Planning: Guerrilla warfare, Urban conflict, Conventional War.
Funding: Spoils, Foreign projects, expenditures by merchants and benefactors
Individuals: Muhajirin (TC: Foreign Fighters) and State Supporters (Old and new Muhajirin, cadre, fighters and suicide bombers)
The case of cadre and martyrs between 1427-1428 Hijri (TC: 2006- 2007)
As Allah opened the doors of heavens Iraq, Muslims rose from all over the world to defend their religion and to defend the Muslim's honor, due to their knowledge of their Jihadist obligations and the necessity of supporting Muslims. So they started migrating to the border areas and crossing the land of Jihad until Allah bestowed upon them great conquests that demolished the crusaders and broke their fierce campaigns against the Muslims in Fallujah, al-Qa'im, and Ramadi. Then the parties started to join forces, and as a result, the Islamic State ceased to receive ordinary fighters who filled the land of Jihad with them. And so for the quality of the battle that is waged, the state was forced to receive migrants, trained fighters, and martyrs due to the necessity borne by the numerous enemies, few supporters, ferocity of the enemy, and the withdrawal of the tribes.
The key reasons that caused this pressure on the brothers are:

1. Through the last four years, crusaders learned from their mistakes.

2. Reliance on creating ordeals within the Mujahidin by tempting some factions to fight against the Islamic State with the direction of the Shiites.

3. Pressure that was placed on ordinary Sunnis as a result of the killings and random arrests of their children and by demolishing their homes. All these acts were a result of their cooperation or their sympathy with the Mujahidin. And this led to Sunnis feeling that the Mujahidin were the biggest reason for their misfortunes and tribulations, especially with the presence of the traitors and the hypocrites, due to the desire of many to receive the Mujahidin and help them.

4. The fierce media campaign led by America, and the traitors on the Islamic State of Iraq, was due to the absence of full empowerment of the State. It created clashes between groups by encouraging groups to participate in the Iraqi elections as well as to join the Iraqi security forces.

5. Crusaders depended on their last card in Iraq and after all their excuses and methods failed to end the battle. There is a campaign of ignorance led by the Father of Ignorance – Pharaoh of the State (TC: Possibly Head of the Iraqi State). That is what the US is currently carrying out by forcing the Sunnis to apostasy and by closing the doors of religious work due to high living costs and unemployment and opening the doors for corruption and immorality among youth and girls which will lead them to work with military and security under the proxy government and under the slogans of building a democratic
Iraq and fighting the Takfiris (TC: Those who claim non-followers are infidels). They will distort their images and call to moral decay and disintegration through opening the nests of prostitution, alcohol, materialism, outward beauty, and immodesty. All these calls are not as influential as the non-Muslim call that the US is leading by exploiting the tribes both financially and through strategic importance. And by the need to expel

End Page

Page 4

the Takfiris and avenge their sons who were massacred at the hands of Mujahidin by using methods of intimidation and motivation. The Islamic State of Iraq is faced with an extraordinary crisis, especially in al-Anbar; and this difficult stage forced the leadership, as I believe, to reduce the entry of Muhajirin for many reasons, most notably the withdrawal of tribal support and the difficulty Muhajirin faced in moving about due to their inability to communicate in the Iraqi dialect. The Muhajirin avoided carrying arms and explosive belts as a result of the abundance of traitors and apostates in many states, especially al-Anbar. Another reason was the lack of shelter in the cities, due to the concerns of good citizens of the consequences of receiving Mujahidin and the fate of their families. In addition, the cities and sectors were already saturated with supporters and as a result, they no longer received new Muhajirin unless they were suicide bombers or cadre.

The decision to not receive any Muhajirin, unless he was a suicide bomber or cadre, reached the coordinators working in the border areas. Then the sequence of events began to unravel slowly with each disbursement of new Mujahidin showing the extent of errors and its effects on the Islamic State. The leadership faced the consequences and criticism. We discovered that many of those who coordinated the entry into Iraq are of two types: either Muhajirin who never experienced Jihad before or those who closely watched the situation and crisis in Iraq, such as Abu-Jalal al-Jaza’iri - may his soul rest in peace. Our brother remained inside Syria nearly six months working as a coordinator for Iraq by introducing the Muhajirin to the land of Jihad even though he did not enter Iraq during the period in which he served.

The second type is those supporters who mostly fled to Syria with the excuse that the war launched by America and its allied tribes placed the fighter’s name on the wanted list and were known to the tribes. And so he could not work for the fear of being arrested by the defectors. Hence, to not miss the virtue of the Jihad, he thought of exiting to Syria where safety, refrigeration, modern cars and doing his job of coordination for the brothers would save him from the call for the battle. This is what many of al-Salman tribe in Hasibah were doing after the second battle of al-Khissah at al-Qa'im and were forced to abandon their homes and flee for Syria. We knew from their parents and relatives in Iraq about their escape. They escaped without formal approval from the State which did not approve of
their stay in Syria and they were warned by Heads of Sectors regarding their decision to flee without formal approval from the State.

We discovered that this type of supporter, who works as a coordinator for entering the land of the Jihad, does not possess any religious restraint or fear of Allah, as represented by either their decision to escape from battle or to remain behind with the disabled or incapable fighters without proper permission from the State to do so. They are similar to the candle which gives light for people while burning itself, and as the one who can give out of nothing. And that is what happened to the coordinators who did not have the chance to taste the sweetness of Jihad and live under the sounds of guns and machine guns and who exaggerate the risks of Jihad and keep the Muhajirin from the land of Jihad. These are the people who obscure the true information that our Muhajirin brothers needed to know about the land of Jihad and do not mention the daily victories and clashes of the brothers and the presence of underground institutions and shelters at every location and the training courses offered in every sector,

**End Page**

**Page 5**

helping the brother develop his work and by telling supportive stories and exaggerating the good situation. All this is affirmed by the CDs that are shown to the brothers thinking that Jihad in Iraq is a different type of jihad, with the brothers having total control and the US is incapable of moving out from its bases for the fear of the Mujahidin.

In general, the brothers eradicated apostasy from its roots, but specifically, most of the Muhajirin were told by the coordinating supporters that each one can select his own target operation of martyrdom, which would contain not less than 20 or 30 infidels. They are told that the operation of martyrdom is an operation of exasperation, without properly clarifying the Shari’ah laws that are related to the operation of martyrdom. And so, they injected in the minds of many of them that these operations cannot be carried out unless directed by the Greater State. And that the brothers are anxiously awaiting martyrdom and the military action is dependent on this blessed operation. And then they pointed out the selection of the target is made by the martyr, whether it is carried out on Apostates or Americans. Whenever the brothers enter the land of Jihad they will be placed in a specific location (guest house) for the martyrs that has things such as elevated religious atmosphere to ask Allah for forgiveness, CDs, fiery speeches by the Sheikhs and the imams of Jihad. And the operation that will be carried out is similar to the operation of Palestine hotel and Mount Lebanon. After all this, they told the trained fighter that the situation in Iraq is a dream for every brother who wants to give what he has to Islam, and that the brothers have complete control on the cities and that the brothers need new ideas for dealing with the enemy.

Most of the fighters in Iraq are well-trained, experienced, professionals with high qualifications. The State is ready to secure all the needs such as weapons, chemicals, and sports equipment for training in camps that are scattered throughout Iraq. Everyone’s skills will be used in practical application in the land
of Jihad whether it is at the level of chemical, electronics, computer field, or level of higher security in coordination with the smugglers, liaisons with the weapons black market, or even at the level of sports, religion and military.

The moment a brother meets the group at the borders, and sits with them, the group will ask him to surrender any amount of money and belongings he has on his person. Then they take his money and belongings under the pretext of security. They then tell him that the brothers in the Islamic state will secure all his needs and he does not need his money; hence, the brother is forced, out of modesty, to give all that he owns.

The moment the Mujahid enters the land of Jihad, he will be faced with a series of transitions, particularly those who enter into al-Anbar, and who are selected to go to the western region. Those new brothers will be sent from one location to another and from one tent to another. Also, the new brother will be handed over from one brother to another and will stay on this schedule for at least a week, under the pretext of the unavailability of someone who can be responsible for him. At the beginning of their arrival, they are placed in a dreary, peculiar desert and forced to live with rough Arabs who probably never prayed to Allah but who are only hospitable because the guests are also Arabs. The new brother will stay at this peculiar location until he reaches one of the guest houses of the brothers where he will be shocked with the realities of the lack of work and idleness at the camps in the desert where people are idle for several months. And without…

Page 6

and suitable goals for the thoughts of the suicide bomber that was brought with him from outside the land of Jihad. Additionally, this person is not able to meet his immediate Emir during which he witnesses the problems of the military brothers. His operation has been postponed for months while he lives in a violent atmosphere of the fighter brothers and their issues because of their inactivity. He lives without having a military Emir to lead them and conduct their operations inside the cities. After a month of waiting and being discharged from his faith, the suicide bomber will be notified that his mission is coming soon with God’s will and with God’s permission, relief is coming. The brother's hope will be refreshed, but he starts hearing stories and episodes of previous suicide bombers who carried out their attacks in the air or against walls. He hears also that the brothers will be sending him to an easy target that can be dealt with by a security or military operation. One of the brothers will inform the suicide bomber that the target will be against two police cars or one of the apostate leaders; as result, his morale will deteriorate as he was hoping to cause huge damage to the apostate group, and devilish thoughts and depression crawls to his heart. The problem will increase when he hears about more suicide bombers who were captured while carrying out their operations, since the car did not explode or as a result of failure of the booby trapped vehicle.

The brother decides to transfer from suicide bomber to fighter, but his request will be rejected by some Emirs, as it is considered the State’s decision, they have no authority
to transfer him to a fighter. The suicide bomber then returns to his country or he will be obliged to accept the status quo and choose any target on which to execute. The brothers in charge will loosen up and deliver him to a new military brother to choose his target, but the suicide bomber cannot enter the city, either due to lack of road security, or that the Emir has inaccurate information. A disorder can take place and the suicide bomber cannot reach his target and he will be surrounded and will execute in the air, God help him.

As for the cadre brother who is staying for a month, struggling and suffering from requirements and needs; he will have an impotent mental status and disappointment, his qualification will decrease and disappear because of depression and lack of help. The problem will increase when he is prevented from moving to another sector, with the excuse that his sector needs him the most, and the State’s regulation, which prevents the transfer of a brother from one sector to another. In addition, there is danger caused by the checkpoints on the roads. The general condition in Iraq is just like the West. Either the brother will decide to go back to his country alleging that he will be searching for another frontier or he stays patient with the reality he lives in until he receives the assurances.

Most of Cadre who came to the West were not utilized correctly which caused mental impotency for the following reasons:

1- The media images outside Iraq and the propaganda are far different from reality in the land of Jihad (TC: Iraq).

2- Most of the Sector Emirs prefer to keep their cadre within their sectors to utilize them in the future, so the cadre will have a role in the future.

3- There is limited exploitation of the cadres by some of the Emirs or tasking the cadre with a task that is not appropriate with his specialty.

4- Subduing most of the cadres and limiting their authority; alleging that it is interfering with the Emirs’ authorities and it is considered a lack of confidence in the State. Additionally, preventing the cadres from contacting the General State to avoid complaint against the Emirs. The cadres are also prevented from making allegations, saying that the cadres do not know the reality in Iraq is different, and they cannot move without the supporters and without weapons.

**End Page**

Page 7

They do not know the language or the large number of Shiites. Many cadres are requesting to return back to their countries in order to conduct the operation on other fronts due to the presence of obstacles in Iraq.

5. The lack of Military Emirs, who are familiar with cadres’ specialties or cadres having better military skills, specialty and efficiency, leads to many cadres who feel restrained and incapable of performing the job or conducting the operation,
due to the incapability of the Emir, either for lack of experience or incompetence as a leader of the State.

And to emphasize these points with practical examples; we have lived in al-Anbar State (The West) during a whole year, and hereby we provide some of the many examples such as the cadres who entered the West and suffered by facing what we previously stated as the painful reality:

1. Abu-Muhjan al-Masri, who’s name is Muhammad, was born and raised in Italy and is an Italian Citizen. He specializes in the computer field, also he was an athlete, lifts weights and participates in track and field. His height is 190 cm, and his favorite weapon is the PKC, he used to carry it during the brothers’ training and run with it as a machine gun and this brother is proficient in many languages. He has special talents in calling for and recruiting for jihad and has good behavior. He has strong communication skills with people, also he has good connections outside Iraq with counterfeiters. He brought a counterfeit $100 USD bill which the Emir was unable to detect as counterfeited. Abu-Muhjan al-Masri suggested to the Emir to establish contacts in order to make more counterfeited money available; however, his request was denied because the Emir of that sector was not in need of money at that time. This brother suffered, as well as the other cadres, from sitting and not doing anything. Therefore, Abu-Muhjan al-Masri, requested from his Emir, Abu-Musa al-Fahdawi, May God accepts him, to be transferred to another sector. His request was denied. Abu-Muhjan al-Masri stayed at al-Husaybah villages surrounding al-Jazirah area for 5 months, without participating in any military activity except the raid on a Shiite house, where he was wounded in his hand. After he healed from his injury, Abu-Muhjan al-Masri requested again to be actively engaged, but his request was denied, and his situation was not changed until he decided to return to Syria, from where he intended to go to Lebanon to work with Fatah al-Islam Group. During that critical time, he was staying in a village, al-Bubiyyah Village, known for harboring Mujahidin. It was known to all that he didn’t want to stay over night in that village; however, one of the Emirs instructed him to stay in the village. They were surrounded by the Americans and the apostates after dawn prayer. Abu-Muhjan al-Masri fought until he was killed by a sniper’s bullet on 7 NOV 2006, God have mercy on his soul.

2. Abu-‘Abdallah al-Shammari was an Algerian of Eritrean origin. Abu-‘Abdallah al-Shammari was raised in the land of Jihad since his childhood. He started the Jihad in Eritrea, his home, when he was 16 years old. Abu-‘Abdallah al-Shammari moved to Afghanistan to receive training in the training camps and to gain experience in weapons and weapon manufacturing. Abu-‘Abdallah al-Shammari then traveled to Iraq at the beginning of the downfall (TC: The regime) and moved between Fallujah and al-Qa’im to Hadithah; however, he stayed in the outskirts of Hadithah without any military operation for almost one year. This cadre was not used except in few cases and the funny thing is that he was arrested four times by the Americans and Shites without them recognizing that he was an immigrant. In the outskirts of Hadithah, he was surrounded with a brother (Abu-Salih al-Shar’i) and they were killed in fighting after he spent 11 years in Jihad, May God accept him among martyrs.

** End Page **
3. Abu-‘Azzam al-Jaza’iri has high resolve, astonishing character, love and a helping hand for his brothers. He lived as a youth in western countries, moving from Italy to the U.S and Canada. Al-Jaza’iri speaks languages, he was skillful in dangerous sports such as Get Kindo and Caliphene, and he worked as a trainer for these sports in Canada. The first sport depends on street fighting and deals with fatal kicks and it is a modified version of Kung Fu; the second sport depends on fighting with knives, the stick and the sword. In addition to all these talents, al-Jaza’iri was a skilled cook, as he worked in one of the restaurants in Canada. In addition to the recruiting technique he possesses, he also has high moral values, generosity, good sense of humor and modesty. This brother entered Iraq ten months ago and is still in the western area sitting in its desert patiently, May God Save him. We ask you to transfer him to the cities that need these cadres, especially in security operations such as kidnapping and assassinations, etc.

These are the most prominent cases, which I became personally familiar with as I saw the tragedy. I witnessed these cases besides other people or other individuals that I was not familiar with.

As to the martyrs (TC: used to describe suicide bombers), the matter was more difficult. Some of them were sent back to their countries and returned after being approved as a fighter, and they either managed to obtain an approval from the Emir changing his status to a fighter, or agreed to carry out an operation but he didn’t succeed, either for choosing the wrong target and for weak intelligence around the place due to negligence of the Emir in studying the desired target, or because he was killed before reaching the city due to the unavailability of a reconnaissance vehicle and watching the road. We will mention the main reasons which led suicide bombers to lapse and change their status to fighters or return back to their countries:

1. Most of the Emirs are being doctrinaires by adopting martyr techniques and depending completely on that to keep their sectors actively operating due to lack of the true fighters or the inefficiency of the Emir in planning. Despite the abundance of Shiite targets, both the crusaders and the Shiites fortify themselves in any way possible to prevent these operations by having concrete barriers, sands and reducing personnel at checkpoints.

2. The Emirs took exclusive possession of the martyrs by making them stay in their respective sectors for up to a six month period, which resulted in losing their desire in the martyr operation and thus every martyr thinks about either returning or changing their status to fighters. They also do not transfer martyrs to another sector which is in need of them.

3. Many of the martyrs were shocked by the actual nature of the suicide operations, as most of them believed that their sacrifice is the ultimate objective without knowing the Shari’ah Laws. In addition to that they lack knowledge and associate with those who discourage. “Listening to people with problems can demolish mountains.” (TC: Proverb)
4. The enormous difference between the foreign media and the actual fact on the ground

** End Page **
5. Emirs are not taking into consideration the psychological side of the martyr by dealing with him in a rough military way, not authorizing him to choose targets, and notifying him before the execution of the operation by one day or only a few hours and refusing to elevate his morale status.

6. The arrival of martyrs into the land of jihad in large numbers and receiving of them by Emirs without preparing them well with plans, or the need to hit enemy targets. They are thus disregarding the significance of the martyr operation by making him feel that his Emir is indifferent about selecting the right target, either due to the operation being delayed or due to the lack of existing targets. They thus prevent the martyr from transferring to another sector to carry out a certain operation.

7. Many of the martyrs were not given the military preparedness and basic training to use a weapon, under the pretext that he is a martyr and does not need to learn. Preventing them from leaving their places or going for a task out of the concern for their safety, knowing they did not carry out any tasks, nor transferring them to another sector.

8. Most of these martyrs were suffering from despair and hopelessness, for the delay of their operations, or not allowing them to be transferred to a different sector to carry out a martyr mission, and not engaging in any jihadi operation throughout their stay in the land of jihad. Therefore many have decided to go back to their homeland.

To emphasize these facts which I have experienced in the western sector, we give some examples, not to be limited to:

1. The martyrs that decided to go back to their homeland are (Abu-`Umar al-Jazrawi and Abu-Dhar al-Yamani). They stayed in their guest houses over a month until they were asked to go to town to carry out an operation against two police cars. After encountering the reality in Anbar and the Western Sector they decided to go back, for the reasons I already stated above, and were returned to their countries.

2. The martyrs (Abu-`Asim al-Yamani, and Abu-`Umar al-Jazrawi, who were killed right before entering al Qa’im town. This was despite the man in charge of handling their transportation (Abu-al-Harith al-Salmani), knew how dangerous the road was; he requested a PKC weapon for fear of clashing with the Shiites. His request was declined for lack of approval of their chief, Abu-Shahad al-Salmani, under the pretext that weapons are scarce. So, Abu-al-Harith left, saying if something happens to us we will not forgive Abu-Shahad. Later they were ambushed and four of them were killed.

3. As for the martyrs Abu-al-Miqdad al-Yamani and Abu-`Umar from al Jazirah ,who were waiting for months then carried out their operations without reaching their planned targets; it was rumored that these targets were destroyed completely, whereas the fact is Abu-al-Miqdad lost his way and was besieged by the Shiites and was
killed. Abu-`Umar was also killed as soon as he reached the concrete barriers. He detonated himself without causing any losses among the Shiites; this was reported by Basim who guided them to their targets.

** End Page **
4. The same scenario was repeated after two months with brother Khattab al-Jawfî who was tasked to carry out a mission against a group of Shiites inside al-Karablâh area by using an explosive belt. As soon as he approached them, he changed his mind and instead he went to a police station, and on his way he was surrounded and was killed.

5. One suicide bomber, Abu-`Ubaydah al-Maghribi, who is from Casablanca, was agitated by his sector Emirs, who kept him waiting seven months in an area located between the western area and al-Rutbah. Currently he is staying in al-Rutbah where he spent four months, he participated once or twice in military operations and, to my knowledge, he is still in al-Rutbah under Abu-`Ubaydah, the sector Emir.

This is what I was able to write about martyrs and staff and how much they suffered in their stay in the western sector (Jazirah or Shamiyah). Many reasons that prompted the martyrs to think of going back, causing their deaths, we have stated, and most of these individuals were from outside Iraq. Regarding that, the coordinators and the human smugglers on the border; many of these smugglers are demanding these new recruits to hand over their money and belongings before entering Iraq, and we mention a few examples: On 05 NOV 2006, three Moroccan suicide bombers entered Iraq they are Abu--al-Bara’, Abu--`Abdallah and Abu--Muhammed. During their stay with us they asked about the reason behind handing over their money to the smugglers where they took 150 Euros, three watches and a ring. The same thing happened to the bomber, Abu--`Asim ((AL-YAMANI)), where they took $ 130 and a Casio watch and glasses. These given examples happened to most of the bombers we met in the Gharbiyyah (TC: Western area). The last bomber was Abu--Bakr ((AL-JAWFI)), he was instructed by the coordinator al Jazrawi in Jazirat-al-`Arab that the people in charge of the border will ask you to hand over your money and not to give them all the money, in fact that has occurred to him, he refused to hand over all the money he was carrying.

As for the consequences that the immigrant brothers suffered despite being a cadre, a suicide bomber, or a fighter, as this was due to the negligence and living conditions. They are as follow:

1. The weaknesses of the jihadist doctrine, as most of the Muhajirin were controlled by their emotions without knowing the harsh reality of jihad.

2. Lack of religious Sharia knowledge and the right thinking in reality.

3. They are influenced by the media and propaganda and by CDs with high expectations.

4. The obstacles were not explained clearly to the mujahid due to the non-existence of religious scholars and because of the coordinator’s exaggeration about the land of jihad to boost their moral.

5. The mujahid has his own culture and traditions before entering Iraq whether they were influenced by bad religious scholars or by out-dated traditional customs, a weak religious motive, and in the presence of arrogant mentality of being forgiven by Allah, despite any guilt.
6- Because there is a lack of a godly role model, he is brought up in his environment not living according to the jihad movement which will cause him to be impatient, deaf to understanding, obedience, the general and specific laws of jihad, as well as misunderstanding Allah’s universal laws in dealing with His faithful believers.

7- There is a lack of lawful religious scholars inside the land of jihad who can explain the obstacles that the jihadist might face, as well as right action, which is the jihadist’s greatest accomplishment. Allah gives victory to those who suffer hardship.

8- There is a lack of interest in distributing the religious messages that explain the laws of jihad, especially suicide missions/martyrdom and the limitations of such, laws that protect, blood laws, and others regulations that are unknown by most of the state’s fighters.

9- The participation of some jihadist specialists, who after receiving training and when used effectively for creating opportunities abroad, could create international chaos, for example, our brothers who come from the West, from America or Europe. Or those who have an exceptional field of specialization that could be used in implementing chemical and qualitative media impact in the land of jihad.

This is about the Muhajirin brothers of both staff and suicide bombers. It is a priority not to pay special attention to the regular fighters, senior or new personnel, whose problems will be greater and harsher than the staff and the suicide bombers, since Iraq’s position is unlikely suitable for welcoming regular fighters. What is the mistake of many of the Muhajirin fighters in Iraq, especially the one in al-Anbar (al-Gharbiyyah) (TC: Western), who are sitting idle without being used even to make explosives or assigned within the sectors where mines are planted. They are becoming frustrated and incompetent from continually sitting idle and from remembering the repeated promises of glory for which many left their countries. For example, Abi ‘Asim al-Libi (TC: the Libyan) and Abi ‘Emir al-Suri (TC: the Syrian) left their countries looking to fight, as well as Abi ‘Ali al-Suri who decided to leave and was sent to a guesthouse in the middle of the desert until his tent was bombed and ended up getting killed along with others.

Summarizing the mentality of the Muhajirin in Western Anbar:

1- Either the muhajeer brother joined as staff and wasn’t appropriately used, neglected and ended up getting killed or he left and returned to his country of origin.

2- Or he joined to become a martyr and didn’t have the chance to achieve his goal for the lack of intelligence within the cities and because too many fighters drew the enemy’s attention, so he decided to return to his country or become a regular fighter instead.

3- Or he is an old fighter that was encouraged to join, and who was inspired by the condition that brothers are living in because of the number of apostates losing their military Emirs, and the capture of most of the cities and villages that were in the hands of the brothers. He is now confronted with two
options, either tolerate the situation, have patience and become a survivor forgetting the picture he had before he joined, or stay upset and keep complaining and critiquing.

** End Page**

Page 12

The situation is bound to get better in the future, despite of the recurring repression of some of the Emirs due to the lack of the brotherly harmony and the relationship between the leadership and the followers.

Obstacles that Muhajirin are facing in the presence of Ansar in the land of Rafidayn (TC: Iraq):

The obstacles facing the brother muhajeer in the land of Rafidayn are:

1- Lack of lawful understanding of the Muhajirin and al-Ansar terminology through the brotherhood, selflessness, sacrifice and victory because of the lack of lawful understanding of the true meaning of jihad and Islamic work for building the Caliphate.

2- The ideological and psychological organizational differences between the muhajeer and al-Ansari, since a lot have lived during an organizational period, experimental movement or specific coordination, whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, Arabian Peninsula or under the Western and Arab extremist dictatorship governments, where caution atmosphere, wishes and foreign work techniques were imposed on them, where a lot of them were and still are living within a limited frame of work and forced to live in an orderly and organized life, which caused the brothers to fall to ruin, whose lives in an open war, experience guerilla warfare which makes it impossible to work in an orderly fashion because of the changes of the conditions on the ground from one stage to another. For example, the problems of the tribes and those who infiltrate them and turn them off of jihad.

3- Cultures and environmental differences, in addition to dialects and customs that cause finding evil and causes for exploiting differences and qualities between the Muhajirin and al-Ansar, disdain for differences in opinions, arguments and exposing faults have all caused the revival of al-Jahiliyyah call (TC: the obscurity age) (Oh Ansar and Muhajirin.)

4- The Quran’s truth in relation to the difference in opinions and the will to fight in the battle of Uhud (TC: a battle that took place during the prophet Muhammad era) was the reason behind the disagreement, quarrel and defeat. God says: “Even if you lost or disagreed and became disobedient after, He showed you what you like, some of you like the world and some the eternity”. This is the only reason behind destruction of the strong bond between the Muhajirin and al-Ansar, when we saw groups of brothers getting hurt from the repeated calls for action because of the stagnancy of some and taking rest through the past four and a half years, where the bellows started showing what people are made of, some stood fast, some fell behind and some retreated, and there are still trials testing the Mujahidin like the crossing of dark night for the godly elite to remain. We’re asking God to help us to be one of them and to be steadfast, make our end better and not abandon us.
5- Difficulty of the muhajeer to stay inside the land of Rafidayn, especially within the residential areas because of the following: 1) Presence of agents and
2) Civilian supporters in some Governorates are afraid because of coercion and the renegade movement among the tribes and their oppression against the Mujahidin and their supporters. 3) muhajir’s improficiency of dialect (TC: Iraqi) along the absence from the Iraqi people’s media. 4) Showing the Muhajirin through an aggressive media campaign as terrorists and murderers that don’t give importance to the Arabic values, making sure they are spilling the Iraqi blood, pushing the Iraqis into sectarian and tribal war, and a lot of them are sent by services and renegade Arabic governments. 5) The Muhajirin are obviously falling short especially the one

Page 13

Of religious qualifications and the callers for jihad that need to carry the message to the people of Iraq explaining the truth of them coming to Iraq, the truth of their fight and that they are not targeting innocents, in fact what drove them to leave their own countries is to save honor, bring rights back, remove injustice and protect Iraqis from the Persians al-Safawiyin and secular Kurds that want the Iraqi Sunni people to suffer enslavement, displacement and mass killing. In addition, there is a lack of resolve with regard to al-Ansar and those who are fighting with the Mujahidin in the same trench because of the weak passion and brotherly relations between them.

6- It becomes clear that because of those reasons al-Ansar are not insisting on welcoming the Mujahidin and the need for them as before. As a definite result, al-Ansar imposed the following restrictions upon the Mujahidin:

1) al-Ansari is making sure to keep the mujahid at the outskirts of villages and deserts afraid of spies and apostates as well as there’s no one to accommodate him in the inside.
2) Most of the Mujahidin are non-proficient in the Iraqi dialect which is going to be the reason behind his capture and the fall between the hand of the Crusaders and the renegades.
3) Not to take any risk with the Mujahidin by sending them into battles with the apostates and the Crusaders under the pretext that Americans and apostates have military superiority on the ground.
4) The mujahid doesn’t know the cities’ entrances and exits, and how to move around and fight. al-Ansari will stay the mujahid’s eyes and ears.
5) al-Mujahid’s lack of knowledge about Iraq, the Iraqi people and how to behave will obviously undermine him through the entire military, security, specialties and religious aspects, and the series of overstepping and random behavior will start from this point, and that’s what we should be focusing on.
6) Some were hurt from the Muhajirin because of their repeated insistence on carrying out operations and going into battles against the infidels and their supporters, which caused embarrassment for some and started promising the Mujahidin in the name of the State (TC: the Islamic State) to carry out operations to the point that they won’t have time to rest. You start hearing promises without honoring them and clashes erupt between the true people of jihad and the one that love the world and fame, some start accusing the State and becoming disobedient and cause the loss of the best of the nation’s youth that want to bring victory to the religion of Allah, and infiltrators among the Mujahidin
will become the leech that sucks the water of life of Jihad under the pretext of giving advice to the State to get rid of the trouble makers.

7) The issue, in most Governorates, to work with al-Ansar in carrying inside jobs, whether administration, leadership or on just members and fighters (IED, sniper and management.)

8) Most of al-Ansar are afraid of moving around with al-muhaheer because of his lack of discipline in following their wishes to move around unarmed, leave unarmed, sleep in homes unarmed, entering and exiting the cities unarmed.

9) Repeating the State’s expressions of not welcoming Mujahidin unless they are staff or suicide bombers, since some of al-Ansar are very careful in dealing with them in their moves and carrying out missions. In return the Muhajirin remind al-Ansar of their favor in moving the wheel of Jihad and establishing its early bases of work and being proud of themselves for excelling in science, military or education disciplines.

10) The presence of a sort of Muhajirin coalitions that create friction with al-Ansar and vice versa, which weakens the passion and brotherly relations.

As far as al-Ansar brothers’ status and the problems they are suffering from in relation to their ideology, organizational and administration situation, and social status, it’s necessary to give the following introduction:

The Hadith of the prophet talks about what people are made of, he says: “Their choice in the al-Jahiliyyah is theirs in Islam if they understand.” Everyone knows the historical era of Iraq living under the rule of its tyrants, where the Ba’ath regime controlled all its aspects of life and caused suffering to its people, religion status went bad in the lack of godly people and the spread of bad Imams of the Ba’ath regime, living condition became bad because of series of wars and the crusader’s embargo and the people of Iraq was carried away off the world scene, ignorance and unemployment increased until the door became wide open for the jihad to this good people and Allah’s precious gift started to become popular. Allah was preparing his people for the Jihad to bring honor back to this nation and carry the banner of al-Tawhid (TC: Unity) over Baghdad like the old days, where people used to come from everywhere for education and wealth. People rose up to defend their religion, dignity and honor. al-Mujahidin al-Ansar joined and started fighting under the blessed banner which was the nucleus of the Islamic State of Iraq (TC: ISI), but some of the previous era’s sediments is still floating around with al-Ansar brothers’ ideologies and morals, where the past four years ravaging war didn’t allow all the brothers of al-Ansar to take advantage of religious education and learn about the essence of unity and the true meaning of fighting for “There’s no Allah but Allah,” and circumstances didn’t allow brothers to read, attend seminars and learn the religion fundamentals. The painful truth is that people are not all alike, some Allah prepared them for jihad, some for education, some are scholars and some in science. It’s rare to see someone who has it all. My brothers al-Ansar and al-Mujahidin should know the truth about our fight that is ideological and not tribal or national and they should learn about the ideology matters since it’s the foundation of standing fast on this
path. A lot of people were thrown into the renegade valleys because of their ignorance, and I was hurt seeing large number of al-Ansar brothers who are the elite of Mujahidin and the best of the nation not knowing the meaning and conditions of “There’s no Allah but Allah.”

** End Page **

Page 15

There is no God but Allah. Some do not know anything but al-Fatiha (TC: The first verse from Quran) and other prayers of protections while they memorize the jihadist movies and songs very well.

If this is the condition of the brother’s faith when he is worshiping God and asking for His mercy without clairvoyance it would be worthy for this generation not to be able to establish the wise Khilafah (TC: Islamic rule) following Prophet Muhammad’s way. How is he going to fight without a target?? And how he is going to continue without faith?? And how will he be patient and withstand all the troubles and divisions without the spirit of hope???

Regarding other type of learning, we notice those who were not knowledgeable before the fall (TC: With reference to Baghdad’s fall by the coalition forces) did not have the motive or desire to learn, with the exception of some who were in the Crusaders’ prisons, most of them are weak in reading and understanding the Quran. In addition to all that, there is a lack of other historic and worldly knowledge, in addition to the remaining tribal spirit of pride, and having unenlightened habits in dealing with women’s rights and referring to the tribe leader in peace and war issues.

This condition led the Iraqis to choose one of the two ways: either apostasy or jihad -- May God show them the right way of jihad. They should elect and obey their Emirs in good and bad, at ease and difficulties. The weakness in religious restraint and their belief in God observing them secretly and openly. They lacked the understanding of the true religious doctrine and instead, understand them as logos and photos. This caused doubts in the faith by the Ansaris (TC: supporters) as if he is worshipping God at an edge; if good things happen, he is fine, and if bad things happen, he is flipped over his face and lost this world and the other world (TC: Referring to the world after life), especially after facing jihad’s heavy costs and burdens (killing, capturing, fleeing). Most of them fled from the Land of Jihad (TC: Iraq) to other countries. And others stopped the jihad looking for comfort and means of income away from jihad’s heavy costs. Those who were fighting for a position and protection for their tribe were disclosed now. Only the faithful, patient Jihadists, yet lacking deep belief and culture, are the ones who resisted although they were surrounded from all sides and people shot at them by the same arrow, and were kicked out of their land and escaped to the desert and tents. They lost their parents, children, and loved ones. They had no other choice than to be patient and stable or retreat and go back.

The Mujahidin’s families were refugees in captivity. The Mujahidin’s family faced troubles and have to discuss this issue especially in al-Anbar and
particularly in (al-Ramadi and al-Gharbiyyah) as the Ansaris (TC: supporters) are facing huge administrative problems as there is a lack of assistance and an increased number of martyrs within their families. There are, captured and fleeing Mujahidin, who have no one but a merciful God. This hardship which Ansaris are going through caused depression and sadness and the feeling of hopelessness in improving their condition. Their desire to fight has been weakened as communications between them and the big Imirah (TC: Islamic state) has been weakened, in addition to the burdened Emirs who have responsibilities beyond their capabilities, with lack of supporters and increasing apostasy. The Mujahidin and Ansaris faced hardship and suffered. Most of the Ansars’ climbed the skulls of the martyrs to reach their worldly motives and some joined to make a living and work in administrative and technical field with no desire to carry a weapon or to face the Infidels and the Apostasy. Some where satisfied with pleasing the Emirs by conducting only one or two missions in his whole jihadist life and bragged about it in their private and public meetings

**End Page**

Page 16
Some considered the jihadist work as an additional duty, as he wanted to continue in his worldly life, and help the Mujahidin every once a while. You find one looking to get married again, the other one is thinking of feeding his children, deserting weapons and fighting. The third one is trying to evade the military burden and trying to be an administrator. As we notice in the last periods we experienced an increased numbers of the brothers who work with the technical and administration field, especially within the supporters, and this is a big disaster which should be treated and uprooted.

Regarding the issue of upgrading the brothers from soldiers to Emirs, conversation in this regard has dimensions, branches, and interference. We should concentrate on: We have to talk about the first stage when the Jihadist movement started at land of al-Rafidayn (TC: Land of Mesopotamia) and the way the groups and organizations were formed.

At the beginning of the fall, Iraq witnessed instability and insecurity. It was required by all faithful people of the Islamic movement to control the situation, especially by providing money and weapons, which is the main support for Jihad. Bilad al-Rafidayn (TC with reference to Mesopotamia) started to attract the cadres and the experts from all the Islamic movements and they all came up as parties and formed organizations depending on different foundations as (Salafists, Brotherhood (TC: Muslim Brotherhood), Sufis, and Ba’ath) and the most significant of these movement was al-Tawhid and Jihad Group which we are going to study and whom God helped by conducting blessed operations which shook the crusaders, which is lead by America, in more than one area in the world. The last operation was to free Fallujah from the dirt of the Crusaders and apostates and to control the city completely.
The favor comes from the first generation Jihadist participants who helped establish this blessed group on strong Salafi (TC: Salafi sector) foundations. Its leaders established the security, military, administration and Sharia system of the group. They attracted all the experts and qualifiers from abroad and met at that blessed city until the horrible attack on Fallujah took place. They attacked many of the leaders who led from the time of establishment until the time of attack, those were (Abu- Anas al-Shami), (Abu- Shahid), and ‘Umar Hadid, and tens who are not less important than those first generation who made tremendous efforts to establish the group. Afterward, the mission transferred to the 2nd generation who are not less important than the first generation’s leaders. With their military and security expertise, they depended heavily on the first generation’s security and military foundations, and did not put in real effort, as it was conducted by the first generation. They lacked the practical expertise in real action. The sensitive issues came up like the police and the IA and the apostasy of the tribes. They did not study the reasons and the effects of the apostasy or the smell of treachery from the tribal leaders. They had the same problem as the first generation. They controlled al-Qa’im, which was the center of al-Mujahidin until it was controlled by the Crusaders and their followers. The second Generation was assassinated and attacked. The second capital of al-Mujahidin was lost. Then the third generation, who still had the soul for fighting and Jihad, had to take responsibility in al-Gharbiyyah and al-Anbar and the older supporters and Muhajirin (TC: Immigrant fighters) had to be transferred to Emirs and leaders. Those leaders did not have the leadership, military, and security skills of the first generation which did not have the opportunity to use the expertise of the second generation because of the extensive problems and attacks by the Crusaders. They completely depended on the 2nd generation’s foundation and almost controlled the situation…

**End Page**

… And they were able to completely take control of al-Ramadi where they fought courageously in spite of the difficulties that faced them, such as conspiracies, errors (TC: in executing the operation) by some, the increasing changes of tribal position (TC: from the Jihadist) and the gap between the public and the jihadist. Other than the disturbances caused by some entities in deepening the gap between our brothers, the jihadists, and causing the death of many good brothers; also giving leadership to the wrong individuals -- all have contributed to the loss of many towns in al-Anbar to the Apostates, to include al-Ramadi, the center of the Islamic state. Many Emirs have tried to hide their military and security weaknesses by declaring the existence of an Islamic State without paying attention to military and security issues. Many of the Emirs mishandled their authorized powers by the Head of State (TC: Islamic State) and use it for their own benefit and became arrogant. Sectors under the authority of those Emirs had many security breaches; the military activity became very weak under the pretext of the future State’s missions and the supposed right of the soldiers to interfere with the State’s affairs. This caused an increase in number of Apostates day after day in addition to the weak military conduct of the State which created a mutiny among
soldiers. Fuel, food, beverages and dorms were misused which created a problem between the Emirs and their subordinates. Emirs began to give orders for incomplete missions without carefully examining all the requirements as we lost everything in the al-Gharbiyyah (TC: Area within the al-Anbar). Weapons depots were destroyed; manpower was misappropriated; we lost everything because of our neglect for the military work and stopping the desertion of angry soldiers from their units to other units. Hence, Emirs tried to absorb the pressure of soldiers by giving orders to execute incomplete, poorly prepared operations. As a result of the loss of the proper chain of command, soldiers were badly treated and Emirs were busy with caring for munitions depots and trying to avoid creating weak booby traps. They also tried to avoid the same mistake of al-Fallujah and al-Qa'im in which the common mistake of continuous retreats resulted in the change in public opinion after fighters vacated those cities and others joined the enemies. Everybody was disappointed by this situation.

As for those good Emirs who were truly dedicated to their duties, without arrogance and with care for their soldiers, even ceased eating meat in the month of Ramadan and made certain their soldiers ate first.

**End Page**

Page 18

We realized their sincerity in carrying the task, but the fact they faced was stronger and harder to overcome for the following reasons:

1- Lack of military, security and leadership experience to most of this generation and the lack of better qualified and experienced leaders.

2- Confronting more than one front at the same time, the most dangerous and intense of which are the renegade tribes.

3- Lack of intercommunication for providing sector’s necessities and exchanging expertise and various resources in sectors and Governorates.

4- Lack of administration in helping the Emir conducting his responsibilities and the lack of honest counselors in his entourage and companions.

5- Presence of people who discourage, intimidate, and betray as well as the lack of true fighters and Mujahidin available to serve. The Emirs were forced, most of the time, to fill in the gaps themselves.

6- Lack of financial and moral support offered to the sector, the increase of payments due to high weapons prices, the large use of gas because the Emir’s sector’s expanded, and the great number of martyrs and displaced families and their monthly needs.

7- Lack of sufficient fighters supporting, equipment and staff from the State and adequate needs to carry out the task.

8- Lack of security personnel and fighters from the city’s residents and the collapse of the sector’s infrastructure.
9- Defection and evasion of the sector’s Mujahidin from conducting their military and security responsibilities under the pretext of being wanted and not being able to move around.

10- Condemning the Emir of failure in a short period of time and not giving him enough time to finish his task.
11- Binding the Emir by the Wali (TC: Governor) in such a way that he (TC: The Emir) does not have the proper military and security measures that will prevent the sector from being taken over to carry out the task.

12- Lack of communication between those Emirs with the border’s facilitators to provide the necessary supplies. A gap existed between them and their fighters due to the heavy responsibilities on their shoulders.

Concerning the misuse of terminologies, there is no limit:

1- Negatively mishandling the State’s directives by hiding behind critics of the State and by explaining that the critics were such because the State chose them to be responsible and justified their bad behavior. Their repeatedly critical statements are the proof of their mistrust and discontent in the group’s approach.

These types of Emirs are slacking and refraining from fighting the Americans under the pretext of the State’s directions to only fight the apostates. Since fighting Americans at the present stage is “not necessary” because it is first imperative to fight the apostates. Thus, the Crusaders were successful in getting themselves out of the way and entangling the apostates and Mujahidin in a bloody battle, and started expanding their way.

Page 19
And infiltrating within the cities and villages without resistance, they began to have confidence, especially in al-Anbar, due to the lack of confrontations and minimal losses. Those Emirs began promising us the Americans would leave Iraq to justify their repeated pullback positions and recurrent setbacks. The cowardly Americans reached a point with eight of their soldiers, using civilian boats, crossing from al-Shamiyyah to al-Jazirah (TC: most probably in Mosul area), walking the distance of 700 meters and entering, in the daylight, the place of one of the brothers in al-Ballaliyyah area where they bound him, searched his house, and retreated without any resistance. Knowing there are brothers in the villages of that area which is supposed to be under their control, you are aware of those airdrops as well as the ambushes they set against the brothers by using civilian clothes and staying still in those areas in an effort to capture them.

It reached a stage where one of the brothers who was stationed close to one of the IEDs that was originally set to target one of the renegades, saw one of the American’s convoy passing by and did not set off the IED off, and he was later asked about his behavior and he answered, and we wish he did not, that he did not have orders to attack the Americans ????!!!. These kinds of Emirs started setting fear in the hearts of Mujahidin through their description of American airdrops, their air superiority and armored vehicles and Hummers, and that we are lacking the effective weapon for confronting them, to include that we are outnumbered and they are better equipped. As soon as the brother Mujahid hears these words about the Americans, fear starts creeping into his heart, as if the Americans were on foot, and one begins comforting himself with the idea of the
Americans definitely pulling out and no one else being left except the apostates who they will extract from their roots. The confusing mystery, as mentioned by one of the brothers, is that apostates everywhere are moving around, growing in number, becoming arrogant and oppressing without restraint in the western area, and the question is why should they not be fiercely attacked; the simple answer would be that they are under the protection of Americans and they do not move unless they are under their wing. And if they were asked why we did not attack the Americans since they move alone, their answer would be that our main target is to attack the renegades, the American will go out soon and all the harm done to the Mujahidin is from the renegades; this is why they should be destroyed.

Consequently, we did not attack or destroy the ‘Uluj (TC: In reference to the Americans and their allies) or extract the apostates but instead we left the ‘Uluj and their followers united and glorified them in media, as they previously used to do with us, and we exchanged roles in which we became as a regular army and our moves, headquarters, affairs and fighters became known to everyone, and Americans changed into guerillas with their work focused on the assassination of Mujahidin leaders and staff and attacked their groups through sudden airdrops, surprising ambushes, and concentrated strikes, and a series of repeated withdrawals and retreats without counterattack became obvious under the pretext that guerilla war required pull out and counterattack but instead we started running away until we reached a desolate desert. The apostates and the Americans, as a result, started launching their attacks to destroy us. We lost cities and afterward villages, and the desert became a dangerous refuge; we got away from people, found ourselves in a wasteland desert and in a circle in which someone could carry out his task because however he moves, plans, or organizes, he will be turning in a closed circle out of which he should find his way for carrying out his jihadist operation based on proper and Sharia foundation.

**End Page**

Page 20

At the time we reached this situation, the result was that al-Ansari was requested to enter the city and his response would be that he is desperate and known by the tribe and could not enter the city. As a result, the security, military, and Sharia infrastructure collapsed, where most of the western cities became void of security and military brothers besides the religious legislators. They began exchanging the news through the media or through women’s conversations and began thinking of how to acquire gas and repair vehicles when tires are replaced every week because of the distant and rugged roads. In addition, the continuous hibernation of brothers caused them psychological problems, arguments and disagreements, and the trust started to tumble between the Emir and his fighters because of their recurring failure in keeping their promises and not being able to change the situation because of the aforementioned reasons.

The Emir’s supposed reverence from his fighters was destroyed as a result of him sitting with them for several months without having the right authority to make decisions except what keeps his dignity alive as he did not have any of his possessions with him on the ground and lacked military qualifications. They did not consult with his brothers in relation to general issues and single-handedly disposing of money and
vehicles. The number of Emirs increased and every specialty began having its own Emir such as the Emir of Mortars, Emir of Administration, Emir of Booby-trap, Emir of Support, Emir of Gas, Emir of Tents, Emir of Kitchen and the General Emir and his deputy and others that were the reason behind the cessation of reverence from the hearts of the brothers toward their Emirs.

One of the terminologies that was distorted was the “Garrisoning” terminology, where some started giving reasons for sitting without going to battle, preparing for operations or planning to stop the advance of Crusaders and apostates which was a force and great reward. We do not disagree with them about this terminology because it is the excuse of those who cannot do and know nothing; I am talking about the true fighters that are seeking the victory of religion, but those of wrong excuses and false intention. I do not think that sitting behind is considered “Garrisoning.”

Another terminology is the “Second Fallujah and al-Qa’im,” where both battles became the cover for every betrayer that wants to run away. His reasoning is to follow the Emir’s directions and does not want to go into a crushing and destructive battle for the brothers; we need to plan and wait for support from the Emir and plan for future operation, God willing.

In summary, the third generation of Emirs has lost control for the following reasons:

1) Its weakness in military, security and Sharia matters and its dependability on second generation elements.

2) It encounters more than one front at the same time and lacks staff in the field of Jihad.

3) Those Emirs do not have any power on the ground besides the failure of their sector’s infrastructure.

4) Lack of support and self sufficiency that they should be depending on for carrying out the work of jihad in their sectors.

5) Presence of flattery between Emirs, both superior and within the same sector, and applying the commandment, “Ordering honor and forbidding dishonor.” commandment with their superior Emirs or even the Emirs of the sectors.

6) Hiding many facts regarding their sectors; being afraid of giving accounts because of their failure.

7) Failure in keeping their promises created distrust with their fighters.

**End Page**

**Page 21**

8. Many Emirs don’t want to fight and are content with writing a monthly report to the State (TC: The Islamic State) and are not focusing on attacking and utilizing activities against the enemy.

9. The existence of barriers with their soldiers due to the lack of concerns about them and not attaching importance to their conditions. The soldiers in their divisions are isolated in the desert without any advisors.

10. The existence of arrogant Emirs, ignoring rights and truth, refuting advices from his soldiers, and ignoring public complaints.
This general situation made the brothers in a complete isolation from the reality where they’ve been divided into four major specialties:

- Military officer
- Sharia officer
- Administrative officer
- Security officer

The Sharia officer, if he exists, you will see him isolated with his books and computer away from the people and fighters’ reality. In many cases you will see him following the military personnel under the pretext of not knowing the terrain, the nature of the people and of apostate tribes (TC: Tribes which follow the enemy), the benefits and the inconveniences resulted from his fatwa (TC: Advisory opinion), so you will see the Sharia officer isolated and marginalized. On the other hand you will see the military officer attached to security. The military officer can’t plant explosives without security information especially with all these scared, deceptive, hypocritical, and talkative individuals. You will notice that the security officer knows nothing about basic security, it is well known to the public that he doesn’t have the ability to succeed in the security field; he was selected by some brothers. The security officer is usually identifiable with his pistol or his handcuffs. He usually collects information from the general public so you will see that the kind of information contains both worthy and unworthy information from the public’s gossip. The four specialists listed above represent why there is a noticeable delay of military and security operations. Because there is little cooperation between the four elements whether at the ground-level where they work together or at the destroyed infrastructure of the division where there is a need for ground-level tactics, cadre, fighters, safe houses, media isolation, the disconnect affects the whole division. The military officer can’t plan without the security information, the Sharia officer can’t judge the guys without interacting with the public and having a good knowledge of the reality of the environment; the Administrative officer can’t satisfy all needs because of overwhelming past, present, and likely future requests. There is a need for the existence of two or three individuals inside the division who supporter it, and where there is an idea about the sources of financing and the plans of work and the existing capabilities. The Division falls by the fall of these individuals whether they are killed, imprisoned or transferred. The new Amir takes over and tries to manage the Division he will have to start not from where the other Amir left off, but from the perspective of these individuals.

** End Page **
The Military officers found themselves isolated unable to operate without security operations due to the large number of spies, sources and apostates. The Sharia officers went through certain misunderstanding that made them come up with some ridiculous fatwas (TC: Advisory opinion) lack of information or incomplete ideas in many cases, so they come up with these fatwas which have a negative impact on al-Jama’a (TC: The brotherhood or the group of followers). Concerning the security personnel, we can say they lost all security work due to the last war on Hasayybah which complicated the situation due to the tribal issue which made the security officer live in fear because of the increase in apostates, and the lack of safe houses and organized military activities to punish these apostates. The task and the responsibilities on the administrative officer’s task became so difficult because they have to answer all demands, provide safe houses, food, distribute salaries on martyrs’ families, and provide the brothers with food and gas in some distant areas that reach out to hundreds of kilometers sometimes. This situation consumed the energy of most of our brothers to administrative issues. As a result, they abandoned military, Sharia and security activities. In the al-Gharbiyya area. After a year and this area is still without a single Sharia officer, and security officer. The military officer’s weapons are rusty; their bodies are weak due to inactivity, physical, and psychological fatigue. In addition, there is great despair and frustration. What made the situation worse is the inexistence of communication means in the middle of the desert; therefore, if a brother gets sick, it will take him over ten days asking for help in vain. In one of the incidents a brother was lost and did not connect with his group, the administrative officer contacted the brothers in another country, the administrative officer knew the lost one and was able to establish communication with him by his own special communications. This division in that wild land reminds me of the Prophet Muhmmad’s speech in this regard (TC: Hadith referring to Prophet Muhammad’s speech). This truth we are living it in al-Anbar region in general and in al-Gharbiyyah specially where everyone starts doing his own thing without anyone to manage or to control him; the young men disrespect the elders, the soldiers don’t listen to their Amir, the Amir is not taking care of his soldiers, everybody is blaming the other. My heart is crying for this situation, and for my brothers, everybody is feeling the situation of the Muslim world being in this desperate and isolated situation. Oh Allah help us, help your fighter, have mercy on your martyrs, Oh brothers don’t give-up, I see a better tomorrow.

Regarding the financing Issue which is the fourth basic issue of the organization:

** End Page **
We need to identify the sources of income regardless if it was internal or external. Some of these sources of income are:

- Investments of agricultures and livestock which belong to the State (TC: Islamic State)
- Gains from the Apostates and infidels
- Taking control over some of the Apostate’s Areas
- Donations from merchants and donors
- The foreign support from the Central Command of the State (TC: Islamic State)
- The external projects to include manufactories and incomes from hospitals and others.

The first issue which our economy suffers from, in my opinion, is because of the non-centralization of some states’ economy. The non-centralization in the financing created some differences between divisions and states. On one hand, you found some detachments with $2000 of monthly spending, you will see others with only $300 of monthly spending and the reason for that is because some states do have different sources of financing. Some states receive about $5000 a month and it doesn’t need more than $2000 of spending; on the other hand you will see other states which need over $3000 of monthly spending but they receive only $2000 due to the overspending on military activities or for the martyr’s family’s allowances and the large number of the unemployed.

The second economical issue that I would like to mention is to relay on only one source of financing and having in the same time a bad management of financing. We have noticed that many of the groups like the Lebanese Allat Group and the Islamic Army in Iraq base their financing on some countries represented by some well known political or religious figures. These individuals are properly guided by the intelligence services of that country which finance these groups for malicious political reasons which usually end by infiltrating these fighting groups and imposing conditions and restrictions on their leaders leading to its destruction. Pay close attention to this issue and be aware of the proverb “Make your dog hungry and he will follow you”

The third economical issue is bad economic management especially when there are many demands from the fighters for money from the Emirs and ignoring any efforts for self-sufficiency. Brothers start asking for many unnecessary things like soda beverages, clothes and many other things that the brother wouldn’t think about buying it if the money had to come from his pocket. In addition, these bargains are usually neglected and thrown here and there.

** End Page **
Regarding the issue of average citizens, I will say that this is the most dangerous issue because governments will raise and fall based on the sympathizers from the citizens or at least having those citizens in a neutral phase during our battles. It’s very important to notice that we can’t utilize any jihadi’s work in any country without analyzing the population’s structure and looking deep into their social and religious sentiments. Before anything we need collect information about the percentage of workers, religions, sects, ethnicities, political affiliations, resources, the income per capita, available jobs, the nature of existing tribes and clans, and the security problems. It’s impossible for any Jama’ah (TC: Group of brothers) to continue jihad and rule if they don’t analyze the citizens’ structure and know if they will be able to accept the Shari’ah for the long term, and live this life and the after-life in this manner. Iraq went through many battles and coups starting from the fall of the Ottoman Empire going through the embargo, the infidel Ba’ath, and Sufi disbeliever. It’s hard to find a good believer who is not imprisoned or wanted. Most of the citizens are just agents, spies, what’s left from the Ba’athists; and the rest of the unbelievers and seculars living outside Iraq under the umbrella of the opposition. What we have to do is to focus on the popular class who believes in Allah or at least ready to adopt the Tawhidi concept (TC: belief in Allah and obligated to His rules on Earth). Regarding the moderate class of people before the fall of the regime, they were Sufis, unbelievers supporting Wali (TC: a Sufi leader) as if he were Allah. On the other side we have the dirty Ikhwan (TC: Referring to the Muslim Brotherhood group), they call for political participation and try hard to join the parliament; they disrespected the values of Islam. There are other criminals who the only thing they know from Islam is its name, the only thing they know from the Koran is its design and they are calling to join the brotherhood under the pretext of “the ends justifies the means.” After the fall of the Ba’athist and the occupation of the crusaders, Allah opened the doors for jihad; however this jihad wasn’t pure; so we start seeing many flags and many groups, each individual start calling for jihad and to fight the crusaders, but Allah wanted for his true Mujahidin the believers in Allah’s doctrine. Many others with contradictory ideas and had other interests behind this jihad; they went for jihad based on tribal or patriotic believes. We start seeing a lot of groups diverting from the real jihad for Allah and for His religion. Many others start showing enmity towards the Mujahidin muwahhideen (TC: Based in Tawhidi concept which means believing in one God). The crusaders seized the opportunity to divide the Mujahidin by using sources and spies, and by bribing tribe leaders to go against the Mujahidin. ** End Page **
The enemy Crusaders exploited the opportunity to segregate the united Mujahidin and segregate them from interacting with the general population by recruiting some of the general population against them and encouraging them to spy against them (the Mujahidin) in the name of national interest. The enemy also was able to initiate conflicts between tribes, ally with some tribal leaders and tempt them with money. The enemy applied the "Carrots and Sticks" method against the population by conducting random arrests and raiding civilians' houses then compensating them with money and condemning the terrorists, bad sheikhs, and outlawing tribal leaders for causing the damage. All of the above has reduced the number of the Mujahidin sympathizers. Due to actions taken by the enemy against the families of the remaining number of the Mujahidin supporters, such as arresting family members, money confiscation, and killings, the supporters began to fear joining the Mujahidin and securing safe houses for them which confined the Mujahidin organization shelters and safe houses within the western area in the villages. The Mujahidin used various local individuals within these areas for their supplies. A local person, whose name is not to be mentioned for security measures, facilitated the following for us (Mujahidin):
- Provided a shelter for the Mujahidin, fighters, and suicide bombers
- Provided storage for our weapons and ammunition at his farm
- Provided a place to assemble VBIEDs
- Utilized his house as a meeting place for Mujahidin and as an initial take off point for VBIEDs
- Mounted rocket launchers and zeroed snipers' rifles
- Utilized his house to set up "Shari'a Court" to resolve various internal conflicts (TC: Internal Conflicts between the Mujahidin)
- Facilitated the transport supplies from the surrounding cities
- Sheltered and fed suicide bombers without asking for money

The individual was only paid 300 USD for his outstanding effort in helping us (Mujahidin) and procuring our needs. The individual substituted his farm work time to slaughter sheep and cooked them to feed us and I was a witness to all his effort. The individual became angry with the Mujahidin for neglecting security measures, such as frequently visiting his house and drawing attention by parking their cars outside his house, and also asking his young children to let them into his house during his absence. The above negligence to security measures led to an American raid against his land, the burning of a VBIED, and destruction of exposed ammunition depots. The individual also received threats from Al Bu-Mihil tribe to search his house and assault his daughters should they confirm his association with the Mujahidin who withdrew to the desert area without apologizing to the individual for the damage they have caused.

When we (Mujahidin) reached the desert, we found help from another local villager whose effort was no less than any typical villager's conduct (TC: According to the writer, the villagers were known for their kindness and generosity). All the family members became soldiers for the country (TC: Islamic Country) even though they were just simple villagers and do not have the necessary training. Five of the family members who were collaborating with us (Mujahidin) were detained due to the negligence of security measures by the (Mujahidin), frequent car traffic of the Mujahidin, the increased Mujahidin demands from them, and recruitment of some the
of the family's young members to cover for the Mujahidin. None of the Mujahidin apologized to the family for the harm they caused the family except for the Emir of the sector who offered to pay whatever he was capable of paying to free the family's household and his brother.

**End Page**

Page 26

How do we expect to win the locals' trust if they do not receive the same treatment that they offer us?

First aid and medical treatments
The idea of first aid and medical treatment is still not a well-developed idea in many states, which, as a result, led to many deaths among the Mujahidin; additionally, many Mujahidin were detained in general hospitals while receiving treatment or during the Americans and apostates' raids on these hospitals.

As for the armament collaboration field, there is rarely any coordination found between the states and the sectors for exchanging and supplying weapons, which resulted from not having a distribution center to account for the ammunition and review the supplies needed for every state as previously brought to your attention in the review of the economy and money distribution.

Applying Shari'a law is facing a problem as well, which appears weak and unaccounted for due to the lack of available Shari'a preachers and lack of coordination between the Shari'a preachers and Media Shari'a preachers.

As for the proposed solutions to solve the Anbar, and especially the al-Gharbiyyah areas, they are primarily instituting Shari'a laws rather than military and security solutions. We thought it could be better to avoid conflicts over principles between many brothers, especially the supporters. As a result, for selecting Shari'a solutions, we had to indicate the general Shari'a laws to the brothers, especially to the Gharbiyyah residents as follows:

Solutions from the Shari'a

The Methodology for an Islamic Militant

1. Behavior, worshiping, contemplating, pondering
2. Shari'a Dogmatic Understanding, especially the Shari'a politics and "Devised Jurisprudence"
3. Pragmatic Understanding of the Shari'a (Understanding of the Islamic movements, Revolutions, and invasions)
4. Other Studies

First, to deal with faith in theory and in practice, through teaching our brethren the principle of, "There is no God but Allah," to focus on the issue of Loyalty and disavowal, "Obedience and Allegiance," and to use kindness with our soldiers brothers and teach them truthfulness in their speech and actions and to trust in God.
and predestination, and to love the prophet by following his example and be patient in following his footsteps.

To teach the following rules by adhering to the orders and avoiding the prohibited that we may face in the land of Jihad.

Page 27
1- If you see that stinginess is being adhered to, seduction is followed, the world influences people and everyone is sticking to his own belief, then mind your own business and veer away from the public's affairs.
2- If incompetent individuals were in charge, then wait for the Day of Judgment when an unqualified Emir takes charge.
3- If you did not keep the trust, then wait for the Day of Judgment.
4- Follow your Emir's orders even if he flogged your back and took your money.
5- O Allah, if the ruler of my nation was cruel, may you be unkind to them.
6- O Allah, I take refuge in you from the lack of confidence and the fornicator.
7- Had they intended to set forth with you, they would have prepared themselves for it, but Allah detested their zealouosness, and held them back.
8- Why do you say what you never do?
9- Go into them through the gate, and if you enter you shall surely be victorious. In Allah put your trust, if you are believers (TC: The latter part of verse 23 – Chapter 5 of the Quran).
10- Do not think of those who rejoice in what they have brought and love to be praised for what they have not done (TC: the first part of verse 188 – Chapter 3 of the Quran) a person rejoicing without sacrifice is akin to someone who is wearing two gowns of falsehood.
11- If you start your morning, don't think about the evening, and if you are in the evening don't think about the morning.
12- Give your love to whomever you wish, for you may not see him again.
13- Conquest with the good and the fornicator -- a novel by Abu- Muhjan al-Thaqafi (T.C: An Islamic hero during the early era of Islam) -- Allah will make this religion victorious over people with no morals.
14- An Individual must stop rumormongering and secrecy will help achieve your goals.
15- Do not be fooled by a pompous individual before knowing him closely (A saying by 'Umar may Allah be pleased with him).
16- I am not a fun of Husk and it is not deceiving me -- Once bitten twice shy.
17- Believers are faithful, hypocrites are manipulators, and the Muslim is a brother to the Muslim, he does not do him injustice nor does he hand him over nor let him down and blood for blood and destruction for destruction.
18- The Prophet's, may peace be upon him, devotion to Ra'al, Dhakwan and 'Asiyyah and His revenge for the death of his messenger, al-Harith Bin 'Umair al-Azdi, as he mobilized the army of Mu'tah and his crying on the martyrs of Uhud.
19- Many a small band has, by permission of Allah, vanquished a mighty army (TC: part of verse 249 – Chapter 2 of the Quran) and in the battle of Hunayn, when your numbers were pleasing you, they availed you nothing (TC: part of verse 25 – Chapter 9 of the Quran) and we are not fighting people by numbers or weapons.
20- Do not be like those who disbelieve and say of their brothers when they journey in the land or go of to the battle, ‘had they stayed with us, they would not have died, nor would they have been killed’ (TC: part of verse 156 – Chapter 3 of the Quran) and who said to their brothers and they themselves had stayed behind, ‘had they obeyed us they would not have been killed’ (TC: first part of verse 168 – Chapter 3 of the Quran) and wherever you are, death will overtake you (TC: part of verse 78 – Chapter 4 of the Quran) and it is not for any soul to die except by the permission of Allah a postponed book (TC: first part of verse 145 – Chapter 3 of the Quran.)
21- If you help Allah he will help you and strengthen your feet (TC: first part of verse 7 – Chapter 47 of the Quran) and if you turn away he will replace you with another nation (TC: latter part of verse 38 – Chapter 47 of the Quran) and He can put you away if he will and bring into being a new creation (TC: latter part of verse 19 – Chapter 14 of the Quran) and Allah knows those of you who slip away surreptitiously so let those who disobey his commands be aware, lest they are struck by sedition (TC: latter part of verse 63 – Chapter 24 of the Quran)
22- Avoid brutality; brutality is darkness and fear the prayer of oppressed even if he had been an infidel.
23- If you were in charge one day, say not, “I am the one,” but rather say, “there is an overseer observing me.”
24- Be patient, and remain steadfast; fear Allah, in order that you will be victorious
25- Ask Allah if in need and depend on him for help.

**End Page**
26- They set themselves; act good when people are acting well and don't do injustice if people acted bad.
27- Allah will give his mercy to a person who is not causing problem when he talks; better yet, his silence would deem him a winner.
28- Don't make false praise, it is like slaughtering.
29- Don't get angry and he was not getting angry for himself.
30- Do not be dubious, it is the worst account.
31- Kind acts will prevent wrongdoing.
32- You are not true believers unless you have mercy to each other…..mercy to the community
33- Don't help the devil against your brother.
34- Stick with the group since the wolf can only eat the separated sheep.
35- Remember Allah during your good times, he will remember you during your hardship.
36- Allah favors the type of work that involves continuity even if it is small.
37- Allah likes someone's work that is done accurately.
38- Don't admire someone's work until you see how it ends up.
39- A person who is pleased with Allah’s response during hard times needs to boost his prayers during his good times.
40- A person who is performing good deeds for the rest of his life will be forgiven for his past misdeeds, but a person who is doing badly for the rest of his life, will be held accountable for both his past and the rest of his life.
41- Do not exceed the proper bounds and even if it is a stick that I am looking at.
42- My Allah, who can change the hearts; continue keeping my heart faithful to you and if we had not strengthen you, you would have been very slightly inclining towards them.
43- My Allah, had it not been for you, we wouldn’t believe nor do charity or pray.
44- You are not helping people with your money, so help them with your ethics.
That was all I was able to mention regarding the rules and Shari'a law which should be studied and practiced with examples from actual reality. We should also lay out Islamic law courses to teach on various levels and classes; for example, to be composed of three levels that every one of our brethren who is a subject of the Islamic State must be familiar with at least the following:

Faith:
The meaning of "Allah there is no God except he," the requirements, terms and contradictions.
The meanings of faith, certainty, depending on God, trust in God and accepting the destiny.
The meaning of patience, fear, hope, devotion, straightness and adherence.
The meaning of obedience, allegiance and disavowal.

Quran:
Second: Memorizing the following verses: al-Fatihah, al-Mu'awwidat, al-Kursi, the end of al-Baqarah, from al-Zalzalah to the end of Juz' 'Am a (TC: they all denote verses of the Quran)

Recitation of the Quran:
Third: Knowing the procedures of cleanliness, Tayammum (TC: cleaning for prayer where there is no water available), prayers, and the procedures of Jihad.

**End Page**
Prophet Biography:
Fourth:
Brief lessons about practically applying the Prophet Muhammad’s line of conduct, specifically battles and jurisprudence in real life.

The Prophetic Hadith:
Fifth:
Memorize the three Prophetic Hadiths of Gabriel, Ikhlas (TC: Faithfulness) and the Halal and the Haram (TC: the Permissible and Forbidden). It is mandatory for every soldier in the Islamic State to memorize those three Hadiths. It is the responsibility of the attached units, contingents and companies to see to it the adherence to this rule in addition to the following rules:

1- Do not stay late after night prayers except for lessons or for a next-day jihadist mission.

2- Night guards must get incentives for doing overtime assignments while those who fail to perform their duties will face disciplinary actions.

3- No sleeping in attached dorms and rotations should be done regularly. Sleeping should only be limited to bunkers and trenches.

4- All should awake at the first call for prayers, no one is exempt unless for official reason, in order to start pre-prayers supplications and recitation.

5- After prayers, a 40-minute recitation should take place.

6- All should adhere to brushing teeth, the morning prayers, and glorification of Allah.

7- All should adhere to the prophetic doings, such as sleeping after ablution and practice the morning, evening, sleeping and awakening supplications.

8- All should clean their weapons at least once a week; do not see others unless for official reasons and be cautious when carrying weapons.

9- All should adhere to the daily 5-minute sports exercise unless exempt for permissible reasons.

10- Take the opportunity of gatherings to address religious words to others.

11- All should be reminded of the importance of being kind and helpful to each other and avoid having gangs and factions unless for the purpose of a mission or duty.

12- All Emirs should meet weekly with their respective soldiers, listen to comments made by soldiers, and have one-and-one meetings.

13- All should fill their times with useful Islamic behavior.

14- Establish a code of conduct for behavior among soldiers and or guests.
15- Pay more attention to worshiping, obedience, and operations security.

Remedial Action for Security Personnel:

1- Provide security and religious lessons for security personnel.

2- Distribute security pamphlets for all attached dorms addressing the use of vehicles, communications, and transportation.
3- Pay more attention to the public and use them as eyes, especially among youth and women after training them to on security awareness.

4- Pay attention to training on how to collect and relay information. Categorize the information into four categories:
- Confirmed information: Conforms with relevant situation, verified with other trusted sources
- Possible Information: Conforms with relevant situation, comes from a single source or a number of unvetted sources
- Doubtful Information: Conforms to relevant situation, came from a single trusted source or a number of unvetted sources and contradicts previous information
- Fake Information: Information that does not conform to a certain situation and also contradicts previous information.

5- Characteristics of Analysts: Experience, acquaintance with the surrounding area, community, honest, attention to small details, broad imagination and perceptive.

6- Carry out assassinations by using silencers, poisons and explosives. Seeks advice from religious officials to assess the possibility of collateral damage in certain special operations which may turn risky.

**End Page**

Page 31

7- Use awards and incentives in assassinating the Heads of the Apostates and for those who provide tips on the movement, locations of those Heads.

8- Carefully review the security pamphlet distributed in al-Anbar which contains forty articles addressed to security personnel.

9- Use loyal physicians working in private hospitals where Heads of the Apostates are receiving medical treatment. Physicians can use injections filled with only air on those Heads in order to kill them. Contaminate wells with poison in areas where those Heads are residing only after consultation with religious legislators.

10- Pay more attention to the Thuraya phones and the use of wireless, and other means of communications.

Remedial Action for Economic Strategy:

1- Be acquainted with the economic strategy, capability and requirements of each group.
2- The centralization of all funding, usually achieved by deferring all major incoming finances to the Head of the State (TC: Islamic State)
3- Invest the capital in different projects which will return revenues to the state
4- Any group should use the least financial resources, at least in the beginning, while using funds in different projects.
5- Distribute money in an equitable manner to personnel and remind them to use it well as it is belongs to Muslims. Asset are only for military, security and religious.
6- Limited Financial resources, less than a thousand (TC: Possibly in USD) can be used by the respective Emirs, while financial resources exceeding a thousand (TC: Possibly in USD) should be notified to the Wali by the respective Emirs (TC: Head of the Islamic State).
7- Avoid unnecessary spending in consumables, such as fuel, cars, ice.
8- Use proper spending in on military and security issues including training camps.
Remedial Action for Military:
1- Endeavor to have books on armed forces, especially translated books as they contain
genuine and precise translated information.
Military work is divided into two lines:
  1st Line: The line of confrontation and combat, also to be known as the heart.

Page 32
2nd line: Line for mobilization, such as readiness and work in industrialization (TC: 
improvising), armament, media and management.
Work in the city is divided into four parts:

  1- Command
  2- Security intelligence group, aim to gather information
  3- Preparation Group
  4- Carry out group

2-Military personnel are divided into contingents supplied with cars, weapons, fuel and
cameras to be located in towns for carrying out military tasks and to make available weekly
reports on results of operations conducted. Care is given to contingents according to their
efforts in tasks.
3- Invent new methods in the contingents' tasks, such as assigning groups for engagement,
supply mines, air defense, snipers, assassinations and improvising explosives. Each group
should have its own way to conduct operations based on available circumstances. In case the
enemy is localized in base, the Support Group should bombard and compel the enemy to
react in large numbers of tanks and hummers. The Mines Group should start killing them and
as the enemy air power starts to create air cover, then the Air Defense Group should make
aircraft ambushes inside bushy areas. When the enemy starts to re-assemble in main streets,
the snipers should eliminate them and force them for surrender or retreat to reorganize
themselves. Again here the militants should strike these forces and force them to retreat to
bases.

How to form a Unit for management responsible for the Da'wah (TC: Call for Islam or
enjoinment) and Committees Organization:
Objectives:

  1- Set necessary plans that would inflict great damage on the enemy and compel it to
     retreat to its bases.
  2- Exploit and put into consideration the plans provided by Emirs (TC: Group Leaders)
  3- Consolidate the spending for Da'wah by assessing the needs of every Group Emir. A
council should be formed to be responsible for the appropriation of money needed by
every State, Sector and Group.
4- Build an integrated communication and morale among all Emirs and Soldiers by discussing and solving any problematic issues while avoiding the discussion of major issues outside this framework.

**End Page**
To set the religious approach as the essential judicial tool that must be fair, impartial, broad-minded and poised.

Its Future Goals:

1. To pick the fruits of jihad through intensive Islamic missionary work and the planting of a generation characterized by faith, seriousness, military discipline and devotion to Allah by means of upholding Islam’s religious rituals.

2. To set off military activities and to build up security imperviousness.

3. To stamp out the traitors, the hypocrites, the languid and to bear down heavily upon them so that to force them out of the State (TC: the Islamic state)

4. To set the standards for the conduct of the state’s post-war affairs, be it financial or economic, to launch the country’s reconstruction phase. The dilapidated homes, in particular, the upholding of what is just in accordance with the law and to focus on the people’s abilities, experiences, and qualified workforce capable of undertaking the state’s key organizations.

The needs of Mujahidin:

1. To pray that they may be rendered victorious, steadfast and to be able to cement the Islamic state and obliterate the idols of present time.

2. To support them with financial aid to enable them to purchase weapons, ammunitions and to supply the warriors, the media personnel, the clerics and security personnel with all their needs. To lead our brethren to the sites that have arms, weapons depots, and heavy weapons.

3. To secure a mobile wireless telecommunications network and to exploit the internet as a media outlet as well as satellite channels to target audiences overseas.

4. To secure loyal physicians to work in hospitals domestically or overseas and also to serve as mobile units with the soldiers during war time. To set up mobile hospitals that consist of ambulances and trailers used as surgery rooms that are outfitted with the most advanced equipments.

5. To pay ransom to secure the release of prisoners.

6. To designate a portion of overseas donations to provide for the children and the families of the martyrs and prisoners as well as allocating a part of the food donations to support the residents of those villages and towns that have suffered as a result of the war and jihadist effort.

7. To designate salaries, food supplies, fuel, clothing, and administrative support for the families of poor combatants, in particular, the displaced and the homeless.
Functions of the Proselytization and Organization Unit or al-Shura Councils (TC: Consultative Councils):

1. To work towards exploiting imams, tribal chiefs, and prominent physicians, teachers and engineers to have them recruited to work for the state indirectly and covertly.
2. To designate imams to covertly and openly incite their congregations to present religious classes to the public, to write reports on bad and languid clerics that would ultimately lead to them being punished. Likewise, for the physicians to render free medical service twice a week and to extend discounted fees to those in need as well as al-Mu’alafat Qulubihim (TC: Consoling hearts was a rule, during the early days of Islam when it was weak and during a time when a portion of the alms was paid to the poor new converts so that they did not waver in their new faith) They would be required to present the idea that supports the Islamic state and its warriors.

3. To focus on rhetoric that targets the public, be it religious or military with an emphasis on the importance of offering solutions to the people’s problems and such rhetoric is based on five principles (TC: Only four are presented):

   - Objective
   - Content
   - Style
   - Method of delivery

4. To groom the Emirs (TC: spiritual leaders) once they are pre-screened from among individuals with leadership qualities who are religious and loyal to the state and its leadership and who should be indoctrinated on the worldwide religious combat school of thought that would cover all fields such as religion, military, politics and leadership through courses in theory and in practice. They should be involved with a hands-on experience along with the leadership from which to learn.

5. To push al-Ansar (TC: the supporters) together with the countrymen into a long-term battle with the crusaders and the apostates by taking an advantage of the elderly (TC: the older fighters), the experienced and the old hands in jihad.

6. To gather all qualified workforce to learn from the experiences of others as a minimum in order to utilize their knowledge in latter stages. To identify their skills, locations, and areas of expertise as well as their problems and how to look after them and to assemble individuals who would benefit from them through courses in theory and in practice.

7. To refrain from turning the state into a formal one and to ensure that the statehood is void of bureaucracy in all its administrative affairs.

8. To use the principle of greed and fear and to hold all leaders and soldiers accountable for dereliction.
9. To set up general training courses in all fields, levels and specializations through various phases and levels of which the first level must be mandatory to all participants of the security, religious, military and organizational courses.

10. To focus on the right approach and elect a group of our brethren who would infuse it appropriately into the hearts of other brethren and the public.
11. To connect the proselytization and coordination unit with the governors, the sector emirs, the military, religious and propaganda emirs in addition to overseas communications through those manning the borders so as to enable us to coordinate with the coordinators and the merchants for the sake of the Islamic state.

12. To emphasize the principle that states, “Let responsibility make the manager.”

13. To pay attention, as much as possible, and to take advantage of the experiences of theorists, historians and analysts, especially those who were involved in extensive jihad experiences with the likes of Doctor Ayman, Sheikh Abu--Mus’ab al-Suri and others.

14. To make optimum use of the sensitive qualified individuals who, when utilized suitably, would move the group quality steps forward, such as those brethren who live in America and who could be recruited to carry out terrorist attacks inside the United States or to strike its interests; therefore, the proselytization and coordination unit must be made well aware of the magnitude of such an issue through which military and political situations could be resolved quickly.

15. Establish the spirit of one team and build the team effort through the leader and soldiers to allow every soldier his importunacy toward the team through the camp’s training and joint missions.

16. Exchange or replace the Amirs who issued wrong decisions that had personal or ideological affect on the group. As an example, any important decisions by an Amir made without referring to the State or the proselytization and coordination must be held accountable. Plant the idea that obeying the State doesn’t necessary means to stay within it infinitely and this obedience doesn’t obligate the obedient to abide to less credited person or to someone whom used to be a previous enlisted under his command. They must be reminded of the Prophet’s action when he replaced one of the Amirs in charged of the city to a young man who has not yet reached his eighteenth birthday during one of the most dangerous battle and military decisions that Muslims experienced. Also the decision by Umar to excommunicate Khalid and replace him with Aba Ubayda while Khalid returned to the back lines like any other regular soldiers. This was done without him creating any sediton or objecting to the order or issuing orders behind Abu Ubayda’s knowledge and Umar May God rest their Souls.

17. Eliminate destructive and cowered thoughts and expel those who hold such a thought by holding them accountable and limiting them by creating and building a spirit of hope and trust for the leaders and soldiers. They must be reminded to be cautious of the enemy without fears, rather trust without pride. Experiments must be conducted through illusory ambushes and captive trainings to find the inhibitor from the fearful in battles.
18. Prohibit discussions of sensitive Sharia subjects including matters of general mistakes (not private subjects) to be discussed in general settings. Also discussions of organizational matters such as speaking badly of others groups that leads to sedition.

19. Make the soldiers adapt to honesty with their Amirs and use the method of paper and pen of submitting complains by writing down any obstacle or problems in front of the accused ones and documents the complainer’s issue and details to confirms its accuracy; thus, limit its discussion among general settings.

20. Make the soldiers adapt constructive criticism method by offering their opinions in all areas and welcome it warmly. Implementing good ideas and reward its originator.

21. Reshape coordinators and border’s facilitators. Force them to abide to the State’s guidance such as passing the publications to new personnel at the Land of Jihad, follow the guidance precisely and hold accountable those who exploit finance and staff members under the State’s name for the interest of some sector’s commanders without informing the proselytization and coordination department of such an act.

22. Deploy the soldiers Muhajirin or Ansar regardless if they are fighters, suicide bombers or a staff member according to the need and of the area requirement with that person without concretion of the new brothers.

23. Refuse the acceptance of any suicide bombers unless the military Amir has submitted a request to the Wali (TC: Governor) and the sector’s Amir of his need for a suicide bomber. And that his plan of executing the mission is complete while his soldiers are ready for it. The mission must have a preparation time of less than a week due to the suffering the suicide bomber experience because of the long wait. Waiting for months in an environment of conflicts and low faith can lead the suicide bomber to change his opinion to become a fighter or return to his homeland.

24. Contact the border facilitators and coordinator to provide technical materials such as computers, advanced cameras, communication system, GPS and other requirements that is not available in the Land of Jihad. Bring medicines and rations by appointing some brothers outside the land to receive contributions for the people of Iraq.

25. Distribute brochures among the coordinators and border’s facilitators to familiarize themselves with the difficulties that face the road to Jihad emphasizing that it’s a road of blood, captivity and not just a phrase. Distribute CDs that teaches Sharia rules of Kafir (TC: Wrong and unbelieving), faith, obedience and loyalty with warnings of chauvinism penance and actual malignant.

26. Make a gradual withdraw of Ansar coordinators and replace them with Muhajirin brothers or exceptional brothers particularly those who ran away from the Land of Jihad without an order.

27. Warnings of security infiltrations that might occur through coordinators from the intelligence community or by someone who enter through a referral without personal knowledge of that person’s background and motives by the coordinator who must have security and Sharia’s credibility.
28. Concerning the Cadres, suitable environment must be prepared or the materials that they need to initiate their jobs regardless if it’s in the technical, electronically, military or Sharia’s field. Assist them with their specialty and provide them with the required continuous and developing support.

29. Put out the sedition fire that America is igniting between the Mujahidin through convergence with their leaders and personnel and treat other group’s members respectfully so they can be utilized and exploited in the future by joining the State and unite the line through meetings of legitimacy and Sharia debates and exchanging views for the purpose of convergence.

30. Considerably direct the tribal issue in the right path through wining the tribal leaders with gifts and visits and extending forgiveness when possible and exploit their sons to dismiss the abhorrent tribal spirit by teaching them loyalty. Particularly the vital personnel within the tribe and be cautious of the unplanned security issues that leads to sedition which doesn’t serve the Mujahidin.

31. Identify the principle of a group in a simplified method that fits with the general minds through using the five basic principles of speech. This can be conducted with cassettes and CDs when available and use emotional convictions method and outreach assistance to the public with distress

**End Page**
against the apostates, and to publicize this through the television and the newspapers and the Takfir (TC: Declaring those Muslims of opposing point of view as infidels), as is the practice of al-Rafidah (TC: Shi’ites) our brothers have not shown up but to shed their blood for protecting the honor of the Sunnis and to aid the Iraqi people.

32) To refute the dubiosity of the detractors and disseminate it among the public, and to systematically react against the originators of heterodoxy of the un-Islamic parties, such as the un-Islamic party and others of the Accordance Front (TC: a Sunni political bloc), and have them distributed, together with flyers, CDs and cassettes that reveal their malice in what they say and do, to imams and tribal chiefs.

This is related to the general remedies that could be applied to Iraq as a whole. On the other hand, as for those remedies applicable to the Western Governorate, al-Qa’im in particular (may Allah establish his Shari’a in there), the issue of qualified individuals and suicide bombers and implicate them in a situation, such as the one in al-Qa’im, would be deemed a waste of the best of our cadre without yielding a good return. This is due to, as we previously mentioned, the collapse of the sector’s infrastructure, the combatants’ morale, the problems the Emirs suffer due to the lack of adequate support, the enormity of their responsibilities with no one around to rescue them, not to mention the intensity in exaggerating retreat and the decline of morale that the Ansar combatants are suffering from, for which, I would mention, the practical solutions on hand that would allow us to liberate Husaybah and turn it into a much better place than its former condition. I would conclude my statement on the Western Governorate, in which I suffered as my other brothers did, by providing serious practical solutions to have the town liberated, the apostates defeated and the morale of combatants boosted; therefore, I would say, as Allah is grantor of success, the following:

There is no doubt that the recent battles that our brothers in the Western Governorate had embarked upon, took its toll out of our qualified personnel in confronting the apostates; together with the fact that the town is in shambles, this caused our brothers to abandon their positions and retreat. The state of lawlessness, which occurred when the Ansar combatants were in control, in addition to the series of withdrawals and the enormous problems that took place as a result of unqualified individuals being at the helm of leadership, as well as the exhaustion our brothers suffered from that led them to leave the town for Syria, or the villages, and then on to the desert -- all of which incapacitated and demoralized the fighters who went through a state of apprehension and anxiety when it comes to combat. Therefore, many fighters turned to administrative work that led to decline in morale of our brothers to fight. When they pursued solutions for the Governorate, the results were ineffective due to the lack of knowledge on the true nature of the Governorate’s woes as our brothers dispersed across a vast area of land and led them to entangle a vicious circle without any progress in sight. This was compounded by a state of demoralization and apprehension that caused our brothers to fear a confrontation with the apostates, a time when the pessimists were not in short supply, the lack of telecommunication networks, and the collapse of the security apparatus due to the weariness of all our brothers who were not prepared to enter the town, not to mention the lack of adequate basic supplies. All this contributed to the condition that we are going through which
resembles, for the most part, the situation in al-Ramadi with some differences in that the timeline of the fall of al-Ramadi and that of al-Qa’im’s are not the same and considering the tribal diversity of the latter and the combative spirit that, by no means, had diminished. al-Ramadi’s fighters were determined to liberate their town and the State (TC: the Islamic state) was concerned about such cause that became abundantly clear during our brothers’ recent offensive that devastated the apostates’ morale and boosted that of the Mujahidin. The public played a role when they all, without exception, went out to meet and greet the Mujahidin who belong to the Governorate. As for Husaybah, what I envision, and Allah knows best, is to get all the homeless brothers out of al-Anbar desert that surrounds Husaybah who do not exceed hundred individuals and have them assigned to the hot sectors, such Diyala and the outskirts of Baghdad, to have their morale boosted and their will to fight re-energized. Giving the option to transfer, for those who opt to do so, and allowing those who wish to stay to remain in the region. A roster is to be drawn, listing all the names of those combatants who have a real desire and the will to fight, for there is no use of going astray in the desert, wasting money on fuel, vehicles, food and beverages. We would bring in five groups of specialists in the field of support and provide them with full and complete supplies of mortars and rockets by forcing all governors to donate a number of rockets, bombs and mortars for the Western Governorate. We would reinforce the bombs with chemicals so that to shell the positions of the apostates and bombard al-Qa’im for one month and we would bring in our media personnel, along with their full gear of computers, cameras, printers, audio and video tapes, to cover the events by threatening to obliterate the apostates so as to demoralize them and to break their will to fight and so as to boost the morale of the fighters by showing films and parades and have them distributed to the masses under the title they are coming. We would develop the editing during the continuing assault, giving the apostates an opportunity to leave town. Following that month of retreat and abandon, the brigades of sordidness, or else it would be the slaughter; the killing and expulsion await them.

We should reach out to the public with the films to distribute them among the community and the apostates alike to foster the public’s morale and have this news disseminated nationwide in Iraq with an emphasis on the Mujahidin, the Western Governorate fighters, who were assigned to the Governorate during that period, in particular. We would try to rent houses in Husaybah for families of our elderly brothers to carry out security penetration and surveillance, to monitor the events closely, to gauge public opinion, to encourage the good people and the supporters to clandestinely host the Mujahidin once they enter the town, to report the heads of apostasy and the members of the brigades sordidness, to report information on their movements, their homes, places where they congregate and to allow a group of security personnel who would not exceed fifteen men entry to carry out covert assassination attacks against the heads of apostasy; the likes of:
Basim al-Radi (Bu-Mahal)
Samran Mikhlif (Bu-Mahal)
Muhammad Husayn al-Shufayr (Jughayfi)
To provide the security personnel with the most advanced toxins, wireless equipments, methods of ambush and IEDs against the heads of apostasy and to have them assassinated by delivering well-manufactured car bombs. During that period of time, following a month or two, and having prepared the public with the continued shelling, the State will prepare for the grand conquest by drawing the loyal fighters of Husaybah, who have unquenchable desire to liberate Husaybah, and the same is applicable to our Muhajirin brothers who were among the early combatants to fight in Husaybah or at its outskirts risking their lives to conquer the town and who also managed to bring a big cache of IEDs, sniper rifles and RPGs into town. They managed to get our brothers in to help conquer the town as well as an easier target, such as the town of al-'Ubaydi, following which the town was liberated. Working groups were implanted within the town at the heels of the killing of the apostates, the bombing of their homes and their expulsion from the town, and afterward we look forward to the future and contemplate how to deal with it. We ask Allah the Almighty; Lord of the throne to **End Page**