title: Somalian Passport of Halimo Farah Abdillahi
Date: Issue 21/11/1999
Length: 5 pages

## Synopsis

The document contains the passport (issued in Sana'a, Yemen in 1999) of Halimo Farah Abdillahi, a Somalian housewife born in 1975 in Kismayo, Somalia, and currently a resident of Mogadishu, Somalia.

AFGP-2002-800088

*Page 1 of 5 MG

Somali Democratic Republic Passport



AFGP-2002-800088

*Page 2 of 5 MG

Passport Number A 0773416
Name: Halimo Farah Abdillahi .
Issued in the Somali Embassy in SANA'A, Yemen

AFGP-2002-800088

*Page 3 of 5 MG

Passport Number 0773416
Somali Democratic Republic
Name: Halimo Farah Abdillahi



1 ١

JAMHUURIYADDA DIMOQRAADIGA SOOMAALIYA
جمهورية الصومال الديمقراطية
SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
MAGACA SHARCIGA
باسم القانون
IN THE NAME OF THE LAW
Wasiirka Arrimaha Dibedda
wuxuu soo saaray Baasaboorkan
يصدر وزير الخارجية هذا الجواز
The Minister of Foreign Affairs has issued this Passport
اسم حامل الجواز
Jaalle HALIMO FARAH
to Mr. ABDILLAHI

Baasaboorkaddaan waxaa bixiyey Dibedda waxaa saxiixa kara Danjiraha iyo Qunsulka Dawladda u Jooga Dibedda.
Passports issued abroad may be signed for the State by Diplomatic or Consular Agents.

2 ٢

SAWIRKA XAASKA
صورة الزوجة
PHOTOGRAPH OF WIFE

Saxiixa qofka Baasaboorka leh
Signature of holder
توقيع حامل الجواز

HALIMO FARAH

Caddeynta saxiixa
Authentication of Signature

L. Rajistar
Reg. No.

L. Baasaboorka
Passport No. A 0773416
رقم الجواز

THIS PASSPORT CONTAINS 48 PAGES BIXIN WUXUU KA KOOBAN YAHAY 48 BOG

*Page 4 of 5 MG

Profession: Housewife
Father's Name: Farah Abdlahhi
Mother's Name: Zemzem Shub
PoB: Kismaio
DoB: 1975
Place of Residence: Mogadishu
District of Mogadishu
Height 165 Centimeters
Eyes: Black
Build: Normal
Significant Marks: NA

Children's names: Asia, dob: 1995
Nooman, dob: 1997



3 ٣

FAAHFAAHINTA QOFKA BAASABOORKA LEH
أوصاف حامل الجواز
DESCRIPTION OF HOLDER

Shaqadiisa HOUSE WIFE المهنة
Occupation
Magaca Aabbaha FARAH ABDULLAHI اسم الأب
Father's name
Magaca Hooyada ZEMZEM-SHUB اسم الأم
Mother's name
Meesha uu ku dhashay KISMAIO محل الميلاد
Place of birth
Taariikhda uu dhashay 1975 تاريخ الميلاد
Date of birth
Meesha uu deggan yahay MOGADISHO محل الإقامة
Domiciled at
Degmada MOGADISHO ناحية
District of
Dhererka M. 165 الطول
Height
Dhismaha jirka NORMAL تكوين الجسم
Build
Indhaha BLACK العينان
Eyes
Midabka BLACK اللون
Complexion
Calaamado NIL المميزات
Significant marks

4 ٤

DADKA LOO OGGOL YAHAY IN AY RAACAAN QOFKA BAASABOORKA LEH
الأشخاص المرخص لهم بالسفر مع حامل الجواز
PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL WITH THE HOLDER
Xaas iyo Carruur
الزوجة والأولاد
Wife and Children

| Magaca الاسم Name | Taa. Dhaahay تاريخ الميلاد Date of birth | Saxiixa Taliyaha توقيع المدير Seen by |
|---|---|---|
| ASIA | 1995 | |
| NOOMAN | 1997 | |

Waxaa lagu qori karaa carruur da'doodu ku siman tahay 14 sanno.
يمكن تسجيل أسماء الأطفال إلى سن ١٤ سنة فقط
Only names of children upto 14 years of age can be entered.

SOMALI REPUBLIC
SOMALI REPUBLIC
Ministry of the Somali D.

AFGP-2002-800088

*Page 5 of 5 MG

This passport is valid for the following countries:
Valid for all Countries
Valid until 20/11/2002
Place of issue Sana'a
Date of Issue: 21/11/1999



5 ٥

Baasaboorkan waxaa lagu tegi karaa dalalka hoos ku qoran :

هذا الجواز صالح للسفر الى البلدان الآتية :

*This passport is valid for the following countries :*

DAL KASTA WAA LAGU TEGI KARAA

صالح لجميع البلدان

VALID FOR ALL COUNTRIES

Wuxuu dhacayaa 20-11-2002 وينتهي العمل بهذا
*Is valid until*

Meesha laga bixiyey SANA'A صدر في
*Place of issue*

Taariikhda la bixiyey 21-11-1999 تاريخ الاصدار
*Date of issue*

SAFAARADDA JAMHUURIYADDA DIMOQRAADIGA SOOMAALIYA
WASIIRKA
MINISTER
SANA'A
Embassy of the Somali Democratic Republic

٦ 6

DAL-KUGAL

التأشيرات

VISAS

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800089
Author: None
Title: Comoros Passport of [Fazul] Abdallah Mohamed
Date: Issued
Length: 15 pages

## Synopsis

This is the Comoros passport of [Fazul] Abdallah Mohammed.

## Key Themes

The document is the Comoros passport of [Fazul] Abdallah Mohammed, a pupil who was born in 1972 in Moroni, Comoros. The passport was originally issued in 1990 in Moroni, and renewed in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 1996. Using the passport, [Fazul] Abdallah Mohammed traveled to Mauritius in 1990, to Tanzania in 1994 and 1995, to Sudan several times in 1995, to Yemen in 1995, and to Kenya in 1993 and several times in 1994 and 1995. He was also a resident of Pakistan for one year in 1991-1992 (probably longer, since he entered Pakistan in 1993 as well). Finally [Fazul] Abdallah Mohammed received visas to Djibouti and India.

AFGP-2002-800089

*Page 1 of 15 MG

Passport Number 022689 / 6399
Name: Abdallah Mohamed
DoB: 25 August 1972
PoB: Moroni, Comoros
Profession: Pupil
Place of Residence: Moroni, Comoros

RECOMMANDATIONS IMPORTANTES

1° - Le passeport demeure la propriété de l'État Comorien. Il est remis à titre rigoureusement personnel au porteur pour lui permettre de voyager librement à l'étranger. Il doit être signé et ne peut être prêté.

2° - Il est interdit d'y effectuer des grattages, corrections, ratures, surcharges et adjonctions de mentions ou de feuilles supplémentaires. Toute rectification non opérée par l'autorité compétente, entraîne la nullité du titre, sans préjudice de poursuites judiciaires.

3° - En cas de perte ou de destruction, le titulaire doit en informer immédiatement l'autorité administrative ou consulaire compétente la plus proche.

4° - Avant son départ pour l'étranger, le titulaire doit s'assurer que son passeport possède une durée de validité suffisante et s'enquérir des conditions d'entrée et de séjour dans le pays de destination auprès du consulat compétent. Il doit aussi s'assurer qu'il disposera de moyens de paiement suffisants en monnaie étrangère pour couvrir les frais de son retour, nos consulats ne pouvant prendre en charge son rapatriement.

5° - Le renouvellement ou la prorogation d'un passeport expiré au cours d'un séjour à l'étranger doit être demandé au consulat de l'État Comorien le plus proche ; cette formalité nécessite un certain délai.

6° - Les enfants ayant atteint l'âge de 15 ans doivent être munis d'un passeport individuel.

7° - Il est recommandé au Comorien qui établit sa résidence à l'étranger, de se faire immatriculer au Consulat dès son arrivée dans la circonscription consulaire. Cette formalité est gratuite.

NOM : FAZUL

اللقب

Prénoms : Abdallah Mohamed

الأسم

Né(e) le : 25 Aout 1972

تاريخ الميلاد

Lieu de naissance : Moroni Comores

محل الميلاد

الجنسيّة قمريّة

Nationalité Comorienne

Profession : Eleve

المهنة

Domicile : Moroni Comores

محل الأقامة

جواز رقم

Passeport N° : 0022689 / 6399

90

A

AFGP-2002-800089

*Page 2 of 15 MG

Arrival cachet  Moroni-Haya  11 Mar 1994



AFGP-2002-800089

Passport issued in Moroni on 25 (?) Oct 1990, and expired on 24 Oct 1995.
Passport renewed in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 16 Oct 1995, valid until 15 Oct 2000
Seal of the Republic of Comoros

*Page 4 of 15 MG
Passport Number 022689
Exit Visa 8253/No90/DSN/PAF
Name: Fazul Abdallah
Issued 16/11/90 signed by Ahamada Zaldou



6 ٦

La validité de ce passeport est prorogée jusqu'au

يمتد العمل بهذا الجواز حتى

Fait à

حرر في

Le

بتاريخ

Signature et cachet de l'Autorité
qui a délivré le passeport

إمضاء وختم السلطة التي أصدرت

Ce passeport contie

7 ٧

VISAS
التأشيرات

MINISTÈRE DE L'INTÉRIEUR
SÛRETÉ NATIONALE

Visa de sortie et retour
8253/N°90/DSN/PAF1
Nom et Prénoms Fazul Abdallah
Valable 1 2 - P
Fait à Moroni le 16/11/90
Chef de Service
Tsmu / Em
AHAMADA Zaïdou

SERVICE L'IMMIGRATION
R.F.I. DES COMORES
MORONI - HAHAYA

11/3/94
ARRIVÉE

*Page 5 of 15 MG

Visa No. /90, issued 23 Nov 90

Arrival Date in Mauritius 23 Nov 1990.
Departure from Mauritius 29 Nov 1990

Kenya Arrival in Mandera, 6 Feb 94
Single journey to Kenya Business Visa dated 6/2/94



*Page 6 of 15 MG
Pakistani Resident Visa No. 5464
Type of visa: Entry
Date of issue: 20/11/1991
Valid for One Year
Status: Single
Expires 19/11/1992

*Page 7 of 15 MG

Kenya one week transit visa issued on Feb 3, 1993
Visa No. 137/2/93
Kenya High Commission in Islamabad
Arrival in Islamabad on 3/2/93
Departure from Karachi, Pakistan ?/1993
IM/No C285642



Visa No 86/93
Name Fazul Abdallah Mohamed
Type of visa: Tourist Visa for Djibouti issued in Nairobi, Kenya 11/2/93.
One entry
Signed by Saleh H. Farah Dirar




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*Page 9 of 15 MG

Visa to the Republic of Sudan issued in Nairobi
Visa No. 95/150

Issue date 15/4/1994
Valid for 3 month
Arrived in Khartoum airport on 28 April, 1994,
Depart Khartoum on 30 Apr 94
Kenya Exit visa on 15 Oct 1994.
Tanzanian Arrival at Kilimanjaro 15 Oct 94
Tanzania Exit from Dar es Salaam, 14 Nov 94




*Page 10 of 15 MG

Nairobi Exit visa 25 Jan 1995

Kenya 135 Immigration Officer 14 Nov 199?
Single journey visa to Kenya for Holiday dates 14/11/94
Paid $10 US
No. C593068
Nairobi entry dated 30 April 1994
Nairobi exit dated April 1994
Kenyan visa issued 14 Nov 94  964972
Paid $10 US.
Arrival Nairobi 24 Nov 94
Depart Nairobi 25 Jan 95



*Page 11 of 15 MG

Tanzanian Visa No. 1371 95, issued in Nairobi on 19 Jan 95
Tanzania High Commission, Passport Control Office
Tanzanian arrival on 25 Jan 95 issued in Namanga
Tanzanian exit on 8 Aug 95, issued at Kilimanjaro International Airport
Arrival to Khartoum airport 3 Aug 1995.
Exit from Khartoum airport on 20 Sep 1995.

*Page 12 of 15 MG

Yemeni visa number issued in Khartoum
Visa No. 623/95

Name Fazul Abdellah Mohamed
Valid until 13/2/96
Issue date 14/4/95
21 Nov 1995 Entry to Yemen Sanaa Airport
Arrival to Khartoum 3 Nov 1995
Depart Khartoum 21 Nov 1995

*Page 13 of 15 MG

Exit from Sanaa on 11 Dec 1995

Arrival in Nairobi, Kenya on 20 Sep 1995
Exit from Nairobi, Kenya on 3 Oct 1995




*Page 14 of 15 MG

Visa to India issued in Sanaa
Visa Number 365195

Date of issue 8/12/1995
Single journey, valid for one month
Attache S.S. Panicker at the Embassy of India




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

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VISAS
التأشيرات

## توصيات هامة

١ - هذا الجواز يظل ملكاً لجمهورية القمر الاتحادية الاسلامية، وهو شخصي لحامله، لكي يسمح له بالسفر الى الخارج، ويلزم أن يكون موقعاً ولا يمكن أن يستعار.

٢ - وممنوع أن يكشط أو وضع تصحيح أو شطب أو إضافات أو زيادة أوراق، كل تصحيح يعمل في هذا الجواز بغير واسطة السلطات المختصة يؤدي إلى إلغاء هذا الجواز مع الاحتفاظ بمتابعته أمام القضاء.

٣ - في حالة فقدانه أو تلفه فانه على حامله أن يبلغ فوراً السلطات الإدارية أو القنصلية المختصة الأكثر قرباً.

٤ - قبل المغادرة للخارج، لحامله أن يتأكد أن جوازه ساري المفعول بمدة كافية، وأن يستعلم عن شروط الدخول والاقامة في البلد المقصود لدى القنصلية المختصة، وأن يحقق أن لديه من العملة الأجنبية الكافية لسداد مصاريف إقامته وبذكرة العودة، قنصلياتنا لا تتحمل أن تحمل مصاريف ترحيله.

٥ - تجديد الجواز أو تمديده في اثناء إقامة في الخارج يطلب من قنصلية القمر الاتحادية الاسلامية الأكثر قرباً أو في البعثات الدبلوماسية الأجنبية التي ترعى مصالح الجمهورية في الدول الأجنبية.

٦ - الأطفال الذين يتجاوزون أعمارهم على ١٥ سنة، يلزمهم أن يحصلوا على جواز فردي.

٧ - يرجى من القمريين الذين يرغبون الاقامة في الخارج أن يسجلوا هنا وصولهم في الدائرة القنصلية للجمهورية هذا الاجراء مجاناً.

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800517
Author: Various and unknown.
Title: Zaid Barre and Events in Somalia
Date: Various.
Length: 38 pages.

## Synopsis

A number of different documents are thrown together, covering 1) the Patani United Liberation Organization's fight for independence from Thailand; 2) the predicament faced by the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia, and proposals by the new leadership on how to fix their problems; 3) a report analyzing the war in Somalia since the fall of Ziad Barre in 1991; 4) regulations for Ansa'ar Allah Base, and an associated security committee; and 5) a report from Yemeni border officials on a secret training mission.

## Key Themes

The document consists of several collections of documents that cover different topics. They are not in order, but are arranged thematically here.

*Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO)*

Patani is completely different from the rest of Thailand in terms of race, language, religion and education. Its main industry is rubber production, but it is also self-sufficient in rice.

Later in the document, the PULO media unit releases a report from a Thai newspaper (13 August 1995) which claims that the Thai government discovered unexploded bombs planted by PULO. Further, the Thai military would like to classify PULO as a terrorist group, and claims that the leader of PULO, Kabir Abdul Rahman, is sick, a charge PULO disputes.

In the next section, the PULO media office in Sudan writes to the people of Sudan on the occasion of PULO's 28th anniversary. In 1993 and 1994, PULO representatives met with the Thai government, and demanded a treaty between PULO and Thailand, as well as self-determination for Patani. PULO's overall goal is an independent democratic state in Patani based on Islamic 'instructions'. The Thai Prime Minister, Banhan Salafa Aaja, rejected these demands. As a result, PULO continues to fight, and asks for the support of all freedom-loving peoples, especially Islamic nations.

Next, the PULO media unit announces that Kabir Abdul Rahman has visited the International Islamic World Organization for Human Rights and discussed the plight of the people of Patani.

In the final section of the document, Abdul Kadir Rahman writes to Abu Obaida and tries to arrange a meeting with him.

*Presidential address, Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia*

The President of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia gives a speech in he notes that the Front was established in 1969, but earlier fought slavery in 1964-1965 in Bali, Harar, and ‘Arsa provinces. The Front has faced many obstacles, including the confiscation of all their weapons coming across the Red Sea, and the martyrdom of many fighters. Nevertheless, the Oromiyan people's faith has not been shaken in the face of many crimes, resulting in hope to other oppressed peoples and fear to colonizers.

The Front welcomed the fall of the Aldirgh government in Ethiopia, attended the reconciliation conference in 1991, and participated in the security and governance preparations for the transitional government. Problems arose in the implementation – the different fronts in Oromia began fighting each other over which one was the legitimate representative of the Oromiyan people. The Front and the Revolutionary Democratic Front for Ethiopian Peoples (RDFEP) began fighting, due to language problems and other misunderstandings, and tensions remain high. The proposed solution is peaceful negotiation and patience, yet while the RDFEP asked for negotiations, the Front's [previous?] leader refused, leading to war. As a result, all gains of the previous years were lost. The previous leader made decisions for his personal benefit, to the detriment of the Front. The new leadership has no objection to staying within Ethiopia provided the rights of the Oromiyan people are respected. The leadership further pledges not to engage in conflict due to religious differences, not to favor any particular area, and not to let the gains from jihad be lost.

*Organizational Predicament of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia*
The author describes how the Front came to be in its current predicament. The original leadership became rigid, and did not heed the opinions of others. Decisions were random and harmful to the Front as a whole, the Oromiyan people saw their dreams dashed, and the strength of the Front actually decreased. The author proposes a general representative conference to outline a political program, create a vision for the Front, and generally reform the organization.

The political program should include measures to encourage multi-party democratic practices, non-discrimination on the basis of religion or nationality, and self-determination by referendum for the Oromiyan people. The economic program would encourage light industry, improve transportation and utility infrastructure, husband natural resources, and modernize agriculture. The educational program would make most education free, establish new schools and scholarships, and encourage the use of the Oromiyan language. The social program's goals are to provide health care for Oromiyans, improve public health and nutrition, and end antiquated marriage and work practices. The national defense program would enlist all males ages 18 to 30 into the regional army. In terms of foreign policy, the Front supports peaceful resolutions to problems, welcomes helpful organizations, and encourages other peoples' self-determination.

*How did the new events start in Somalia?*
The author describes how Ziad Barre instigated a conflict within Mogadishu that quickly spiraled out of control. The USC was successful in driving Ziad Barre from power, but could keep control itself, and the uprising turned into a war between the rival tribes Hawi and Darood. The author concludes that this was Ziad Barre's intention all along, since he could use the violence 1) instigate a tribal war where he would come out ahead, and 2) inflict suffering on Somalia such that people will long for the days of Ziad Barre. The author argues that Ziad Barre largely succeeded.

Although the combatants might at times divide themselves into Hawi and Darood, the groups within the tribes often fight each other, and the identities themselves are but covers for hatred, prejudice, and ambition, all of which have led them away from Islam. These divisions are new and complicated – previously Somalia had been one nation, one people, one language, and one religion. The author goes into depth as to the various combatants within the Hawi and Darood parties, and explains their complexity. He decries the chaos and violence of present-day Somalia, and finds the hidden hand of Western powers, particularly the United States (whose diplomats were trained in Italy regarding Somali tribes), in the violence. The only solution is a strong Islamic central state with shari'a.

*Ansa'ar Allah Base*
This document lays out some of the duties involved in running this training camp and the organization in general. The security committee is responsible for the physical security of the camp, and of the personnel training within the camp, as well the mental 'security' of trainees and other personnel. This particular protection can be accomplished through the interception of hostile media, lectures, and training sessions. The security committee also engages in counterintelligence work within the organization, collects intelligence, conducts police investigations, coordinates with Islamic intelligence services (this is shelved for the present time), and takes part in covert action. The chairman of the security committee should have been a member of the organization for five years, of sound religion, and have sufficient military and security experience.

*Yemen Democratic People's Republic Ministry of State Security*
A 1985 letter to high-level officials in the Yemen Democratic People's Republic from Yemeni border security officials clarifies some points about a top secret training mission. The training mission involves a number of different aspects, including anti-personnel training, and anti-'military machineries' training. There was a problem with leaks from within the mission, and as a result, those in charge have taken steps to train participants on the importance of security. The group cooperated with Khubra during the training, and took a number of lectures. Unfortunately, many of the recruits had never used the weapons before, and their literacy and educational levels were extremely low. Finances were also so tight that they were forced to take out personal loans to cover costs. The authors propose that a secret training area for application and weapons training be designated, and groups trained in 1986 (the next year). They also propose to assign the leaker somewhere out of the country so as not to cause problems. Finally, they suggest storing the weapons in a secure area, and raising the salaries of the workers.

**AFGP-2002-800517**
**Full Translation**
**July 1, 2002**

Summary
This 56 pages document contains several old subjects related to:

- Patani United Liberation Organization.
- Speech Given by the President of the Islamic Front of Oromia Liberation during the Meeting of Reform committee
- Islamic Front of Liberating Oromia and the Revolutionary Democratic Front of Ethiopian People
- How did the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia choose war?
- Organizational Predicament of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia.
- Foreign Relations with the People of the Region.
- How the new events started in Somalia?
- Who are the fighters?
- Darood and Hawi Parties in Somalia.
- The Situations of Two Parties.
- Ansaar Allah Base. Military Committee. Camp duties to organize personnel movement.
- Goals and Duties of the Security Committee
- Statement From
- Patani United Liberation Organization
  To Sudanese Moslem People and to the Islamic Nations in General in relation to the 28th annual anniversary for establishing the struggling organization
- Patani through History
- Peace Negations between Patani and Thailand
- Patani Leader Visits Islamic Human Rights Organization
- Yemen Democratic Population Republic
  Ministry of State Security
  Administration of State Security - Borders Center.
- Personal letter from Kabir Abdul Rahman to Abu Obaida about meeting with each others for important subjects.

Patani United Liberation Organization

Populations
About 5 millions

Race
Our origin is the race as Malaysians, Indonesians, but we are completely different form the Thailand people in race, religion, language, and education.

Language
Our language is the same language of Malaysia and Indonesia and written by Arabic letters.

Economical Resources
Tin, lead, Indian glue and woods exported outside the country and there is gold in Tumok area in Nara Tiwat. A rubber industry is the most important industry which comes the second in Thailand exportation which come the fourth in the world in rubber production.

Other products are dry coconut, fish, tungsten, silver, iron, copper, magnesium, and eye liner stone.
Rice and other vegetables are massively produced in Patani which is sufficient for the State. Salt is obtained from drying the sea water.
In addition to that, oil and gas wells were discovered in the deep Patani Sea about 2000 $KM^2$.

Signed by
Information Unit
Patani United Liberation Organization

Speech Given by the President of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia during the Reform Committee Meeting

Dear distinguished guests, thank you for attending in response to our invitation.
Dear comrades, members of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia. You have provided appreciated efforts and overcame many hard circumstances in order to correct conditions of this front and achieved this stage. On this occasion, I congratulate you from the bottom of my heart. We place our hope in the Almighty Allah first, then in your continuous efforts which will exchange the weakness of this front with guaranteed victory.

If we tried to talk about this front since its establishment in 1969, we see that it is labeled as a front for the last 24 years. It was established to fight against slavery during the years of 1964 and 1965 in Bali, Harar, and 'Arsa provinces. In order for it to continue the struggle on the right path; this means the struggle to achieve freedom which was born in the above mentioned areas removed the weak points, clarified its work program, announced its name for the first time, and started its struggle in new phase.

Obstacle Faced the Front
It is obvious that we can't limit all obstacles and difficulties which appeared during the struggle specifically. But it is importance to list some of the important events.
1- General leadership: The leadership of this front like Jara Abba 'Ada and his friends who courageously attempted to arm the front with excellent weapons by bringing it through the red sea under the leadership of Jara Abba, but he was arrested along with his thirty friends while on their way exiting the red sea opposite to 'Aden after they entered the Somali borders. They were jailed for 5 years from 1970-1975, where many of the friends died in prison for various reasons and all the weapons were confiscated. This event in itself is considered among the biggest obstacles.
2- Their friends who continued the struggle like major Elemo Qilto the contingent commander and Mohamed Kabeera and their friends who were martyred in the Galmo directorate in a location called Jeffa Anena. These are some of the many obstacles they faced during their armed struggle to protect

the honor of Islam against the tyrant crusaders who ruled Moslems by force and fire.

(EC: Page two of the speech is not available).

*Page 3 of 56

… difficult to describe. Some of them returned to their homes and still there until today. Their problem has not been solved and they are suffering from financial and morale problems.

I urge the educated sons of Oromo to enter into the historical record all events you experienced during those terrible moments and escaped death then. Record all events to be a good example for others of freedom and dignity lovers, and spreading the Islamic religion through carrying weapons and achieve martyrdom in the sake of Allah and the noble cause that valued tremendously by Allah.
I am perfectly aware of the damages that affected the Oromiyan nation. Few brothers have seen the situation at some locations of the humanitarian and relief organizations during their visit to check on them and to deliver aid. They are the best witness of what they have witnessed the regrettable financial or moral suffering.

**The Positive Sides of the Struggle and its Benefits:**
1- The Oromiyan people despite the greater sacrifices they offered have proven their honorable struggle that this deep rooted nation will not give in or surrender in front of all kinds of oppression and torture such as amputating women's breasts and men's penises, in addition to massive arrests, collective killing, deportation from the country, and all other barbaric behaviors that shiver the skins. All of these crimes did not shake the will of people, but to the contrary it showed the entire world their just struggle and paved the way for freedom and dignity in life and the hereafter.

*Page 4 of 56

2- This struggle has opened new horizons and bright dawn for other nations neighboring the Oromiyans, and motivated them to begin their painful struggle for freedom.

3- This armed struggle created fear in the hearts of the colonizer who knows no rational logic or language of honor, but only the language of guns and cannons.

**The various Conflicts that occurred in the area:**

We should always remember that the peoples of Ethiopia who fought bloody battles to change the oppressive policy adopted by the consecutive Ethiopian governments over many centuries were successful in destroying the entity of what is called "Aldirgh Fascist Government" and called the nations in the region to attend a popular conference for peace and harmony. The conference concluded by issuing a National Charter to be as a temporary constitution.

What was the position of the Islamic front for the liberation of Oromia from the call to this conference?

The Islamic front for the liberation of Oromia took an honorable position in supporting this National historical call for the interest and unity among the struggling groups for freedom. It also welcomed the fall of the military government, "Aldirgh".

**The Role of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia representatives in the conference:**

The participation of the representatives of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia in the Charter conference was not for the sake of attending only, but it provided the participants with constructive proposals regarding equality among citizens in their human rights, social rights and religious rights; in addition to self determination of the Eritrean people. This means that our Front participation was very effective and beneficial.

**What is the position of our Front from resolutions of the conference held on 1 – 6 June 1991:**

Our Front welcomed the resolutions and recommendations reached by the conference. The convincing evidence of that acceptance is:

1- The Front dispatched three candidates to participate in the people representatives elections who will participate in future representatives' council.

2- It participated in the peace committee established in the representatives' council with two members elected by council for this purpose.
3- It prepared individuals from its members within to participate in many sub-committees positions to execute the various projects of the interim government.
4- Moslem Mujahidin were officially recognized by the government. They began keeping the peace and security in the various areas.
A- It allocated military expenditures for them.
B- They were allocated military barracks's for training.
C- Our delegation participated with the interim government delegation that was dispatched outside the country.
D- Social sessions were opened in our offices in Oromia and held discussions with our people, and exchanged views and ideas in a democratic and free atmosphere. We also participated in the election process for the election commission membership.
E- We prepared ourselves to compete in the election.
F- We received governmental expenditures in addition to offices, cars, and other benefits.
G- We were given the chance to participate in the interim government when it was formed.

What happened afterwards? And why did it happen?

Obviously, there is no shame for the front to inform the people of all the points of weakness in performing the duties and responsibilities; but the big shame is concealing it from them. What happened?
-Problems happened.
-These problems were of different colors (kinds).
- Problems happened when we began executing matters unfamiliar in the region, or when we began implementing policies unfamiliar to the region.



If we look deeply in the matter, we will find that all problems have happened when we started to apply the results of the national conference charters and recommendations while meeting in June 1991 and resulted in the resolutions "National Charter"

**Types of these Problems:**
Most of the problems that happened in the country occurred in the Oromiyan areas' and the following are the reasons that contributed in justifying these problems to occur in Oromia more than other areas.
1-The Oromiyan Fronts particularly the armed ones could not agree on how to implement the written program in the national charter inside the Oromiyan areas.
They even abandoned the signed reconciliation agreement that was approved the Oromiyan tribal chiefs in the country and became ink on paper. Each Oromiyan Front went its own way as dictated by its special interests and competition amongst each other.
Each Front claiming and convincing itself it is the front that representing the Oromiyan people because of my sincerity and honesty, and accused the others as being dishonest and insincere. It exceeded that level of propaganda to the point that some began burning houses over its occupants and arresting other fronts members. Eventually, it reached the points of armed confrontation and killing each other.
For example: What is happening between the Oromo Liberation Front and the Islamic Front for the liberation of Oromo in East Oromo at this time while we are preparing this report?
These fronts themselves know the facts, as the Oromiyan nation knows it as well. The appreciated efforts by a selected group of the Oromo tribal chiefs were not implemented to achieve reconciliation between the various Oromiyan fronts.



**The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromo and the Revolutionary Democratic Front for the Ethiopian People:**

Problems occurred between those two fronts. What were these problems?
1- The position of Oromiyan Islamic liberation Front with one leg inside the entity of the interim government and the second leg in the forest to end the rebellious and revolt created suspicions and accusations between them, and lack of trust in each other.
2- On the other hand, when the armed forces of the various Fronts are mobilized fully armed, and none of them speaks the language of the other marching next to it especially in areas where conflicts and disagreements

occurred between the various groups; these conditions created huge and grave problems.

As a result to these circumstances, a misunderstanding took place between the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO) and the Revolutionary Democratic Front for Ethiopian Peoples, resulted in killing the leaders of the (IFLO) in Deerdawa city.
The tension became intense between the two fronts since that day.

**Why were there no solutions for the occurring problems?**
It is common knowledge that there are no problems without solutions for them, unless the people are ignorant of how to solve them. Adding wood to the burning fire or adding fire to the fire means not knowing the easy methods for solving problems.

**What is the solution?**
1- It seems to us that the solution is to first be patient to what is happening.
2- Attempting to solve these problems peacefully by adopting the wise policy and not violence. By saying this we do not mean that we don't care about the lives of our leaders who were martyred, and we don't mean that we fear bloody war.
3- We say this to choose the peaceful means instead of following avenging methods to widen the conflict and complicate matters until reaching a dead end and the complicated matter remains outside the frame of the solution. Thus, civil war breaks out on a larger scale and no one knows its results except Allah. It was better for our Front to adopt this reasonable policy; more accurately, by our leaders in the supreme command.



**The witness to this:**
1-The Supreme Command of the Revolutionary Front for the Ethiopian peoples requested several times from our front leadership to meet and talk about finding peaceful solutions to the problems between us and deal with them wisely.
Therefore, appreciated efforts have been excreted by people and countries interested in achieving stable peace and security in the region to solve these problems. Regretfully, this noble idea did not succeed because the leader of

our front rejected these peaceful proposals by being stubborn and ignorant of the complicated problems that might occur by rejecting this request.
2- Reconciliation is the method for solving problems as mention by Allah in his holy book "Reconciliation is better"; and "If they tilted toward peace, do the same and count on God who knows and hears everything".
3- Opting for war instead of peace will destroy all struggle gains that we attained with bloods and souls.
4- Opting for war will take us back to where the struggle began (20) years ago. This is what we fear happening and lead to a consequence we will not accept God forbid.

**How did the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia opted for war?**
1- The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia position was very strange where it stood with its one leg inside the politics of the interim government and at the same time placed the other foot outside its politics. This behavior in itself, lead to a quick confrontation and the war broke out.
2- It did not take into account what is better, war or peace. Meanwhile, the political solution by peaceful means is better than war that brings destruction to the nation.



3- Of the grave mistakes committed by the front is making quick decisions before discussing their advantages and disadvantages, and consulting the members. Instead, one or two persons individually make the decisions regardless of their results.

**What were the problems resulting from that choice?**
1- The struggle moved backward.
2- The destruction of all gains achieved through painful struggle previously.
3- Causing grave damage to the directorates and villages that supported the illegitimate front that oppose the interim government.
4- Despite the exile of the front leader, he is still the lone decision maker as his personal interests dictate.
5- Failure of the front leadership members to meet in order to solve the complex problems before it is too late to solve it, and before it spreads in all areas.
We prepared detailed reports about these subjects at the proper time that dealt with various problems requiring solution as soon as possible.

Unfortunately, these reports were not accepted by the front leader because they did not serve his personal interests.

**Why it became necessary to form the leadership?**

1- To find appropriate and peaceful solutions for all the above mentioned problems.
2- Since the major weak point and the source of all problems resulted from weak leadership that is unqualified to be in a leadership position, and its inability to handle the responsibility and inability to withstand opposition from all directions; the leadership and the front were shocked from its basis and were faced with moral, social, and financial destructions. Their ship failed to sail to safety, and they all drowned in the sea of failure with their followers just like what happened to the pharaoh's soldiers.
Therefore, we had to take strict measures to save the situation by gathering the remaining of the groups to establish sound policy based on sound foundations.
3- To prepare ourselves to protect the rights of the Oromiyan nation with all the power we can muster; and
4- To strengthen the unity of the Oromiyan nation and the struggle, and to coordinate the ranks among the groups each claiming to be the only one who has the right to struggle in the name of the Oromiyan nation, in order to struggle united together and protect our nation from oppression.



5- To prepare a unified program for constructive work in cooperation with other nations that do not violate the legitimate rights of the Oromiyan nation taking into consideration the rights of our nation and give it first priority.
6- As long as the legitimate rights for our nation are unharmed, we see no objection to consolidate with a government elected by the Ethiopian people to build the government together in the future.
The geographic location of Oromia within the Ethiopian map is like the heart in the body, and it is possible that the body can't live without a heart since the heart exists nowhere else but in the body.
If the legitimate rights of all peoples in the region are equally protected, there is no objection to live together peacefully, elect a national government and build it on democratic basis with equal right for all.

**What are the benefits achieved by the new leadership to correct the mistakes?**

1- The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia with its new leadership proved to everyone that there are men in the front who are not warmongers but insist on peaceful solution to complicated problems at the present time; problems that threatened peace and security in the region.
2- This new leadership explained to the people that problems do exist within the leadership itself due to severe conflicts.
3- The matter of the problems exposed by the new front and the existence of an idea to solve them peacefully existed before among members of the Central Committee of the Executive leadership. The leadership also proved that the idea of peace is the idea of the nation and is not forced on anyone.
4- This wise leadership with its sound conduct played a major role in improving the relationship between the Ethiopian interim government and the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia.



5- It established and anchored the foundations of this new leadership which will work day and night to solve the many problems in the near future in God's willing.
6- This new leadership exerts appreciated efforts as it did in the past to prevent the efforts of painful Jihad from going backward, and make sure that the struggle is not owned by individuals to do with it what they please. Furthermore, the struggle of this leadership must not be bias to any specific area, and the Oromiyan nation who accepted the front's program should unite around it without discrimination. The front prepared a wide program for everyone to participate in.
7- It drew the political program that will enlighten the road for the future.
8- Moreover, it issued a resolution that prohibits confrontation between any parties based on religious differences. We held a conference and discussed this issue and reached a decision in that regard.
Finally we thank God for assisting us in overcoming these obstacles; and thank you for listening.

AL Hajj Omar Mohamed Malka
President of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia

Translated from Oromiyan language into Arabic by
Mohammed Khalil 'Arisho, Writing Services Office

## Organizational Predicament of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia:

### Introduction

It is known that nations faced by complicated problems need advancement in solving their political problems to the level of organizational maturity or the political organizations that struggle to accomplish their people's wishes. We are aware that these Oromiyan political organizations did not excel to the level of challenge and did not show the political maturity which will bring the Oromiyan struggle ship to a safe harbor. Instead of that, the confrontation among them reached the point of raising arms against each others for the sake of having one leadership for the people's struggle and dishonest competition. If we believe that the political work has some competition, but this competition believed to be honest and democratic. Our believe that the reason for that, there are lack of understanding in ideologies and organizational ways produced from these organizations to be in a harsh political circumstances which will not allow the opportunity for exchanging ideas and the difficulties of communication among their ideologists. But these situations have changed which permit the opportunities for reviewing their papers and to think seriously in developing ways, ideologies, and organizational practices in a better democratic and scientific way through the benefit of positives and negatives previous stage. Regarding the Islamic front, it is considered the largest Oromiyan organization which receives respect and appreciation in struggle and sacrificing souls among the Oromiyan people.
The establishment of Oromiyan front goes back to 1962. Since that date, it kept struggling and sacrificing martyrs to get rid of enemy and to give the Oromiyan nation freedom of independence and sovereignty over their land, and the right for self determination.

### Sources of the organizational predicament in the front

The traditional leadership of the front kept complicating its growth and development, and accompanied the events and political volatility as a result of its aging leader who was still holding the position of the front presidency since its birth which caused autocratic ruling in ideas as well as rigidity.
As a result of that:

1- There was no interest in the front organization's fundamentals which did not have an organizational conference to discuss the front issues and have resolutions and recommendations in a democratic way.
2- The front kept shrinking and loosing supporters of educated and knowledgeable resources because of contradicted behaviors to freedom of opinion and innovation which made the rigid leadership gather a group of technicians, fanatics, and gullible from the public who know hypocrisy and insincerity.


3- Destruction of the gains achieved by the front through its efforts and struggle of its martyrs who sacrificed everything expensive for the cause of achieving the nation of Oromo's wishes.
4- Making quick and random resolutions which hurt more than benefit it the interest of the front and people which resulted in clipping rings of the front and diminishing its role, or minimizing its value and taking it to the jungle again with tied hands and collapsed strength.
5- Destruction of dreams and hopes of Oromiyan people which waited to get their stolen rights.
6- These behaviors damaged the relationship with friends of peace and good deed lovers for Oromiyan people, and people in the region. When the sounds of loving and caring people did not receive hearing ears to correct the path and straighten the leaders, few of the enthusiastic leaders help to make this front achieves its noble goals and warned themselves to return to its foundation and consulted in organizational reform, the result was establishing a temporary committee that take cares of issues and prevents destruction of the front, therefore the need to issue a statement to correct the path of front, and to call for a general conference that discusses the front issues.

**Suggestions for solving organizational predicament of the front:**

The general conference is considered a fundamental start to solve the organizational predicament from its roots through dealing with issues with their own people who are representing all levels of Oromiyan people from all regions were good results are expected from this conference and to give the authority to those elected from the public (solving and making decisions) who can carry the faith and responsibility for specific period of time until the front achieves its goals and the desired fruits as follow:

1- Finding a legislative draft that determines the relationships between leadership, the base, and style of leading this front and the period for continuation in managing the administration of the front, and determining the conditions that must be available for those who have different managements.
2- Finding a political program and future plans for the front.
3- Discussing political situations and circumstances that affect the Oromiyan nation specially and the nations of the region generally, and putting a vision for solving existing problems.
4- Putting a vision for the role that is played by the front in a period through and during the passage of interim period.
5- Reforming front leadership in a democratic fashion.
6- Issuing a resolution and recommendations that are used as a guideline to abide by.



**The Political Program**

Introduction
There is a political conflict spreading in this region for more than five centuries from the conflict existed between two largest nationalists living in the northern hills of current Ethiopia for the sake of political domination in the countries; considering the triumph side of the two was taking an advantage of gathering people towards the expansion greed and the best witness about that are the victims in (Wallo) in northern Oromia.
After the complete fall of Oromiyan entity under the control of Emperor Manillek, he was subjected to worse oppression and massive annihilation which is cleansing of half of the Oromiyan population during short period, and chopping men's hands and testicles, and removing women breasts to get rid of the nation existence and looting their properties, and wiping their traditions, language, and erasing their existence.
Despite all of that, they did not give up, but continued to struggle in unorganized forms and later transferred to a political front forms.

**The Goals**
1- This front works to achieve the wishes of the Oromiyan people through democratic practices.

2- The front tries to provide a suitable environment that enables the Oromiyan people through honest referendum in the matter of independence, federal, or confederation with people of region.
3- This front considers a style and multi parties system.
4- This front works on getting rid of racial discrimination which is practiced against Islamic religions or any other religions.
5- This front believes in the right of any nationality in self determination.
6- This front works on sympathizing with freedom of religion, expression, passion, peaceful demonstration, and freedom of political belonging.



7- This front considers the privileges of all essential rights to any nationality and people living inside the region of Oromia.

**The Economy and Development**

1- The right to own by every person or group is protected.
2- Encouraging free economy and developing local resources of countries and respecting treaties, and contract from leaders.
3- Providing opportunities of work.
4- Having good relationship to encourage commerce and to provide the market with local products.
5- Taking care of agriculture technology development and encouraging farmers to provide free agricultural lands opportunities to receive fertilities and improved bugs' chemicals.
6- Protecting the forest from disappearance and encouraging policy for planting trees to fight desert and to protect the environment.
7- Taking care of animal resources to make the country competitive in market place.
8- Taking care in mineralogy to advantage the country's resources and to protect the resources from fading.
9- Encourage building small and medium size factories.
10- Training working force.
11- Establishing and developing transportation roads and communications (wire, wireless, and mail) for the importance of these means to expedite the process of development.
12- Establishing and developing an electrical section and water supply in cities and villages.

Educational Program:

It is known that our society have been deprived of education. The front is trying to achieve advancement in education and technology as follow:
1- Free education until college level.
2- Eliminating illiteracy (education and alphabetical).
3- Establishing schools, institutes, universities to achieve scientific and technical development.
4- Providing opportunities of scholarships for friendly and sister nations.
5- Developing Oromiyan language to be the language of reading, writing, and education.

**Social Program**
1- Providing health care by establishing medical services in cities and villages through building clinics and hospitals.
2- Providing medicine to provide health to entire citizens.
3- Taking care of scientific researches to provide medicines and developing local medicines.
4- Fighting all means that encourage transmitted diseases like (AIDS) or drugs.
5- Fighting bad habits and old traditions inherited from the enemy.
6- Providing healthy food to the public and developing ways to prepare food using new scientific ways.
7- Taking care of mothers and children.
8- Encouraging legal marriage and fighting bad habits in marriage like high dowry and kidnapping girls, etc.
9- Working towards respecting work and workers by providing the needed care for them and determining official work hours, wages, vacations, and respecting the rights of work and workers.
10- Providing justice of equal rights in mutual work.



**National Defense**
1- Preparing a national army to defend the wishes and people's hopes.
2- Imposing compulsory service on all young men aged 18-30 years old.
3- Preparing and establishing the necessary centers.

**Foreign Relations with People of the Region**

1- This front cooperates with legitimate political organizations to people in the region.
2- This front provides self determination of all people in the region.
3- Finding relationship of understanding and coalition with political organizations that represents people of the region to defend security and sovereignty of these nations.
4- This front believes that peaceful solution to border conflicts among different nationalities is the road towards peaceful negotiation.

**Foreign International Relation**

1- This front supports all efforts leading towards establishing peace, justice, understanding, and international cooperation and security in solving problems and regional conflicts.
2- This front believes in respecting human rights and preventive interference of foreigners in internal affairs of any country.
3- This front supports struggle of weak nations who are trying to get their self determination.



**How did the new events start in Somalia?**

The new events started in the capital Mogadishu in December 1990 when armed confrontation started between two tribes "Hawi" in one of Mogadishu neighborhood. The resources show that Ziad Barri was behind fueling this war between the two tribes were his strategy was to remain in power in past years and let tribes fight each others, but the magic is turned on the magician and could not control this armed forces in which he started between two tribes in the capital. The confrontation lasted for days then spread and continued to fight the regular army; then USC front took advantage of the situation and its troops have arrived Mogadishu from the middle areas (Blaad, Johar, Bolbirdah, and Blowdwin), and joined the wave where the cause has changed to a comprehensive battle, and general people riot against the removed president Ziad Barri until the regime's president after few weeks fled the capital Mogadishu with few of his loyal assistants and soldiers specially the remaining of special forces which he established to guard and protect himself. USC was not alone in the battle of the capital, but its role was small, and many of people participated in the war that is living in

the capital. Young men carried arms, teenagers, and others of the defeated president left the capital. He left it like a destroyed ghost town which destroyed by artillery shelling and many of its people died. When USC front announced taking power through broadcasting, it did not and don't until now have the capabilities to control even the capital Mogadishu, or to collect arms from people, and to control security in the capital because people were armed. If all people have arms, then it will be hard to control the security situation.

But after expelling the defeated president from the capital Mogadishu, the battle transformed from toppling Ziad Barri regime to a horrible war between the two large tribes (Hawi and Darood). Since the USC is a Hawi front and controlled the capital, and its armed people are from different background like soldiers, militias, teenagers, and criminals, and the defeated president armed people of Darood tribe.



The war has changed to a hunting war by tribal identification and many people died. Who changed the war from a war against the regime to war among tribes? Who directed it into this sneaky way? It is obvious that the defeated president was planning to transfer this war into a tribal war that eats everything in Somalia. This had many objectives:

First: He wanted to transfer the issue into a tribal war that keeps people busy with each others and enables him to penetrate his tribal lines which will make him a brave son who owns resources and arms which will determine the tribe in its fight against other tribes. He will be a hero with a valued opinion instead of a criminal behind all of these ordeals and pains.

Second: The second goal is to involve the countries in an ugly civil war after leaving the government and then tribal war comes with miseries, pain which will make Somali nation forget the suffering and wounds during the 20 years of controlling Ziad Barri regime, but making gullible people say "Ziad Barri regime was better of the horrible scary situation"

Ziad Barri succeeded with those who planned with him, executed with him, and helped him whether they know or not in this plan and most of the people are saying today: Ziad Barri regime was despite its problems better than this

situation which deteriorated the countries today. He became now with his followers leading wars of their tribes because the issue became a tribal and became riding to the side of people who are governed for 20 years and brought him pain and suffering, destroyed everything, and looted all resources. Some of the opposition fronts of Ziad Barri in the last years stand with him in the same trench in a dirty tribal war without a goal or principle and rationale for that, but it is a crazy and dirty war.

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**Who are the combatants?**

It is very important to understand and be aware of the dangerous situation that affect the Somali people today and that affect its people by annihilation. It is burning and fading people and reaching the level of devastation. We need to use names and titles they are fighting about them and under those principles they shed blood, violate dignities, loot monies, and violate everything despite our hatred to its deterioration and used, but it is needed to verify the reality.

Somali people were divided into unprecedented two parts and had two big names which did not enter any war before. These names are “Hawi” and “Darood”

The name “Hawi” includes many tribes like “Abjal”, Habrejder, Haldli, Marsidi, and others. Also the name Darood includes many tribes like Majerateen, Ajadin, Marihjan, and others. Many wars took place in the last few years among the tribes that belong to “Hawi” among themselves, as wars happen among the tribes that belong to “Darood” among themselves. For example, there were awful battles between Abjal and Hawadli before the fall to Ziad Barri regime. Also there were horrific wars among tribes of Al Majerateen among themselves. But this is the first time that divides the people into “Hawi” and “Darood” and fight each others based on that despite of the battles and tribal hatred which did not stop until this moment and in this new innovated division among the tribes that belong to one of these two names of huge statues. The latest battles in the capital Mogadishu, which mentioned as one of the toughest wars since the beginning of the civil war, took place between “Abjal” and “Hairjadr” and they are from “Hawi” and they are now in war with “Darood”.

Although, few days ago, a war between two tribes of Ajadeen tribes which are part of "Darood" coalition. We realize now these names or situations don't carry any affection, loyalty, or understanding among the people who belong to the same name or tribe. But all of their conducts are based on dirty and hateful prejudice that does not stop them from shedding blood of each others. It is the dirty intolerance that took us away from Islam. On this principle, these people commit their crimes and permit themselves to do anything when the people got divided into those two big names and when the battle between "Hawi" and "Darood" started, the situation became very strange, abnormal, and horrible at the same time. Why?

The answer belongs to several factors:
1- This division is the first in their kind.
2- These tribes that belong to "Al Darood" or "Al Hawi" are not attracted between each others. Tribes belong to "Al Darood" have severe and historical fighting as well as the tribes under the name "Hawi" have long time hostility against each others.
3- The supporters and leaders of the regime were divided into two parts. One joined with "Hawi" and the other with "Darood". The army and police also have divided on this account. This helped the previous regime to escape from judgment until now.
4- These people from "Hawi" and "Darood" are from one origin and they were living with each others in most areas. They did not have any war between each others because of belonging to "Darood" or "Hawi" and they married from each others, and they were bonded in a way hard to separate. I was told by an old man that that he is a grandfather, uncle, and brother in law to more that fifty people from "Hawi" divided by tribes. This is the situation of many Somali who are bonding in a complicated way between "Hawi and Darood" because this nation is not divided by anything, the same origin, same religion, one language, one race, one home. Why are they divided? Nothing.., except it is a dirty division with the intention of achieving filthy goals. If this is known, we must give details about the circumstances of fighting forces in this strange mix.



**The Darood Party:**

What does this front include?

Some of its platoons:
1- SPM front and it's from "Ajadeen". This platoon is led by Colonel Mohamed Omar Jais and he is a former officer from the armed forces separated from Ziad Barri regime before its fall, and was opposing Ziad Barri regime but he is close to him now and does not hurt him. This is the wonder of tribal values.
2- Another platoon led by Bashir Ballqo and he is from "Ajadeen" and has some other officers.
3- SNF fronts. They are coalitions of Majerateen, Walilux, Talbihanti, some Marijan and others. Most of them are led by General Mohamed Saeed Murjan. He is the honest soldier of Ziad Barri and his son in law, and the other is defense minister and belongs to Majerateen tribe.
4- These fronts are fighting now under the name SPM and have a joint leadership, cursing each others, their overall "General" Adam Jibiyo and he is a former defense minister to Ziad Barri regime then he imprisoned him at the end of his regime. Its major command center is the southern areas near Kenyan border.
5- Platoon of the toppled president Ziad Barri and the remaining of his loyal forces and some of his generals and officers, and some ministers like Jani, Omar Haj Mohamed, Abdul Qader Haj Masla, and others. He is stationed in the area of "Jeddo" like Jerbahari and Bortobo and they are the areas that are Marijan tribes which the toppled president belongs to.
These are the platoons that fighting from the "Darood" front for the sake of that name and allow everything from the other name despite that each one has its own goals. The toppled president has his own goals. SPM has its own goals but they are meeting now under the slogan of "Darood" while their hearts are different and previous and current hostilities are complex and don't calm down.



<u>The Hawa Party</u>
This Party is represented by USC front, the united conference and includes identification tribes like:
1- The "Abjal" and represented by the interim president which was announced the united conference in Mogadishu Ali Mahdi and the best supporter from the former regime is the general Hussien Kalmi Afrah and he was the assistant to Ziad Barri for a long time.

2- The “Habrijeder”. This is a big tribe from Hawi and extended from the middle areas to the borders of eastern areas of Somalia. It is represented by general “Aideed” and he is an old officer who used to work with Ziad Barri regime. An officer, then an ambassador; he is leading most of wars of USC front. He is an enemy to Ali Mahdi. Because of the conflict between him and Ali Mahdi, many bloody wars took place between their supporters in Mogadishu and caused massive victims.
3- The “Hawadli” tribe and it is from the Hawi tribe.
4- The “Marsada” tribe.
5- The “Shikhal” tribe.
Other tribes labeled under the name “Hawi” and have people from the former regime, officer, and its army which belong to the name “Hawi”. This front also fighting under this name and justify everything from the other party.

**The Status of the Two Parties:**

Now after what we knew about the supporter of both “Hawi” and “Darood”, we must focus on the effects of this war, its situations, and awful results. We must answer these important questions are:
1-Who are the people leading this destructive war from both parties?
2-What are they doing to the countries and people?
3-What do they want from these destruction and terrorism?

I will try to answer these three important questions within the limited and allowable situation.

*Pages (24 to 36) of 56

(TC: Summary of the events listed from page 24 to page 36 which answer these questions).

- Tribal leaders such as politicians, former business men are living outside their regions.
- War leaders who fuel the wars are corruptors of countries and acted against the rule of God (Allah) and his messenger.
- Talks about fighting between the two parties and chaos associated with war and destructions of tribes.

- Situation of soldiers is deteriorating because of tribal hatred and blindness of racism.  Everything they do is corruption, destruction, and rape.
- The real face of the two tribal fighting Hawi and Darood. Their leaders dress nicely and fight with ideas, while soldiers commit horrific crimes and bloodshed in addition to violating human rights of women and commit ethnic cleansing.
- All people became armed with machine guns including kids, women, and men without discrimination.
- The fight between two parties is not justified by any religion or any law.
- People who are fighting in Somalia are thugs, gangs, bandits, thieves, and criminals who used to enter villages to kill and plunder everything.
- Foreign plans are the hidden hands behind this destruction of Somalia. It was not Ziad Barri who planned for war, but the crusaders meant to weaken and destabilize Somalia in eastern Africa.
- American plans to divide Somalia were discovered during the storming of American embassy in Mogadishu.
- American diplomats who came to Mogadishu during Ziad Barri era were trained in Italy about tribes considering Italy is the former colonizer of Somalia.
- Some of the leaders from both Darood and Hawi are known of being agents for western intelligence.
- Hidden western fingers are behind the bloody war in Somalia.
- Stability of the country will only exist if the central strong government is established.
- All people involved in the war are behind corruption and destruction.
- The remaining of Somalia today is just a name, killed and wounded people in addition to refugees, and countries destruction and sabotage. Also looting, plundering, raping women, and slaughtering thousands of innocent civilians.
- The only solution for all problems facing Somalia is the Islamic solution. Islam alone is the solution and many people have realized that by applying the Sharia (Islamic law) and abiding by the rules of God (Allah).

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**1- The Security Situation**
**2- The Health Situation**

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In the name of Allah the Merciful the Compassionate

Ansa'ar Allah Base
Military Committee

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**Camp duties to organize personnel movement:**
1- Receive the newcomers with a letter from the guesthouse supervisor.
2- Notify the committee chairman one week before the training course ends.
3- Attach a list containing names of the graduates and categorize them according to section they wish to join after the training course.
4- Fill departure cards for those who wish to travel and submit them to the guesthouse with sufficient time in advance before the training course ends.
5- Agree with the committee chairman on training courses schedules and inform him of it with sufficient time in advance to be circulated to the centers.
6- Fill the evaluation cards and sent them to the office with graduates.

Committee Chairman
Suriname (AKA):
Signature:

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**The Security Committee:**

Definition:
It is the committee responsible to provide the required security for the personnel and organizational operation.
The goal of safeguarding personnel security is achieved by:
1- Protecting the minds (intellect/ideas) of the organization personnel from theft by continuous organizational education (EC: Brain washing) to keep them informed of the latest developments, and also to protect them from

hostile media influence. Implementation of this mission is achieved by the Emir (leader) and intellectual advisors through Shari'a, realistic and security training courses.
2- Preventing penetration by subjecting employment performance to security reports from the various sections.
3- The goal of safeguarding the organizational operation is achieved through the following:
A- Promote personnel security sensitivity through security education, and informing them of all developments in this field through lectures, security memos and publications. The security office is responsible for this mission.
B- Providing the agencies that work on protecting VIP's in the organization in addition to the facilities and its personnel. Moreover, it gathers all the necessary information concerned with the security operation. The security office is responsible for this mission.

**Goals and Duties of the Security committee:**
1- Provide the needed security for organization leadership.
2- Educate all organization personnel on security taking into consideration the special points in this concern.
3- Seek obtaining modern ideas and inventions that facilitate executing security work.
4- Perform internal counter espionage duties and devote appropriate efforts for it.
5- Perform security duties like arrest, search, investigations and extracted information archives. Beating is prohibited.
6- Coordinate cooperation and exchange of intelligence with Islamic security agencies (Organizations, States).
7- Perform secretive Islamic intelligence activities effectively (information section, research section, analysis section, secret (covert) operations section, counter espionage, etc.).

**Important Regulations:**

First: All office missions must abide by the true religion.
Second: Abide by the highest degrees of confirmations when selecting the office personnel.
Third: In dangerous matters with mixed interests; the committee's responsibility ends by presenting them to the leadership to reach the appropriate decision regarding it.

Fourth: The committee's sixth duty is controlled by shelving it (temporarily) in cooperation with Islamic State agencies at the place of residence by avoiding appearing in the detention operations front.

We can now begin talking about the security office elements that are represented in the following:

1- Office organizational structure.
2- Structure logo and seal (stamp).
3- Structure cadre and the duties, and characteristics of each cadre.
4- Duties of the office sections.

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A- Third: Structure cadre and the duties, and characteristics of each cadre.

**Note:**
The committee should take a pledge from all workers to keep secrets. They must keep their promise especially if their organizational relationship ends.

***The Committee Chairman:**
He is the official front of the committee, and responsible for executing the security duties assigned to him. He has the right to delegate some of his authorities to his assistants without relieving him of the responsibility of all committee's functions.

**Conditions and characteristics of committee chairman:**
1- It is preferred that he has been a member of the organization for at least five years during which he gained the leadership trust regarding his capability to work in this field.
2- He must have appropriate and sufficient military and security experience to qualify him to do this work.
He must be God fearing and devoted.

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(TC: This page is related to the subject of confrontation between the two Somali tribes and their fight against each others, and killing innocent civilians in addition to looting and plundering villages.)

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Patani United Liberation Organization

Excerpted from the daily news Wa Minchin newspaper dated 13/8/1995

The following information displayed by the daily news Minchin some the listed news:
1- Thailand government discovered unexploded bombs in a KULL location in the education center and the governor office in the State of Binara "Nartiorat". The government accused Patani United Liberation Organization placing this bomb where a letter was found with it. The letter included a threat to the president and to new Prime Minister ((Banhan Silafaja)) asking him to resume the third peace negotiation. The commandos have thrown a bomb (kind 26) one day earlier on a Rama Kafi hotel which is considered the largest hotel in Ja'ala State.
2- The commander of the fourth Tai army general Fanteef Jonatorf announced that the solution to Fatani problems is included in changing the name of Patani United Liberation Organization to a regular terrorist group and the former commander of the fourth army general Keeti Ratinjaya responded that changing the name from Patani United Liberation Organization to a general terrorist group is not the road for peaceful solution and whatever is said by general Fanteef is just meaningless philosophy.
3- Thailand government broadcasted news regarding the secretary general of Patani United Liberation Organization ((Kabir Abdel Rahman)) is severely sick and he had a surgical operation in Syrian Arab Rebulic. These are fabricated news, not accurate, and baseless. But the Thai government wanted by that to weaken the morale within the members of Patani United Liberation Organization.

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Fax #: 097449403, Telekom Malaysia, 12/09/95

Patani United Liberation Organization
(TC: Unknown Language in this page).

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By a treaty signed with Britain and India Jan. 1, 1946, Siam renounced all wartime acquisitions of Malayan territory and agreed that no canal linking the Gulf of Siam with the Indian Ocean would be cut across Siamese territory without British concurrence.

From: World History

P - 761

Later Thai officials explained that it had been shelved for military reasons. The military did not want a canal cutting across Thai territory. There was fear the physical separation would encourage a secessionist movement in the south.

The official Thai reaction was not made known until February 1974. Thai Defence Minister Dawee Chullasapya was warned by the late Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai that the proposed canal project would benefit the Soviet Union. "I told him the project has been cancelled," Marshall Dawee said on his return from a week-long visit to China.

But in June, the visiting Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr Sukit Nimmanhemin, said in Singapore he did not believe a canal would ever be cut across Kra. "People have been talking about this for the last 50 years.

From : Kra canal

Part – 2

## Map of Patani




(6) Patani territory occupied by Siam in the 14 th C.
(7) Patani territory occupied by Siam in 1790.
(8) Patani territory occupied by Siam in 1810.
(9) Patani territory occupied by Siam in 1832.
(10) Patani territory occupied by Siam in the 17 th C.

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Illegible page

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Patani United Liberation Organization

Statement
From
Patani United Liberation Organization
To the Sudanese Moslem People and to the Islamic Nations in General about the 28th annual anniversary for establishing the struggling organization

Islamic greetings
Dear Sudanese Moslem Nation
To the Struggling Islamic Ummah (Nation)

During these holy days to congratulate the struggling Sudan who is celebrating its victory on the parties forces that assembles around it and the wedding of its hero martyrs and their effective and constructive operation in internal infrastructure and the 40th anniversary of returning its sovereignty. We pass also the 28th anniversary of establishing the official organization of Mujahideen of your brothers in Patani (South Thailand) under the name Patani United Liberation Organization which established by your Patani brothers in their conference outside Thailand in the 22 Feb 1968 for the sake of liberating Moslem Patani State from enemy of Thailand government and establish a State on the foundation of social justice according to Islamic instructions.
Patani Moslem brothers have exerted continuous efforts since the occupation in 1832 to get their sovereignty peacefully sometimes and by military some other times. But their tries met with an iron fist from the authority in Thailand. Your Patani brothers are still carrying the rifle in one hand and the olive branch in the other hoping to reach a solution to their just cause. The last tries for peaceful solution when the representative of Patani United Liberation Organization met with the representative of Thailand government in Cairo-Arab Republic of Egypt form 9-12 April 1993 and in Damascus-Syrian Arab Republic during the period 26 - 28 April 1994.

These negotiations resulted in requesting the representative of Thailand government form Patani United Liberation Organization to present all details of legislation draft which was prepared by the organization for Patani self determination. Patani United Liberation Organization requested from the representative of Thailand to announce its preparation to award complete self determination to Moslem States in Patani, Naratiorat, Jaala, Stul, and Sunkla, which are the national countries of Patanis. Also to be prepared to sign a treaty with Patani United Liberation Organization for this purpose. Thailand government sent new representative who was the higher commander of Thailand armed forces to contact the Chief of Staff of Armed Forces of the organization in Malaysia to resume peace negations.
But the new Thai government led by the national Thai party leader rejected to accept the suggestion of United Organization of Liberating Patani because the Prime Minister ((Banhan Salafa Aaja)) has a dark history fighting Islam in Patani since he was the minister of interior. The resumption of peace talks in Sudan or Sweden according to the previous arrangements. Therefore, Patani United Liberation Organization does not find itself a way until to continue its armed jihad against oppression in Thailand. From this logic, Patani United Liberation Organization calls Moslem brothers in the free Sudan first and the whole world to stand by them until God rules between them and those oppressors and aggressors.
Koranic verse about victory for believers
Media Unit
Patani United Liberation Organization
Sudan Office
22-1-1996


**Patani through History**
Since the Patani Islamic State ((currently form four districts of Thailand)) was an independent county with sovereignty before annexation to Thailand in 1986, and since repeated tries by the Patani Moslem people to return their sovereignty was faced with a brutal opposition by Thailand authorities

which adopted bloody policy under the unification slogan, and since Patani people were determined to get their normal rights and liberate their country, the Patani leaders in their conference which convened outside Thailand have established on the 22 Jan, 1968 the Patani United Liberation Organization.

***Goals**
The goal of this organization is to liberate Patani from Thai government (the enemy) and to establish a welfare democratic state based on principles of social justice according to Islamic instructions.

***Presidential Office**
The organization's presidential office will be movable while eight delegations present eighteen countries. We ask assistance from all nations of loving justice in the world to get our rights according to United Nations resolutions and world announcement on human rights.

***Facts**
Patani is surrounded with the gulf of Siam and Thailand from the north, Chinese sea from the east, Malaysia from the south, and Indian Ocean from the west.

*Area
16,000 Square Miles

*Scanned as Page 49 of 56

From the Oromo notes

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Patani United Liberation Organization
The Islamic world magazine issued by the Islamic world conference in issue number 12 volume 33 dated 19 Rabih1, 1416 AH / 16 Sep 1995 the following news:

The Patani – Thailand peace negotiations
(TC: Repeated information from pages 46-47)
The peace negotiation between Patani United Liberation Organization and the Kingdom of Thailand have gathered twice, the first was in Cairo-Arab

Republic of Egypt form 9-12 April 1993 and the second was in Damascus-Syrian Arab Republic between 26 to 28 April 1994.
These negotiations resulted in requesting the representative of Thailand government form Patani United Liberation Organization to present all details of legislation draft which was prepared by the organization for Patani self determination. Patani United Liberation Organization requested from the representative of Thailand to announce its preparation to award complete self determination to the Moslem States in Patani, Naratiorat, Jaala, Stul, and Sunkla which is the national country of Patanis and to be prepared to sign a treaty with the Patani United Liberation Organization for this purpose.

The big brother Abdul Rahman-Secretary General of Patani United Liberation Organization calls the Islamic organization conference, all Islamic administrations, the Islamic world unity and Islamic world conference and the society of Islamic call, and Arabic and Islamic people conference to provide their action support to the cause which was long forgotten, the cause of 6 million Moslem people nation in Malayo.



**Patani United Liberation Organization**

**Patani Leader Visits Islamic Human Rights Organization**

The news of Islamic International World Organization for human rights that Mr. Kabir Abdul Al Rahman the founder of Patani United Liberation Organization and president of Patani conference of Malayo people and Islamic peace has visited the mentioned organization and Sheikh Fatehi Khalil Mohamed the secretary general of the Islamic world organization of human rights have discussed with the Patani leader Kabir Abdul Rahman the problems and difficulties that face the Malayo Patani people in their struggle to get their rights in self determination.

Media Unit
Patani United Liberation Organization

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

# The Muslim World

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE MOTAM

Vol.33 19th Rabi-us-Sani 1416 AH -- 16th September 1995

**PATANI-THAI PEACE TALKS:** The peace talks between the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the representative of the government of the Royal Kingdom of Thailand had already been held twice the first one in Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt, on 9-12-April 1993 and the second was in Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic, on 26-28 April 1994. The results of both talks was that the reps. of the Thai government insisted that PULO should provide them with full details of their drafted constitution of the Autonomy of Patani. While PULO requested that the Thai government must declare its readiness to grant full political Autonomy to the Muslim people of Malayu provinces, namely Patani, Narathiwat, Jala, Setul and Songkla the national homeland of the patani people and willing also to sign agreement with the PULO for this purpose.

Nevertheless, the Thai government is sending new representative, and assistance of the supreme commander of the Armed forces of the Royal Kingdom of Thailand to contact the chief of staff of the PULO forces personally in Malaysia in order to resume further the peace talks.

Br. Kabir A. Rahman the Secretary-General of PULO, request OIC and all Islamic bodies be it be the Rabitah Alam al-Islami, the Motamar al-Alam al-Islami, the Call of Islam Society, Popular Arab and Islamic Conference for their practical supports to such a long neglected case of Six-Million Patani Muslim Malayu homeland.

**PATANI LEADER VISIT IIHRO:** International Islamic Human Rights Organization [IIHRO] acknowledged the visit of Mr. Kabir A. Rahman the Founder of Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the chairman of Patani Malayu People Inter-conference and Islamic Peace (pmicip). Shaikh Fathi Khalil Mohumed, the Secretary-General of IIHRO and Patani leader K.A. Rahman discussed during his visit the problems and the difficulties which the Patani Malayu people are facing in their struggle to achieve their rights of self determination.

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Yemen Democratic Population Republic
Ministry of State Security

Administration of State Security-Borders Center
M-Yefe'
Reference 9/20/85
Date 12/6/85

(Top Secret)

Respected Brother: 1st Secretary of Party Organization
Respected Brother: President of national Defense Assembly

Greeting

Subject: (Report regarding duties of defense number 7)
We would like to clarify the mission assigned during the exceptional trilateral meeting number (11) 1984. I followed on the subject with curiosity and my report will be explained as follow:
1- The mission and completion of difference arrangement.
2- Levels of training and understanding of arms by the participants.
3- Obstacles facing us.
4- Suggestion.

(First Point)
Despite of the difficulty and sensitivity of the mission, we were able to station (13) groups from (3-5). Through our follow up to these (?), we concentrated on the areas which possible for the military machineries to enter, allocated (8) groups for training on anti military machineries, and concentrated on the areas (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) and back up group to support any weak group for any reason. These small groups have capabilities for using new arms and the areas from (1) to (7) are secured for defense in case of any machinery attack from outside. We allocated also

(five) groups for training on anti infantries weapons and arranged protection to areas (8), (9), (10), and (11) and back up group. We had training for this group and through training; we found inside this group that some problems like leakage of secrets outside the training location. To answer the question about this leak, we will give you a detailed report about it and take this case for judgment. We will study with experts the possibility of changing kinds of weapons to conceal our work. We like to assure you that execution of this mission was under complete secrecy and we allocated several educational training sessions for groups about covering up their work and to protect the secrecy which is considered an essential stipulation of conditions to form the difference and we were able to achieve positive outcomes regarding this issue.
About promoting members from outside the area, I object about this point of this decision considering foreign intelligence concentration on dealing with members called nationalism, and postponement of the subject is a condition for mission success inside, and in my estimation, the mission must not (?) stop at this level to ensure continuation and success.

(Second Point)
During the training, we cooperated with Khubra in theoretical teaching and every group took (45) theoretical lectures. The group took (25) application lectures and worked on preventing trained personnel from the beginning in teaching until Al Kharj (?) and these groups lack experience in live shooting on this weapon. The fact is the level of teaching and rehabilitation did not satisfy our wishes, but some difficulties faced us, about 50% of participants are not high school graduate and some of them did not study in an educational way, but librated of illiteracy and despite this, awareness was very good in my own experience estimate in this field.

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We will have another refreshing training session in the first semester of 1986 in cooperation with Al Khubra specifically on the rocket guidance instruments.

(Third Point)
The most obstacles faced our mission are the following:

1- Some of the personnel were late after the beginning of training which caused weakness in understanding weapons.
2- Some of the participants did not have educational background. It is needed in the future to search some members who are educated. We noticed that most participants are young. Therefore it is essential to have participating friends with history of struggle.
Some of important obstacles faced our mission are political, social, and historical evaluation of some participant who came little short which pushed some participants for conversation and leaking information after the end of training in addition to shortage in financial resources which did not meet the demand of this mission that force us to take a 3,000 Dinars personal loan from the public sectors and will provide you with an invoice of expenses for training.
Most of the difficulties, I will verify to you in my final report and in my oral report during the next meeting.

((Fourth and Last Point))
Despite of our very good outcomes, we suggest the following:
1- Internal and secret area to be arranged for us for application and live shooting range until we complete our information about the weapons and knowing the capabilities of the participants through managing the missiles in its own specialty and I suggest that you take group (a) in the first semester of 1986 and group (b) in the second semester of the same year.
2- I suggest that you send the person who leaked information outside and especially to socialist countries, and assigning him in a political role so he would not be detained without benefit, knowingly that the information given by him was not intended to hurt the regime, and if he stayed outside for 7 years under the excuse of a “party training session”, this will assure us all considerations mentioned above and specially secrets, protecting this friend, and changing the weapon with another one.
3- We suggest storing weapons in secure locations in the border areas and near to the areas specified for protection by every group and suggest being areas occupied by experienced party members, and not having political influence, or not exposed to foreign intelligence. I suggest forming exceptional groups in outside areas with respect to considerations of the role of foreign intelligence and their affect on the nationalistic members.
4- I suggest raising the salaries of workers in these groups from (105) Dinars to (120) Dinars per month and assigning them to other missions after completing the live shooting training.

5- I suggest promoting the excelled personnel quickly.

This report is briefed and I am presenting it to you hoping to show you the observations that will complete our report.

Greetings
Signature
Charge' of Security in Border Areas

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In the name of God the most graceful and beneficial

Dear Abu Obaida, God bless him:
Peace and blessing of Allah to be upon you. (Islamic Greeting)

Dear brother:
I came to visit you according to our appointment on Tuesday 26/12 during Maghrib (sunset) prayer in Riyadh mosque, but you were not there. I hope that everything is okay!

Please visit me in my Omdurman home and I will be in the same house after Maghrib everyday. I expect your visit for important issues.

I am sorry I could not come the second time because I am sick with an illness that bothers me during movement.
Islamic greetings

Kabeer Abdul Rahman

End of Document / Translation

Edited

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800573
Author: Various
Title: Invoices for al-Qa`ida and Islamic Union Expenses
Date: 1993
Length: 14 pages

## Synopsis

The document mostly consists of a large number of invoices for money spent by al-Qaeda and the Islamic Union in Somalia and Ogaden to support training, living expenses, and military operations in 1993.

## Key Themes

In the first letter, Saiful-Islam writes to Brother 'Omar details how he spent the money given to him, and notes that Abu Hafs refused to send his passport because he was afraid it would be lost.

The second item is a list of budget items including food, shipping, travel, shoes, socks and personal use) in both Somalian shillings and Ethiopian bir.

The bulk of the document consists of short statements by al-Qaeda operatives or members of the Islamic Union in Somalia and Ogaden attesting to the fact that they have received money (in either bir or shillings) from the local al-Qaeda accountant (generally, but not always, Zachariah al-Maqdesi), or 'Omar Tajuddin, Commander of the Preparation Branch. 'Abdullah Irad, Commander of the Jihad Office, and 'Abdullah 'Omar, Commander of the Islamic Union, and 'Omar Tajuddin himself, were frequent recipients.

The money loaned out was used for the following activities:

1. Medical treatment for one of the brothers
2. Fuel for the rations vehicle; diesel fuel
3. Alimony for a woman
4. A brother visiting his family
5. Assisting the brothers in traveling to the Abagro River
6. Military operations and supplies on the southern, northern, northeastern, and eastern fronts, as well as in Gedo
7. Camels, both for travel and for meat
8. Shipping
9. Food and drink
10. Paying off debts

The final two items are somewhat different. The first item is a detailed budget of travel and supply expenses. The second item identifies some of the key people in budgetary operations, and who has debts in what amounts. Ahmed Karaghai is the courier who came from Addis Ababa. Ahmed Diri Sheikh Rasheed and Mohammed 'Atya are in charge of purchasing. 'Abd Al-Salam 'Othman took $5000 from Djibouti without permission.

AFGP-2002-800573
Full Translation
Date: 03/19/2002

Summary of document: A 33 hand written document covering signed receipts of personal loans, daily and operational expenditures in Ethiopian Bir and Somalian Shilling for a group of Al-Qa'eda training and operating in Somalia.

*Page 1 of 33 (cover page)

(TC: Cover of a note book, partially illegible, the only legible word is "Training"; I believe the note book was used to keep accounting records for expenditures of Al-Qa'eda group training in Somalia).

*Page 2 of 33

Dear brother 'Omar,
The sums of (78,400) Ethiopian Bir + 5,000,000 Somali Shilling left with us were spent as follows:
-Paid the sum of 60,000 Ethiopian Bir to Mohammed Atya' as loan payment.
-We sent you the sum of 3,400 Ethiopian Bir + 2,500,000 Somali Shilling. You and Zachariah can make the decision on how to spend this money to benefit the platoons or the camp.
Please inform Zachariah that Sheikh Abu Hafs refused to send his passport for fear of losing it.
Finally, we pray for your success and our success too. Please give our utmost regards to all the brothers. Now, here is the Sheikh's letter, please read it for Zachariah and 'Abd Al-Sabour but secretly.
Best regards from everyone here; please pray for us.

Signed;

Saiful-Islam

Thursday – October 16, 1993
The last hour in the building

*Page 3 of 33

(TC: Page contains a two line paragraph mostly illegible; the very few legible words give a general meaning of permitting an individual to purchase few items for his personal use).

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$1,200.00 = 4,020,000 Somali Shilling
2,000,000 Shilling General Fund

200 Ethiopian Bir = 100,000 Shilling; general (dishes)
100 Bir = 50,000 Shilling; general (trip)
200 Bir = 150,000 Shilling; general (shipping)
400 Bir = 300,000 Shilling; general (food)
300 Bir = 150,000 Shilling; general (shipping)
Total = 3,438,000 Shilling

2 X 35 = 70,000 Shilling; shoes
4 X 12 = 48,000 Shilling; shoes
7 X 5 = 35,000 Shilling; socks
7 X 5 = 35,000 Shilling (illegible)
Total = 3,463,000 Shilling

200 Bir = 100,000 Shilling; personal (‘Omar)
150 Bir = 75,000 Shilling; personal (Mohammed Weli)
300 Bir = 150,000 Shilling; personal (Mohammed Khalifah)
Total = 325,000 Shilling
Grand total = 3,463,000 Shilling
Remaining amount = 5,570 + 1,500 = 6,070

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In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

On November 25, 1993 corresponding to Jumada Al-Thani 12, 1414H; I the undersigned ‘Abdullah Idad, hereby confess that I have received from

brother Zachariah Al-Maqdesi the sum of 1,000 Ethiopian Bir to be spent on medical treatment of one of the brothers who is seriously ill.

Received by: Handed by:

‘Abdullah Irad Camp Commander
Date: 11/25/93 06/12/1414

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| Date | Amount | Details |
|---|---|---|
| 06/17/1414 H. | 100,000 Shilling | Invoice # 4 |
| | 100,000 Shilling | Invoice # 5 |
| | 500 Bir | Invoice # 14 |
| | 2,000 Bir | Invoice # 15 |
| | 2,900 Bir | Personal expenses for ‘Omar |

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In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

I the undersigned brother ‘Abdullah Irad hereby confess that I have received from Brother ‘Omar Tajuddin, commander of the preparation branch, the sum of 1,000 Ethiopian Bir as a loan to purchase fuel for the rations vehicle. I also confirm that on 06/12/1414 H. I received from him an additional sum of 1,000 Ethiopian Bir. We agreed that the alimony for the woman must be paid whether the 2,000 Bir in full or in monthly installments.

The following signatures appear:
Commander of the preparation branch
Commander of the Jihad office
The 1st witness
The 2nd witness
The accountant

Note: The monthly salary is 350 Bir.

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In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

This is to certify that the sum of 150 Ethiopian Bir was paid to brother Fareh, one of the instructors to assist him in his trip to visit his family.

Signed:
Commander of the preparation branch
The accountant
Date: 12/11/1993

*Page 9 of 33

In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

Receipt # 5

I the undersigned, ‘Abdullah ‘Omar, commander of the Islamic Union hereby confess that I have received from brother ‘Omar Tajuddin, commander of the preparation branch the sum of 700 Ethiopian Bir. One half of the amount to be spent for purchasing diesel fuel for the vehicle while the second half to be spent on assisting the brothers in their travel to the Abagro river.

Signed:
Sheikh “Abdullah ‘Omar; Commander of the Islamic Union
Commander of the Preparation branch

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Total trip expenditure = 7,079 Ethiopian Bir

Signed:
Commander of the preparation branch
The accountant

Date: 09/16/1993

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In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

The detailed expenditure for the trip:

| | |
|---|---|
| 3 Trained camels | 1,488,000 |
| 3 camels for meat | 1,050,000 |
| 4 sacks of rice | 540,000 |
| Juice | 170,000 |
| Tea | 60,000 |
| 4 (illegible) for the camels | 60,000 |
| 2 shoes | 46,000 |
| Suitcase | 20,000 |
| Purchaser Expenses 570 X 230 Bir | 131,100 |
| Total 3,733,100 Somali Shilling | 6,542 Bir |
| Shipping to Luuq/Lough | 200 |
| Total | 6,749 Bir |
| Road expenses | 348 |
| Grand total | 7,097 |

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In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

I the undersigned Ahmed Sheikh/Sheid, hereby confess that I have received from Brother Zachariah Al-Maqdisi the sum of 5,000 Ethiopian Bir as full payment of the debt. (5,000 Bir X 570 = 2,850,000 Somali Shilling).

Signed:
Ahmed Sheikh
Commander of the Preparation branch
The 1st witness: Ahmed ‘Omar Diri
The 2nd witness
Date: 12/23/1993

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In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

Invoice # 25
The sum of 23,000 Somali Shilling was paid to Brother ‘Abd Al-Schakour Aheer, one of the Somali instructors by order of brother ‘Omar Tajuddin on 12/25/1993.

Signed:
‘Abd Al-Schakour Aheer
The accountant
The 1st witness
The 2nd witness

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In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

Invoice # 21
I the undersigned ‘Abd Al-weli Hasan Adam, commander of Hamzeh Bin ‘Abd Al-Motalib platoon in the southern sector; confess that on January 5, 1993 I have received from Brother Zechariah Al-Maqdesi the sum of 2,000,000 Somali Shilling for military operations in the southern sector.

Signed:
‘Abd Al-Weli Hasan Adam
Zachariah Al-Maqdesi
Commander of the preparation branch
The 1st witness: ‘Abd Al-Rasheed Ahmed
The 2nd witness: Mohammed Wadhe’ Adam

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(TC: A duplication of page 14).

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In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Invoice # 23
We the undersigned:
Sheikh ‘Abdullah Irad, Commander of the Jihad office
Sheikh ‘Abdullah ‘Omar, the Emir of Ogaden Union
Brother Mohammed Atya’, purchasing director

Hereby confess that on December 18, 1993 we have received the sum of $5,000 equivalent to 35,000 Ethiopian Bir to pay a portion of the debt.

Signed:
Sheikh ‘Abdullah ‘Omar
Sheikh ‘Abdullah Irad
Mohammed Atya’
‘Omar Tajuddin, Preparation branch commander
Zachariah Al-Maqdesi, accountant
1st witness, ‘Abd Al-Sabour ‘Abdullah
2nd witness, ‘Abd Al-Rasheed

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In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Invoice # 21
The sum of 500 Ethiopian Bir was paid out to Brother Ahmed Nour, commander of the Al-Fath company in the southern sector by order of the preparation branch commander brother ‘Omar Tajuddin. The money to be spent on supplies for one of the platoons in the said sector.

Signed:
“Omar Tajuddin
‘Abd Al-Sabour ‘Abdullah
Zachariah Al-Maqdesi

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In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Invoice # 22
The sum of 580 Ethiopian Bir was paid out on December 16, 1993 to purchase a camel for the camp.

Signed:

Preparation branch commander
The accountant

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In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
The sum of (???) Bir was paid out to purchase items to assist in the trip. The money was spent as follows:
230 Bir personal expenses for Brother Ahmed Diri to Gerbo.

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In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Invoice #18
The sum of 560,000 Somali Shilling was paid out on 06/23/1414H. to purchase a camel for the camp.

Signed:
Preparation branch commander
The accountant
Witness/ course supervisor

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Invoice # 19
The sum of 1,320 Bir was paid out on 12/12/1993 to purchase one small and one large camel for the camp.

Signed:
"Omar Tajuddin: Preparation branch commander
Accountant: Zachariah Al-Maqdesi
'Abd Al-Sabour 'Abdullah: Witness

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In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

The sum of 150,000 Somali shilling was paid out to purchase salt

Signed:
Preparation branch commander
Accountant: Zachariah Al-Maqdesi

*Page 21 of 33

In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Invoice # 14

The sum of 500 Bir was paid out on November 22, 1993 to Brother ‘Omar Tajuddin for personal expenses.

Signed:
Camp commander/Recipient
The accountant
Witness: ‘Abd Al-Sabour

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This is to certify that on 06/17/1414 H, Brother “Omar Tajuddin has received the sum of 2,000 Bir to pay his personal debts.

Signed:
Preparation branch commander
The accountant
The witness

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In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Invoice # 11
This is to certify that on 06/08/1414 H the sum of 150,000 Somali Shilling was paid out to the brothers to cover their expenses on the return trip.
(The money sent from Jude ‘Asbou with Mohammed Jarween).
Signed:
Camp commander
Accountant: Zachariah
1st recipient: Max’ed Caber
2nd recipient: Ahmed Sheikh

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In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
I contacted him on ….. and he told me that I permitted him to take 5,000 Bir from the money without signing a receipt.

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In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Dear Brother ‘Omar,
Peace upon you;
We are in good health, and hope you are too.
Brother Sheikh Mohammed arrived with the sum of 75,916 Ethiopian Bir on him. With the permission of brother Saiful-Islam, we took 5,000 Bir of it.
Please include us in your prayers.
Best regards and wishes to you from the brothers in Hamzeh platoon.
Please give regards to brothers Zachariah and ‘Abd Al-Sabour.

Your Brother in Islam
Ibn Tayeb
Date: January 14, 1993

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In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Invoice # 10

This is to certify that on November 27, 1993 the sum of 50,000 Ethiopian Bir was paid out to brothers Mohammed Atya’ and Mohammed Diri who are in charge of purchasing food for the camp.

Also, the sum of 1,000 Bir was paid out to brothers Mohammed Atya’ and Mohammed Diri to pay their personal debts.

Signed:
Mohammed Diri
Ahmed Sheikh

Zachariah Al-Maqdesi
Camp Commander
1st witness: “Abd Al-Rasheed Ahmed
2nd witness: ‘Abd Al-Sabour ‘Abdullah

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In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Invoice # 9

This is to certify that the sum of 5,000 Ethiopian Bir was paid out to brother Mohammed Atya’ who is in charge of purchasing.

Signed:
The accountant: Zachariah
1st witness
2nd witness

Also, the sum of 20,000 Somali Shilling was paid out as personal assistant to Mohammed Weli Hasan.

Signed:
Accountant
Recipient
Witness

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Invoice # 6
Period accounts from 05/10/1414 H
-Payment of 3,000 Shilling on 05/10/1414H to purchase milk in the Dihoun area.
-Payment of 900 Shilling on 05/11/1414H to purchase tea in the Dihoun area.
-Payment of 20,000 Shilling on 05/12/1414H to purchase meat in the Dihoun area.

Signed: ‘Omar Tajuddin

Invoice # 7

-Payment of 96,000 Shilling to purchase two lambs and other items.
The cost of the two lambs 35,000 + 48,000 = 83,000 + 13,000 for milk.

Signed: Zachariah

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Period accounts from 05/08/1414 H
Invoice # 4
The sum of 100,000 Shilling was paid out on 05/08/1414H to brother Mohammed Weli Owduwa to pay personal debts of 'Omar Tajuddin.

Signed:

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Invoice # 5
This is to certify that on November 1, 1993 brother 'Omar Tajuddin received the sum of 100,000 Shilling to pay personal debts.

Signed:
The accountant: Zachariah
The recipient

(TC: Pages 30 and 29 are a continuation of each other but scanned in reverse order)

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Period accounts from 05/07/1414 H
Sums received from brother Saiful-Islam were:
-3,400 Bir as private funds.
-2,500,000 Shilling as general funds.

The private funds:
Invoice # 1
The sum of 1,000 Bir was paid out on 05/04/1414H to brother Mohammed Sheikh Khalifah to purchase special requests "foods" for the instructors.
2,400 Bir remaining.

The general funds

Invoice # 2
The sum of 1,500,000 Shilling was paid out on 05/06/1414H to brother Mohammed Sheikh Hasan to cover the northern, North eastern and Eastern fronts expenditures.

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Invoice # 3
Also, the sum of 314,500 Shilling was paid out on 05/04/1414H to brother Ahmed Al-Taweel to facilitate the loading of sacks requested from Gerbo and his living expenses along with two other men for 15 days; in addition to 3,700 shilling on 05/04/1414H to purchase sugar and tea.
The remaining amount as of 05/07/1414H 4,500 Shilling; 650,300 Shilling.

Signed:
'Omar Tajuddin
Date: 05/07/1414H

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In the Name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

Dear brother/ 'Omar Tajuddin
Please be informed that brother Mohammed Jarween arrived from Luuq on Thursday October 16, 1993.

| | |
|---|---|
| Amount started with | 80,000 Bir |
| Amount we received | 68,400 Bir |
| Bir exchanged to Somali Shilling | 10,000 Bir |
| Shillings received for the exchange | 5,150,000 Shilling |
| Total amount we received | 78,400 Bir |
| Difference | 1,600 Bir |
| This amount was spent on the road as follows: | |
| Taxi fare | 500 Bir |
| Companion expenses | 100 Bir |
| Purchased the following from Garbo | 1,000 Bir |
| 2 sacks of sugar | 240,000 Shilling |
| 3 cartons of oil | 360,000 Shilling |
| 2 slippers | 12,000 Shilling |
| Miscellaneous expenses | 20,000 Shilling |

| | |
|---|---|
| Labor | 5,000 Shilling |
| Remaining cash | 28,000 Shilling |
| Total | 505,000 Shilling |

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(TC: A duplication of page 31).

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Funds Expenditure:

$1 = 7 Ethiopian Bir
1 Bir = 400 to 500 Somali Shilling

General information:
-Ahmed Karaghai is the person who brought the money from Addis Ababa Oderdawa, he is only a currier.
-Ahmed Diri Sheikh Rasheed / Mohammed Atya' are in charge of purchasing.
Debt: Mohammed Atya' = 68,069,000 Somali Shilling.
Debt: $5,000 taken by 'Abd Al-Salam 'Othman from Djibouti without permission.
Debt: 3,000,000 Shilling on Faisal Mukhtar.
Debt: 400,000 Shilling on 'Ali Mohammed.

The remaining is the sum of 500,000 Shilling for 'Abd Al-Wahid used for military operations inside Gedo.

End of Translation

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800581
Author: Abu 'Ata Al-Sharqi
Title: Abu 'Ata Al-Sharqi Reports from Afghanistan
Date: September 4, 1994
Length: 3 pages

## Synopsis

Abu 'Ata Al-Sharqi reports in a letter the situation before he and other al-Qaeda operatives leave Afghanistan. He expresses satisfaction that Fayez Muhammad is experiencing problems after causing al-Qaeda hardship in some way, and asks to be allowed to finish the Furqan project by training a group of Uzbeks before he leaves Afghanistan for Sudan.

## Key Themes

Al-Sharqi acknowledges the order to evacuate Afghanistan, and thinks the order is for the best. He is sorry to leave, regarding Afghanistan as a paradise, with ample opportunities to see the fruits of their labors (comparable to Sudan), but also as a place with difficult conditions.

Three recent incidents have made Al-Sharqi happy:

1. The Vice President of Al-Jama't Al-Islamiyah visited Al-Badr Camp, and agreed with Al-Sharqi and his associates that "such incidents" should not happen, nor is this the way they should communicate. He would go to Al-Ghond himself to resolve the situation.
2. Al-Sharqi and his associates visited Kabul and Hikmetyar's headquarters to deny that al-Qaeda had given any weapons to Massoud (it had actually gone to Al-Nahda party), and to discuss their problem with Al-Ghond. Hikmetyar's people agreed that Fayez Muhammad (apparently the person behind the "incident") was corrupt, and might have to be killed.
3. Fayez Muhammad was protecting fellow Manakel tribe members built houses in violation of the government of Khost's regulations, but backed down in the face of the government's threats to attack Matoon citadel and kick the party out of Khost.

Al-Sharqi expresses his satisfaction that Fayez Muhammad is experiencing such misfortune in light of what he did to them.

The Al-Qaeda operatives' mission was to help with the Furqan project. Previously, they had trained a class of Tajiks at al-Farouq camp, and had the opportunity to train Uzbeks as well. Abu Walid, an associate of Al-Sharqi, is strongly in favor of training the Uzbeks since the opportunity may not arise again. Eventually, they agree to do it as long as the Uzbeks arrive within two months, pending a decision from the al-Qaeda leadership, which Al-Sharqi asks for. He asks the recipient of the leader to prepare a stand or cart for him (for business) in Khartoum in anticipation of his arrival there.

GM/JDE

*Page 1 of 6
To: My Dear Brother the Military Official
Greetings and I hope you receive this letter in best health in both your religion and world (spiritually and physically.

We've received the news from you to evacuate immediately and we were happy because it will open new hopes and it will remove heavy burdens on the people here, maybe for the best.

I'm sorry to leave this land that taught us a lot and still does. The possibilities of work are vast despite the difficult conditions surrounding us. However our leaving might lead to new doors that might produce fruits that might make us forget the paradise in Afghanistan. However, I don't think or expect that we'll ever reap fruits as those we did in Afghanistan.

The equation is very difficult; the area needs a little bit //TC: Continued//

*Page 2 of 6
//TC: Continued from above// of work to produce large amounts of fruits. It reminds me of the lands of Sudan. All you need to do is throw the seeds and come back at harvest time and collect the fruits. At the same time, conditions here are very difficult and need strong will and seriousness to continue despite severe harassments from all sides… it is really a difficult equation for those who want to work in this abundant region.

I'm personally happy with this decision, which I think was taken after the party incident that I wrote to you about and which I suggested to evacuate immediately even before the date upon which we agreed earlier. There are things that made me happy before receiving your letter, actually three incidents that took place that I'd like to summarize for you so that you are involved in the issues.

1. The first incident - the visit of the Vice President of the Al-Jama't Al-Islamiyah to Al-Badr Camp. We used this opportunity to make our case to the party; he showed his unhappiness with this situation and promised that he would go personally to Al-Ghond //TC: Phonetically transcribed// in order to prevent such incidents from happening again and to say that this is not the way we should communicate and it should not have happened in the first place.

2. The second incident - a fast visit that we took to Kabul and Hikmetyar's headquarters. We went there for two purposes:

a.) we denied that we have given any weapons or ammunition that belongs to Al-Qai'da to Massoud as was reported, instead it was received by Al-Nahda party.

b.) we talked to him about our problem with Al-Ghond. //TC: Continued//

*Page 3 of 6
//TC: Continued from above// We haven't found Hikmetyar because I think he was injured //TC: or coming down with disease//, but we raised the issue with some of the leaders there and they were dismayed by what Fayez Muhammad did. They told us that Fayez Muhammad became a problem to the party because he

embezzled a lot of money and that the party may physically eliminate him. We realized that Fayez Muhammad is a very unwanted character, even from his party and that he used his position to make a fortune.

3. The third incident - the government of Khost is waging a campaign against the old communists; they were all from Manakel tribe, it is the same tribe that Fayez Muhammad belongs to; they embezzled land from the government and build private buildings on it without any permits. The government wanted to destroy these houses, but they received protection from Fayez Muhammad who interfered and helped them. The governor of Khost, who is from the Haqqani organization, told Fayez Muhammad that if they fired one shot then they will in turn attack Matoon citadel, which is owned by the party and kick them out of Khost. Next day, Fayez Muhammad sent one tank to support the government forces in order to destroy these buildings and the government got its way.

All these three incidents made me feel comfortable psychologically and I felt more calm and in balance because Fayez Muhammad started to face many troubles and started one day after another to lose his power; I don't think he would dare to repeat what he has done to use before, especially that everyone in Khost has a knowledge of that and we thank God for that.

*Page 4 of 6

New Issue:

As you know, our stay here was basically to help Al-Furqan Project. When brother Abu Walid heard about the news, which made a lot of us happy, he was very sad because he was planning to bring the Uzbeks for training and sent someone to tell them that. He expected that we would observe their training as we did with the Tajiks.

Abu Walid in fact asked me to help him in that regard because there is no one else that can take care of this training but us. He said that the Uzbeks are an excellent opportunity that will never happen again and we should not let it go. You might read in his reports to you the same opinion. In fact he gave me several reasons to support his opinion.

After several debates we agreed to consult with the brothers who are in charge here and ask them if they was to stay and carry out this assignment or leave without doing it. If they accepted we will ask from our brothers to postpone our departure until we finish the training assignment. If they agree we will stay and if they don't there is nothing we can do and leave.

And this is what I've done. I sat down with all the brothers and told them what was going on and I showed them the importance of growing this seed in the area of Uzbekistan and we did in Tajikistan. And then we leave it to God to make it fruitful. After exchanging opinions we agreed on the following:

*Page 5 of 6

We agree to stay in order to train the Uzbeks under the Furqan project as we did the Tajiks on one condition - they should come here within two months maximum starting September 3, 1994 to Al-Farouq Camp. Brother Abu Walid agreed to this condition.

Therefore the decision is now all yours to accept or reject. As for my personal opinion, as I said in the beginning, there is an abundance of fruits in this area. And the difficulties are also abundant. I think that carrying out this assignment will change gradually the map of the region in the Muslim people's favor.

To tell you the truth I am tired of the problems in the area, but I think I can stay to finish this assignment and I ask God to bless us for his work.

I am confident that the problems will never end as long as we are among are Tatar (Tartar) brothers, but our faith in God and reliance on him and knowing that this assignment will be followed by others - all these issues make me stronger and push me to work even more and to rely on God. We are waiting to receive your reply on this issue and please pray for us. Our greetings to all the brothers; especially Abu Abdallah.

Please do not forget to prepare a shop for me in Khartoum Bizarre to sell potatoes and onions upon my arrival, God willing. If that's expensive, buy me a cart to walk in the streets of Um Dorman.

Your brother,
Abu 'Ata Al-Sharqi
September 4, 1994
(Signature)

*Page 6 of 6
Signatures of the people the "Jihadwal State"

| | |
|---|---|
| Abu 'Ata Al-Sharqi | (Signature) |
| Nathar Ahmad | (Signature) |
| Abu Zar'a Al-Yemeni | (Signature) |
| Abu Bakr Al-Maghribi | (Signature) |
| Abu Salman | (Signature) |
| Abu Husam Al-Kandi | (Signature) |
| Abd Al-Hamid | (Signature) |
| Abu Khalad | (Signature) |
| Abu Tamim | (Signature) |
| Abu Ayoob | (Signature) |
| Abu Al-Faraj | (Signature) |

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800597
Author: Abu Hafess (probably Abu Hafs AKA Muhammad Atef)
Title: Abu Hafs' Report on Operations in Somalia
Date: Unknown
Length: 9 pages

## Synopsis

Abu Hafs submits a report on the al-Qaeda operations in Somalia, Ogaden, Kenya, and Djibouti, and lists budget needs. Luuq camp has a great location, but is short on many supplies. The situation in the Ogaden, currently under the purview of Saif al-Islam, is going well, but needs money. The Kenya office is has a central logistical and administrative function, but suffers from security problems. Finally, the Djibouti office needs a married operative who will not be corrupted.

## Key Themes

Abu Hafs rejects doing Brother Anass's courses in the areas he visited for security, and suggests Khartoum instead. He then gives code words the recipients of the report should use for Sudan and Somalia, and the times and days that certain frequencies can be used to contact him via wireless communications.

The next section is a detailed description of Luuq Camp. The camp's location is good for using as a springboard for guerrilla warfare, since the mountainous terrain makes it hard for outside forces to penetrate, especially during the rainy season, when the camouflage is thicker. Marehan tribes (the tribe of Seyad Barre) live in the area, but the actual area around the camp is sparsely populated, and many of the people are supporters of the Islamic Union. Abu Hafs rates the security situation as good, and military supplies are mostly good, with the exception of clothing, shoes, canteens, RPGs, ammunition for artillery, and vehicles (two cars are needed, if possible). As for the training, it is going well, especially given the horrible condition many of the recruits were in at the beginning. Trainers are needed.

Abu Hafs met with Professor Mahmood, and it became clear to him that the coaltion in Luuq lacks decision-making ability, and defers to the central authority, which is non-confrontational in incidents with the Americans and Kenya. Abu Hafs senses this may be a problem in the future.

Regarding communications, Abu Hafs triumphantly notes that Saif in Ogaden, and Omar in Laascaanood (of the "Sudanese Agricultural Equipment Division") were contacted using a "faraway-communications wireless system." It will be cheaper than phones, but requires codes. The group still needs devices with repeaters, and several high frequency devices, although it is unclear how they will transport the devices to the needy areas.

The goal of the brothers in Luuq is two-fold: to form a guerrilla force, and to discover and collect information on the enemy for use in the future.

Abu Hafs then goes on to describe the situation in the Ogaden. He notes that he was able to make contact with Saif. Saif is doing well, prior reports that the Ogaden camp was surrounded are untrue, and he is desperate need of money. Abu Hafs wants to go to Ogaden, probably via the Luuq route, and met with Sheikh Saley and Sheikh Abdellah Omar, where he encouraged them with the group's logo: "Make me achieve my earnings under the shadow of my arrow."

Abu Hafs continues with a discussion of the Kenya office. The purpose of the Nairobi office (which is in a rented house) is to receive, prepare, equip, and supply brothers going to the camps in Luuq or Ogaden. The actual cost of transporting people from Nairobi to Luuq is high. The security situation is poor – crime is high, and the political situation is unstable, possibly even explosive. Furthermore, Arabs in particular are subject to extreme surveillance.

Djibouti has an al-Qaeda operative in the form of Brother Khaled, but he must be removed immediately because he is susceptible to Djibouti's corruption as a single male, and replaced with Abu Ahmed Al-Radji, who is married.

Abu Hafs then lists the fixed budget for the Kenya/Luuq operations, and mentions that Brother Khaled is $4000 in debt. The trainers would also like good salaries as they would like to get married, and low salaries would apparently present obstacles to doing hat.

Finally, Abu Hafs met with Abu Khadija al-Zahri, and confirmed that the evacuation of Laasqoray was not about a lack of food after all.

# AFGP-2002-800597

**FULL TRANSLATION (by AL)**
**HIGH PRIORITY**
**DATE: APRIL 1ST, 2002**
**(LUUQ CAMP, OGADEN, KENYA, SOMALIA, BUDGET)**

**Regarding the subject matter of brother Anass's courses:**

We found out that it is difficult to do this in the areas that we visited because of dangers pertaining to security. This is why it is preferred that the courses be done by you in Khartoum. As a result this will save us transportation expenses and others.

**Regarding contacts with the camps:**

You can contact us very easily using wireless communications.

| **Code Name** | Somalia | Bader |
|---|---|---|
| | Sudan | Saqer |

**Frequencies:**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| May 20th | 1- | 8559 | 10:06 am |
| | 2- | 9237 | 08:04 pm |
| May 21st | 3- | 12559 | 10:06 am |
| | 4- | 23556 | 08:04 pm |

The first frequency is used during even days (20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30)
The second frequency is used during odd days (21, 23, 25, 27, 29)

**Page (4)** **In the Name of Allah the Most Compassionate the Most Merciful**

**LUUQ CAMP**

Praise be to Allah I visited brother Ahmed's camp and I stayed with them about 15 days.

Description of the location and the region:

The camp is located in a good district on longitude line 25º 41º and latitude line 26º (Southwest Somalia.)

It is located on the West of the Kenyan borders at a distance of about 11 kilometers. It is separated by a chain of mountains in which the highest mountain is 600 meters. BaladHawa is located 24 km north, and Garbahari is located 80 km west, and Luuq is located in the Northeast.

**Description of the region:**

**Hills region:** This is considered one of the open areas that consist of dense trees, thorn bushes, and mountains covered by thorn bushes of medium density.
Mountain elevation: Medium between - 500 meters to 800 meters
- 1500 feet to 2400 meters feet
And the region is considered one of the best for those fighting guerrilla warfare (Spring boards). It is difficult for any organized force to take over this region, or even think about penetrating it. And I obtained maps covering a small part of the region.
Here is a brief description of the region of which I obtained maps. It should be noted that the region is of good quality tree density. It is useful for men fighting guerrilla warfare.

And the region's borders are: from latitude line: 2° 40° to 3° 45° North
And from latitude line: 10° 41° to 42° 00° East

This region is northeast of the Kenyan borders, it is shaped as a 90-degree triangle, and the length of its base is 92 kilometers, its height 122 kilometers, meaning that the distance of this region is 11,224 km².

There are many Mountain ranges:

a- Mountain range Southeast of the region. It spans from Southwest to Northeast. It is the largest mountain range consisting of 918 meter-height. The apparent side from the range has a length of 4 km.

b- Mountain range Southwest of the region, it is intersected by a road between Gerssaley and Berdaley. The highest mountain equals 718 meters.

c- Mountain range in the East. And the highest mountain there equals 721 meters.

d- Mountain range in the Northeast enjoys two high mountains: 613 meters and 636 meters.

e- Hills range in the far North reaches a height of 440 meters.

The region is all covered with thorn bushes and if you go to any mountain peak you will see nothing but trees, therefore your visibility will be more or less 5 meters.

**Page (5)**

a- **Road System**: The road system is not bad. As it is depicted on the map, the road leads to Gerssaley and Berdaley, and it spans to the Kenyan borders at a distance of 27 kilometers away from (Elwakh). This road extends to the Southeast.

b- **Water:** There are lots of water sources reasonably good. (Explained on the map.)

c- **Climate:** Hot with high humidity, as it is the case in the forest areas. The rain season is very short, it lasts about two months.

**Note:**

1- **This description concerns the rainy season only, as all the three are green. However, during the drought season the leaves fall, as a result the camouflage is less possible than in the rainy season.**

2- **I described to you only the region, which I provided you with its maps. However, the region that enjoys similar hills is bigger than the one described many times.**

**Population:**

1- Marehan tribes live in this region, they originated from Darut, and it is (Seyad Barree's tribe.) Aideed tried to invade this region before but he could not and lost a lot of his supporters there.
According to preliminary information, there are no secular parties in the region. However, there are members, who were previously followers of Seyad Barree.

2- There are sympathizer from the region to the Islamic Union (Al-Ittihad Al-Islamy).

3- The region where the camp is located: The population density there is extremely low; moving shepherds.

**Security of The Region:**

From the security point of view, the region is excellent, and the camp's location is very good.

**Supplies:**

There are several ways to bring supplies to the region, through roadways from Kenya or Somalia.

**Conclusion:**

And it is very difficult for any organized force to work there.

Enclosed is a copy of a map showing the location of the camp (with a map scale of 200/ unintelligible.)

**Page (6) Luuq (follow-up)**

**The Coalition in Luuq:** After the meeting that took place between me and Professor Mahmood, Mohammed Hajji's Assistant, I concluded that the brothers in Luuq (leadership) could not make any personal decisions, as they were under the umbrella of the coalition. And I did confirm this, after the occurrence of many incidents in the region, as a result two brothers were killed by **the Americans**, and five of the brothers were killed by Kenyan forces in an ambush.
Professor Mahmood got in touch with Sheikh Ali Warssama and informed him of what took place, the Sheikh then told him there is no need for confrontation.
I believe this will become an obstacle in a future operation.
(I did not meet with Sheikh Mohammed Hajji Youssef because he did not go there and he went to Mogadishu for a meeting.)

**The available means, (Military):**

1- There are sufficient supplies, especially, in light ammunitions, except RPG is not available. Light and medium weapons in satisfactory quantity (Automatic rifles, light automatic weapons, doschka, Kalashnikov), with the availability of enough ammunitions.

2- Artillery division is satisfactory and most of it is good to be used. But there is a lack of ammunition.

3- Transportation is rare: (Car, one truck)

**Training:**

1- The brothers started indeed the first training session. The number of trainees must be about 40 members per session; this way we can graduate a group of cadres that will be able to lead a company in guerrilla warfare. The brothers are presently in the Basic Training Course, and it will conclude soon.

2- The total number of the brother is 150 (brothers)—40 trainees and they consist: Guards and Administrative duties' forces in the area.

3- It is expected that the coalition will admit 150 brothers in the next session.

4- The situation of the trainees (from health point of view) was very bad, as a result of malnutrition. But now it has improved tremendously.

5- It is expected that others will arrive from various regions, especially, if the coalition makes decisions pertaining to inviting others to Islam.

**Page (7)**

**Communications:**

1- Praise be to Allah we were able to obtain a faraway-communication wireless system. (Brother Saif in Ogaden and brother Omar in Laascaanood were contacted through this system.) Thus, we can hear clearly the Sudanese Agriculture Equipment Division in Kassala and the Ogaden.
We went to see him and called them. The sound is clear. Therefore, if it is possible to contact them through this system, we will save more money than the use of the telephone. This will be through the use of codes.

2-We need small devices with repeaters. This is very important, especially during the current discovery patrols. (15 devices) suitable. We also need two devices H.F.

To date no decision on how to bring these supplies has been reached, and we continue to look for ways of achieving this goal.

**Transportation:**

We are in a great need in this area: They only have one very old used truck belonging to the coalition. And the brothers are in tremendous need to a car, Toyota, at least. Also, if possible, 2 cars.

**Other Administrative Issues:**

Clothing: Trainees clothing is in low supply.
Shoes: The brothers are in need of (300) military uniforms. A very low supply.
Canteens: "We don't have. We have only very small quantity."

**Page (8)**

1- A decision has been reached about a fixed military budget. Enclosed with the report is a budget of (5000 to 6000 dollars per month.) Because the prices are extremely high, as it is explained in the attached list.

2- A financial report on the previous expenses has been submitted, and it is included in the report.

**The Brothers' General Needs in LUUQ:**

1- Trainers:
   a. Abu Al-Noor
   b. Abu Al-Haitham
   c. Abu Al-fateh
   d. Abu Emad Al-Yamani (First Aid)
   e. Abu Hamma Al-Saeedy

2- Communication Devices:

| **Quantity** | |
|---|---|
| 2 | Big Devices |
| 15 | Small Devices |

**Objectives:**

The objectives for the brothers in Luuq have been determined:

1- Formation of a guerrilla force.
2- Discovery and collection of information on the enemy and knowledge of the area in order to be ready for work anytime, Allah's Willing!

**Page (9)**

**THE OGADEN:**

Praise be to Allah, we got in touch with brother Saif through Hamad's device. Thank Allah, the situation is very pleasing. It is apparent the news –(they are surrounded-) we previously received is categorically not true. And I had sent a letter with Sheikh Saleh when I met with him. It contains necessary warnings. Also, I will try to join them, Allah's Willing! I believe I will be obliged to go through Luuq road, because Djibouti road system is not complete and there is a concentration of forces there.
And the brother is in desperate need for the monies because he did not receive the amount of $21,600.

And I spoke to brother Saif and explained to him the situation.

Enclosed is a letter with the report, which just arrived from Saif explaining the situation.

During my meeting with Sheikh Saleh and Sheikh Abdellah Omar, I strongly focused on voicing up our logo: (Make me achieve my earnings under the shadow of my arrow.) I noticed that the Sheikhs' reaction was positive and that the course they took had a good impact on them; as a result it became easier to deal with them.

The brothers are in need of small and big wireless communications devices with repeaters.

**Training Subject**: As it is explained in the letter, everything is going very well.
They need trainers. And I will specify the names of the brothers at the end of the report.

**Page (10)**

1- The function of the office in Nairobi is to receive the brothers arriving to work in Luuq or Ogaden, and to equip them and deploy them to the camps. Also it provides administrative services that are not available in Mandera and in other areas**,** example: medicine etc.

We rented a house for $500. Brothers Tawfeeq and Salem are residing in it and using it for the aforementioned functions. Thus, a set budget of $1200 per month for the rent of the house has been specified. The details are in the enclosed report.

2- The security situation: Extreme surveillance, especially of the Arabs. Workers for the Relief Agency were detained because they were accused of supporting Muslim extremists.

3- Kenya is not a good place (Nairobi or Boosasso) for prisoners, as the cost of living is high, plus corruption is dangerously prevalent: Theft, houses' breaking- in, no political stability, and it is possible that there will be an explosion in the country.

4- Enclosed is a financial report from 1/17 to 5/20. And it concludes that brother Saleem has a remaining balance of $7,917, about $7,000 (**Translator's Notes:** HE MEANT TO WRITE ABOUT $8,000.)

5- The operation pertaining to the transfer of the brothers from Nairobi to Luuq will be costly: $150 for rent per person, and the roadways are not good.

<u>The enclosed report explains details of the budget.</u>

**Page (11)**

**Djibouti**

Of course, Djibouti is strategically very important for conducting operations. We must have one of our members there, preferably, he must be married. Because of corruption in the country, the area is not suitable for a bachelor. Therefore, I suggest that you remove brother Khaled as fast as possible. He can be replaced by brother Abu Ahmed Al-Radji (Abdussalam) and his Somali wife. He will perform the same task. And Abu-Ahmed should be sufficient.

Due to the abnormal high cost of living.
Enclosed is a financial report written by brother Khaled regarding previous expenses.

**The fixed budget is as follow:**

| | |
|---|---|
| 1- Rental housing (two rooms only) | **$500** |
| 2- Electricity, water | **$ 50** |
| 3- Salaries (brothers) | |
| - Abu Ahmed | **$150** until cost of living adjustment in Djibouti is determined. |
| - Abu Khadija | **$150** |
| - Abu Youssef | **$100** |
| - Pakistanis | **$3100** |
| 4- Gas 5 | **$120** |

5- Other expenses: (Travel tickets, guest entertainment, residency paperwork fees etc.)
6- Telephone calls. Very expensive.

**The Current Financial Situation:**

Brother Khaled has no money. His debts reached **$4000**.

**Page 12**

**(The Current Financial Situation:)**

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1- | The remaining balance in Nairobi | | **$7,917** |
| 2- | Djibouti | He has a debt | **$4,000** |
| 3- | Luuq | Only one month budget remains. | |
| 4- | The brothers in the Ogaden are in daring need to financial support. | | |

**Salaries:**

Please make a decision regarding the trainers salaries as the majority of them would like pretty much to get married. And this a major problem for them. They reminded that I had told them that the trainers enjoy a special treatment. Kindly, look into it and provide us with a decision quickly.

**Page (3)**

3- Regarding the subject of Laasqoray: I met with brother Abu Khadija Al-Zahri. It was clear to me that the decision to evacuate the area was taken prior to Sheikh Hassan's visit with us in Sudan. This has nothing to do with food. The storage was abundant with food, according to brother Abu Khadija. And you can ask Abu Talha to confirm this.

4- There is a group that split from the General Coalition.

And Allah Knows.

Signed
**Abu-Hafess**

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800600
Title: Report on the Needs of the Mujahidin in Somalia
Author: Unknown
Date: February 19, 1993
Length: 3 pages

## Synopsis

A letter to Ottman or Abu Baqar that details the current needs of the mujahidin in Somalia, and negatively assesses the personality of the Islamic youth, the current state of jihad and the leadership of the local jihad movement.

## Key Themes

The first section is a list of requested items, with costs, for the mujahidin: Kalashinovs, BKMs, and RPGs, as well as rice, dates, and semolina. The leader also requests five open-backed Toyota Land Cruisers, communications devices,

The author then negatively assesses the youth involved in the movement. They are rash, shallow, have no preparation, and foolishly rushed into the city.

The author divides the fight in the Mogadishu and Luuq regions into at least three steps. The first step is unintelligible. The second period [but not step] involves attacking the leaders of the tribes, hopefully by finding some way of turning tribal allies (presumably of al-Qaeda) against other members of their tribes. This will likely be difficult. The second step [but not period] consists of fighting from within the cities, using different types of cells – ambushes, light arms, hand guns, explosives, etc. The third step is quick occupation of the cities by special forces in case the Americans leave, after which the group's forces will target Somali authorities and tribal leaders. The author doubts that the Americans will ever leave.

After much unintelligible writing, the author assesses the state of the jihad movement and its leadership. The leadership is terrible, and the author does not expect this to change, even with the new shura council. He suggests entering the political arena themselves, connecting with the base, and preparing some youth groups in the face of the poor leadership. The brothers have good intentions, including assassinations, and training in the cities, but they need encouragement. These brothers have an extremely low opinion of the leadership, blame it for the failure of jihad, and are threatening to leave the movement.

AFGP-2002-800600
PARTIAL TRANSLATION
04/01/02

In the name of Allah the gracious and Merciful
19/2/1993

To: Ottman or Abu baqar
All the brothers arrived well and safe and we would like you to send us these necessary supplies and weapons for one thousand Mujahad (fighters) and they are as followed.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Klachinkov | 800 | 500,000 S.Somali | $1000 | |
| B.K.M | 100 | 4 millionS.Somali | $888 | |
| R.P.G | 100 | 800,000 S.Somali | $180.00 | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| Food supplies : | | | | |
| Rice | 1000 ton | 300,000 S.Somali | $ 66.00 | |
| Dates | 4000 cartons | 70.000 S.Somali | $10.0 | |
| Somolina | 1000 ton | 300.000 S.Somali | $66.00 | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |

Transportation means:

5 cars land cruiser open from the back (Toyota brand)

Communication devises:
These devices will be used in long and short distances.
We need a sum of$ 100,000 to be used in recruitment and orientation.
We need a sum of $50,000 for administrative purposes and accomplishment of work

We hope that you send us all the requests and God will reward you
Your brother

Going back to the youth, they have a common characteristic which is the hastiness, and that superficial look toward things and he mentioned a name of the brothers ABDU ALLAH U/I possibly Maray, I am not saying anything but this needs a personality study

and there should be a study before taking any decisions now to know the men and know I strongly criticize and whished to talk to you on the telephone about this matter and the man MUBARAK and the weapons inside because the brothers decided to enter the city Without setting a plan, and that's why you should set up a plan of action.

Page 12 of 25
For the Mugadishu and Loq regions:

The first step is [U/I]
The second period will be all against tribe leaders [U/I] and equip some of the brothers from the same tribes to lead the tribe which is a very hard but we should try it any way to [U/I] possibly sharpen the brothers adversaries from the same tribe .

The second step are the operations especially against Americans from the inside of the cities with the changing cells which work in different areas example (explosives cells, security cells, hand gun cells, and light armament and the ambushes cells outside the city and cells of ballonets in case there is a obstacle on an attack with fire weapons) and that follows…

The third step is the occupation with special forces (quick entry) to put an end to the situation in case the Americans leave, if they ever leave and I don't think they will, but the most important in the beginning is to hit the Somali authorities from the leaders of the tribes and others inside first and the ones living abroad now and I think to delay those before the Americans so I wouldn't stimulate the tribes and will accuse the allies [U/I] and so many other causes (according to my thinking ) and God knows.
Page 13 of 25
Very hard to read, practically impossible to read %90 of the words:
South of Somalia for them [U/I] work in farms [U/I] like the other tribes and
Page 16 of 25

If they see a job in the field they will participate right away and without any conditions and a lot of those brothers will ask if there is a plan of work in the future steps and these are the youth that established the camps.

My view in working in Somalia in the future

- The leadership right now is almost impossible as it looks we will decide the on the jihad and I do not expect the future leadership to change a lot of things and I mean by that the new Choura committee.
We will prepare the political arena and the base for work if we exploit all the energies or new eminent leaders in the arena and we can say that the only obstacle in front of the jihad work is the absence of leadership.

The situation we are experiencing right now is very hard to continue the jihad work in collective way but it is possible to continue with some youth groups that accomplish some operations.


And to succeed in all these difficulties there should be a lot of time but the brothers have very good intentions in continuing the jihad work like training the brothers in the cities and doing some assassinations in the cities when ever possible and if they get support for their work in an early stage, they will continue the work.
Their opinion about the movement right now is very negative because they think that the leadership is the one that sabotaged the jihad work on purpose and they accuse it of treason and some of them submitted their resignations but the collective separation is very hard for the known reasons, the separations are to start yet if the Choura committee doesn't change any thing significant in the jihad but the youth that established the camps and lived in them, don't see that the jihad is tied up with anything and most of those youth don't think about establishing individual businesses.

The rest of the document is very hard to read, most of it is scratched.

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800611
Author: Hassan Dahir Haji Aweis
Title: Hassan Aweys Kenya Visa Application
Date: 9 March 1993
Length: 2 pages

## Synopsis

The document is a Kenyan visa application, dated 9 March 1993, filled out by Hassan Daih Haji Aweis. The author describes himself as a Somalian merchant, born in 1944 in Dimaree, and currently resident in Mogadishu, with a passport issued by the Internal Ministry of Somalia in 1990. He intends to visit the Tanfeeq Trading Company in Nairobi on business for a month's duration.

FORM V.1

*APPENDIX A*

R .....

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION

**APPLICATION FORM FOR A VISA**

*(To be Completed in Block Letters)*

Single/Multiple/Transit Visa for SINGLE.

1. *(a)* Surname (Mr./~~Mrs./Miss~~) HASSAN
   *(b)* Other Names in Full DAHIR HAJI HIWEIS
   *(c)* Full Names of Father/Husband/Wife .....
   *(Name of husband or wife in the case of married persons or father if unmarried)*

2. *(a)* Date of Birth 1944 Country and Place of Birth SOMALIA, DIMAREB
   *(b)* Profession/Occupation MERCHANT Sex M.

3. *(a)* Nationality at Birth SOMALI
   *(b)* Present Nationality, if different SAME.
   *(c)* Country of Residence SOMALIA.

4. Passport/Travel Document held:
   *(a)* No. A0194973 Place of Issue Mogadishu
   Date of Issue 3/12/90 Valid Until 3/12/93.
   *(b)* Issued by Internal Minister.
   *(Name of Authority Issuing Passport or Travel Document)*

5. Contact Address in the Country of Residence P.O. Box 1116 Mogadishu.

6. *(a)* Reasons for Entry BUSINESS.
   *(b)* Proposed Date of Entry 20/2/93.
   Duration of Stay 1 MONTH.

7. Full Names and Address of Friends, Firms or Relatives to be Visited TOWFEEQ TRADING Co. Ltd.
P.O. BOX 10865 NAIROBI

8. Have you been a resident of, visited or resided in the Republic of South Africa during the last twelve months? Yes/No. If Yes, give dates and duration of such residence or visits.
No.

9. Dates and Duration of Previous Visits to Kenya NIL.

10. Are you Returnable to Your Country of Residence/Domicile? YES.

11. It should be noted that possession of a visa is not the final authority to enter Kenya.

I hereby declare that the foregoing particulars are correct in every detail.

*Signature of Applicant*

*Date* 9/3/93.

*Note.*—This application must be accompanied by two recent passport size photographs of applicant.

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**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

GPK (L)

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800621
Author: Various and unknown
Title: Letters on al-Qa`ida's Operations in Africa
Length: 6 pages
Date: 1993

## Synopsis

A series of letters from various authors that discuss al-Qaeda's operations in Africa, specifically Somalia and Ogaden. In the first and fourth letters, the authors discuss their failure to get from Nairobi to Luuq and Mendira, The author of the third letter offers his help with African travel document. In the second letter, the author negatively assesses the current state of the Islamic Movement in Somalia, and in the fifth letter, Saif al-Islam gives a status report on his efforts in Ghar Shaigut camp.

## Key Themes

The first letter, to Abu AbdAllah, is a report of an operative's arrival and activities in Nairobi in support of al-Qaeda's operations in Somalia and Ogaden [Ugadin]. The trip itself was expensive, and the author delivered $2500 to Abu Tariq, who handled expenses and logistics. The al-Qaeda team met with Ugadin allies, and tried and failed to get to Mendira or Luuq, Somalia via plane – it was stymied by government regulations and inappropriate facilities in Luuq.

The second letter is a report of the state and history of the Islamic movement in Somalia. In southern Somalia, Algamaa Al-Islamiah, led by Mahmud Isa, broke off from al-Ahl, led by Abdelqadir Shaikh Edris. In the north, the Islamic Youth Group The structure of the Islamic movement mirrors that of the Muslim brotherhood, with national and local executive councils and advisory councils, although many decisions are made in the mosques and streets. The Afghan Jihad-influenced youth of the movement rose up to defend Kismayo from Aideed's advancing forces, but were defeated, and driven back. The author blames the movement for bad planning and preparation, little money, and little connection between the leaders and the base.

The third letter is from Abu Abd-Allah Althani Alfa Ibrahim to Abi Ab-Allah Saad Alsaad. The author regrets that circumstances prevent him from making a trip to Africa, but since he's free at the moment, he would be happy to help African brothers obtain documents from Guinea, Liberia, Ivory Coast, or Sierra Leone.

The fourth letter, to Abu Abd-Allah, is similar to the first letter in describing the failure to get to Luuq or Mendira. The author provides intelligence on the movement of US forces to meet with Somali leaders in Luuq, and lists concerns he has about the operation, such as the airport, time for more training, establishing more training center, and relations and coordination with the Ugadin tribes, as well as other operatives.

In the fifth letter, dated 19 March 1993, Saif al-Islam, the main al-Qaeda operative in Ugadin, writes to Brother Othman, and describes the situation in Ghar Shaighut, the training camp he helped to establish. Camp resources are low, food, weapons and ammunition must be purchased in nearby villages, and the brothers are weak. Nonetheless, Saif al-Islam judges the time good to collect weapons and train as the enemy is weak and non-confrontational. The local allies (under Abd al-Salam Othman Abd al-Salam) are in charge of political, administrating and daawi operations, but al-Qaeda has assumed responsibility for training. Saif al-Islam ends with a discussion of the monetary needs of the local allies, and puts forward

with his estimated required budget, which totals $64000 for three months' supply of the camp force alone, and $130,000 per month for 600 people to be trained.

Linguist: TS

*Page 1 of 13

In the name of Allah, the most gracious, the most merciful

Praise Allah the lord of the world, peace be upon the messenger our prophet Muhammad, his kens and companions.

Beloved brother: Abu AbdAllah may Allah protect him.
Allah Peace, mercy and blessings be upon you.

Praise Allah, the lord of the world. We had reached Nairobi safely. The trip was excellent but it was expensive. I delivered $2500 to Abu- Tariq to cover the airplane fuel and parking fees in addition to the hotel, food and other services. However he has a detailed list .

1) We attempted to fly to Mendira or to Louq but we were informed that we have to obtain permission from the government. Such action requires a lot of time, expenses and precise information concerning the reasons for going along with the names. We tried to rent an airplane but that requires several days too.
2) In general Abu Teri met with some pilots who are working on louq line and found out that the Louq airport's length is 800 meter which suits helicopters but too small for the plane we have .
3) We met with Ugadin brothers. The meeting was positive. We agreed on the quick change of the current military policies because it is not appropriate for the security side or the capabilities. They agreed immediately.
4) There are news about the arrival of the American forces to the area

*Page 2 of 13 (and 4)
(A letter)

In the name of Allah, the most Gracious, the most Merciful

The first study:
It appears that there was no several ideas reached the Somalia, nevertheless, the Islamic Movement history is very recent and the Islamic groups were as follows:

- A group called themselves Al-Ahl that was founded by ( Abdelqadir Shaikh Edris) who later followed the thoughts of Al-Takfir. The group split into two factions:the original Al-Ahl and Algamaa Al-Islamiah (Islamic group). The leader of the split group is Mahmud Isa (Salafi and Muslim Brotherhood thoughts). There is another group in the same southern Somalia region called the Reform. There is another tribal group (Ashaariah).

Linguist: TS

- In the north there was The Islamic Youth Unity group ( Regional local group). This is a Muslim Brotherhood- salafi organization.which later united with the Islamic group and formed The Alliance group in the the year 1483.
- Shedri (TN: it may be Consultative) Council issues the decisions , an Executive council composed from office of (education, regions, security, jihad, and finance). Each region has a consultative council and an executive council, then branches and offices. It is clear that this organization structure is following the Brotherhood structure. In reality these offices were formal but the real actions were done on the side in mosques then the street promises. The movement was underground.
- The group did not have any plan (as was admitted by the Amir and the youth), nevertheless, the youth started their action in kees mayo city in southern somalia by getting engaged in its battle and the tribes men escaped before Aideed. There was 800 brothers in their camps and the escapees asked the youth to protect the city from Aideed provided that they would give up the airport, the harbor and the public utilities in the city for the youth. The youth agreed despite the fact that they smelled the deception. A defense line was established at a distance of 60km from the city, nevertheless the youth were defeated before ( continue page 3)

Aideed ( due to his high capability in planning and battles command that beat out all other commanders along with the courage). The youth left the city and thought of moving to another strategic area. They selected (yasahdu Area ?). The talk is long and the risks are coming. This group was unable to make any correct decision. All their decisions were in complete error. Nevertheless, their youth learned at last that their elders thoughts is far from theirs.

We conclude the following:

- The Sheikhs of the group were not Jihadi . the youth were influenced by hearing about the Afghani Jihad. The youth of the young men along with insufficiency of their experience and rashness toward the matters without deliberation hindered their effectiveness.
- The difference between the leadership and the base:
- The shortage of the cadres and the financial capacities
- The unplanned actions, and the technical errors.
- Non-preparation of the populace (The tribes are fighting each other).

These are some of the lessons derived from this quick report but there are many lessons that may fill a book.

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Page 4 of 13- Blanck page.

Page 5 of 13: A letter from Abu Abd-Allah Althani Alfa Ibrahim To Abi Ab-Allah Saad Alsaad

Arabic and Islamic Greetings:

Linguist: TS

Dear brother:
It was planned for me to travel to Africa and to my country soon. However it appears that the matter will be delayed. Since I am not engaged now in any activity, I would like to undertake any operation in the sake of Islam internally or externally. Thank Allah I am capable of doing that due to the experience I gained in these actions.
I am still attempting to bring the bothers from Africa. I will send the trusted ones.
Note: in case one of the African brothers or others needs traveling documents from Guinea, Liberia, Ivory Coast or even sierra Leon I am ready to do that for any brother who wants to travel or bring them official endorsement from here to the visa and customs in an easy way.

Page 6 of 13:
In the name of Allah The Most Gracious, The Most Merciful

Praise Allah The Lord of The Universe.

( TN: The rest of the page is empty)

Page 7of 13::

Arabic and Islamic greetings:

The honorable brother Abu Abd-Allah, may Allah protect him
We arrived at Nairobi safely. The trip was good. We tried to go to mendira or to louq by the same plane but we could not because this needs a permission from the Kenyan government. Brother Tariq has the details.
Some events took place in the area. The American forces sent two armored cars to Louq area and met with the Somali brothers to inform them about a meeting that will take place between the commanders who are present in Somalia along with the UN officials and the relief in Louq.

Page 8 of 13

Steps:
- Louq
- Basic weight
- Sabuti for the Ugayin
- Shorten the time by more training, and by establishing more centers during three months.
- Supplyies road
- Having relations with Ugadin tribes

Linguist: TS

- Storing quantities of food and ammunition
- The airport
- Coordination with Al-Afar and Al-Aromo
- Strengthen the relations with Hagi Muhammad.

Page 9 of 13
( A letter from Saif Al- Islam
date: March 19, 1993., Gharshifut, Ugadin
To: Brother Othman)

In the name of Allah, the most Gracious, the most merciful

Brother Othman

( Greetings)
Thank Allah. We arrived at Al-Qaeda in 23 Ramadan. All brothers are o.k. and send you their greetings hoping to see you soon.
I am sending a report concerning the events that took place :
- After twenty three days we covered 415km on foot till we reached the place the brothers selected for us to be a center for Al-Qaeda. It is located in a place full of trees inside a forest . We found an open space where about 600 person have been living there in a camp called (Ghar Shaighut) The forest mountain.
- The food is modest and consists of wheat cooked in water like the rice in addition to corn flour soup. There is no rice and the milk is rare due to the dryness these days. A sheep is killed for us from time to time.

Page 10 of 13:
( Continue- A letter)

- Of course the camp resources .are equal to nothing
- The weapons they have are limited. The majority of it do not exist except the light of it.
- The ammunitions also are limited and used only for defense. It is not sufficient for the training programs. Therefore a new quantity has to be purchased. It is available in the surrounding villages at a reasonable price- 555 shilling for the klashinkov up to 20,000 for RPG.
- There was no furniture except some sheets. No plastic to protect from the rain.and no ammunition dump.
- The camels and three mules were the only transportation means. It takes 8 hours to reach the closest village (called graisly) to purchase the basic food items, and two days to the closest city (garbo) walking. There is a plan to extend the road from graisly to the camp in RER AMADEN area.

Linguist: TS

- Of course all the brothers arrived from the direction of Louq. Most of them walked 500km or more in Ramadan. They became real weak and therefore we postponed the training period to Shawal in order to be able to fast, complete the preparation of the program and to change the place to a better one.
- When I arrived I met with the brother in charge of the region (Abd- Al- Salam Othman Abd –Al-Salam) and brother Mustafa Arab, the military chief and the following discussion took place
-
- Page 11 of 13(continue):

- I inquired about their knowledge of our presence, and our role. They said that they contacted you to send a training group to train the brothers here. They did not mention any other commitment on your side. They inquired of the possibility that they have control over all matters- political, administrative and military. I told them that the political, administrative and daawi matters are their responsibility because they the natives who are more knowledgeable in this sphere, but for the military matters, it has two sides, the training and the fighting. We can handle all the training activities. As for the fighting, we do not organize any operations except by groups we trained. Therefore the matter needs patience without rushing. Thank Allah, the enemy is weak now, and escaping any confrontation. This is a good opportunity to collect the weapons, intensify training and preparation. We can organize the forces in battalions and squadrons and keep them stationed along the supply routes and around the base. They agreed with me.
- I proposed to them to change the camp place, and started making tours in the surrounding area. We selected a place surrounded by the mountain and the trees, and the land is suitable for setting up the tents beside digging tunnels in the mountain.
- Since digging tunnels requires a lot of time, we decided to buy 50 tents big enough to house the personnel of the first squadron, the administration and the warehouse in such a manner that the first training seminar can be conducted. At the same time another group start digging the tunnels.
- The members of the first seminar will be 160 in addition to similar number will be present in the same place for digging operations, guarding and service. The rest of the 600 will be assigned at the roads, villages and cities in the vicinity to act as advanced detachments for mobile defense system to prevent the enemy from taking us by surprise.

Page 12 of 13:

- In conclusion the camp start from nothing, and in need of every thing- food, car, ammunitions and weapons.

An important note:

- I did not promise them by any thing as we agreed on. Every thing needed I asked them to provide it. On their side they did not demand any thing. It appears that

they have some money to the point they think of stocking some food and ammunitions sufficient for six months. However, there is some thing very important deserve full attention. The brothers attempt to gain the friendship of the surrounding tribes. This is a good step and real important , but this requires special budget to offer them some services to avoid the repetition of the problem of the Somali brothers. Also it should be done quickly.

- In conclution, The camp needs the following:
- Page 13:

- Are you going to provide for the training camp only? Every individual will cost $1.5 daily- $45 monthly. Therefore the camp force (30) will cost $13,500 per month. Total food budget for three months = 13,500 x 3= $40,500.
- The cost of ammunitions: klashinkof shots = $12,500 (2000 shots x $0.5 )
- The cost of RPG (120 X $4) = $ 480
- The explosions = $500
- Rounds for other weapons = $5,000
- Other supplies and equipment = $5,000
- The minimum total cost = $ 64,000

In addition to the above we need badly a truck and two pick-up at least or two trucks and one pick-up double.

- if you are going to provide for the whole group (600 persons), the total cost every three months will equal (600x $130,000) at the minimum. This does not cover the administration, media, and the tribes expenses.

- Note: attached is a list of the brothers needs. Please bring them whatever you can.

- May Allah reward you. Peace upon you.

- Saif Al-Islam (unclear)

- Friday 19 March 1993.

- Gharshifut, Ugadin

- The end

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Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800639
Title: A Quick Review of the Current Political Situation
Author: Unknown
Date: Unknown
Length: 4 pages

## Synopsis

The author discusses Aideed's ascendancy in Somali, attacks against the US and UN, and the situation among the brothers in other regions in the Horn of Africa.

## Key Themes

The author writes to Abu Abdalla, Abu Obaida, and unnamed others, and gives a situation report for operations in the Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia.

Aideed has large amounts of support in the region. The Ali Mahdi coalition is thinking of allying with him, while the main opposition coalition is fracturing. The UN, for its part, has moved out of Mogadishu in order to support anti-Aideed factions via money and humanitarian aid. Even so, Aideed has become a hero to those looking for an effective leader, and he can overcome opposition in Mogadishu and Kemayo. As for Islamic Unity, they are apparently requesting people in Jeddo, and continue training in Mogadishu.

After a missing page, the document picks up with a list of attacks in Somalia. American and UN forces have suffered a number of casualties due to attacks. The Americans are afraid, and asked Aideed's forces to investigate, but Aideed denies any wrongdoing. Aideed's group called Sheikh Abdulla Sahal, threatened his followers, and began looking for the brothers in order to stop the attacks. There will be a discussion about security even though there are only five brothers, led by Abu Ahamd Al Masri.

As for Dubli, Saif is trying to get there to assess the situation. The brothers tried only one failed RPG attack against a UN helicopter. In Ojadeen, the brothers have arrived safely. Sheikh Abdulla Omar asked for engineers, but none are available right now. There is nothing new to report in Jeddo.

In the Name of God, the Most Merciful and Gracious

Blessing to the almighty God and prayers to his Prophet and his followers:

Dear Brother Abu Abdalla, May God protect you
Dear Brother Abu Obaida, May God protect you
Dear Brothers, May God protect you all

Peace be upon you and mercy / blessing of Allah be upon you all:

I pray to God to be all in good conditions. Our greetings to all brothers at your end.

**A quick review of the current political situation:**

1. Mr. Aideed has the huge regional support. He is trying to take advantage of this support to get a new supporter from Ali Mahdi the twelve coalitions.

Many signs of success to these movements have appeared which is committed by the help of Kenyan and Ethiopian presidents. Many divisions have appeared within the major opposition tribal parties against Aideed. The following schedule shows the forms of these new coalitions.

| Ali Mahdi Coalition | | Aideed Coalition | | Tribal |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Leadership | Party | Leadership | Party | |
| 1. Ali Mahdi | USC | Aideed | USC | Al Hawiye |
| 2. Mohamad Abshar | SSDF | Abdalla Yousef | SSDF | Al Darod Majirten |
| 3. Adam Jaber | SPM | Omar Jess | SPM | Al Ojadeen |
| 4. Omar Haji | SNF | Jali | SNF | Om AL Hurman |
| 5. Abdul Qader Zuba | SDM | Ali Alewa | SDM | Rahawayen |

2. United Nations is considered the bitter enemy to Aideed. UN made a decision to transfer its headquarters from Mogadishu in addition to the humanitarian organizations that belong to the UN. The UN concentrates on supporting the opposition parties to Aideed outside Mogadishu. Also using the financial support and humanitarian (food and medicine) to isolate Aideed and getting the support of parties that support Aideed outside Mogadishu and connecting that with the financial and humanitarian support.

3. In spite of that we can say that Aideed became a local hero even among those who hate him as a result of his previous work against their tribes. Aideed is considered the first candidate to take care of business in Somalia.

4. About having a tribal fighting, it is possible especially in two areas Mogadishu and Kemayo. Aideed can overcome his opposition in these two areas.

5. Regarding the Islamic Unity, there is nothing new visible, but requesting 100 trained people to Jeddo area and continue some training in Mogadishu.

**********PAGE 3 is MISSING**********

3. Blowing up a car belongs to American Forces which killed 8 people. The operation was not announced and a 13 KG explosive was used.

4. The following day of this operation another 8 KG explosive attached to one of the American cars and was exploded. The damage is not known.

5. Blowing up a UN car. Damage is not known (Botsiana Soldiers).
6. An attack on a group of UN and 3 people were killed a 4 wounded. These operations were not announced by any broadcasts. There is a complete evaluation to any operations committed against American Forces.

As a result to previous operations, there is a fear among the American Forces and they called some of Aideed's officials and held them responsible for these operations. But they denied that and the American Forces asked them to investigate the situation.

Aideed followers started to call the leadership unity and Sheikh Abdulla Sahal and threaten them. The response of the brothers was positive and they will continue in operations.
Sheikh Abdulla Sahal went to see the brothers and told them that the search is intensified to find their location and they are determined to stop the operations against American Forces. He asked the brothers to discontinue their relationship with disassociated brothers from Sheikh Abdulla and demanded the need to leave Mogadishu within a week.

In God's willing there will be a discussion and a decision to be made regarding special security situation with the brothers despite there are only (5) brothers who are headed by brother Abu Ahamd AL MASRI.

**Situation in Dubli**

There is nothing new here and brother Saif is trying to go there since 10 days ago. He might arrive within the next day or two to assess the situation completely.

No operations have been done except for one against a UN helicopter patrolling the beach. The brothers tried to hit it twice by RPG but failed. (The shot that does not hit the target makes the impact)

**Situation in Ojadeen**

Brothers have arrived safely and thank God for that and we don't have any engineer to send there at this time. Sheikh Abdulla Omar called me and I told him that we will send somebody to him in the near future because we don't have engineers at this time.

**Situation in Jeddo**

There is nothing new except for the Somali brothers who are doing the training and we are trying to send brothers to you to have a vacation ….INCOMPLTE END OF FILE…

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800640
Author: Omar Taj Al Dein Bin Abdullah "Abu Belal" and others
Title: Abu Belal's Report on Jihad in Somalia
Date: Unknown
Length: 10 pages

## Synopsis

Omar Taj Al Dein Bin Abdullah "Abu Belal" and possibly others describe the jihad situation in Somalia, an ambush against allied forces, the problems faced by the local movements, and what is needed for jihad.

## Key Themes

The first section of the document appears to be a highly fragmented letter from Omar Taj Al Dein Bin Abdullah "Abu Belal" and possibly others describing the jihad situation in Somalia, and updating the recipient on the organization's activities.

Jihad in Somalia was started by the youth without any planning or coordination, against the advice of shura councils outside of Somalia. America is getting closer, and there is a danger of the money being misspent. Now is not the time for jihad, but for da'wa (prosletyzation). Each member of the movement is still too attached to his tribe rather than Islam. As a result, the Executive Council should participate, and military operations need to be planned. Military forces are apparently not up to standards, and information is spotty. 'Abdu Rahman in Djibouti is mentioned several times as being involved.

The next several pages describe a battle. The author was in a caravan that stopped in a potentially hostile area against his advice. The enemy then ambushed them, and the author (called "Muhammad" by one of the soldiers) took charge. The ambushed forces successfully prevented the enemy from encircling them, cut off the enemy's routes, and deployed an anti-tank force to protect them [the author provides a map]. Eleven 'Muslims' and about fifty enemy soldiers died. The author's allies want to return by the same way they had come, but the author told them not to make the same mistake twice. Instead, they returned a different way, and faced a confrontation with local Somalis that failed to escalate.

The author mentions that he is sending Abu Salman with more details, and asks for money for expenses. He proposes setting up a company in (Baru?) region to support operations in Ogaden. Preferably the office will be led by a Somali, and will not cost too much. It is possible to buy very cheap weapons. The author also mentions a split among the ranks of the Al-Wadi Company [probably a specific jihad group], Al-Cabal Company, and Al-Ittihad Company.

There are a number of positive aspects of the Al-Sharika movement, notably the large numbers of members, and the mutual respect the members have, but they need to organize military forces, and representative councils. In terms of negative aspects, the movement is not prepared for jihad. In terms of willingness to engage in jihad, ability to gain the support of the Somali people, ability to train young people, and authority of the leaders, the movement is still lacking. In general, the movement's leaders have not successfully coordinated jihad, da'wa, and other religious work, do not court outside opinions when necessary, and simultaneously seem to have no desire for jihad, yet a certain amount of impatience and agitation.

Finally, the author wants to know about the disposition of the enemy, both external, and internal groups that are against a foreign presence.

The last section is possibly unrelated to the beginning of the document. A number of tribes would like to regain authority from the Hawi tribe. There is only one Muslim group in the area. It has a camp in "Bu Saso" where brothers who left Afghanistan train recruits. There are also a large number of Muslim youths in Mogadishu belonging to a number of different movements. The 'brotherhood' and Al-Ittihad apparently have camps in the city itself. The author asks for mujahidin brothers to supervise the intellectual aspects of the movements, and a coordination and communication center that will connect and strengthen the youths, and the unity of the people in order to carry out jihad.

Northern Somalia is controlled by the Somali National Movement, which refuses to join the rest of Somalia. There are two Islamic movements, the Islamic Union, and the Unity movement, but neither has been able to establish camps.

(T.C. The document is incoherent, not in order, the handwriting is unclear to say the least).
The document is also divided into two unrelated parts.

**Part one:**

***Page 1 of 30 pages**

These are the news that we have, so what are the news that you have.
From your son: Omar Taj Al Dein Bin Abdullah "Abu Belal"

Signature
1620 / 1129

*** Page 2 of 30 pages**
(Missing)

*** Page 3 of 30 pages**

(T.C. First part is unclear)
6- When the movement is sure of the role that was played by Abdullah Yousef and others for the occupation of the nation and the Somali people. Despite that the Somalis are not welling to kill this heretic o his likes to avoid the confrontation with the tribes
7- As you know the Jihad started without planning or coordination. The movement started by the youth in the movement ( Military Council) opposing the Shoura Council all over the world in Al Emarates, Saudi, and others. This continued in the beginning.

***Page 4 of 30 pages**

And the provinces and inviting people to worship Allah, as well as warning them from any future threat.(second line unintelligible). …America and others and to get closer to the tribes (lines 4, 5 and 6 unintelligible.)….The money belongs to the people and it is not government's money knowing that there is no government….(unintelligible).

I sat down with brother Abderrahman and brother Abdelkader with the Emeer of the Movement and we discussed this decision. We came to a conclusion, but he says that Al-jihad is stages and this is no time for fighting but doing Da'wa (inviting people to worshiping Allah). As regards to fighting it will take place after planning (unintelligible.)

***Page 5 of 30 pages**
First three lines are unintelligible.

11. The nature of the Jihad operation and unity of the movement is very independent as long as it is headed by the Shura (advisory)…(unintelligible)…all of the Somali people are Muslims. As I stated, that each member of the movement is fanatically attached to his

tribe, with only some of them informed. I say that the Jihad operation and the movement must be tied to two conditions:
First, participation of the Executive Council of the Movement with half of its members.
Second:

1. The acceptance of military operations completely.
2. Planning
3. The use of military forces
4. Choosing military leaders.
5. The movement in charge of military training.
6. And others…(unintelligible)

13. As you know dear brother, that we moved to the region Houri (?) and then we headed toward the Hunfatouk (?) region. From there we divided the troops between the Baru' (?) and Bin 'Anoud (?) and the Ogadeen region.

*** Page 6 of 30 pages**

The beginning the first line is unintelligible…the line ends with…
…their nation and homes. Brother 'ABDULLAH SAMI was with brother 'ABDU RAHMAN and brother (unintelligible) in BENTALOUF (?) region and (unintelligible)...the mountainous region and DARIB(?) region.
(Beginning of the line unintelligible)…the deployed groups (unintelligible) and these matters were proposed to brother 'ABDU RAHMAN in Djibouti where he will contact you according to what brother KHALIFA BIN NAIROBI mentioned.
Importantly, the troop movements – many observations can made in this regard:

1. The vehicles available are not to standards.
2. The provisions are in abundance.
3. The tires are in bad condition.
4. (unintelligible)
5. Not knowing the way to Djibouti
6. (unintelligible)
7. (unintelligible)
8. Djibouti…using (unintelligible) with the lack of a good and sharp guide of the region.
9. Not accepting the participation in military decision making...(unintelligible).

*** Page 7 of 30 pages**

While we were crossing the area (unintelligible) by the tribes, I was saying to the leader of Caravan that the road is dangerous (unintelligible) let us choose another road, and he was saying that all these tribes here are Somalis and are sympathetic to us (unintelligible)…..1413H (unintelligible) as we arrived to an area (unintelligible) away from one of the tribes by about 15 km.
Then, the leader of the marching group gave orders to stop for a break and to have lunch and drink tea. I told him this is a big mistake, you are in the enemy's area, continue

marching without stopping and provide the brothers with dates. We have about one and half day remaining to complete our march. And then he said: “Thais it.” Then, I responded: “I submit to your order.”
We stayed and set the fire and we prayed Dhuhr and Assr. And we got the vehicles ready to go (unintelligible) to secure and survey, meanwhile the rest of the vehicles were ready to move (unintelligible)… At that time one of the brothers came running and yelling the enemy has arrived, the brother then panicked and rushed away from the cars and the enemy begun firing. The leader of the group came to me and asked: “O Mohammed advise me, what should I do.” I told him, first of all give the order

*** Page 8 of 30 pages**
for the vehicles to move toward the West (unintelligible) …toward the South…and organize the brothers (unintelligible) We followed the brothers’ path at first toward the East where the enemy is located, and I followed them. I noticed that the enemy (unintelligible)…North as it is explained in graph number 9 and I realized that the enemy was trying to besiege the northern area. I took four brothers with me to prevent the encirclement and to impose that on the enemy. I went back to the eastern area and organized the brothers for a defensive deployment, I then went to the leader and gave an order to secure the road and cut the enemy from passing. Later, we deployed an anti-tank unit with a protecting force; as a result we were successful, thank God.
At that point, (unintelligible) we decided to take a strategic action against the enemy (unintelligible) …to close the North-East front. But there was (unintelligible) to execute the plan, and at the sunset the enemy had ceased firing (unintelligible) and Allah’s triumph was achieved, praise be to Allah.
As a result, 11 Muslim soldiers were killed due to mistakes made during the battle. We consider them Martyrs.

***Page 9 of 30**


The area of the enemy's deployment
Cutting the chance for enemy's
Vehicles massing
For enemy's descent


The area of the enemy's deployment
Cutting the chance for enemy's
Vehicles massing
For enemy's descent

*** Page 10 of 30 pages**

Twelve were lightly wounded, praise to Allah. According to information we received, about 50 soldiers from the infidels were killed; the majority of them were (unintelligible). Few of them fled the area and their whereabouts was not known. Knowing that the enemy forces number was 60 only.
We have noticed some of the enemy's dead bodies were decayed corpses. The brothers discussed among themselves the way of returning after this; some of them suggested that we take the same road and others proposed to continue the same way, knowing that our direction was from East to West.
Then, I joined the discussion without asking their permission, because they were making decision without consulting with us in certain matters. Therefore, I realized that it necessary to participate in the decision-making process. I told them that when they insisted on going back the same way they came, that "this is a grave mistake, do not treat a mistake by making a mistake."

***Page 11 of 30 pages**

If there were a faster way which will enable us to return cautiously (unintelligible)… Praise to Allah one of the men knew another way, which we followed (unintelligible)…most importantly, a man from the movement came from inside Ogadeen and informed us that the enemy is preparing an ambush for us. And he said I will show another way to exit this area. We succeeded in exiting and returned to the Somali liberated land. As soon as we arrived, the tribes moved against us and wanted to expel us from land that is a property of (Al-dardureein) (?) And praise be to Allah, the war that the Secularists want to ignite did not take place... (unintelligible)… Our military consists of 200 (?) soldiers. (unintelligible)…The military situation (unintelligible)….
Observation: I sent brother Abu Salman (?) to inform you in details about the matter because he was present during the battle and is considered one of the best young men, and he was an advisor once to the Emir of the Jihad Office

***Page 12 of 30 pages**

former Sheikh (unintelligible)….Please inform the group and ask his help once you get there and about the planning and decision making previously (unintelligible)…With respect to me, I am now the (Baruu) (?)region (unintelligible)….until the soldiers are ready, we will move to Ogadeen.
15- individuals// Dear brother Othman as I am in Baruu region (?) as I told you before. I am at your command.

Observation: I ask Allah and ask you to send a $6,000.00 (?) if possible, knowing that the amount that was sent to me before was sufficient in covering our needs for a certain period. But I decided to ask for this amount in order to cover all the personal, economic, and family needs in the future. And Allah knows (unintelligible)….God bless you. … (Unintelligible).

***Page 13 of 30 pages**

We need your point of view. I propose that our company will participate in opening a special office in (Baruu) (?) region to cover and organize future operations in Ogadeen. (Unintelligible)…And receiving the incoming youth from and to Somalia and the Ogadeen (unintelligible)… from Djibouti and (Baruu) (?) and vice versa, and if that is suitable (unintelligible)…And preferably that one of the Somali brothers will supervise this office and participate commercial operations of this office. It will be preferred if the commercial operations are both international and local.
(Unintelligible)…In Somalia (unintelligible) and to register a private car under the supervision of the office (unintelligible)….Knowing that the office will not require an expensive amount about (1.2000, 000 million (?), $3,000.00 (?), from $2,500.00 to $3,000.00 (unintelligible). And this matter is important.
Will it be possible to buy weapons and ammunition? It is very cheap.

*** Page 14 of 30 pages**

I purchased a new Russian revolver T.T. It is very, very good, by about 150 dollars or 600,000 Somali Shelen, about 265.00 Djibouti francs (unintelligible.)

17- Dear brother (unintelligible) ….regarding your suggestions about what you read in this profound report (unintelligible) and on what I proposed in future operation in the Ogadeen region (unintelligible)….After the conclusion of the meeting with Al-Wadi Company, especially after 11/4/1413 H.
Knowing that I heard that representatives from the Al-Ittihad Company had moved and warned Al-Wadi Company from dealing with The Al-Cabal Company from dealing with them in Ogadeen (unintelligible)….This is considered a reason in their split in their ranks, as they said (unintelligible)….
Allah knows.

18- (Unintelligible) heading to Sheik Hassan Abu Maryam and Sheikh Ibn Omar Abderrahman, and what took place between them and us on (date unintelligible) at Al-Wadi Company.

*** Page 15 of 30 pages**

**The positive aspects of the movements**

1- The mutual respect
2- The desire of the union elements (Al Sharika)
3- The truthful nature between individuals of the Al Shrika
4- Establishing the consulting councils to discuss the different important issues. We mean here the councils to represent the whole area not only AL Sharika.
5- Organize the military. Group F/S/ K/ LO
6- Acknowledge the dire need for the military expert

7- The large number of the members of Al Sharika.

*** Page 16 of 30 pages**
(Ill. Part)

and a branch --- that needs leadership, both ideologically and educational
(T.C. The rest of the page is ill.)

*** page 17 of 30 pages**
**The negative aspects of the union (Al Sharika) (T.C. Sharika means the company).**

1- Does not understand the importance of the geographic area.
2- The union (AL Sharika) is not prepared to face the Somalia people, and tel them about the grave dangers the world is preparing for them.
3- The temporary refusal of the union (AL Sharika) to start the Jihad.
4- Does not raise the young people in the union (AL Sharika) to understand the movement political principles.
5- (T.C. Ill.)
6- The lake of authority of the emir on the managerial or military level because of the control of the Shoura council.

***page 18 of 30 pages**

7- The fundamentalist ideology of the Shoura council and the Islamic brand of democracy and decision making.
8- No coordination between Islamic Shareaa "Islamic Law" and Fiqh "Interpretation of the Islamic texts" and the Political condition that influence the decision making.
9- There is no well power in the movement to cut the enticers from our midst, such as the other groups that fight Islam.
10- Lake of patience and calm among the individuals of the organization in the leadership or the members.
11- There is no true desire in the leadership

***Page 19 of 30 pages**

The continuation of Jihad against the infidel nations
12- The lake of coordination in the religious work and between the Jihad and D'aawa. Jihad should be postponed. Jihad is different phases.
13- The lake of secrecy in the movement in the managerial and military issues.
14- The absence of Islamic council, and the lake of the other opinion that does not belong to the union despite their need to this union.

15- Leave it, it is rotten "tribalism".
16- The division of the unity to tow branches. The first branch envision the jihad, therefore they have high priority for the military leadership and management

*** Pages 20 of 30 pages**

**Information regarding the enemy:**

- Number of enemy forces and nationalities
- Force distribution and expected dropping locations
- What are the equipment and arms used by the enemy and the method of use.
- Describe some of the battles against the enemy from the tactical and weaponry aspects.
- Enemy movements and his security precautions.
- Was explosive mines used, and who used it.
- Was there a major confrontation or battle
- Was helicopters used
- What are the airports used by the enemy internally and externally
- What are the buildings used by the enemy internally and externally

**The internal enemy:**

- What are the internal groups, their numbers, their weapons, and their locations.
- Which group is cooperating with the foreign enemy.
- Are there any internal groups against any foreign presence
- What are the names of the most known leaders of the internal groups that opposes the foreign presence.
- Is there any remarkable influence to any of these groups on the public

**Land**

As following:
- The volume of the forces
- Level of their weapons
- Their locations
- Their weapons, equipment, tools, etc.
- What are the modes of :
  1- communications, transportation, medical affairs, psychological warfare, supply routs.

**Part 2:**

**TC. the document has water marks that completely erased the upper and lower parts of all pages. Only the middle part of the pages could be translated**

*** Page 1 of 4**
The tribes that was mistreated in Syad Beris days to revenge from this tribe. This tribes have also armed fronts such as SPM and SSDF in addition to a movement headed by Berri. These movements has its own power ambitions, and would like to

regain the authority from the "Hawia" tribe, which got rid of the ex-president Syad Berri.

The Islamic movement in the area:

1- There only one non-disputed group in control, the union
**2-** The Islamic movement have a camp in the area "Bu Saso"
**3-** Indoctoronate this camp and the other camps in the country with the Jihad by the brothers who left Aghanistan. There are differences in the opinions between the heads of the camps and the leaders of the different movements.

**Suggested solutions.**

*** Page 2 of 4**

There are a large number of Moslem young people from this clan in the capital city who belong to the following movements:

1- The Islamic union
2- The Islah Movement (The Islamic brotherhood)
3- The Shaikh clan (belong to the family of sheikh Mohamad Moaalem.
4- Few individuals from the union (Al Wheda).

B- There are several camps for the brotherhood and Al Etehad movements in the capital based on the recent reports.

**Suggested Solutions**
Send some well known Mujahedeen brothers to supervise and to mediate between the intellectual movements to form a wide Moslem front……
And the leadership ……. Shaerif Abd Noor.

*** Page 3 of 4**
in the future …..from the vacuum that existed ….
To the revolution and the uprising of the people. It is a must to mix with the people and identify with their pain and suffering and share their happiness.

Finally we need to establish a coordination and communications center to connect the youth in the different areas in and out of the country. It is important to strengthen the unity between the people. This is very important in Jihad.

Note:
The difference in opinions between the brotherhood and the fundamentalists is not as bad as some who lived the progress of the Islamic movement in Egypt lead us to believe. From the doctrine aspect for example, the two movements are considered fundamentalists ….

….. the movement between the tribes leads to stress

The tribe of Ishaq control the northern parts of the country through the Somali National movement SNM. These parts of the country enjoys a relative calm. This part declared its session from Somalia, based on the desire of its people, they refuse to join Somalia under any circumstances, because of the oppression they suffered under the deposed dictator Seyad Berri.who is originally from the south. Some tribes ruled other tribes because of that.

The condition of the Islamic movement in the area:

1- There are two movements in the area, in addition to few number of followers of a third movement.
    - A- The Islamic union (fundamentalists)
    - B- Unity movement (brotherhood)
2- There are no camps in the area, there was no opportunity to do so.

Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800641
Title: "Political Difficulties that Face the Organizations Representing Islamic Nationalists in Ethiopia" and "Brief Report on Current Events in Ethiopia"
Author: Unknown
Date: Unknown
Length: 7 pages
NB: The pages in the document are not in order. The document itself is translated poorly, and is incomplete.

## Synopsis

The author describes the previous problems, the current challenges, and the future opportunities for Muslims and the organizations posed by the transitional government in Ethiopia.

## Key Themes

The current regime in power in Ethiopia (Al Dargh) has some flexibility, and provides more political opportunities to Muslim nationalities in Ethiopia than previous regimes did. Unfortunately, Muslim nationalist organizations were often not in a position to take advantage of these opportunities. The population was in many cases stopped from economic production, and discriminated against for opportunities (which were given to non-Muslim organizations). In addition conflict was increased among different nationalities, journalists' opportunities were limited, and education and organizational opportunities were curtailed after the author's organization moved in.

With that said, opportunities for Muslim now exist.

1. Muslim nationalists were able to take control of their own areas.
2. Some Muslim nationalist organizations were able to return and contact their populations.
3. International Islamic organizations were allowed into Ethiopia.
4. Muslims are enthusiastic.
5. The youth of Ethiopia are eager to hear about Islam.

The author makes seven suggestions to improve the situation of Muslim organizations in Ethiopia:

1. Conducting a study of the reasons for the weakening of Muslim nationalists.
2. Having an urgent meeting among the region's group to resolve problems.
3. Taking advantage of the opportunities for political participation offered by the transitional government.
4. Providing the political and financial knowledge to take advantage of the opportunities, given a three month time limit.
5. Raising the leadership standards of the Islamic organizations.
6. Pressuring the president of the Islamic front to accept the opportunities.

Elsewhere, the author makes more detailed suggestions.

1. Conduct a conference to deal with the Islamic front's internal divisions.
2. Try to find unity among the various factions.
3. Try to coordinate among Somali and Oromi organizations to confront Islam's enemies.
4. Take advantage of current opportunities by acknowledging that the Christians of Ethiopia are merely a ship floating in a sea of the rising Muslim population, establishing political parties that represent all Muslims, and financially supporting media outlets to prepare Muslim psychologically.
5. Resolve problems with the transitional government to avoid war.

6. Raise the economic and educational level of local Muslims.

The author also provides a report on current events in Ethiopia. He expresses astonishment that the Ethiopian government was previously overthrown by such puny means. The new transitional government's extension of opportunities to Muslims, namely the right to rule themselves, participate in the government, and broadcast their own media, is welcome, but it is ultimately a deceptive plot.

The author describes Islamic nationalities in Ethiopia, including the Oromo (who have 3 Islamic organizations, and 2 non-Muslim ones), the Ofar, Somalis, the Bani Shangool, and the Adra.

Expected dangers involve a betrayal by non-Muslims, who could deprive Muslim organizations of their military and political gains following the elections if they choose military confrontation.

In the Name of God the most Merciful and Gracious

**Political Difficulties that Face the Organizations Representing Islamic Nationalists in Ethiopia**

If we go back a little bit to compare the situations and conditions that faced Moslems during the era of Hila Sillas. We can't compare it with the next in general, which we mean during the regime (Al Dargh) which has some flexibility and openness regarding Moslems compared to the previous situation of oppression, violations, and prohibition from practicing rights and freedom. These previous political authorities have practiced that against Moslem Nationalists and especially Oromo nationalist which represent about 65% of Ethiopian population.

We see from this new regime some better characteristics for Moslems than previous regimes. But the educational and political levels of Moslems was not at the level to benefit from positives which distinguished that period on one hand and the political pressure for not having opportunities to all organizations that represent Moslems from different nationalities which presenting the area as an Islamic form and for its importance on the other hand.

The most important tribes or major nationalities are people that belong to Islam about 85% in Horait Ororjet. This nationality was violated and many abuses were practiced against their people for the following reasons:

1. A study of the reasons of weakening Moslems nationalist in Ethiopia in general and weakening Moslems tribes within the Oromo nation.

2. Having an urgent meeting between the nations of HOLL to find suitable solutions regarding negativities in the area.

3. Putting efforts to take advantage of the opportunities which are still existing and taking advantage of the new government agreement to enroll political movements which participated during transitional government or to enroll new political parties to be established now. The main goal of what we say is not to leave the political opportunities and leaving our supporters with nothing.

4. Providing the necessary requirements to take advantage of this opportunity in spite of having all political personnel knowledgeable or financial facilitation with the knowledge that new opportunity has a 3 month time limit at most.

5. Putting suitable plans to raise the standard of organizational leaderships which represent the oppressed Moslem nationalists and to understand the political situation that surround them and practice their missions with an understanding that match the dangers that face them.

6. Putting a pressure on the president of Islamic front to accept some politicians' suggestions which see tenacity in opinions is wasting more of the existing opportunities and to accept dialog to find solutions or an alternative which affect this organization.

4. Stopping most population of this area from production.
5. Remaining all opportunities to non Moslems organizations in Oraya.
6. Increasing events and oscillation from the accommodation among different nationalities especially Somalians and Oramian on the artificial borders in nationalists' areas.
7. Limiting the journalist opportunities which were available in forms of broadcasting means in the current government.
8. Stopping the educational and organizational opportunities among Moslems permanently after we established offices and the center.

**Current Opportunities available for Moslems**

1. Moslems' nationalistic changes were able to control the areas and removing the Amheriat Christian nationalistic from the ruling Moslem regions. This is an important factor to Moslems where they took advantage of that and united among themselves.
2. Some organizations representing Moslems tribes were able to return to their regions and contact the population.
3. International Islamic organizations were able to open their offices in Ethiopia and work in Moslem regions. This was not accepted in the past eras.
4. A high feeling to Moslems and their enthusiasm to stand with slogans to spread Islam with full freedom offered from the transitional government.
5. The openness of young people and youths to accept Islamic preaching and their desire to learn about religion in all regions in Ethiopia.

**Suggestions to Deal with Current Situations in the Regions**

1. Conducting a conference to deal with all internal disagreements in the Islamic front which breaking its organization and for reasons of weakness the foundations and its means regarding war.
2. Trying to find unity between Islamic front, Oromo Abu, and the organization that represent Waqo.
3. Trying to find coordination among organizations that represent all Moslems' regions, the Somali and Oromi organizations especially for not having a tribal conflict among these nationalities to miss opportunities with the enemy of Moslems.

**2. Ofar Nationalistic (Dankal)**
It is a 100% Islamic nationality and has its own language. They live along the beach of Red Sea and distributed among Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Eritrea. It strategic location and number about 2 millions people represented by Ofar liberation front headed by Sultan Ali MAKRAH.

**3. Somali Nationalities**
Some of them live in Ethiopia. There are several tribes like Wagadeen, Essa tribe; Wagda, Bursi, Wahaweyat, and they are represented by different Somali fronts.

**4. Bani Shangool Tribe**
It is a nationality that lives on the southern Sudanese border with Ethiopia in the State and region ORMI and they speak Arabic and have one local dialect. They are represented by the liberation front of Bani Shangool.

**5. Adra Nationality**
It is a small nationality which existing in two cities Herrodas Abya. It is a Moslem nationalistic 100% and its members are highly educated and most of them are merchants and numbered by thousands.

**6.** There are other nationalities most of them are Moslems and other are Christians like Garagi nationalistic.

**Expected Dangers**
The current situation facing the region requires that Moslems to acknowledge the danger of the Crusaders plans and that appear in the following:

A. When the role of fronts which have interest in the Islamic orient before the election, and assured other non Moslems fronts that people will choose these fronts? After that they initiated to involve these fronts to face military confrontation and destroy them on one hand and to prohibit them from election on the other hand in order to loose their political and military gains.
B. Some of leadership of these fronts could not realize the danger of the situation and chosen the difficult choice which is the military confrontation which led to the following negativities:

1. Total loss of military fronts to their political and military gains.
2. The Islamic region representing these fronts to be a war zones which will not have elections and impossible to have developing projects and humanitarian organizations…….INCOMPLETE PARAGRAPH.

In the Name of Allah the most merciful and Gracious

**Brief Report on Current Events in Ethiopia**

The changes that took place in Ethiopia are a milestone that never happened before in a long time ago which Christian nationalistic was ruling the countries since taking it by the support of western countries in the 18th century when the Islamic Emirates fell which are known by "Memalek Al Teraz Al Islami."

It is astonishing to the mature human being who is following the events during 1991 in Ethiopia which led to destruction of a half million man army and has all military equipment to destroy most of neighboring countries in a short period of time against a smaller force in number and machines. But believer realizes that Allah almighty is only destroy that force as well as the previous centuries of oppressors who violated people and committed evils on earth. This is the judgment of Allah (GOD) against the oppressors and will not find a substitute to that.

That oppress force has gone and followed by the current new transitional government which seemed to learned lessons from previous government in this country and the world. This government has decided for the first time in Ethiopian modern history for the Islamic nationalities to participate in governing and decided to give them self determination.

Also decided to opposition Islamic fronts the right to participate in election in Islamic states and allowed Moslems to have preaching their religion by using different broadcasting systems. It also allowed Islamic nationalities to rule their own regions according to their tradition, customs and heritage with our knowledge that this is their deceiving game. God almighty said: "Christian and Jews will not approve you until you follow their religions."

**Islamic Nationalities**

1. Oromo Nationality: It represent 2/3 of the Ethiopian populations of 52 millions and about 85% of their people are Moslems and represented by 5 fronts. 3of them are Islamic and 2 are non Islamic and headed by educated Christians Oroma who were raised by the missionaries and they have financial and humanitarian capabilities.

2. Ofar Nationality

*Page 6 of 7 MG

1. TBELF -The population front to liberation ??
2. OBDO – Democratic organization for Oromi nation.
3. -----Democracy for Amhara.
4. -----Organization for the free officers. Amhara
5. ABRDF-Democratic organization for ????

(4) Working to take advantage of existing opportunities and preparation for future political opportunities especially the opportunity to form political parties in the countries to prevent weak role of Moslems again and the following factors must be taken into account:

A. The knowledge that organizations and entities that rule the countries know that countries are dominated by Christian's group and confrontation among them has no deep roots. They are riding a ship in a Moslems sea in which their number is increasing far more the Christians. This will make them think about returning backward to confirm control and limit employment opportunities.
B. The political existing entities are considered built on the foundation of racism and don't use Islamic work strategy here before the build up of obstacles among Moslems. The opportunities to form political parties in the countries will give an opportunity to Moslems to kill these obstacles and help them to make political parties that represent all Moslems without discriminating among them.
C. This needs a psychological preparation with media, journalism and publishing magazines to serve them. All of these require some financial support to make it happen. Also the communication coordination with people in charge and other Moslems from other nationalities and regions is part of the political work at the current time and this needs allocating armed members for that and the poverty in the countries prevents that. Money plays an important role to achieve that or not.

(5) An attempt to solve the problems existing with the transitional government peacefully and to avoid military choice which will only cause more destruction in the shadow of unbalanced forces and lack of preparation to achieve the goals of military work.

(6) An attention in the areas of educational and development to raise the level of Moslems which is deteriorating in poverty and ignorance.

Repeated information about Ofar nationalities listed in the previous page.

Doc ID: AFGP-2003-001293H
Author: Al-Wali
Title: Meeting Notes and a Letter from Al-Wali
Date: Unknown
Length: 1 page

## Synopsis

The document consists of notes or the agenda from a meeting on the situation in the Horn of Africa, and a letter from Al-Wali on training.

## Key Themes

The first part of the document appears to be either notes from a meeting, or the agenda for a meeting. The meeting apparently revolves around the relationship with Sheik Hassan, the military situation in Kismayo, the disposition of al-Qaeda operatives in the region, especially Ogaden.

In the section part, Al-Wali writes a letter to Maurib, in which he suggests to Maurib that he arrange for two hours off every day for training for the Arab brothers. Yusif Jan Muhammad Ahmed is never to compete with the Afghans, although training is fine.

AFGP-2003-001293H

[Translator Comment: single letters are given in SATTS (a transliteration standard). Illegible words that can be contextually derived are placed within brackets. Those which can not be determined within the realm of reasonable plausibility are given in the following format: "[xM]", where "x" represents the number of words missing, when known. Translator comments will hitherto be placed within brackets and are preceded with the abbreviated "TC:"]

[TC: The following numbered items are all checked-off with the exception of numbers 6 and 8. The number "5" is repeated.]

1) Assurance that Sheik Hassan and his comrades have control of the area
2) The military situation in the area
3) The situation in Kissmayo [for Aby Aideed]
4) The relationship [with] Sheik [Hassan] and [1M]
5) The relationship of the brothers in Ogaden and the extent of their presence in the region
5) The situation in the region Balad Hawa and its surroundings; and the situation of Muhammad Hajji Yusif
6) The [number] of residents in Kamboni and its surroundings; the [relief] organization
7) The [agreement] with Sheik Hassan on sending a group to [2M] headquarters work
8) The agreement with brother Assi and his associates to say in the region [as a front] for the brothers
9) The situation of [2M]
10) [3M]

[TC: Page break, new document, same handwriting but different pen]

To brother [Maurib],

[TC: Islamic greetings]

We hope that you are organizing your time to give the Arab brothers two hours off from work each day to give them very specialized and beneficial lessons. The training will be in a special place [2M]. We also want you to forbid participation of the Arab brother Yusif Jan Muhammad Ahmed in competition with the Afghans for reasons we know of. Just general training is enough, and he is to never participate in the competitions.

Your brother,

Al-Wali

Doc ID: ISGQ-2005-00024493
Author: Unknown
Title: Iraqi Intelligence Service reports on Al-Qa`ida Threats in Djibouti
Date: September-October 2001
Length: 8 pages

## Synopsis

The Djibouti station of the Iraqi Intelligence Service reports on threats by Al-Qaeda to blow up foreign companies in Djibouti, and on the activities of Islamist groups in Djibouti and Somaliland.

## Key Themes

23 August 2001 – This is the report indicating that Al-Qaeda has made threats against foreign companies (some of which contain Jewish members) for cooperating with the US.

25 August 2001 -- Al-Qaeda has delivered messages in Arabic and French, signed by Osama bin Laden, that threaten to blow up certain foreign companies in Djibouti at the end of August unless they cease cooperating with the US. In response, the French military has increased its security around its military hospital, and air and naval bases, and the US embassy has built fortifications. The Djibouti government is concerned about the blow to investment that such threats could entail.

1 September 2001 – The previous report is reiterated in a slightly different form.

6 September 2001 -- The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) orders the Djibouti station to follow up on certain reports.

25 October 2001 – The Djibouti station responds. The Al-Tabligh and Al-Da'wah groups are active in Djibouti – twelve members were arrested, but were released for lack of evidence. According to the Libyan Charge d'Affaires, most of the members of the groups' cell, which is headquartered at 'Uthman bin 'Affan mosque in Djibouti and led by Ahmad Tahir 'Umar, are Arabs. The Libyan government is monitoring the group due to the presence of Libyans. There is a camp in Ber'u in Somaliland where Arabs of various nationalities (but no Iraqis) receive 'professional' training in weapons and forgery. The camp is run by the Al-Qaeda-related Al-Jihad Organization, headed by Ibrahim Hasan Sultan.

**ISGQ-2005-00024493**
**Full translation of pages 2-8**

**<u>Page 2</u>**

**Presidency of the Republic**
**Intelligence Service**

(Translator's Comment (TC): Handwritten note on the top left of the page that reads "*Djibouti*")

(Translator's Comment (TC): Handwritten note in the middle of the page that reads "*Djibouti*")

In The Name of God the Most Merciful, Most Compassionate

Secret letter

And Urgent

**From: Intelligence**
**To: Djibouti**
Reference: (SATTS D1)/4/2/15
Date: 06 September 2001

In reference to your letter number 38 on 25 August 2001(.) Please follow up the subject and provide us with the information you gathered about it (.) Send it by mail and not through encrypted message.

(Translator's Comment (TC): handwritten notes in the middle of the page that reads "*Intelligence Service, 2001*", *Embassy of the Republic of Iraq* "*Djibouti*", "*Fawzi, Date 5/9*", "*Date 6/9*", *Sabbar, Date 6/9*)

Signature: (TC: Signature)
Title: Director of the 1st Department
Date: 06 September 2001

Receipt time: (TC: seal of the Director Office-Iraqi Intelligence Service-Al-Basrah)
Delivery time:

In The Name of God, the Most Merciful, Most Compassionate

(TC: Crest of the Republic)

**Ambassade De La Republique D'Irak**
**Embassy of the Republic of Iraq**
**In Djibouti**
**P.O Box 1983**
**2nd Information Analysis and Researches Department**
Reference: 1/2/153
Date: 25 October 2001

To: 2nd Information Analysis and Researches Department
Subject: Threatening messages and Muslims' activities

In reference to your telegram 15 on 06 September 2001

1. What we told you is not a high-level secret as the Djiboutian Security Forces arrested many people especially Muslims and from Al-Tabligh and Al-Da'wah Group, as the arrested from them are around 12 people, then they were released for not proving anything against them. In addition, this news that spread between people, should not go through ciphers in order not be snooped. Additionally, this news should not lose its importance in the time the country lived bad situation because of the increase of indignation and the public resentment.
2. In context with this, I knew from the Libyan Charge D'affaires concerning the Muslims' activity about the existence of a cell from Al-Tabligh and Al-Da'wah Movements. Most of them are Arabs; it occupied 'Uthman Bin 'Affan Mosque in 26th Street Headquarters; they are two Algerians, two Lebanese, Sudani, and the head (Amir) of the group called Ahmad Tahir 'Umar, a merchant and who is Djiboutian nationality.
3. Also, the aforementioned told me that Tripoli is following up on the movements of Muslims especially the Libyans, and an officer from the Libyan Intelligence came for this issue and stayed for nearly two weeks here after his return from Mogadishu and Somali Land because of the existence of a large number of them in Somali Land.
4. I questioned the Libyan Consul about the same subject in the excuse of existence of Iraqi Muslims in Somali Land to not irritate him. He answered that Muslims have a camp in Ber'u City in Somali Land, it is the second city after Hargeysa, and they do professional training and possess new devices and equipment for different kinds of forgery documents. They are from different Arab nationalities (Syrians, Saudis, Sudanese, Egyptians, Yemenis and Libyans) and the number of Libyans is around 60 people. The Head of group that called (Amir) Ibrahim Hasan Sultan (Abu Sulayman) from Al-Jihad Organization, related to Al-Qa'ida… …Organization for Osama Bin Laden. He mentioned there is no Iraqi between them.

For acknowledgment
Best regards

(TC: Signature)
Director of 2nd Information Analysis and Researches Department

(TC: Handwritten note on the right bottom of the page that reads "*Mr. Ra'id please, Signature, Date 12 November*")

In The Name of God the Most Merciful, Most Compassionate

**Presidency of the Republic**
**Intelligence Service**

To: The General Director of the 4th Directorate
Subject: Information

Please be acknowledged on the following information that came to us from Djibouti Station:

1. Messages, written in Arabic and French languages, signed by Osama Bin Laden, had been delivered to more than one foreign company in Djibouti, Indian Chinese Bank that Managed by Moroccan Jewish and (Shell and Total) Companies. Whom were threatened with explosions, warning and requesting them to stop any co-operation with Americans or it will execute its threats at the end of August.
2. Those threats raised the authorities' fears and it made fortifications and intensified observation in the port.
3. The French troops in Djibouti took strict security precautions around the French Military Hospital, which received those injured from the USS Cole Destroyer incident and on its air and naval bases, and the American Embassy made invincible fortifications around its building.
4. The Djiboutian Government feel anxious for that, because this threat will prevent foreign investors and capital which were expected to enter the country after the signing the last peace treaty. Djiboutian Intelligence alluded that the Arab youth in the country stand behind these letters.

For acknowledgement … Best regards

(TC Signature)
Director 1st Department
01 September 2001
(TC: Handwritten note on the right bottom that reads "*followed up by mail and not by telegrams, Signature, Date 2/9*")
(TC: Handwritten note on the right bottom that reads "*Tariq, Date 1/9*")
(TC: Handwritten note on the right bottom that reads "*Tariq take necessary action, Signature, Date 3/9*")
(TC: Handwritten note on the middle bottom that reads "*4th Section, Signature, Date 3/9*")
(TC: Handwritten note on the middle bottom that reads "*Hafiz, Date 1/9*")

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(TC: Handwritten note on the left bottom of the page that reads "*7441*")

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Letter form
Cipher

From: Djibouti
To: 2nd Section/4th Division/1st Department/4th Directorate
Reference: 38
Date: 25 August 2001

Threatening messages in Arabic and translated into French were sent and signed by (Osama Bin Laden) to more than one foreign company here including Indian Chinese Bank, which managed by French Jewish from Moroccan origins (Anklada) and to Shell and Total Companies, in which some members affiliated with Mosad (Israeli Intelligence) are working in. They are requesting those companies to stop co-operation with Americans. In addition, they threatened to explode them in the end of the current month August. This frightened the authorities, and it made fortifications and detailed observation for the port. The French troops took severe security precautions around the French Military Hospital, which received the Cole Destroyer injured people previously and on the air and naval bases. The American Embassy made invincible fortifications. Djiboutian Intelligence noticed that the letters written inside Djibouti and done by Arab youth in an attempt to minimize worries. The government feels worry, since this will prevent the foreign investors and the capital inflow from coming after the signature of the last peace treaty.

Signature: (TC Signature)
Title: Cipher of the 1st Directorate
Date: 25 August 2001
Receipt time:
Delivery time:
(TC: Handwritten note on the middle bottom of the page that reads "*Time 11.00*")

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs**
**The Minister's Office**
**(Communication)**
Reference: 67
Issuance date: 23 August 2001
Receipt date: 23 August 2001
Receipt time:

Top secret and urgent telegram From Iraq In Djibouti Page (1)

Threatening letters in Arabic and signed by Osama Bin Laden were sent to more than one foreign company and bank in Djibouti, in which some Jewish members work in, and requested that they stop co-operating with the Americans or it will be exposed for explosions. This caused panic and horror for the authorities that took severe security procedures around the port, the French Forces took the same procedure around its bases, and troops and the American Embassy made invincible fortifications. End.

(TC: Handwritten note on the middle top of the page that reads "*(SATTS D1/4)*" possibly 1st Department of 4th Directorate)
(TC: Signature, Date 25/8, Time 1400)